completed the "work" set forth in 7648, G. C., and are now ready for the "work," set forth in 7649, G. C., that is, "work in high school branches." The further education of these children (through with the "curriculum" in 7648, G. C.), was what the General Assembly had in mind, having provided in other sections that children must attend school until eighteen years of age.

A case similar to this and passed upon by this department in 1918 grew out of the language occurring in Section 4726-1, G. C., one of the sections upon the centralization of schools, wherein Section 4726-1 provided that three members of the board of education to be chosen were "to serve for three years," while other sections of law provide that the term of a member of a rural board of education shall be four years. The error appearing in 4726-1, G. C., as enacted in 106 O. L., 442, using the words "three years" where it was intended to be "four years," was at once apparent and the then attorney general held as follows in Opinion 970, appearing at page 186, Vol. 1, 1918, towit:

"Where one word has been wrongly used for another and the context affords the means of construction, the proper word will be deemed substituted or supplied.

"In Section 4726, G. C., where provision is made that three members of a board of education shall be elected for three years, an error is apparent and the phrase therein should read 'shall elect two members of the board of education for two years and three members to serve for four years, and at the proper elections thereafter their successors shall be elected for four years.'

In this opinion cited there are a number of cases on statutory construction which sustain the opinion of the attorney general that the intent of the general assembly should be considered and the statute made workable in the light of the intent of the lawmaking body, where the error is flagrant and at once apparent. It may be said that this construction put upon Section 4726-1 by the attorney general in 1918, in order to make the section workable, has been uniformily accepted, as is indicated by the fact that the section still reads three years, when it should read four years, the General Assembly itself not having corrected the error appearing in 4726-1. The rule has been well stated in Vol. 25, Ruling Case Law, under "Statutes" as follows:

"214. The most common occasion for construing statutes is where there is found in a statute some obscurity, ambiguity or other fault of expression; for in that case it is necessary to interpret the law in order to discover the true meaning.

And if the legislature has enacted two or more statutes which from their wording appear to be inconsistent *** there is an ambiguity, for *** it is always presumed it intended its enactments to become valid and enforceable laws. Another occasion for construing a statute is where uncertainty as to its meaning arises not alone from ambiguity of the language employed, but from the fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words will lead to such unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction that they could not have been intended by the legislature.

"215. *** The true rule is that statutes are to be construed as they were intended to be understood when they were passed. Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and the state of the law existent at the time of their enactment. The words of a statute must be taken in the sense in which they were understood at the time when the statute was enacted. ***

"216. In the interpretation and construction of statutes the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. As has frequently been stated in effect, the intention of the legislature constitutes the law. All rules for the interpretation and construction of statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the discovery of the legislative intent, and they are valuable only in so far as, in their application, they enable us the better to ascertain and give effect to that intent. ***

"222. It often happens that the true intention of the lawmaking body, though obvious, is not expressed by the language employed in a statute when that language is given its literal meaning. In such cases, the carrying out of the legislative intention, which, as we have seen, is the prime and sole object of all rules of construction, can only be accomplished by departure from the literal interpretation of the language employed. *** When the intention of a statute is plainly discernible from its provisions that intention is as obligatory as the letter of the statute, and will even prevail over the strict letter. The reason of the law, as indicated by its general terms, should prevail over its letter, when the plain purpose of the act will be defeated by strict adherence to its verbiage. *** The legislative intention, as collected from an examination of the whole as well as the separate parts of a statute, will prevail over the literal import of particular terms, and will control the strict letter of the statute, where an adherence to such strict letter would lead to injustice, to absurdity, or contradictory provisions. It is an old and unshaken rule in the construction of statutes that the intention of a remedial statute will always prevail over the literal sense of its terms, and therefore when the expression is special or particular, but the reason is general, the expression should be

deemed general.

It is also an old and well-established rule of the common law, applicable to all written instruments, that 'verba intentional, non e contra, debent inservire'; that is to say, words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words. Every statute, it has been said, should be expounded, not according to the letter, but according to the meaning, for he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. *** Whenever the legislative intention can be discovered, it ought to be followed with reason and discretion in the construction of the statute, although such construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute. It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers. *** The letter of a statute must not be unreasonably violated; it is to be sacrificed only so far as is necessary to give effect to the legislative intent. The rule has no application at all where the intention of the legislature, as expressed in the law, is reasonably free from doubt. And the literal and obvious interpretation of the terms of a statute should be adhered to in case the intention of the legislature is doubtful. The rule is to be applied only where there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent. *** In order that a statutory provision may be construed differently from its literal meaning, it must be inconsistent with or repugnant to some other provision in or the general purview of the act, ***. An essential element of the doctrine is that the intention should clearly appear in the enactment, otherwise its terms cannot be disregarded."

