trial at law, owing to public excitement and danger, George v. Tutt, 36 Mo. 141. See Coffee v. Nealy, 2 Heisk. 304; Harvey v. Seashol, 4 W. Va. 115; or, an epidemic, Townsend v. Branch Bank, 9 Ala. 120; or, threats of bodily harm, Duncan v. Gibson, 45 Mo. 352.

Because a third person stated to complainant that he had arranged the matter with, the plaintiff below, who afterwards took a judgment by default, Gamble v. Campbell, 6 Fla. 347; Walker v. Shreve, 87 Ill. 474.

JUDGMENT.

Because entered by confession in vacation, contrary to the statute, De Riemer v. Cantillon, 4 Johns. Ch. 85.

Because entered on a motion, after the expiration of the statute allowing such entries, Turpin v. Thomas, 2 Hen. & Munf. 139. See Joseph v. Burk, 46 Ind. 59.

Because entered for more than was due the plaintiff therein, Greames v. Strithe, 2 Dick. 469; Goolsby v. St. John, 25 Gratt. 146; Rust v. Ware, 6 Gratt. 50; Woods v. Macrae, Wythe, 253; King v. Vaughn, 8 Yerg. 60; Benton v. Roberts, 3 Rob. (La.) 224; Palmer v. Malone, 1 Heisk. 459; Stinson v. Hill, 21 La. Ann. 560; Yantis v. Burdett, 3 Mo. 457; Bank of Tennessee v. Patterson, 8 Humph. 363. See Jones v. Neely, 82 Ill. 71; Scriven v. Hursh, 39 Mich. 98; Babcock v. McCamant, 53 Ill. 214; Hodges v. Planters Bank, 7 Gill & Johns. 306; Chase v. Manhardt, 1 Bland, 533; Blizzard v. Bross, 56 Ind. 74.

Because entered on bonds issued under a law admitted to be unconstitutional, Cassel v. Scott, 17 Ind. 514. See Reeves v. Cooper, 1 Beas. 223; Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 346; Thomas v. Philips, 3 Sm. & Marsh. 358; Green v. Robinson, 5 How. (Miss.) 80.

Because by default against a corporation without an inquiry, contrary to the statute, Boyd v. Chesapeake Canal, 17 Md. 195.

Because entered against only one of two defendants, Robb v. Halsey, 11 Sm. & Marsh. 140; Caldwell v. Stephens, 57 Mo. 589.

Because entered against an executrix individually, Glenn v. McGuire, 3 Tenn. Ch. 695; Leonard v. Collier, 53 Ga. 387.

Because entered at a wrong term, Shricker v.. Field, 9 Iowa, 366.

Because destroyed by casuality, Garrett v. Lynch, 45 Ala. 204. See Scott v. Watson,3 Tenn. Ch. 652; Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 652; Cyrus v. Hicks, 20 Tex. 483; Chambers v. Warren, 6 B. Mon. 244; 6 Cept. L. J. 101.

Because entered before the return day of the summons, Davis v. Staples, 45 Mo. 567.

Because a justice of the peace rendered a judgment "by default," Hunter v. Hoole, 17 Cal. 170. Because rendered against the defendant "et al.," and at chambers, and not in term time, Sanchez v. Carriaga, 31 Cal. 170.

Because there is a variance between the bond and the warrant and their recital in the judg

ment confessed thereon, Marshall v. Hart, 4 Minn. 450.

Because signed at chambers without complainant's consent, Rust v. Faust, 15 La. Ann. 477.

Because entered against a firm after the death of one partner, Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 280, 322.

Because not entered by a justice until the day after the verdict had been rendered, Stokes v. Knarr, 11 Wis. 389. See Wiley v. Southerland, 41 Ill. 25.

Because given against a garnishee, although no proceedings had been taken against the defendant beyond serving him with process, Earl v. Matheny, 60 Ind. 202.

Because founded on a British debt, which, by statute, was uncollectible, Terrel v. Dick, 1 Call, 546.

Because a debt was divided so as to give an inferior court jurisdiction over two actions thereon, Pryor v. Emerson, 22 Tex. 162.

Because the damages in a judgment by default in tort are excessive, Walker v. Shreve, 87 Ill. 474; Smith v. Lowry, 3 Mon. 420. See Anderson v. Fox, 2 Hen. & Munf. 245; Lewis v. Wyatt, 2 Rand. 44.

EXECUTION.

Because the property levied on had been released by a written agreement between the parties, Kendall v. Dow, 46 Ga. 607.

