L. 1916, ch. 13.

Automobile casualty insurance.

§§ 347, 348.

policy. If the corporation is not possessed of cash funds above its unearned premium sufficient for the payment of the incurred losses and expenses, it shall make an assessment for the amount needed to pay such losses and expenses upon the members liable to assessment therefor, in proportion to their several liability. Every member shall be liable to pay and shall pay his proportionate part of any assessment which may be laid by the corporation in accordance with law and his contract, on account of losses and expenses incurred while he was a member, if he is notified of such assessment within one year after the expiration of his policy. All proposed premium assessments shall be filed in the insurance department and shall not take effect until approved by the superintendent of insurance, after such investigation as he may deem necessary. All funds of the corporation and the contingent liability of the members thereof shall be available for the payment of any liability of the corporation. (Added by L. 1912, ch. 13, in effect Feb. 21, 1916.)

§ 347. Reports to and examinations by superintendent of insurance; filing of policy forms.-Every such corporation shall make reports to the superintendent of insurance at the same time and in the same manner as are required from stock insurance companies transacting the same kind of business, and the superintendent of insurance may examine into the affairs of such corporation at any time, either personally or by any duly au thorized examiner appointed by him, and the superintendent of insurance must make such an examination into the affairs of said corporation at least once in every two years.

No such corporation shall issue any policy of insurance until a copy of the form thereof has been filed with the superintendent of insurance. (Added by L. 1912, ch. 13, in effect Feb. 21, 1916.)

§ 348. Authorization of foreign mutual automobile casualty insurance corporations.-After January one, nineteen hundred and nineteen, the superintendent of insurance may issue a certificate of authority to a mutual automobile casualty insurance corporation organized under the laws of any other state or country, to do such insurance business in this state provided that every such foreign mutual corporation shall have the qualifications required of a domestic corporation organized under this article and provided further, that in no event shall authority be given to any such foreign mutual corporation organized to do other kinds of insurances than those specified in this article. Such corporation shall be subject to all the provisions of law applicable to corporations organized under this ar(Added by L. 1912, ch. 13, in effect Feb. 21, 1916.)

ticle.

INTERSTATE BRIDGE COMMISSION.

Creation and powers; State boards and commissions L., §§ 55-63.

Authority to sue and be sued.-Roberts v. Anderson (1915), 226 Fed. 7.

§ 3. Contents of articles of association.

At common law, and without statutory authority, persons may associate themselves together in a joint stock company, with transferable shares. Roberts v. Anderson (1915), 226 Fed. 7.

JUDGMENT.

Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1671-a.-In an action or proceeding specified in articles second, third or fourth of this title, all the proceedings and the judgment shall bind, in addition to the persons who are bound pursuant to the provisions of section sixteen hundred and seventy, all persons who acquire inchoate dower in the real property described in the notice of pendency of the action after the filing of such notice and also all persons born between the filing of such notice of pendency of action and the entry of judgments in such action who would have been bound by such proceedings if borne * after such judgment; provided the court may in its discretion at any time before final judgment allow any such person to intervene or may require that he be brought in as party, or may make such other order or provision for the protection or recognition of his rights as justice may require and the circumstances of the case permit. In admitting such new party or requiring such new party to be brought in the court may give or refuse leave to answer; may permit or direct that the answer of any other defendant or defendants stand as his answer; may direct that the action retain its place on the calendar; may require or dispense with the appointment of guardian ad litem; may allow a new trial or any re-hearing; or direct that all or any part of the proceedings stand and bind such new party or make or impose any other provision, term or condition that to the court may seem proper. (Added by L. 1916, ch. 518, in effect Sept. 1, 1916.)

*So in original.

Suspension or disbarment of attorneys.

§§ 26, 88.

JUDICIARY LAW.

(L. 1909, ch. 35.)

§ 26. Additional compensation allowed judges in Kings, Queens and Richmond counties.

The surrogate of the county of Queens is not entitled to compensation for the drawing of jurors under this section providing for compensation "to each judge, including each justice of the Supreme Court, for the services performed by him in connection with the drawing of jurors," notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure for the drawing of jurors for service in the Surrogate's Court. People ex rel. Noble v. Mitchel (1915), 170 App. Div. 379, 155 N. Y. Supp. 660.

$88.

Admission to and removal from practice by appellate division.

