ples of expediency and right, proved by immemorial usage, recognised and sanctioned by the highest legal Authorities, and analogous to the power exercised without dispute by Courts of Justice; that it grew up with our Constitution; that it is established and confirmed as clearly and incontrovertibly as any part of the Law of the Land, and is one of the most important safeguards of the Rights and Liberties of the People.

Extracts from the Appendix.

CLAIM AND RECOGNITION of the Privileges of Parliament, and the power of Commitment.

11 Rich. II.-Rot. Parl. Vol. iii. p. 244 -En yeest Parlement, toutz les Seign'rs si bien Espiritels come Temporels alors presentz clamerent come lour Libertee & Franchise, q'les grosses matires moevez en cest Parlement, & a movers en autres Parlementz en temps a venir, tochantz Pieres de la Terre, serroient demesnez, ajuggez, & discus par le cours de Parlement, & nemye par la Loy Civile, ne par la Commune, Ley de la Terre, usez en autres plus bas Courtes du Roialme: quell claym, liberte, & franchise le Roy lour benignement alloua & ottroia en plein Parlement.

32 Hen. VI.-Rot. Parl. Vol. v. p. 239. -Thorp's Case.-The seid Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx not entendyng to empeche or hurt the Libertees and Privilegges of theym that were com'en for the Commune of this lande to this present Parlement, but egally after the cours of lawe to mynystre justice, and to have knowlegge what the law will wey in that behalve, opened and declared to the Justices the premissez, and axed of them whether the seid Thomas ought to be delivered from prison, by force and vertue of the Privelegge of Parlement or

noo.

To the which question the chefe Justcez, in the name of all the Justicez, after sadde communication and mature deliberation hadde among theim, aunswered and said, that they ought not to aunswere to that question, for it hath not be used afore tyme that the Justicez should in eny wyse determine the Privelegge of this high Court of Parlement.

4 Hen. VII.-The original Roll in the Parliament Office.-Stroud's Case. This is the act conc'nyng Richard Stroude for matt' resoned in the Piament.--The act begins by reciting the Petition of Rd. Stroude, and after that recital proceeds

thus:

Henry R.

Soit beill aux Senio's. And on that be it inacted by the seide Autorite, That at suts, accusementis, condempnacons, execucions, fynys, am'ciamentis, punysshements, correccons, grev'ncez, charges, & impositions putt or hadde or her aft' to be put or hadde unto or apon the seide Richard, and to every other of thep'son or p'son afore specyfyed that nowe be of this p'sent P'liament or that of any P'liament her after shall be for any bylle speyking, reasonying or declarying off any mat' or maters conc'nying the P'liament to be comenced and treated. off, be utt'ly voyde & of none effecte, and on that be hyt inacted by the seide Autorite, That if the seide Richard Strode or any of all the seide other p'son or persons her after be vexy'd, trobeled or other wyse charged for any causes as is aforesaide, that then he or they & every of them so vexed or troubled off and for the same, have acc'on upon the case agaynste ev'ry such p'son or p'sons so vexying or trobelying any cot'rie to this Ordin'ns & p'vision, in the whych acc'on the p'tie greyvd shall be recov' treby'll damages & costis & that no p'teccon, essouie nor wager of Lawe yn the seide acc'on in anywise be admytted nor receyvid.

A Ce'st Bill Ley Seinos ss Assent. 1606.-Com, Journ. Vol. i. p. 349.The Commons tell the Lords" that they doubt not, but the Commons House is a Court, and a Court of Record."

1620.-Com. Journ. Vol. i. p. 545.—In a Report of Precedents by sir Edward Coke, it is agreed, "The House of Commons, alone, hath a power of punishment, and that judicial."-Hall's Case 23 Elizth. and Long's Case 5th Elizth. cited.

