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717. Private property of civilian employees lost or damaged in river and harbor service.-* * whenever personal property of employees of the United States, who are employed on or in connection with river and harbor works, is damaged or destroyed in connection with the loss, threatened loss, or damage to United States property, or through efforts to save life or to preserve United States property, the Chief of Engineers shall cause an immediate examination to be made, and if, in his judgment, the facts and circumstances are such as to make the whole or any part of the damages or destruction a proper charge against the United States, the Chief of Engineers, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, shall have authority to adjust and settle all claims for damages or destruction caused by the above-designated collisions, accidents, and so forth, in cases where the damage or expense does not exceed $500, and pay the same from the appropriation directly involved, and to report such as exceed $500 to Congress for its consideration. Sec. 4, act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 676), as amended by sec. 9, act of June 5, 1920 (41 Stat. 1015); U. S. C. 33: 564. 718. Pay and allowances; attorneys' fees.Provided, That in the settlement of claims of officers, soldiers, sailors, and marines, or their representatives, and all other claims for pay and allowances within the jurisdiction of the Auditor for the War Department or the Auditor for the Navy Department, presented and filed hereafter in which it is the present practice to make deductions of attorneys' fees from the amount found due, no deductions of fees for attorneys or agents shall hereafter be made, but the draft, check, or warrant for the full amount found due shall be delivered to the payee in person or sent to his bona fide post-office address (residence or place of business). Sec. 1, act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 637); U. S. C. 31: 102.

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Provided, That hereafter no agent or attorney shall demand or accept, for his services in connection with the prosecution of claims for arrears of pay, bounty, or other allowances due on account of the services during the Civil War of an officer or enlisted man of the Regular or Volunteer Armies of the United States, filed after the passage of this Act, any fee for any services rendered in connection therewith. Whoever shall violate this provision upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both, and shall be disbarred from practice before the Treasury Department. Act of Dec. 22, 1911 (37 Stat. 49); U. S. C. 10: 867.

The duties of the auditors are now performed by the General Accounting Office. See 1665, post.

719. Same; longevity pay.-That the Court of Claims shall certify to the proper accounting officers of the United States the findings of fact heretofore made for claimants in claims of officers of the United States Army for longevity pay under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States against Morton (volume 112, United States Reports, page 1) and United States against Watson (volume 130, United States Reports, page 80), and of the Court of Claims in Stewart against United States (volume 34, Court of Claims Reports, page 553).

And that the proper accounting officers of the United States shall proceed to settle the claims so certified and all other claims for longevity pay and allowances on account of services of officers in the Regular Army arising under section 15 of an Act approved July 5, 1838, entitled "An Act to increase the present Military Establishment of the United States, and for other purposes," and subsequent Acts affecting longevity pay and allowances, in accordance with the decisions of the courts of the United States in all cases in which heretofore, namely, between 1890 and 1908, such claims were disallowed by any accounting

officer of the Treasury, and no decision of a comptroller heretofore made against a claimant under said section 15 shall prevent a settlement under the terms of this Act of any such disallowed claim. Every such claim shall be payable to the claimant or to his widow or to his legal representative: Provided, That no claim hereunder shall be allowed if made by any person who is an assignee of such claim nor to a legal representative without proof of the existence of blood relations to whom the fund would be distributed: Provided further, That it shall be unlawful for any agent or attorney, firm of attorneys, or any person engaged heretofore or hereafter in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting any claim under this Act to charge or receive more than 10 per centum of any amount appropriated in satisfaction of the claim. Act of Jan. 29, 1927 (44 Stat. 1054).

720. Same; National Guard.—That the Comptroller General of the United States be and he is hereby authorized and directed to adjust and settle claims for pay for services rendered during the fiscal years 1917, 1918, and 1919, or any portion thereof, for which appropriations are now being made pursuant to sections 67 and 92 of the National Defense Act, approved June 3, 1916, as amended, and certify such settlements to Congress from time to time. Act of May 22, 1928 (45 Stat. 704).

721. Same; time limit for filing claims.-No claim for arrears of pay, bounty, or other allowances growing out of the service of Volunteers who served in the Army of the United States during the Civil War shall be received or considered by the accounting officers of the Treasury unless filed in the office of the Auditor for the War Department on or before December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twelve:

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No claim for arrears of pay, bounty, or other allowances growing out of the service of Volunteers who served in the Army of the United States during the War with Spain shall be received or considered by the accounting officers of the Treasury unless filed in the office of the Auditor for the War Department on or before December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and fourteen. 22, 1911 (37 Stat. 49); U. S. C. 10: 866, 867.

Notes of Decisions

Bar of limitations not raised by subsequent act. The bar of limitations imposed by this section, on claims for arrears of pay, bounty, or other allowances growing out of the service of volunteers in the Army of the United States during the Civil

Act of Dec.

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CHAPTER 11

CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

Collection, 722.

Compromise, 723.

722. Collection.

Priority, 724.

Liability for failure to give priority, 725.

The auditors, under the direction of the Comptroller of the Treasury, shall superintend the recovery of all debts finally certified by them, respectively, to be due to the United States. Sec. 4, act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 206); U. S. C. 31: 93.