Court of Appeals, jurisdiction.-Questions relating to the comparative weight of evidence or the fairness of the sentence in a proceeding to discipline an attorney are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Matter of Harris (1916), 217

N. Y.

Attorney at law disbarred for extorting from a client who was in financial straits exorbitant and unconscionable fees for legal services and also for fleeing the jurisdiction to avoid the enforcement of an order of the court directing him to pay over moneys to the client. Matter of Cohen (1915), 169 App. Div. 544, 155 N. Y. Supp. 517; for converting to his own use moneys paid to him by a client for the purpose of settling an action and for embezzling other moneys received in a professional capacity. Matter of Harris (1915), 169 App. Div. 525, 155 N. Y. Supp. 450; for converting to his own use money held by him as a receiver in bankruptcy, for making false affidavits as to the balance of money in his hands as receiver and for converting moneys collected for clients. Matter of Lichtenberg (1915), 169 App. Div. 505, 155 N. Y. Supp. 482; for converting to his own use moneys intrusted to him by his client for the purpose of investment. Matter of Hayes (1915), 169 App. Div. 516, 155 N. Y. Supp. 457; for conspiring with another person to obtain moneys by the institution of groundless actions amounting to blackmail. Matter of Lenney (1915), 169 App. Div. 509, 155 N. Y. Supp. 473; for converting to his own use moneys of a client intrusted to him for investment, and by a fictitious payment of interest inducing her to believe that he had loaned the money for her on a mortgage. Matter of Vanderpool (1915), 169 App. Div. 499, 155 N. Y. Supp. 467; for converting to his own use moneys intrusted to him by a client for safekeeping. Matter of Ayler (1915), 169 App. Div. 494, 155 N. Y. Supp. 489; for converting to his own use money received from a client for the purpose of procuring bail and payment of incidental expenses, and also for converting money obtained from a friend of the

client as

a counsel fee. Matter of Westcott (1915), 170 App. Div. 541, 156 N. Y.

Supp. 504; for presenting to the court, on several occasions, an affidavit signed by

him and

known by him to be false for the purpose of obtaining an extension of

time within which to serve a case on appeal. Matter of Cebulsky (1915), 169 App. Div. 636, 155 N. Y. Supp. 463; for settling a judgment in favor of his client

without

authority and against express directions, for converting to his own use

the moneys received on such settlement and for giving false testimony in dis

barment

proceedings. Matter of Simpkins (1915), 169 App. Div. 632, 155 N. Y.

Supp. 521; for procuring or conniving in the payment of money to a witness to

§ 88

Suspension or disbarment of attorneys.

induce him to remain without the State so that he could not be subpoenaed to appear against his client on behalf of the People. Matter of Rouss (1915), 169 App. Div. 629, 155 N. Y. Supp. 557; for failing to pay over moneys intrusted to him by a client for the purpose of paying alimony and for converting the same to his own use, and also because he concealed from the law examiners at the time he was admitted to the bar the fact that he had been convicted of a crime and confined pursuant to a sentence. Matter of Osgoodby (1915), 169 App. Div. 626, 155 N. Y. Supp. 465; because, having been retained to prosecute an action for divorce and being unable to obtain evidence against the defendant, he employed a woman to seduce the defendant to commit adultery and thereafter verified a complaint alleging that the correspondent was not yet identified, and because he permitted his client at trial to swear that the adultery was committed without her consent, connivance, privity or procurement, etc. Matter of Forrester (1915), 169 App. Div. 619, 155 N. Y. Supp. 420.

Attorney at law suspended from practice for advertising that he made matrimonial actions a specialty, contrary to section 120 of the Penal Law. Matter of Neuman (1915), 169 App. Div. 638, 155 N. Y. Supp. 428; for failing for two months to turn over to a client moneys received by him in settlement of a claim for personal injuries. Matter of Levor (1915), 169 App. Div. 642, 155 N. Y. Supp. 426; for one year for making false affidavits used in legal proceedings, for moving for an extra allowance upon an affidavit grossly overstating the value of certain property, and also for presenting a sham issue to the court on a submission of controversy. Matter of Harris (1915), 169 App. Div. 644, 156 N. Y. Supp. 283; for two years for failing to pay over moneys collected for a client until compelled to do so by legal proceedings, in which the court stated that it is a serious offense for an attorney to deal with his client's money as if it were his own or to subject it to any risk of loss whatever. Matter of Evans (1915), 169 App. Div. 502, 155 N. Y. Supp. 491; for two years for deception as to the intention of his clients in relation to a proceeding for leave to sell an infant's real estate and also for inducing his client to believe that a third person was entitled to a commission for procuring a loan which could easily have been procured by the attorney personally. Matter of O'Brien (1915), 169 App. Div. 519, 155 N. Y. Supp. 552; for one year for stopping payment on a check given by him for the payment of costs and disbursements of other attorneys for searching title to lands, the check having been given in order to induce the making of a loan to his clients. Matter of Kalisky (1915), 169 App. Div. 531, 155 N. Y. Supp. 550; for two years because having been asked by a city magistrate whether bail offered by his client in a criminal case was good bail, stated that it was good, when as a matter of fact the value of the property offered as security was grossly overstated. Matter of Sachs (1915), 169 App. Div. 622, 155 N. Y. Supp. 461.

