tioned here only corporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings; for as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking and moving of bodies, we, at first sight, find ourselves at a loss; though, perhaps, when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies, and their operations, and examined how far our notions, even in these, reach, with any clearness, beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even in these too our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity.

§ 15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions, we can make but few general certain propositions concerning them. This is evident, the abstract complex ideas of substances, for which their general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions, can afford us very little universal certainty. Because our ideas of them are not made up of that, on which those qualities we observe in them, and would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain connexion; v. g. let the ideas to which we give the name, man, be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary motion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and consequently the essence of our species, man, we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea. Because, not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of motion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the same subject, there are very few other qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion; and, therefore, we cannot, with certainty, affirm, that all men sleep by intervals; that no man can be nourished by wood or stones; that all men will be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnance with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea that name stands for. We must, in these and the like, . appeal to trial in particular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content ourselves with probability in the rest; but can have no general certainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution, which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word man stands for, is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones, upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and

others that are nourished by wood and stones; but as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals, whereon these, and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few ideas only, which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances, as almost none at all.

§ 16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.—To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are then only capable of certainty, when the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiment, or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas, that alone is able to afford us general knowledge.

CHAPTER VII.

OF MAXIMS.

§1. They are self-evident. There is a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims and axioms, bave passed for principles of science; and, because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate, although nobody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.

§ 2. Wherein that self-evidence consists.—Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas: now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those propositions, which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight; for

in all of them he will find, that the reason of his assent, is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition.

§ 3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms. This being so, in the next place let us consider, whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions, which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas, which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions, which have had the credit of maxims, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number, of other propositions are such.

§4. First, as to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident. For, First, the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity, being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-evident propositions, as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas; and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge,) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another. Which always being so (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives), he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to, as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand for. And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of another, to be the same or different, it is presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition, and this equally, whether these propositions be in terms

standing for more general ideas, or such as are less so, v. g. whether the general idea of being, be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, "whatsoever is, is;" or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as a man is a man; or, whatsoever is white, is white; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not being, which is the only (if I may so call it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it; as a man is not a horse; red is not blue. The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less, as well as the more, general propositions, and all for the same reason, viz. because the mind perceives in any ideas that it has, the same idea to be the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and not the same. And this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It is not therefore alone to these two general propositions, "Whatsoever is, is;" and "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" that this sort of self-evidence belongs, by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by the terms, whatsoever and thing, than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting to no more, in short, but this, that the same is the same, and same is not different, are truths known in more particular instances, as well as in those general maxims, and known also in particular instances, before these general maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible, than that the mind, without the help of any proof or reflection on either of these general propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea of blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not absent; that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in his mind; he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be in his mind, and not away, when it is there, with a certainty that cannot be greater; and, therefore, the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as

many self-evident propositions, as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this proposition, "A circle, is a circle," be not as self-evident a proposition, as that consisting of more general terms, "Whatsoever is, is;" and again, whether this proposition, "Blue is not red," be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" and so of all the like.

§ 5. Secondly, in co-existence we have few self-evident propositions. Secondly, As to co-existence, or such necessary connexion between two ideas, that in the subject where one of them is supposed, there the other must necessarily be also; of such agreement or disagreement as this, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them: and therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge. Nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, though some there are; v. g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a self-evident proposition, "that two bodies cannot be in the same place."

§ 6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have. Thirdly, As to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As, “equals taken from equals, the remainders will be equal;" which, with the rest of that kind, however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not find that they have a clearer selfevidence than these, that "One and one are equal to two;" that "If you take from the five fingers of one hand, two, and from the five fingers of the other hand, two, the remaining numbers will be equal." These, and a thousand other such propositions, may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater, clearness than those mathematical axioms.

§ 7. Fourthly, concerning real existence we have none. Fourthly, As to real existence, since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a first being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident, knowledge; and, therefore, concerning those there are no maxims.

§ 8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.In the next place, let us consider what influence these received