Whigs and the Liberals. Response was now made to Mr. Webster's proposal to establish * conventional line, and in January, 1842, information reached Mr. Webster from Mr. 1 rett that Lord Aberdeen had determined for bent to our proposition, and had sent Lord Ashburton as special Minister to the United States to settle the boundary and all outFueling questions. This marked a sharp change in the English attitude, and was no doubt owing in a measure at least to the Confidence which was felt in Mr. Webster peroneally Indeed, it is to Mr. Webster that we te the settlement at that time of ques How: which had been so mflamed by extrameone and wondental circumstances that they food brought the two countries to the verge

Me Webster's position had throughout Jen one of extreme difficulty. Not only did To deve trade al with the Met cod case, but the Toarder went a constant ferment and he was como lled to be const unty on the alert to precant its abh utbreak which might precipiFit hochinat my moment In addition to all the hi www personal situation was most Fredon Chamal Harrison, who had made him

rary of war did a month after his inauof and although President Tyler gave Hit routine to Mi Webster, he iminly broke with the Whig party, which fcfcbent him and Mi Webster's position

1

Boquence, a very difficult one. Which that he ought immediately to

I was denounced as a traitor to lop jalusipl's and there was much bitterof bython Mi Webster, however, 4 and the situation between this country 146 * Babam better than any one else. how how dangerous it was. He felt, Fondul that if any one could bring it to

ful conclusion he could, and that whatht party associates might say or think, plam duty to remain in the Cabinet of the Lo dic question was settled. Un4 therefore by the attacks made upon bem med at his post, and it was well Camry that he did so, Lord Ashmand in the United States on the Apo B42, and the result of his Hobo with the Secretary of State was known m history as the

1

owing to the fact that the territory of the two States of Maine and Massachusetts was involved, and Webster could not deal with this territory, therefore, with a free hand. It was very fortunate that Mr. Webster was a New England man, and his personal influence as well as the tact he displayed was most effective in managing the arrangements with the two States. It is not possible to follow the negotiations in their details, for the discussion involved filled volumes at the time and might be made to fill volumes now. All that it is possible to say here is that the treaty brought about, in the first place, a condition of entire peace between the two countries and thus put an end to one in which war was momentarily probable. It settled the northeastern boundary and the northern boundary from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods, together with various matters related to these two questions. It also made an agreement for joint effort toward the suppression of the slave trade and for joint remonstrances to the other Powers against that traffic. It further provided in another article for the extradition of criminals. As a whole the treaty was a most important advance toward the establishment of good relations between the two branches of the English-speaking people. It was one of Mr. Webster's greatest achievements, and, in view of the extreme irritation existing and the incipient border warfare, it was a very remarkable feat. Benton denounced the treaty in the Senate as a surrender to England, and Lord Palmerston denounced it in Parliament as a surrender by England to the United States; from which it may be inferred that it was, on the whole, a very fair settlement.

The Webster-Ashburton Treaty had. however, one defect; it did not settle our northwestern boundary beyond the Rocky Mountains. That region, it will be remembered, under the treaties of 1818 and 1827 was left to the joint occupation of Great Britain and the United States, although Mr. Monroe had offered to settle the question by adopting the forty-ninth parallel as the line of division. The country remained unoccupied, but the Hudson Bay Company began to push its posts down to the Columbia River, and just when Mr. Webster was at work on the treaty with Lord Ashburton the American movement toward Oregon began in earnest. As soon as our settlers arrived there troubles at once arose. and the question drifted into the domain of politics. The failure of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to deal with it and the absorption

of the Administration in the much greater question of the annexation of Texas kept the whole matter open, with increasing irritation, although Mr. Tyler renewed the offer of the forty-ninth parallel, to which Great Britain paid no attention. The American rights and claims were taken up with noisy enthusiasm in different parts of the country, and were put forward by public meetings in the largest possible way. When the election of 1844 came on, the Democrats took extreme ground in their platform, claiming the whole region which was in dispute, and the cry of Fifty-four forty or fight" ran through the campaign. The excitement was enhanced by the failure of Congress to act, for there were many Senators and Representatives from the older parts of the country who regarded Oregon as worthless, and who resisted all efforts to take action in regard to it. Mr. Polk, the Democratic candidate, was one of the extremists on the question and in favor of the 54-40 line. Nothing could have been less desirable than this attitude. It is never well to threaten, and it is particularly undesirable to threaten unless you mean just what you say. The people who were responsible for the cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight" did not really mean to fight for that line, and therefore the cry was mere bluster for political purposes. It had, however, the effect of inflaming the question, so that there was talk of war on both sides of the Atlantic. When Mr. Polk came in, he took very extreme ground in his inaugural, and this had a still worse effect in England, and increased the difficulty of a settlement. After all his bluster, however, Polk, with the very lame excuse that he was involved by the acts of his predecessor, renewed the offer of the forty-ninth parallel, which Mr. Pakenham, the British Minister, who was apparently about as judicious as Polk, promptly, and, as it afterward appeared, without authority, declined. President Polk in his Message asked Congress for authority to terminate the convention of 1827. Resolutions were passed and the convention was terminated. The situation had now become so threatening that Mr. Webster made a strong speech at Boston in which he denounced the folly of going to war with England on such a question and urged its proper settlement. The speech made a deep impression not only in England and America, but in Europe. Pakenham, under instructions from the Ministry, then renewed on his side the offer of the forty-ninth parallel, and the valiant Polk accepted it with

the approval of Congress. The treaty of 1846 followed, by which the line to the coast was settled. We obtained the Oregon country and granted to Great Britain the right of navigation on the Columbia River. The loss of the region between the forty-ninth parallel and ' the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever befell the United States. Whether it could have been obtained without a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said, officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were fully prepared to do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40 without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value, and the fact remains that by the treaty we lost a complete control of the Pacific coast.