Attorney disciplined for improper practice in conducting a collection agency. Matter of (1915), 170 App. Div. 922.

Attorney at law severely censured for writing a letter to a justice of the Municipal Court, in relation to an action against him, personally, in said court, impugning the motives of the justice, charging him with improper judicial action and containing reflections upon other justices of the court. Matter of Carrao (1915), 170 App. Div. 545, 156 N. Y. Supp. 379; for preparing and causing his client to verify an answer when he knew or had reason to believe that the material allegations of the complaint denied therein were in fact true. Matter of Schreiber (1915), 170 App. Div. 543, 156 N. Y. Supp. 398; for depositing moneys received in settlement of a client's claim in his own account, for using the proceeds, and for delay in paying over to his clients. Matter of Cohen (1915), 169 App. Div. 492, 155 N. Y. Supp. 459; for soliciting by false representations a retainer from the client of another attorney by whom he had formerly been employed as clerk, and for settling a judg

L. 1916, ch. 377.

Appellate term, 2nd department; stenographers, etc.

§ 104a.

ment without taking steps to safeguard his former employer's lien. Matter of Glasberg (1915), 169 App. Div. 496, 155 N. Y. Supp. 437; for endeavoring to obtain employment in his professional capacity by means of false representations. Matter of Lauterbach (1915), 169 App. Div. 534, 155 N. Y. Supp 478; for returning to a fraternal benefit society a portion of moneys paid in settlement of his client's claim, so as to enable the association to gain credit by a false appearance of liberality, the claim having actually been settled for a smaller amount, and also for refusing to disclose the facts to the court when called upon to do so. Matter of Burnstine (1915), 169 App. Div. 540, 155 N. Y. Supp. 500; for lack of frankness to court on trial of action. Matter of Tepper (1915), 170 App. Div. 889; censured and also suspended from practice for procuring a portion of the savings of a former client, a poor woman, ignorant of business affairs, in order that he might acquire for himself an interest in a mining venture. Matter of Coleman (1915), 170 App. Div. 537, 156 N. Y. Supp. 487; disciplined by severe censure because, though acting with commendable motives, he wrote a letter containing false statements designed to protect a friend against whom a criminal charge had been made, and because he signed the jurat to an affidavit of a person who did not appear before him but swore to the affidavit over the telephone, said affidavit not being intended for use in judicial proceedings. Matter of Napolis (1915), 169 App. Div. 469, 155 N. Y. Supp. 416.

Specific contractual relations of attorney and client are not always necessary to create professional obligations for which a lawyer may be held to account. Matter of Coleman (1915), 170 App. Div. 537, 156 N. Y. Supp 487.

Admission of an attorney at law to the bar revoked because he was guilty of fraud and deceit in the proceeding by which he was admitted in that he filed affidavits stating that he had served a regular clerkship in the office of a practicing attorney for a certain period, when, as a matter of fact, during said period he was employed by other persons in commercial business and only reported at the attorney's office for a brief period each day. Matter of Moskovitz (1915), 169 App. Div. 527, 155 N. Y. Supp. 485.

Departure from jurisdiction. While the court may not punish an attorney for failure to pay over moneys where it is due to inability rather than contumacy, it is a serious offense to flee the jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering the court powerless to enforce its order. Matter of Cohen (1915), 169 App. Div. 544, 155 N. Y. Supp. 517.

§ 104-a. Clerks, stenographers and attendants of appellate term in second department. The justices of the appellate division of the supreme court in the second department, or a majority of them, are authorized to appoint in their discretion, and to remove at pleasure, for the appellate term of the supreme court in the second department, a chief clerk, one deputy clerk,

one

confidental clerk and stenographer, one confidential opinion stenographer and not to exceed three attendants, and from time to time to fix their salaries or compensation, which shall not exceed for the chief clerk four thousand dollars per annum, for the deputy clerk three thousand five hundred dollars per annum, for the confidential clerk and stenographer three thousand dollars per annum, for the confidential opinion stenographer three thousand dollars per annum and for the attendants the salaries now allowed by law to attendants in the supreme court in Kings County; and the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York is authorized and empowered to provide the means to pay such salaries