which Herman Zeigler failed to account did not, it is said, come to his hands as receiving teiler of the savings department of the bank, or in the performance of his duties as such; but they came to his hands while he was temporarily performing the duties of another office. But this bond is not conditioned that he shall faithfully perform the duties of any other office, or account for moneys that might come to his hands by virtue of any other trust; and his sureties can not be supposed to have contemplated when they undertook to be responsible for his conduct as receiving teller of the savings department, that they were making themselves responsible for his conduct in some other position, to which he might be assigned, and of which the duties might be different and the responsibilities greater. This, in short, is the argument for the defense. Abstractly considered, this argument is undeniable. The sureties upon an official bond undertake for nothing which is not within the letter of their contract. The obligation is strictissimi juris ; and nothing is to be taken by construction against the obligors. They have consented to be bound to a certain extent only, and their liability must be found within the terms of that consent. Paw Paw v. Eggleston, 25 Mich. 36, 40; Detroit v. Leadbeater, 20 Mich. 24; Johnston v. Kimball, 39 Mich. 137; Bullock v. Taylor, Id. 187; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; State v. Cutting, 2 Ohio, 1; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Weonston v. State, 73 Ind. 175. This is familiar law, and rests on sound reason. But has this law any application to the facts of this ease? The judge of the Superior Court thought it had, and turned the case out of court. We are not satisfied he was correct in this. The bank, it appears, was one which had two departments; a savings department, and a commercial department. It had for both one cashier and one general teller; and the money does not appear to have been kept separate, but was brought daily into a common fund. The receiving teller was subordinate to the general teller, as well as to the cashier. The exact duties of the receiving teller of the savings department do not seem to have been particularly defined, except as the designation of the office would define them, or as they would be indicated by the condition of the bond. He was to be responsible for all such sums of money, property and funds as the cashier might place in his hands as such teller, and also for all such other money, property and funds as might otherwise come into his hands as such teller. His duty was to account faithfully for all these. When the teller should stand at his desk and receive savings deposits, he would of course receive them as receiving teller; and it might also be said that he would receive them because they were placed in his hands by the cashier, who, as chief financial officer of the bank, had placed him at that post. But if the defense is correct in the view taken of this officer's duties, it is not very manifest that the cashier could have had any oc casion to intrust him with moneys otherwise. He simply received what was paid in, and handed it over to the general teller. What occasion could have arisen for putting other moneys into his hands as receiving teller merely? But we think this view is too restricted and narrow. Every such appointment is made with the general course of business in such institutions in mind, and it must contemplate that what is customary will take place. If it is customary for one officer to assist another when the need arises, we must assume that he expected to render such assistance, and that by implication he undertook to do so as a part of his official duty. And if he was bound to have this understanding of his undertaking and his duty, his sureties were bound to have the like understanding. The number of officers of a bank will vary with the extent of the business and with its needs. There may be only a president and cashier, but there will commonly be a teller, and there may also be a vice-president, assistant cashier, one or more assistant tellers, and such number of book-keepers, messengers and other assistants as the business may require. When a cashier and a teller are sufficient for all the ordinary needs of the bank, is a cashier performing an official act when, in the temporary absence of the teller, he steps to the teller's place and receives a deposit? Or is the teller acting outside his duty when, under corresponding circumstances, at the cashier's request, he answers the ordinary calls at the cashier's table? We think not. We think any such interchange of assistance as temporary need may require, is fairly within the contemplation of any appointment to such a place of the undertaking in accepting it, and of any official bond that might be given by the appointee. If this were not so, every officer in a bank would require an assistant, or the business of the bank would come to a stop whenever temporary illness or any necessity whatever should, for any time however short, take him from