Because after two abortive attempts to claim a homestead exemption, the sheriff refused to entertain a third, which was correct in form, Platt v. Sheffield, 63 Ga. 627.

Because plaintiff promised the defendant, who was a surety only, that he would issue no execution against him, if he (the defendant) would make no defense to the action, and afterwards issued it, Mitchell v. Boyer, 58 Ind. 19.

Because, by agreement, a judgment was to be paid within a specified time, and the plaintiff issued an execution before the expiration thereof, Anamoza v. Wurzbacher, 37 Iowa, 25; Hibbard v. Eastman, 47 N. H. 507.

Because more than one was issued, irregularly, Wagner v. Peques, 10 Rich. (N. S.) 259; Elliott v. Elmore, 16 Ohio, 27, Gregory v. Ford, 14 Cal. 138; Laselle v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 226. See Williams v. Wright, 9 Humph. 493; Huntington v. Bell, 2 Port. 51; Edgar v. Clevenger, 1 Gr. Ch. 258; Babcock v. McCamant, 53 Ill. 214; Yantis v. Burdett. 3 Mo. 459.

Because the judgment was obtained against the sheriff for the proceeds of a sale, which had been afterwards set aside for his false return, Tutt v. Ferguson, 13 Kan. 45.

Because only three days notice of the seizure of lands was given, whereas defendant was entitled to five, Morgan v. Whiteside, 14 La. 277.

Because no judgment had been obtained, Laselle v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 226.

Because defendant died before the test of the writ, Shottenkirk v. Wheeler, 3 Johns. Ch. 275;

Perkins v. Bullinger, 1 Hayw. 367. See Meek v. Bunker, 33 Iowa, 169.

Because a ca. sa. issued for a fine and costs without a fi. fa., Atty-Gen. v. Baker, 9 Rich. Eq. 521. Because a sci.fa. after a ca. sa. was returned at a wrong term, Nicholson v. Patterson, 6 Humph.

394.

Because never legally levied, Baine v. Williams, 10 Sm. & Marsh. 113.

Because the sheriff made no report of sale under a foreclosure, Rogers v. Holyoke, 14 Minn. 220.

Because issued more than ten years after the judgment had been recovered, contrary to the statute, Hanson v. Johnson, 20 Minn. 194.

Because several lots of land were sold together instead of separately, Cavenagh v. Jakeway, Walk. (Mich.) 344.

Because it had no seal, Jilsum v. Stebbins, 41 Wis. 235.

Because issued for a sum larger than the judgment, Ibid.; Barrow v. Robichaux, 14 La. Ann. 207; Walker v. Villaraso, 26 La. Ann. 42; Robb v. Halsey, 11 Sm. & Marsh. 110.

Because possession had not been delivered, by the sheriff, under a hab. fac., although his return so stated, Baker v. Morgan, 2 Dow, 526.

Because the value of the property seized exceeded the justice's jurisdiction, Davis v. Staples, 45 Mo. 567; Saunders v. Albritton. 37 Ala. 716. See Breckinridge v. McCormick,43 Ill. 491; Stroud v. Humble, 1 La. Ann. 310.

Because the defendant is misnamed, Wilton Town Co. v. Humphrey, 15 Kan. 372.

Because issued on a docketed justice's judg ment, which is void on its face. Gates v. Lane, 44 Cal. 392; 49 Cal. 266. 1

Because issued in the name of an administrator, on a judgment recovered by an intestate, without a sci. fa., Ammons v. Whitehead, 31 Miss. 99; Egbert v. Mercer, 66 Ind. 305.

Because the lands levied on and threatened with sale had not been appraised, Robinson v. Chesseldine, 5 Ill. 232.

Because defendant's personal property had been seized without exhausting his lands, Farrell v. McKee, 36 Ill. 225.

Because the sheriff threatened to apply the proceeds of sale to satisfy junior liens on the lands sold, Chittenden v. Rogers, 42 Ill. 95.

Because defendants had agreed as to the portion of the judgment each would pay, Skinner v. Barney, 19 Ala. 698; Knight v. Cheney, 64 Mo. 513. See Thompson v. Nat. Bank, 106 Mass. 128. Because the judgment had been reversed, Fahs v. Roberts, 54 Ill. 192; McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 187. See Goodwin v. Williams, 5 Grant Ch. 178.

Because issued prematurely, Dayton v. Commercial Bank, 9 Rob. (La.) 17; Lasalle v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 226; Sowle v. Pollard, 14 La. Ann. 287. Because the return of the advertisement and sale of lands was irregular, Wilson v. Miller, 30 Md. 82.

