This section clearly authorizes the Industrial Commission to conduct a hearing upon the complaint of any one relative to a place of employment being unsafe or injurious to the welfare of any employe. The following is quoted from Section 871-13, G. C., a part of the Industrial Commission Act, which seems important to consider in connection with the provisions of Section 871-23 and Section 934-1, heretofore quoted:

"Section 871-13. The following terms as used in this act shall be construed as follows:

(1) The phrase 'place of employment,' shall mean and include every place, whether indoors or out, or under the ground, and the premises appurtenant thereto where either temporarily or permanently any industry, trade or business, is carried on, or where any process or operation, directly or indirectly related to any industry, trade or business, is carried on, and where any person is directly or indirectly, employed by another for direct or inderect gain or profit but shall not include any place where persons are employed in private domestic services or agricultural pursuits which do not involve the use of mechanical power.

***

(10) The term 'welfare,' shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral well-being.

(11) The term 'safe,' and 'safety,' as applied to any employment or a place of employment shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of employes or frequenter as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit, including requirements as to the hours of labor with relation to the health and welfare of employes."

In considering the provisions of the Industrial Commission Act in connection with the section about which you inquire, it is clear that the wash room, required to be provided under the provisions of Section 934-1, constitutes a part of the place of employment at any mine at which it exists. This being a place of employment, it necessarily follows that under the provisions of the Industrial Commission law, heretofore set forth, upon complaint being made to the Industrial Commission they have full authority to investigate and conduct a hearing relative to said place of employment being unsafe or injurious to the welfare of any employe.

From the definitions above quoted as given by the legislature, it is clear that any condition that affects the health of an employe would be within the terms of the sections above quoted.

In view of the foregoing citations and discussions, it is the opinion of this department that Section 934-1, G. C., clearly discloses that it was the intent of the legislature that the owner of a

mine should provide a wash room adequate for the accommodation of employes and that such a room shall be maintained by said owner in a reasonably sanitary condition. Under the powers granted to the Industrial Commission, upon complaint being made to it or upon its own motion, it may inquire into the conditions affecting the health and safety of employes at any particular place of employment, which authorizes it to determine whether or not a wash room is in such condition as to be injurious to the welfare of miners, and grant such orders in connection therewith as may be necessary. Such orders as are properly made have the effect of law.

The Employment of an Assistant to the Board of Deputy State Supervisors of Elections in Counties in Which There Are No Registration Cities, for the Entire Year, is Not the Intent of the Law and Hence Not Within the Term "Proper and Necessary Expense" as Found in Section 4821, G. C.; the Employment of an Assistant for Part Time Services May Be a Proper and Necessary Expense; the Expense of Such Assistant Depends Upon the Discretion and Good Judgment of the Board of Deputy State Supervisors of Elections in the First Instance and that of the County Commissioners in the Last Instance; and the County Commissioners Under Section 2460, G. C., May Pay in Full or Pay in Part or Refuse to Allow Any Claim for Expenses Incurred by the Board of Deputy State Supervisors of Elections Under Section 4821, G. C., as Their Judgment Dictates.

No. 2488-(Opinion Dated October 18, 1921.) Hon. Lloyd S. Leech, Prosecuting Attorney, Coshocton, Ohio: Dear Sir-This will acknowledge receipt of your letter read

ing:

"The deputy state supervisors of elections of Coshocton county, on the 18th day of July, 1921, employed an assistant clerk to help take care of the work of the election board and fixed her salary at sixty dollars per month. This was done by the election officials without consulting the board of county commissioners, and the bill for her services was then presented to the board of county commissioners, which said board refused to approve and allow the same. Whereupon, the question of the legality of the expenditure of said money was submitted to me and I have informed both boards that I am of the opinion that the bill would be a proper one to allow if the additional services were necessary, but under the law I was of the opinion that the board of commissioners before allowing the claim,

should determine whether or not the expenditure of money for such purpose was a necessary expenditure, and if so, then the board of commissioners should determine as to what was a reasonable amount to be paid for said services.

Both of said boards are desirous of having an opinion from your office concerning this matter, so that they may know which board shall determine what assistants shall be secured for the election officials and the amount of compensation therefor.

I am enclosing herewith the communication directed to me by the election officials covering their contentions in regard to this matter."

Accompanying this letter was one received by you from the board of deputy state supervisors of elections of your county, asking to be advised on certain questions which were set out at length therein, but are here omitted. The questions presented for discussion by your letter may be stated as follows:

(1) Is the employment of an assistant to the board of deputy state supervisors of election by the month, for the year round, a proper and necessary expense in a county in which there is no registration city?

(2) How shall expenses that are proper and necessary under Section 4821 G. C. be incurred and paid?