It must therefore be held that the "subjects mentioned in Section 7648," as appearing in 7764-1, G. C., really means the subjects mentioned in 7649, the latter being the section which speaks about high school subjects. This is further evidenced by the language appearing in Section 7651, G. C., as it existed prior to its amendment in 107 O. L., 624, the section formerly reading as follows:

"The high schools of the state shall be classified into schools of the first, second and third grades. All courses of study offered in such schools shall be in branches enumerated in section seventy-six hundred and forty-nine."

Section 7651, G. C., reads at the present time as follows:

"The high schools of the state shall be classifiew into schools of the first, second and third grades. The superintendent of public instruction shall formulate standards under

which the high schools of the state shall be administered. The superintendent of public instruction shall formulate a policy for the recognition of intermediate schools (junior high schools) and for public schools dividing their course as follows: six years elementary, three years intermediate and three years high school. Graduates of intermediate schools shall be given such high school credit as the superintendent of public instruction may direct."

The second and third grade high school receives its certification as to its grade (sometimes called a charter) from the superintendent of public instruction, after proper investigation by him, and the fact that the second or third grade high school has been rated as such by the department of education, and as the charter from the superintendent of public instruction is a clear indication that the second or third grade high school in question is providing "work in high school branches," (7764-1), such schools fall within the intent of Section 7764-1, G. C.

In reply to your inquiry you are therefore advised that it is the opinion of this department, upon the questions involved, that:

1. In lieu of providing work in high school branches, as required of boards of education, under the provisions of Section 7764-1, G. C., a board of education may transport to a high school outside the district all pupils of compulsory school age who have finished the ordinary grade school curriculum (7648, G. C.), and who live more than four miles from any high school.

2. A board of education maintaining a second grade or a third grade high school is satisfying the requirements of Section 7764-1, G. C., by providing work in high school branches for those pupils who have not graduated from such second or third grade high school.

3. Where one word or a section number has been wrongly used for another and the context affords the means of construction, the proper word or section number will be deemed substituted or supplied.

In Section 7764-1, where provision is made that boards of education shall provide work in high school branches, as mentioned in Section 7648, G. C., an error in the section number 7648 is apparent and such section number should read 7649, G. C., the latter being the section of the General Code which defines what shall be work in high school branches in the public schools.

Powers Formerly Exercised by the Inspector of Building and Loan Associations Are Now Transferred to the New Department of Commerce. A Corporation Loaning Money on Indorsed Notes and Also Engaged in the Business of Selling Investment Certificates is Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce as to Both of Its Activities.

No. 2406-(Opinion Dated September 9, 1921) Department of Commerce, Division Building and Loan, Columbus, Ohio:

Gentlemen-Acknowledgment is made of the receipt of your recent request for the opinion of this department as follows:

"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 154-39 of the Administrative Code, this Division has been requested to assume authority over Blank Company, of Columbus, Ohio.

"The enclosed letter from L. D. Blank, Esq., legal director of the said company, is self explanatory.

"As indicated therein, will you kindly advise this office whether it will be necessary for this company to maintain its qualifications under the chattel loan law in order to carry on their business in the manner indicated after having been brought under the jurisdiction of this department?"

The business of this company is of a two-fold kind, (1) the loaning of money on endorsed notes, and (2) the sale of investment certificates. The law relating to chattel loans is found in Sections 6346-1 et seq., G. C., while the law relative to bond investment companies is found in Sections 696 et seq., G. C. Copies of the company's endorsed notes and its investment certificates, with a letter from its counsel, were enclosed with your subsequent letters.

The substance of the sample note submitted is that XYZ agrees to pay AB, CD and EF, or their order, one hundred dollars in ten equal installments at the company's office. The payments begin thirty days after date and six dollars' interest is payable eleven months after date. So that the principal is payable at the end of ten months and interest equal to six per cent per annum is payable eleven months after date. The note is then negotiated by the endorsement of AB, CD and EF and delivery to the company, which then loans the sum of one hundred dollars. Whether the money is actually paid to the endorsers or to the maker is not stated and is not material.

Section 6346-1 in part provides:

"It shall be unlawful *** to engage *** in the business of making loans on *** endorsed * * * notes *** at a charge