Because the return stated that the sheriff had levied on part of a tract of land, Waters v. Duvall, 6 Gill & Johns. 75; 11 Id. 37; Nelson v. Turner, 2 Md. Ch. 73.

Because issued before the entry of a remittitur below, after an appeal, Savoie v. Thibodaux, 29 La. Ann. 511.

APPEAL.

Because a valid judgment had been affirmed on void appeal, Boone v. Poindexter, 12 Sm. & Marsh. 640.

Because the justice left the State three days after the trial before him, and did not return until after the time for appealing had elapsed, Smith v. De Lashmutt, 4 Mo. 103.

Because the judgment was rendered more than thirty days after the trial, instead of within three days, whereby complainant lost an appeal, Sauer v. Kansas, 69 Mo. 46.

Because pending one writ of error another had been issued, and the judgment affirmed thereon, McClune v. Colclough, 6 Ala. 492.

Because a judgment had been prematurely affirmed, McCollum v. Prewitt, 37 Ala. 573.

Because an appeal on a mechanics' lien does not qualify it as notice to a purchaser under a subsequent judgment, Julien Gas Light Co. v. Hurley, 11 Iowa, 520.

Because complainant's counsel took an appeal, when an application for a new trial was proper, Yancey v. Downer, 5 Litt. 8; Richmond R. Co. v. Shippen, 2 Patt. & H. 327.

Equity has interfered, in the following in

stances:

Where four jurors testified that they would not have found any damages in an action of slander, but for the impression that their opinions were governed by the majority, Cochran v. Street, Wythe, 133. See Sumner v. Whitley, 1 Mo. 708.

Because a court of law refused to open its judgment, in order that the defendant therein might set up usury in the instrument on which the judg ment was founded, Wistar v. McManes, 54 Pa. St. 318; Fanning v. Dunham, 5 Johns. Ch. 122; Hill v. Reifsnider, 46 Md. 555.

Because commissioners appointed by the orphans court, under a testator's direction, to assign a widow's dower out of several lots, erroneously assigned it out of only one lot, Baynard v. Norris, 5 Gill, 468. But see Pardue v. West, 1 Lea, 729. Where, by a mistake in printing the record of the court of appeals, establishing a will, the will is changed so that a conditional devise is given absolutely, the person affected thereby not having been a party to the suit, Byrne v. Edmonds, 23 Gratt. 200.

Because the judgment was rendered for too small an amount-even after satisfaction, Barthell v. Roderick, 34 Iowa, 517; Partridge v. Harrow, 27 Iowa, 96; Cohen v. Dubose, Harp. Ch. 102; Chapman v. Hurd, 67 Ill. 234; Gump's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 476; Vilas v. Jones, 1 N. Y. 283; Wilson v. Boughton, 50 Mo. 17.

Where a judgment in ejectment had been re

covered against complainant, because the clerk's certificate of the record of complainant's deed was October, 1823, instead of October, 1822, as, in fact, it should have been, Hiatt v. Calloway, 7 B. Mon. 178. See Munroe v. Eastman, 31 Mich. 283; Musser v. Hyde, 2 Watts & Serg. 314.

Because a sheriff, by mistake, attached lot 268 instead of 287, Wardlaw v. Wardlaw, 50 Ga. 544; Robins v. Swain, 68 Ill. 197. See Corles v. Lashley, 2 McCart. 116.

Because notice of the judgment was not given to the defendant therein three days before issuing execution, as required by statute, Lapene v. MeCan, 28. La. Ann. 749; Greene v. Johnson, 21 La. Ann. 464. See Walker v. Villaraso, 26 La. Ann. 42.

Because the plaintiff had promised to suspend or forego proceedings at law, but nevertheless took judgment, Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill. 385; Brooks v. Whitson, 7 Sm. & Marsh, 513; Huggins v. King, 3 Barb. 616; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Webster v. Skipwith, 26 Miss. 341; Pelham v. Moreland, 11 Ark. 442; Purviance v. Edwards, 17 Fla. 140; Stanton v. Embry, 46 Conn. 65, 595; Bresnehan v. Price, 57 Mo. 522; Cage v. Cassidy, 23 How. 109; O'Neill v. Browne, 9 Irish Eq. 131; Gainesborough v. Gifford, 2 P. Wms. 424; Gillett v. Booth, 6 Bradw. 423; Gibby v. Hall, 12 C. E. Gr. 282. But see Butman v. Forshay, 21 La. Ann. 165; Marsh v. Lasher, 2 Beas. 253.