The duties of the auditors and Comptroller of the Treasury are now performed by the General Accounting Office. See 1665, post.

723. Compromise.-Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the postal laws. R. S. 3469; U. S. C. 31: 194.

Notes of Decisions

Distinction between compromise and remission. There is a clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case, as under this section, and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability, as under R. 8. 5294, as amended. The former power is a fiscal one, but the latter is in the nature of a pardoning power. (1895) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 264. See, also, (1900) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 18; (1899) 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 344. But see (1894) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 727.

Power to compromise in general.-The Secretary of the Treasury, under this section could not exercise powers specially conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission. (1924) 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 108. Customs agent and special deputy collector held without authority under this section to compromise Government's claim for additional duty. U. S. v. McNab Co. (D. C. 1924), 300 Fed. 391.

946), by accepting an obligation of a later maturity similar in other respects to those obligations out of which the claim arose. (1924) 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 108.

The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to compromise a final judgment in favor of the United States, which is clearly collectible. The statute only authorizes a compromise of a claim which is in some way doubtful. (1900) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 18; (1895) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 264 (reaffirming opinion of July 11, 1894 [1894] 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 50); (1902) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 631.

But by virtue of authority conferred by sec. 10, act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 740), incorporated in this section, judgments obtained by the United States in civil proceedings instituted under the internal revenue laws might be compromised by the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the report and recommendation of the attorney or agent of the Government and of the Solicitor of the Treasury. (1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 479.

Claims subject to compromise.-The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority under this section to compromise a claim growing out of an overdue obligation, evi- Claims in favor of the Government, dencing a loan made under sec. 210, Trans-founded on judgments entered upon forportation Act, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. | feited recognizances taken in the prosecu

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tion of offenses against the postal laws, may be compromised by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions and upon the considerations imposed by this section. (1885) 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 277. Judgments on recognizances may be subject to compromise. (1897) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 494.

Grounds for compromise.-In passing on cases submitted to him for compromise, under R. S. 3229, and this section, the Secretary of the Treasury, while he is not at liberty to act from motives merely of compassion or charity, may consider not only the pecuniary interests of the Government, but take into view general considerations of justice and equity and of public policy.

(1881) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 213.

The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized to remit or release any portion of a judgment indebtedness on considerations of hardship to particular individuals. The authority to "compromise" relates to claims of doubtful recovery or enforcement. (1879) 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 617; (1894) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 50, distinguishing (1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 479, and (1884) 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 72.

Authority of Attorney General to compromise pending litigation.-The Attorney General may absolutely dismiss or discontinue suits in which the Government is interested a fortiori he may terminate the same upon terms, at any stage, by way of com

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The doubt as to the authority of the Attorney General, expressed in opinion of February 10, 1894 (20 Op. Atty. Gen. 714), not concurred in. Id.

Except as modified by R. S. 3229, and this section, the power to determine whether a compromise should be made of pending litigation would seem to rest with the Attorney General; such suits being necessarily under his control and subject to his direction. (1901) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 507.

Conclusiveness of unauthorized compromise judgment.-There was no ratification of an unauthorized judgment of compromise entered in favor of the United States, nor any laches in attacking it, where there was a delay of a little more than five years after the judgment was entered before steps were taken to set it aside, but this was due to the fact that no one having authority to act had any knowledge of the facts until that time. U. S. v. Beebe (1901), 180 U. S. 343.

Compelling settlement.-State court which appointed receiver for insolvent corporation could not require Federal Government, as condition to either filing or allowance of its claim for taxes, to submit proposition of settlement. Reinecke v. General Combustion Co. (1925), 237 Ill. App. 404.

724. Priority. Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed. R. S. 3466; U. S. C. 31: 191.

Notes of Decisions

History of section. This section is a reenactment and extension of sec. 65, act of Mar. 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 676), and the same or equivalent language, so far as the question here involved is concerned, is found in

earlier statutes, cited by the court. U. S. v. Oklahoma (1923), 261 U. S. 253.

Nature of right.-It depends exclusively on statute. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corporation (C. C. A. 1925), 6 Fed. (2d) 752, affirming (D. C. 1924), 300 Fed. 952. Affirmed Stripe v. U. S. (1926),

269 U. S. 503.

Claim of United States for priority of payment of tax debt depends on priority statute, and does not rest on any sovereign prerogative. U. S. v. Middle States Oil Corporation (C. C. A. 1917), 18 F. (2d) 231.

And though United States, in taking over and operating railroads, acted in sovereign capacity, rights of Director General as to priority of claims arising out of operation rests on statutory provisions, and not on sovereign prerogative. Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co. (1926), 271 U. S. 236, affirming (C. C. A. 1924), 2 F. (2d) 194,

General rules of construction.-But this act has reference to the public good, and must be liberally construed. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank (1838), 12 Pet. 102, 134. To the same effect, see Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1926), 269 U. S. 483; U. S. v. People's Trust Co. (D. C. 1927), 17 F. (2d) 437; In re Stiles' Estate (N. Y. Sur. 1926), 215 N. Y. S. 134, 126 Misc. Rep. 715.

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