his desk. We agree entirely with the defense that it is not legally competent to impose new duties upon an officer to the prejudice of his sureties, but we do not think such a temporary assignment is a case of that nature. The officer is merely giving the temporary aid which must have been contemplated in his employment; and if he were to refuse to give it when having no better reason than that he did not consider it a part of his business, he would have been likely to be regarded by his superiors as altogether too unaccommodating for their purposes. It would not be too much to expect a dismissal under such circumstances. We need not say whether a dismissal would be strictly justifiable, for we do not think the needs of this case require a decision upon that point. It is enough in this case to note that Hermann Zeigler did not refuse. As receiving teller of the savings department he was called upon to take the place of the general teller temporarily, and he took it and received moneys which he embezzled. The moneys were confided to him by the cashier, because of his being such receiving teller, and because in the opinion of the cashier, which Zeigler himself did not contest, it was proper that he should receive them under the circumstances. They therefore came to his hands, because of his office and under circumstances justifying their heing confided to him as such. The cases of Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Rochester City Bank v. Elwood, 21 N. Y. 88; and German-American Bank v. Auth, 87 Pa. St. 419, are in point. The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial ordered. The other justices concurred. Appeal from an order appointing a receiver The parties agreed that the appeal might be taken within twenty days from the date of the order, and the transcript was filed within that time, but not within the ten days allowed by law taking appeals in such cases. It is not competent for the parties to a case to extend by agreement the time within which an appeal may be taken to this court. But aside from this the bill of exceptions was not filed within the time allowed for that purpose. The bill was signed by the judge, but was not filed within the time given. It was filed within the term at which the order was made, and as a rule a bill so filed will be presumed to have been filed within the time allowed, but this presumption can not be indulged when the record affirmatively shows what time was granted and does not show a further extension. The appeal is dismissed. Flory v. Wilson, S. C. Ind., Octo ber 25, 1882. The 2. CONTRACT-ENTRY OF LAND-PAYMENT OF TAXES. A firm of bankers agreed with a man to enter land which they would sell him at $1.35 per acre any ́ time within six months, or $1.50 per acre within one year."' Soon after they paid the annual taxes on the lands, and when they came to sell they added the amount to the agreed price. purchaser paid it under protest, and afterwards sued to recover it back. Held, that as the firm were entitled to keep their title or their security good by paying the taxes and were not bound to determine the legality thereof at their own risk, they could maintain an equitable action for the amount so paid, even though the contract purchaser had not agreed to repay it. Where a party -sues for the repayment of money paid under pro test, and the defendant claims the money under color of right, as having been paid out by him for plaintiff's benefit, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that defendant has no right to it; and if he does not do so the question of the admissibility of the receipt taken by defendant, in proof of his payment, becomes immaterial. Congdon v. Preston, S. C. Mich., October 11, 1862; 13 N. W. Rep., 516. 3 CRIMINAL LAW-ALIBI-RAPE-INSTRUCTIONS. On a trial for assault with intent to commit rape," where the defense was an alibi, an instruction by the court to the jury that it is recognized in the law that the defense of alibi is one easily manufactured, and jurors are generally and properly advised by the courts to scan the proofs of an alibi with care and caution," when in another part of the instructions the jury were advised that a charge of this crime was one easily made, hard to prove, but still harder to be defended, even by the innocent, and they should not suffer their indignant feelings to control or influence their judgment when considering such cases, but they should bring to the consideration of the evidence in the case their cool, deliberate, dispassionate judgment alone," was held not to be erState v. Blunt, S. C. Iowa, October 5, 1882; 13 N. W. Rep., 427. ror. 1. A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and where there are no corroborating circumstances it is the duty of the court, as a matter of law, to instruct the jury to acquit. 2. The evidence of an accomplice, standing alone, is not entitled to any weight and should not be considered by the jury. 3. Evidence tending to support the statements of an accomplice, is competent and should be permitted to go to the jury. 4. Before a jury can consider the evidence of an accomplice, as a factor in the problem of guilt or innocence, they must first determine that the other evidence heard proved the ex. istence of corroborative facts. Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky. Ct. App., September 12, 1882, 4 Ky. L. Rep., 182. 5. CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-RESISTING Officer. In action against defendant charged with wounding a peace officer, while attempting to make an arrest without a warrant, and upon information that a felony had been committed by the parties sought to be arrested, it is competent to prove the declations of persons present at the time of the arrest and indicating the persons supposed to be guilty, in order to show that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a felony had been committed. Werner v. Commonwealth, Ky. Ct. App., September 26, 1882, 4 Ky. L. Rep., 203. 6. CRIMINAL LAW-PERJURY-DELIBERATION. Where one cautioned beforehand on a point to which he knew he was called as a witness, notwithstanding the caution, persists in the oath, there is such deliberation about it that it can not be said that the jury did not have sufficient evidence that he swore deliberately to a statement absolutely false; it being sufficiently shown that the facts sworn to did not exist. Knight v. State, S. C. Ga., Octo ber 17, 1882. 7. CRIMINAL LAW-WHAT AMOUNTS TO BURGLARY. If two men conspire to open a window and enter a sorte, and one opens it in part, and leaves it thus, standing a short distance off, and the other hoists the sash high enough to enter, and does enter except his lower limbs, and then is seized, and if it be done with intent to commit a larceny, both would be guilty of burglary. Cooper v. State, S. C. Ga., October 17, 1882. 8. DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. Where A sells B his stock of goods, good-will, etc., in a certain business, and agrees not to carry on a similar business in a certain city and for a certain time, stipulating that in the event of a breach of his contract he will pay to B $2.000, which is to be liquidated damages:" Held, that on a breach of the covenant B can recover the sum stipulated as liquidated damages. Newman v. Wolfson, S. C. Ga., October 17, 1882. 9. DESCENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS-"NEXT OF KIN." The phrase "next of kin" includes such persons as are entitled to inherit the personal estate of a deceased person. Under our statute of descent and distribution, a husband does not inherit his wife's personal estate, and is therefore not the next of kin. Warren v. Engelhart, S. C. Neb., October 3, 1882, 13 N. W. R., 401. 10. DIVORCE-ALIMONY TO THE PARTY IN FAULT. Alimony is rarely and only under peculiar circumstances granted to the party in fault in a divorce suit, even when the party is the wife; and in this case, under the facts developed by the evidence, the allowance of alimony to the husband was improper, although an attorney's fee of $25 might have been allowed; but such fee will not be made a lien upon the homestead of the wife. Barnes v. Barnes, S. C. Iowa, October 5, 1882, 13 N. W. R., 441. 11. DIVORCE-CONDONATION. In a divorce suit, if a husband is shown to have been guilty of such inhuman treatment that the life of his wife was in danger, it is no ground for a new trial that her relatives actively interested themselves in procuring and aiding the divorce proceedings. The fact that the wife lived with and "cooked and washed' for the husband until the decree was rendered, should not be considered as condonation. Harnett v. Harnett, S. C. Iowa, Oct. 3, 1882; 13 N. W. Rep., 408. 12. DIVORCE-MOTION FOR ALIMONY-QUESTION AT ISSUE. The inquiry in applications for alimony is, what is the husband's ability to support his wife, as she had been accustomed to live with him; the merits of the libel for divorce are not then to be passed upon. It was error to hear testimony on the part of defendant in error on the question of the husband's pecuniary condition, and refuse to hear evidence on the same question from the other side. Jenkins v. Jenkins, S. C. Ga., Oct. 17, 1882. 13. EQUITY- JURISDICTION - ACCOUNT -PART OF PROFITS AS COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYEE. Where an employee of a firm is to receive a certain sum per year, and one-half of the net profits of a certain branch of the business, as compensation for his services, a court of chancery will have jurisdiction of a bill by such employee for an account of the partnership, for the purpose of ascertaining the profits of such business, although the complainant is not a partner. Channon v. Stewart, S. C. Ill., September Term, 1882; Reporter's Advance Sheets, 103 Ill., 541. 14. EQUITY JURISDICTION · INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN NUSIANCE-ULTRA VIRES. The information alleges that the defendants were doing and contemplating acts that if carried out were not only ultra vires, but would result in a public nuisance, to-wit: They were digging a weil into which to drain the water from a pond, the effect of which would be by lowering the water of said pond, to impair its usefulness for fishing and boating, and to have exposed decaying vegetation, slime and mud, to the detriment of the public health. The defendants demurred to the information on the ground of a want of equity jurisdiction, and on other grounds. Demurrer overruled. Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., Sept., 1882; 1 Am. L. Mag., 308. 15. EVIDENCE CHARGE. ACCOUNT BOOKS LUMPING 1. A lumping charge in a book of original entries is not competent evidence. 2. The charges, to be admissible, should be sufficiently specific and itemized to enable the correctness of the charges to be tested. Corr ". Sellers, S. C. Pa., Oct. 2, 1882; 39 Leg. Int., 374. 16. EVIDENCE- INDECENT ASSAULT CHARACTER OF PLAINTIFF. A sued B for an indecent assault, laying her damages at $5,000. Her bodily injuries were trifling. Held, that the gravamen of her charge was the mental and moral outrage. Held, further, that evidence was properly admitted, showing her to be unchaste in character, conduct and reputation. Mitchell v. Work, S. C. R. I.; March Term, 1882, R. I. Index, 22. 17. FRAUD-REPRESENTATIONS AS TO ONE'S CREDIT. Trespass on the case can not be sustained for fraudulent representations as to one's pecuniary circumstances; as when the defendant obtained goods by representing that he had a contract to deliver wood on the railroad; that it was to be paid for soon; that the avails should be given to the plaintiff, when he had already promised, and afterward assigned the same to another party. Best v. Smith, S. C. Vt., 1882, Reporter's Advance Sheets. 18. GUARDIAN AND WARD-LENDING WARD'S FUNDS ON PERSONAL SECURITY-APPEAL. 1. A guardian, if he acts with due care, prudence, diligence and good faith in loaning the funds of his ward, is not liable for a loss caused by the bankruptcy of his borrower, although he takes only his note, without other security; and this is so, although he loans money of his own to the same party, and receives but one note running to himself. not as guardian, as evidence of both debts. 2. Distinction between permanent loans for income, and temporary loans of current funds in small sums. 3. The guardian is allowed his expenses of appeal. Barney v. Parsons, S. C. Vt., 1882. Reporter's Advance Sheets. 19. HUSBAND AND WIFE-BOND OF-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND. A husband who executes the bond accompanying the mortgage of his wife to a building association, is liable on such bond, although he received none of the consideration, and although his wife is not liable on the mortgage by reason of her disability incident to coverture. Wiggins Appeal, S. C. Pa., October 2, 1882, 13 Pittsb. L. J., 92. 20. HUSBAND AND WIFE-GROUNDS FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. Where a wife, after making several groundless charges against her husband, and subjecting him to vexatious suits for divorce, and after having lived away from her husband for a long time, suddenly returns to his house, and without retracting any charges which she formerly made, or expressing a desire to live with him, as his wife, in peace and harmony, demands the right to remain and is refused, she can not make such refusal, under the circumstances, the basis of a proceeding for separate maintenance. Jenkins v. Jenkins, S. C. Ill., September 27, 1882, 15 Chi. L. N. 49. 21. HUSBAND AND WIFE-JOINT SUIT. A husband and wife sued jointly upon a promise to pay them jointly for services performed by them jointly. Held, that they were rightly joined as plaintiffs. Hopkins v. Angell, S. C. R. I., June 17, 1882, R. I. Index, 67. 22. HUSBAND AND WIFE - SEPARATE ESTATEWORDS TO CREATE. 1. Where property is bequeathed to a married woman, it is necessary, in order to exclude the marital rights of the husband, that an intention on the part of the testator to vest in her a separate estate should appear so clearly as to be beyond the reach of reasonable doubt. 2. It is not necessary that the words "sole and separate estate' should be used for that purpose; but in the absence of words of equivalent import, or provisions that exclude the marital rights of the husband, or give the wife powers concerning the property inconsistent with the disabilities of coverture, the rights of the husband will attach. Vail v. Vail, S. C. Errrors Conn., 1882; 14 Rep., 489. 23. MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVANT'S TORT-MASTER'S LIABILITY. The act of an employee of a railroad company, in removing a trespasser from a train, can not be considered the act of the company, unless he was employed generally to remove trespassers, or specifically to remove the particular trespasser. An employer is liable for the torts of an employee only where they are committed in the course of his employment; but an employer is not liable for a wilful injury done by an employee, though done while in the course of his employment, unless the employee's purpose was to serve his employer by the wilful act. Where the employee is not acting in the course of his employment, the employer is not liable even for the employee's negligence, and the mere purpose of the employee to serve his employer has no tendency to bring the act within the course of his employment. Marion v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., S. C. Iowa, Oct. 4, 1882; 13 N. W. Rep., 415. 