Because after a summons had been returned non est, as defendant therein knew, the plaintiff persuaded the sheriff to alter that return without defendant's knowledge, Chambers v. Handley, 4 Bibb. 284.

Because an execution had been levied on assets here in the hands of a foreign administrator, no administrator having been appointed here, Grant v. McDonald, 8 Grant Ch. 468.

Because the judge before whom an application for a new trial had been made, was, by reason of sickness, unable to determine it within the time limited by law, Leigh v. Annor, 35 Ark. 123.

Because a judgment in a suit against an alleged firm was rendered against one who was not a partner, nor served with process, Purviance v. Edwards, 17 Fla. 110; Campbell v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 324.

Because there was no real plaintiff, and no notice, Nicholson v. Stephens, 47 Ind. 185.

Because a school teacher recovered a judgment by consent for compensation as such, without having produced a certificate as required by statute, Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170.

Because the verdiet was obtained on the testimony of one witness, whose answer was afterwards clearly contradicted in equity, Verdier v. Hume, 4 Hen. & Munf. 479. See Vaughn v. Johnson, 1 Stock. 173; Peagram v. King, 2 Hawks, 605; Burgess v. Lorengood, 2 Jones Eq. 457; Croft v. Thompson, 51 N. H. 536.

Because a judgment in ejectment had been recovered against complainant, because the surveyor's certificate, by mistake, recited that complain

ant's survey was made by virtue of entry 964, instead of No. 946, the true number, and there was, at the time of the trial, no official to give complainant a correct copy of the survey, Wilson v. Kilcannon, 1 Overt. 201.

Because the judgment was obtained by the sheriff's false return of a summons, Owens v. Ramstead, 22 Ill. 161; Jones v. Neely, 82 Ill. 71; Hickey v. Stone, 60 Ill. 458.

Because a judgment was affirmed through the judge's mistake in wrongly dating the bill of exceptions, Kohn v. Lovett, 43 Ga. 179. But see Ford v. Weir, 24 Miss. 563.

Because the summons was served on an agent of a corporation, who was not the proper official, Southern Ex. Co. v. Croft, 43 Miss. 508; Grand Tower v. Schirmer, 61 Ill. 106; Chambers v. Bridge Manf. Co., 16 Kan. 270.

Because a justice of the peace issued an execution more than five years after the judgment had been rendered, contrary to the statute, Givens v. Campbell, 20 Iowa, 79; Stout v. Macy, 22 Cal. 647; North v. Swing, 21 Tex. 193.

Because the clerk of the inferior court made a mistake in drawing an appeal bond, whereby tlie appeal bond whereby the appeal was dismissed, Saunders v. Jennings, 2 J. J. Marsh.513.

Because the private property of stockholders had been seized to satisfy a corporation debt, without statutory preliminaries having been complied with, Hampson v. Weare, 4 Iowa, 13.

Because the clerk of the court neglected to set aside a judgment by default, and enter a plea as directed, Mayo v. Bentley, 4 Call, 528.

Because the sheriff was plaintiff, and served his own process. Knott v. Jarbe, 1 Met. (Ky.) 504. JOHN H. STEWART.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, September 9, 1882.

1. One who requests a bank to remit to him by draft the money which he has on deposit therein, and which by the rules of the bank is payable only at its counter, assumes the risk of transmission of the draft in the usual way by mail; and the mailing of such draft, properly addressed, discharges the debt of the bank to him.

2. In transmitting such draft the bank may adopt the address contained in the letter requesting the remittance, and is not bound to use a more particular designation or mode of address for the purpose of insuring delivery to the proper person.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County. J. C. Ludwig, for appellant; Cotzhausen, Sylvester & Sheiber, for respondent.

COLE, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The facts in this case on which the question of law arises are these: The plaintiff had on depos

it to his credit in the savings department of the defendant bank the sum of $954. Being at Weisbaden, in Germany, he addressed a letter to the cashier of the bank, with this request: "To remit to me the sum which may be due me upon my bank book by draft, or in such manner as you think is best, so that I can draw the money at Frankfort-on-the-Main.” Pursuant to this re

quest the defendant drew its bill of exchange on a bank at Frankfort for the amount, payable at sight to the order of the plaintiff, inclosed the same in a sealed envelope addressed to Mr. Phillip Jung, Weisbaden, Germany, Europe, and transmitted the same by mail in the usual course of business. In due time the drawee in said bill returned the same to the defendant, indorsed "paid." In point of fact, however, the bill never came to the hands or possession of the plaintiff, but was delivered by the officials of the postal department of Weisbaden to another person of the name of Phillip Jung, who indorsed the same and obtained the money thereon without the knowledge, consent or authority of the plaintiff.

