1. They are self-evident. 3. Self-evidence not peculiar 6. Thirdly, in other relations 7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none. S. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge. 9. Because they are not the truths the first known. 10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend. 11. What use these general 12. Maxims, if care be not 16-18. Instance in man. 2. A threefold knowledge of existence. 3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. CHAP. X. Of the existence of a God. SECT. 1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. 2. Man knows that he himself is. 3. He knows also, that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore something eternal. 4. That eternal being must be 5. And most knowing. 8. Something from eternity. 9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative. 10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative. 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom. 13. Whether material, or no. one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative. 16. Thirdly, a system of inco gitative matter cannot be cogitative. 17. Whether in motion or at rest. 18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind. СНАР. ХІ. Of the knowledge of the existence of other things. SECT. 1. Is to be had only by sensation. 2. Instance, whiteness of this paper. 3. This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us. 4. First, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of the senses. 5. Secondly, because an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very distinct perceptions. 6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensation, accompanies not the returning of those ideas, without the external objects. 7. Fourthly, our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things. 8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs. 9. But reaches no farther than actual sensation. 10. Folly to expect demonstra tion in every thing. 11. Past existence is known by memory. 12. The existence of spirits not knowable. 13. Particular propositions concerning knowable. existence are 14. And general propositions concerning abstract ideas. 4. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others experience. 5. In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment. 6. They being capable of great variety. CHAP. XVI. Of the degrees of assent. SECT. 1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability. 2. These cannot be always actually in view, and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance, that we once saw ground for such a degree of as sent. 3. The ill consequence of this, if our former judgment were not rightly made. 4. The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbear ance. 5. Probability is either of matter of fact, or speculation. 6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces assurance approaching to knowledge. 7. Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part produce confidence. 8. Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident belief. 1. Various significations of the 2. Wherein reasoning con- 3. Its four parts. 4. Syllogism, not the great 7. Other helps should be 8. We reason about particu- 9. First, reason fails us for want of ideas. 10. Secondly, because of ob scure and imperfect ideas. 11. Thirdly, for want of intermediate ideas. 12. Fourthly, because of wrong principles. 13. Fifthly, because of doubtful terms. 14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning. 15. The next is demonstration by reasoning. 16. To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning. 17. Intuition, demonstration, judgment. 18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas. 19. Four sorts of arguments: first, ad verecundiam. 20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam. 21. Thirdly, ad hominem. 22. Fourthly, ad judicium. 23. Above, contrary, and according to reason. 24. Reason and faith not opposite. 1. Necessary to know their boundaries. 2. Faith and reason what, as contra-distinguished. 3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation. 4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions, knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth. 5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason. 6. Traditional revelation much less. 7. Things above reason. 8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith. 9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to. 10. In matters, where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to. 11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted. SECT. CHAP. XIX. Of enthusiasm. 1. Love of truth necessary. 3. Force of enthusiasm. 5. Rise of enthusiasm. 8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling. 10. Enthusiasm, how to be 11. Enthusiasm fails of evi- 13. Light in the mind, what. 15, 16. Belief, no proof of revela tion. CHAP. XX. Of wrong assent, or errour. SECT. 1. Causes of errour. 2. First, want of proofs. 4. People hindered from in- |