24. MASTER AND SERVANT-WHO IS A FELLOW SER VANT. A boy about seventeen years old was employed as brakeman by the engineer of an ore train. The engineer had power to employ and discharge brakemen, and the boy was capable and experienced in the business. The engineer directed the fireman to back the locomotive upon a side track to the train, and told the brakeman to attend a switch. He himself went to attend another switch further on. While this was being done, the bell and whistle of a train on the main track near by were both sounding. The first switch was passed and the engineer was about throwing the second when he heard an outcry and saw the brakeman under the locomotive. The brakeman died in a few minutes of his injuries, and his administrator sued the railroad company for the injury. It was proved that the brakeman knew the train was about mov ing back and that there was room enough for him 25. NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ALIGHTING FROM STREET CAR. The court can not rule that when a street car had stopped or was about to stop at the signal of an alighting passenger, another passenger who wished to alight at the same time was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in not giving notice of his wish. When such other passenger, in alighting while the car was stopped or about stopping, was injured by a fall caused by the acceleration of the car's movement: Held, that the question of his contributory negligence was rightly left to the jury. Rathbone v. Union Ry. Co., S. C. R. I., July 7, 1882; R. I. Index, 98. 26. NEGOTIABLE PAPER-PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN INDORSEMENT. Parol evidence is admissible to prove, when one, who is not a party to the note, although the owner, indorses his name in blank, that it was agreed that he was not to be liable unless the purchaser should return the note on his failure to collect it at maturity. Brewer v. Woodward, S. C. Vt., 1882; Reporter's Advance Sheets. 27. NEGOTIABLE PAPER-UNCERTAINTY. A promissory note omitted to state the amount in writing, simply being for blank dollars, but stated at its head $200 in figures. Held, that the figures in the margin were no part of the instrument; were a mere memorandum; and could not supply the blank left for insertion of the amount the maker agreed to pay; and there could be no recovery on such a note. Hollen v. Davis, S. C. Iowa, October 5, 1882. 13 N. W. Rep., 413. 28. SALE-BILLS OF LADING WITH DRAFT ATTACHED -CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT. Where property is sold and bills of lading are received, which, being attached to a draft for the price, are negotiated, the question whether the consignee is entitled to the bills upon acceptance of the draft, will depend upon the intention of the parties to sell on credit or not. If the sale was on credit, the consignee is entitled to the bills, but not so if the sale was not on credit. Security Bank v. Luttgren, S. C. Minn., August, 1882, 14 Rep., 498. 29. USURY-VOLUNTARY PAYMENT. The payment of a promissory note, governed by the law merchant, to an innocent indorsee is not a voluntary payment, and usurions interest included in such payment may be recovered of the payee of the note. And this is true where such note was given in renewal of prior notes bearing usurious interest, if the usurious interest was carried forward and embraced in the last note. Such note is tainted with the accumulated usury of the entire series, and if, by a transfer of that note to an innocent indorsee, the maker is deprived of his right of recoupment, he may recover of the original payee the sum in usury which he has been compelled to pay. Where a payment is made upon such note, the holder can not apply it to the usurious interest and thus bring it within the rule of voluntary payments. Brown v. Lacy, S. C. Ind., Oct. 24, 1882. QUERIES AND ANSWERS. [*** The attention of subscribers is directed to this department, as a means of mutual benefit. Answers to queries will be thankfully received, and due credit given whenever requested. To save trouble for the reader each query will be repeated whenever an answer to it is printed. The queries must be brief; long statements of facts of particular cases must, for want of space, be invariably rejected. Anonymous communications are not requested. QUERIES. 42. 1st. The statutes of Kansas, sec. 8, ch. 33, Gen. Stats. A. D. 1868, provide, viz.: One-half in value of all real estate in which husband had interest during marriage, and which had not been sold on execution, and not necessary for payment of debts, and of which wife has made no conveyance, shall be set off to her under direction of probate court, etc. 2d. Dower and curtesy are abolished by sec. 28, ch. 33 same statute, but husband and wife each have the same right in deceased partner's estate, i.e., the rose will smell as sweet by any other name. 3d. A owned land, conveyed part to B; wife did not join in deed to B, but subsequently conveyed, by ordinary deed, the same land to C, and C conveyed to B, 4th. A conveyed part land to D; wife did not join, but subsequently conveyed to D by ordinary deed. 5th. Subsequently A died. Wife claims dower in entire tract. 