Under these circumstances, is the defendant bank bound to make good the loss, the money having been paid by the drawee to the wrong person? We fail to perceive upon what principle of law.it can be held liable. The learned circuit court decided that the bill of exchange was issued and transmitted, in conformity to the written directions of the plaintiff, in the usual and ordinary course of business, and that in so transmitting the same the defendant used ordinary care and diligence to the end it might reach the plaintiff. It seems to us this view of both the law and facts of the case is indubitably correct. The money was remitted to the plaintiff in strict conformity to his express written direction. It was remitted "by draft" on a Frankfort bank, as he requested, in the usual way, by mail. If a loss has happened it is certainly not through the fault of the defendant; for certainly the plaintiff's letter to the cashier clearly authorized or justified the bank in remitting the money as it did, if language means anything. The plaintiff saw fit to take the risk of this mode of transmission. When the draft was properly mailed and addressed to him at Weisbaden it became his property, and the defendant discharged its obligation to him. It can not be held liable to pay the money again because the draft came to the possession of the wrong party. It is true the plaintiff directed the cashier to remit "by draft or in such manner as you think is best, so that I can draw the money at" Frankfort. But in this he clearly indicated one mode of transmission, namely, by draft. This mode the bank adopted. If the bank had selected some other usual and proper way of transmitting the money, as by letter of credit, it would doubtless have been within the direction given. But it did not see fit to exercisǝ any discretion in the premises, but remitted the money by draft, as the plaintiff requested. It fully performed its duty and discharged its debt.

But the learned counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the oflicers of the bank were guilty of negligence, because they did not in some way more clearly designate the person for whom the letter was intended. It is said they should have addressed it to Phillip Jung, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, or should have adopted some other address which would have secured its right delivery. It is sufficient to say, in answer to this argument, that the plaintiff did not direct the bank to use any such designation or mode of address in sending the draft to him. The defendant was surely authorized to adopt the address contained in the letter sent to it. It is further said the evidence shows that Welsbaden was a large city, which is resorted to during the summer season by thousands for the purpose of bathing; that there might have been a dozen persons by the name of Phillip Jung in the city at the time, to whom the draft was liable to be delivered. Assuming this to be so, and that the officers of the bank had knowledge of these facts, still, did the rule of diligence require them to do more than adopt the address furnished in the letter itself? It seems to us not. It was the duty of the plaintiff, under the circumstances, to take precaution that the letter should not be delivered by the post office officials to the wrong person. The same counsel further relied upon the rule that where payment is made by remittance by mail to the creditor the transmission is ordinarily at the risk of the debtor. This is doubtless so in the absence of an express direction of the creditor to remit in that way, or where there is no usage or course of dealing from which the authority of the creditor to so remit may be inferred. Burr v. Sickles, 17 Ark. 428, and authorities cited in the opinion. Here there was express authority to remit by draft in the usual way. Besides, it must be observed that by the rules of the defendant the money was payable at its counter, and it was not its duty to seek the plaintiff and pay him. The money was transmitted by the defendant by draft on the Frankfort bank, solely for the accommodation of the plaintiff. And as this was done in accordance with the plaintiff's letter in the usual way, the draft was at his risk while in the course of transmission. Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 N. Y. 205. In any view of the case, we think the defendant has fully discharged its obligation to the plaintiff.

It follows that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.

1. AGENCY-FACTORS AND BROKERS-LIEN UPON MONEY COLLECTED FOR COMMISSION.

A factor is intrusted with the possession, management, control and disposal of the goods to be bought or sold, and has a special property in them; a broker usually has no such possession, nor special property or lien. Where simply negotiated a contract between S and A, an iron company, and collected the money arising therefrom for S, upon notes drawn to S's order, the iron not being shipped to C, and he having no control or disposition of it, nor responsibility for its shipment or delivery, and the contract being directly with S, the principal: Held, that C was not a factor. but a broker in the transaction, and had no lien upon the money collected for his services and payment of freight, etc. S made an assignment to R of a bill for one of the shipments to the iron company, notice of which was received by C before he received the money from the iron company upon the shipment. Semble. had C receive the money before the assignment was made, he could have claimed his commissions out of it as against R, upon the ground of set-off. Cabeen v. Schoener, S. C. Pa., April 10, 1882, 39 Leg. Int., 336.