1675, June 4th.-Com. Journ. Vol. ix. p. 354.-In the matter of the appellant Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, the Commons assert their right" to punish by imprisonment a Commoner that is guilty of violating their privileges, that being according to the known Laws and Custom of Parliament and the right of their Privileges declared by the King's Royal Predecessors in former Parliaments and by himself in his;" and "that neither the

Great Charter, the Petition of Right, nor any other Laws, do take away the Law and Custom of Parliament, or of either House of Parliament.”

1701.-Vol. xiii, p. 767.--Kentish Petition.-Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Committee, that to assert the House of Commons have no power of Commits

power to commit for Contempt or breach of Privilege. Indeed, it seems they must have power to commit for any crime. When the House of Commons adjudge any thing to be a Contempt or a breach of Privilege, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in consequence an execution; and no Court can discharge or bail a person that is in execution by the judgment of any other Court."

And he concluded his judgment in these words:

"I am perfectly satisfied that if Lord Holt himself were to have determined it, the Lord Mayor would have been remanded. In the case of Mr. Murray, the Judges could not hesitate concerning the contempt by a man who refused to receive his sentence in a proper posture; all the Judges agreed, that he must be remanded, because he was committed by a Court having competent jurisdiction. Courts of Justice have no cognizance of the acts of the Houses of Parliament, because they belong ad aliud examen. I have the most perfect satisfaction in my own mind in that determination. Sir Martin Wright, who felt a generous and distinguished warmth for the liberty of the Subject; Mr. Justice Denison, who was so free from connections and ambition of every kind; and Mr. Justice Foster, who may be truly called the Magna Charta of liberty, of persons as well as fortune; all these revered Judges concurred in this point. I am therefore clearly and with full satisfaction of opinion, that the Lord Mayor must be remanded."

Gould, Justice." I entirely concur in opinion with my Lord Chief Justice, that this Court hath no cognizance of Contempts or breach of Privilege of the House of Commons; they are the only Judges of their own Privileges; and that they may be properly called Judges, appears in 4 Inst. 47, where my Lord Coke says, an alien cannot be elected of the Parliament, because such a person can hod no place of judicature. Much stress has been laid upon an objection, that the Warrant of the Speaker is not conformable to the Order of the House; and yet no such thing appears upon the Return, as has been pretended. The Order says, that the Lord Mayor shall be taken into the custody of the Serjeant or his Deputy; it does not say, by the Serjeant or his Deputy. This Court cannot know the nature and power of the proceedings of the House

of Commons; it is founded on a different law; the Lex et Consuetudo Parliamenti, is known to Parliament men only. Trewynnard's case, Dier, 59, 60. When matters of Privilege come incidentally before the Court, it is obliged to determine them, to prevent a failure of justice. It is true this Court did, in the instance alluded to by the Counsel at the Bar, determine upon the Privilege of Parliament in the case of a Libel; but then that Privilege was promulged and known; it existed in records and law books, and was allowed by Parliament itself. But even in that case, we now know that we were mistaken; for the House of Commons have since determined, that Privilege does not extend to matters of Libel., The cases produced respecting the High Commission Court, &c. are not to the present purpose, because those Courts had not a legal authority. The Resolution of the House of Commons is an adjudication, and every Court must judge of its own contempts.

Blackstone, Justice." I concur in opinion, that we cannot discharge the Lord Mayor. The present case is of great importance, because the liberty of the Subject is materially concerned. The House of Commons is a supreme Court, and they are Judges of their own Privileges and Contempts, more especially with respect to their own Members.-Here is a Mem ber committed in execution by the judg ment of his own House. All Courts, by which I mean to include the two Houses of Parlament and the Courts of Westminster Hai, can have no control`in matters of Contempt. The sole adjudication of Contempts, and the punishment thereof, in any manner, belongs exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective Court. Infinite confusion and disorder would follow, if Courts could by Writ of Habeas Corpus examine and determine the Contempts of others. This power to commit resuits from the first principles of justice; for if they have power to decide, they ought to have power to punish. No other Court shall scan the judgment of a superior Court, or the principal Seat of Justice. As I said before, it would occasion the utmost confusion, if every Court of this Hall should have power to examine. the cominitments of the other Courts of the Hall for contempts; so that the judg ment and commitment of each respective Court as to contempts, must be final and without control. It is a confidence that may, with perfect safety and secu