It is noticed that the letter to you from the board of deputy state supervisors of elections says an assistant for part time had been employed in the years 1918, 1919, and 1920. It seems that the employment of this girl as assistant was intended to be for full time at sixty dollars per month, although a claim for salary due her for the period of three weeks from July 18th to August 6th for sixty dollars was presented to the county commissioners for payment and was refused by them. This seems to have been the first claim presented to the commissioners for payment. The report of the state examiner of the bureau of inspection and supervision of public offices who made the examination of your county, also enclosed in your letter, shows that continuous employment was contemplated for this assistant by the board of deputy state supervisors of elections. Upon such a set of facts the questions you ask arise.

Section 4821, G. C., reads:

"All proper and necessary expenses of the board of deputy state supervisors shall be paid from the county treasury as other county expenses, and the county commissioners shall make the necessary levy to provide therefore. In counties, containing annual general registration cities such expenses

shall include expenses duly authorized and incurred in the investigation and prosecution of offenses again laws relating to the registration of electors, the right of suffrage and the conduct of elections."

This section provides that "all proper and necessary expenses ** shall be paid * * * as other county expenses

It is provided in Section 2460, G. C., that

"No claim against the county shall be paid otherwise than upon the allowance of the county commissioners, upon the warrant of the county auditor, except in those cases in which the amount due is fixed by law, or is authorized to be fixed by law, or is authorized to be fixed by some other person or tribunal,, in which case it shall be paid upon the warrant of the county auditor, upon the proper certificate of the person or tribunal allowing the claim. No public money shall be disbursed by the county commissioners, or any of them, but shall be disbursed by the county treasurer, upon the warrant of the county auditor, specifying the name of the party entitled thereto, on what account, and upon whose allowance, if not fixed by law."

The law as found in Section 4821, G. C., has it that all proper and necessary expenses of the board of deputy state supervisors of elections shall be paid as other claims against the county are paid. In every county many proper expenses may not be necessary and some necessary expenses may not be proper ones for all counties. It is not possible to prepare a catalogue of all proper expenses, and, if such a list were within the realm of the probable, not to say possible, not all such expenses would be necessary ones. Many such are unnecessary. This condition obtains in all offices and business pursuits. The elimination of proper expenses that are unnecessary marks the difference between the efficient and economic administration of affairs and inefficiency and waste. It is here the law wisely expects and permits the discretion and good judgment of boards and officers to be exercised. That is the case in the instant matter.

Section 2460, G. C., puts over and around the public purse the county commissioners' discretion and good judgment when it provides that "no claim shall be paid otherwise than upon allowance" by them. It is also a presumption of the law that discretion and good judgment will be exercised by the board of deputy state supervisors of elections in keeping within expenses that are proper and necessary, as it will do if it expects that concurrence of judgment in the county commissioners which will induce these com

missioners to pay the bills thus incurred. Team work is expected because an action to direct and control the discretion of the commissioners in payment or refusal to pay a claim presented will be assumed by a court of law only when there is apparent gross mismanagement, capricious conduct, penchant partiality, fraud or collusion.

As a precedent the board of deputy state supervisors of elections in their argument advanced the statement that a part time assistant was employed in 1918, etc., to take care of the work entailed under Section 5078-1, G. C., which section is the absent voter's law. The services of such assistant during the years when, on account of the war, so many voters were absent from home, may have been proper and necessary. Since then the volume of work on account of absent voters has materially decreased, and it may or may not at this time impose so great an amount of work as to require extra help. But, to say the most, such extra help could scarcely be said to be required for a longer period than the month during which such absent voters may exercise the privilege that the law affords them in casting their ballots. The board of deputy state supervisors of elections cannot pay an assistant; that depends upon the action of the county commissioners. The county commissioners by their own action cannot order the expense of an assistant for the board of deputy state supervisors of elections. A joint action of the board of deputy state supervisors of elections and the county commissioners is necessary to comply with the statute in creating a proper and necessary expense and paying for it. Determination of the whole matter is within the discretion of the board of deputy state supervisors of elections to initiate, and the concurrence of that of the county commissioners to complete.

The board of deputy state supervisors of elections cites in its argument, State v. Craig, 11 O. C. D., 557, and seems to rely upon that case for support in its action. That is a case in which injunction is sought to restrain the auditor from issuing his warrant to pay for the services of an assistant to the deputy state supervisors of elections. The auditor answers admitting that unless restrained he will issue said warrant to pay said claim. To the answer a general demurrer is interposed. The court says:

"There is no claim here that the amount to be paid is fixed by law. Nor is there any allegation that the same has been allowed by the county commissioners; neither is there any law which authorizes any person or tribunal to fix the amount of such compensation."