6th. Her attorney theorizes as follows: 1st. Dower exists in fact, as treated in text-works, and that this estate has all incidents of it. 2d. That the conveyance above referred to by wife to cut out dower, must be (1), made in connection with husband; (2), if not so made, contain apt words to release dower, and that an ordinary separate deed before death does not bar dower. "KANSAS." 43. B contracts to furnish materials and construct the buildings on a certain fair ground owned by a corporporation. B is to receive $12,000 for the material and labor, $1,000 of which is to be in stock of the company at par. On the 1st of each month the architect is to make an estimate of the materials furnished and labor done, and the company agrees to pay B ninety per cent. of these estimates within three days after the completion of the estimates. The company has failed to pay any of these estimates on time-the last one is six weeks past due. The company has offered to give B certificates of stock. B refuses to accept. The company elected B a director, but B refuses to qualify and has never met with the shareholders as a shareholder,but has given verbal permission to a stockholder to vote his shares. 1. Can B now rescind the contract and collect for labor done? 2. Can the company compel B to accept the twenty shares before they are paid up, and then assess him on them? 3. If B fulfils his part of the contract, notwithstanding the laches of the company, can he avoid taking the shares, and file lien for full amount due and unpaid? W. & W. Topeka, Kan. 44. Is a railroad company bound to carry a passenger the reverse way on a ticket; for instance if I hold a ticket from A to B, and I get on the train at B to go to A, and offer this ticket for my passage, and the conductor refuses to accept it, and denounces me as a fraud, and stops the train and forces me off, is the company liable for damages. J. T. A. RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE. SCHOULER'S DOMESTIC RELATIONS. A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations; Embracing Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward, Infancy, and Master and Servant. By James Schouler. Third Edition. Boston, 1882: Little, Brown & Co. This work, the first edition of which was printed in 1870, has, in spite of one or two inconsiderable blemishes, steadily won its way in professional favor, until it is as "familiar in their mouths as household words," and deservedly ranks as almost a standard treatise. It has the quality, which is unique among modern law books, of being at once practical and elementary, calculated to mete the needs of both the busy lawyer, who needs only a direction to the authorities, aud of the student, who seeks to acquire the principles of the legal science. It will be readily perceived from the topics treated, that the matter must have been considerably condensed in order to come within the boards of a seven-hundred page volume. And this is specially true of the subjects of Husband and Wife and Infancy. This condensation has been faithfully done by actual compression, rather than by the excision of important matter, and it consequently follows that one of the chief excellencies of the work is that it treats systematically and thoroughly, although briefly, a wider range of topics than any other work upon cognate subjects. The mechanical labor of reference to the volume is considerably facilitated by the adoption of section headings set in bold-faced type, which is an innovation upon the typography of the former edition, and a valuable one. MODERN JURY TRIALS. Modern Jury Trials and Advocates, Containing Condensed Cases, with Sketches and Speeches of American Advocates; The Art of Winning Cases and Manner off Counsel Described, with Notes and Rules of Practice. By J. W. Donovan. New York, 1882. Banks & Brothers. This volume treats of the oratorical aspect of jury trials, and can not, therefore, be with strictness called a law-book. For although oratory is an embellishment to the acccomplished lawyer, and a valuable addition to his arsenal, it can not in any sense be said to be a necessity to him. There are many good lawyers, some of them of the class called jury lawyers, who are guiltless of the faintest impregnation of that divine afflatus, which is the gift of the gods to the orator, no less than to the poet. And yet it can not be said of the orator as of the poet: "Nascitur non fit." For while no one can "make," i. e., teach an orator, he may, and frequently does, to great extent, teach himself. It is inseparable from the oratorical temperament, that its fortunate possessor should be quick to take a hint, to learn from the experience and methods of others. |