2. BANK-DEBT OF DIRECTOR-CHARTER ALLOW

ANCES.

The debt of a director of a bank which is in excess of an amount fixed and prohibited by its charter can not be recovered by the bank. Penn v. Bowman, S. C. Ill., May Term, 1882, 14 Rep. 393.

3. COMMON CARRIER-REFUSAL OF FREIGHT-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR DELAY.

1. A railroad company may rightfully decline to receive freight offered, when it has not the requisite rolling stock and equipments to carry it without delay; but if it receives goods for transportation, it can not escape responsibility for delay by a previous accumulation of freight at its depots by acquainting the shipper, when he offers goods for carriage, with the facts, and affording him the option of acquiescing in the delay or seeking some other line of transportation. 2. The measure of damages for delay by a carrier in the transportation and delivery of goods at their point of destination, is the difference in the market value of. the goods at such destination on the day they ought to have been delivered, and the market value on the day they were delivered. Bussey v. Memphis, etc. R. Co., U. S. C. C., E. D. Ark., April Term, 1882, 13 Fed. Rep., 330.

.CONTRACTS-IMPLIED PROMISE-WANT OF PRIV

ITY.

1. An action for money had and received can be maintained whenever one man has received or obtained the possession of money of another which er æquo et bono he ought to pay over. 2. There need be no privity between the parties, or promise to pay other than the implied promise which arises from the facts. When the fact appears that one has money which he ought to pay over, the law creates the privity and the promise. Brand v. Williams, S. C. Minn., June, 1882, 14 Rep., 404.

5. CONTRACT-SALE-DELIVERY TO CARRIER-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

A delivery of goods by a vendor to a common carrier is a delivery to the vendee, though such carrier was not designated by him, and under the provision of the Iowa statute of frauds, that no evidence of any contract for the sale of personal property is competent when no part of the property is delivered, and no part of the price pald, such a delivery is sufficient to take the contract out of the statute. Bullock v. Tschergi, U. S. C. C., D. Iowa, 13 Fed. Rep., 345.

6. CONTRACT-SURETY'S LIABILITY AS CONSIDERA

TION.

In 1875, one Ferguson as principal, and King and Gipson as his sureties, executed a note to Shanklin, upon which a joint judgment was afterwards taken against all the makers without any finding as to the suretyship of King and Gipson; afterward Shanklin agreed to accept the note of Gipson, properly secured, in payment of said judgment, and the note in suit was executed by Gipson, and McClanrock as his surety; there was no agreement that said judgment should be assigned by Shanklin to Gipson, and upon the execution of the note Shanklin satisfied the judgment of record. Upon these facts the court correctly found that Gipson was liable on the note. Gipson v. Shanklin, S. C. Ind., October 5, 1882.

7. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-EFFECT OF EMANCIPATION UPON PARENT'S RIGHT OF ACTION. A parent has no right of action to recover damages for the death of his son, who, although a minor, has been emancipated from his parent's control by marriage, and leaves a widow living. Such widow is the only one in whom such right to damages is vested. Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, S. C. Pa., April 24, 1882; 39 Leg. Int., 337.

8. ESTOPPEL-NOTICE TO BANK OF THE FIDUCIARY CHARACTER OF A DEPOSIT.

A, being illiterate, allowed his wife to transact his banking business, who, taking advantage of her position, placed to her credit in the same bank a large amount of her husband's money. Upon the decease of his wife, A, being unable to find his deposit books, called at the bank and was informed of the amount standing to his wife's credit; whereupon be ordered the bank not to pay the money to any one until he found the deposit books. A afterwards had an administrator of his wife's estate appointed for the purpose of obtaining possession of the amount in bank, and also gave the bank officials notice to that effect, who afterwards paid the money over to such administrator. A afterwards attempted to hold the bank responsible for paying over the money. Held, that A was estopped in any such proceeding, as the first notice to the bank had been waived by the appointment of an administrator. McDermott v. Miner's Bank, S. C. Pa., May 1, 1882; 39 Leg. Int., 336.

9 EVIDENCE-OFFER TO BRIBE WITNESS-COMPE

TENCY.

A clerk of a railway company had assigned to him the general and special duty of looking for and arranging the evidence in cases where the company was sued by persons injured, or in cases where they claimed to be injured by the negligence of the company, with general authority to use his own judgment in the premises. Held, that the offer of a bribe by him to a witness to keep him from testifying or to influence his evidence was competent evidence against the company as his