rity, be reposed in the Judges and the Houses of Parliament. The Legislature since the Revolution (see 9 & 10 W. III. c. 15.) have created many new contempts. The objections which are brought, of abusive consequences, prove too much, because they are applicable to all Courts of dernier resort: et ab abusu ad usum non valent consequentia,' is a maxim of law as well as of logic. General convenience must always outweigh partial inconvenience; even supposing (which in my conscience, I am far from supposing) that in the present case the House has abused its power. I know, and am sure that the House of Commons are both able and well inclined to do justice. How preposterous is the present murmur and complaint! The House of Commons have this power only in common with all the Courts of Westminster Hall: and if any persons may be safely trusted with this power, they must surely be the Commons, who are chosen by the people; for their privileges and powers are the privileges and powers of the people. There is a great fallacy in my brother Glynn's whole argument, when he makes the question to be, Whether the House have acted according to their right or not?-Can any good man think of involving the Judges in a contest with either House of Parliament, or with one another? And yet this manner of putting the question would produce such a contest. The House of Commons is the only Judge of its own proceedings: Holt differed from the other Judges in this point, but we must be governed by the eleven, and not by the single one. It is a right inherent in all supreme Courts; the House of Commons have always exercised it. Little nice objections of particular words, and forms and ceremonies of execution, are not to be regarded in the acts of the House of Commons; it is our duty to presume the Orders of that House, and their execution, are according to law. The Habeas Corpus in Murray's case was at Common Law. I concur entirely with my Lord Chief Justice."

1771. Oliver's Case. And in Mr. Alderman Oliver's case, argued in the Court of Exchequer on the 27th of April 1771, the four Judges, Chief Baron Parker, Mr Baron Smythe, Mr. Barou Adams, and Mr. Baron Perrot, unanimously acknowledged in like manner the right of the House of Commons to commit. 1779.-Durnford and East's Report, K. B.

Book 8. p. 314.

Flower's Case.-In the case of Flower, committed by the House of Lords, for a libel on the Bishop of Landaff, on his being brought up to the King's Bench upon Habeas Corpus,

an

Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice, said-" If we entertained any doubts upon this subject, it would be unbecoming in us to rush to a speedy decision without looking through all the cases cited by the Defendant's Counsel; but not having any doubts, I think it best to dispose of the case at once. The cases that have been referred to are all collected in Lord Hale's Treatise on the Jurisdiction of the Lords' House of Parliament, and that valuable Preface to it published by Mr. Hargrave; but in the whole of that publication the Defendant's Counsel has not found one case applicable to the present. This is one of the plainest questions that ever was discussed in a Court of Law. Some things, however, have dropped from the learned Counsel that require answer :-First, it is said that the House of Lords is not a Court of Record: that the House of Lords when exercising a legislative capacity is not a Court of Record, is undoubtedly true; but when sitting in a judicial capacity, as in the present case, it is a Court of Record. Then it was objected, that the Defendant was condemned without being heard in his defence: but the warrant of commitment furnishes an answer to that; by that it appears, that he was informed of the complaint made against him,' &c. and having been heard as to what he had to say in answer to the said complaint, &c. he was adjudged guilty of a high breach of the Privileges of the House,' &c. so that it clearly appears that he was heard in his defence, and had the same opportunity of calling Witnesses, that every other Defendant has in a Court of Justice. Then insinuations are thrown out against the encroachments by the House of Lords on the liberties of the Subject: but the good subjects of this country feel themselves protected in their liberties by both Houses of Parliament. Government rests in a great degree on public opinion; and if ever the time shall come, when factious men will overturn the Government of the Country, they will begin their work by calunniating the Courts of Justice and both Houses of Parliament.-The ground of this proceeding is, that the Defendant has been guilty of a breach of Privileges of the House, and a