It is impossible, nor is it necessary, here to enter into the controversies which arose from the annexation of Texas and in which England took no little interest, but the great movement of expansion which characterized that period brought on another question with England which at one time was very serious and which resulted in a treaty that was for many years a stumbling-block in the way of all plans for building an Isthmian canal. From the time of Monroe, Clay, and John Quincy Adams the construction of an interoceanic canal had been one of the cherished desires of the United States. It passed through many phases, involved as it was in the tortuous and revolutionary conditions of Central America, but the question finally came to a head after the annexation of Texas. Great Britain had always, despite treaties to the contrary, maintained a hold on the Mosquito Coast, and was in the habit of exercising a protectorate over a person whom she humorously called the Mosquito King," selected from the worthless savages who inhabited that region. She now took advantage of this interest in the Mosquito Coast to take possession of San Juan, which was at the mouth of the river where it was planned to begin the Nicaragua Canal. On the other hand, the United States engaged in the work of making arrangements with the Central American republics and with Granada to get possession of the canal routes. It is not necessary to follow the treaties made by Mr. Hise and later by Mr. Squier in which they exceeded their instructions and secured for us everything we desired. With England at the mouth of the San Juan and indulging herself in the seizure of Tigre Island

the utmost cordiality by every one in authority from the President down and with real enthusiasm by the people. That he carried away pleasant memories of America was made evident throughout his life, and especially after he came to the throne, by his kindliness and friendship not only toward the United States. but toward all Americans. What was more important at the time, the warmth of his reception in the United States deeply gratified the Queen and Prince Albert, and was not without a marked influence a year later when the relations of the two countries and the fate of the American Union were trembling in the balance.

The Elgin Treaty, and, still more, the visit of the Prince of Wales just on the eve of the Civil War, came at a time when the people of the United States were so deeply absorbed in the slavery question at home that they had little thought to give to their relations with any foreign country. The passions aroused by the slavery struggle were rising to a fierce intensity and the dark clouds of secession and civil war were already gathering upon the horizon. With the coming of that war all that had been gained in the past years toward the establishment of permanent and really friendly relations between the two countries, which had been severed by the American Revolution, was lost in a moment. During the years which had elapsed between 1815 and 1860 the most severe reproach uttered by English lips against the United States was the continued maintenance of Negro slavery. The reproach was bitterly felt because no answer, no explanation, no defense, was possible. Now the United States was plunged in civil war waged by the North for the preservation of the Union, and all the world knew that the cause of the North carried with it freedom to the slaves. The people of the Northern States felt that under these circumstances and in that hour of trial the sympathy of England would go out to them at once without either question or hesitation. To their intense surprise, the feeling in England, as expressed in her magazines and newspapers and by the governing classes, was uniformly hostile. The vocal part of English society seemed to be wholly in sympathy with the South, and the North could not learn until later that the silent masses of England were on the side of the Union and freedom. The bitterness of hatred awakened by the utterances of the English press and English public men can hardly be realized to-day. Early in the struggle its in

tensity was manifested when the Trent affair occurred. The act of Wilkes in stopping the Trent and taking from her the Southem commissioners was entirely indefensible from our point of view because it was a flat contradiction of the American doctrine for which the country had fought in 1812. Yet in 1861 the people of the Northern States hailed the action of Wilkes with wild delight, and the hatred aroused by the English attitude was so great that they were quite ready to go to war, although war at that moment probably meant the establishment of the Confederacy and the final severance of the Union. This feeling was rife not only among the people of the North, but among public men in Washington. The attitude of England in regard to the Trent affair was not calculated to improve the situation, and yet, in all candor, it must be said that it is difficult to see how England could have assumed any other position than that which she actually took, although by doing so she utterly rejected the doctrine which she upheld. and enforced during the first fifteen years of the century. Fortunately, in his large and patient wisdom, President Lincoln was able to suppress the very natural feeling which he shared with his people, and, looking beyond the passions of the moment, had the courage to withdraw from the untenable situation created by the action of Wilkes. On the other hand, English Ministers who were only too ready to take advantage of the Trent affair in order to precipitate a war which would have insured the destruction of the United States were sufficiently influenced by the wise counsels of Prince Albert, acting through the Queen, by whom American kindness to the Prince of Wales was still freshly remembered, to modify a despatch which, if unaltered, would almost certainly have brought on war and the establishment of the Confederacy. Lincoln gave up Mason and Shdell, and the country, unconvinced, accepted his action. The feeling of the people was exactly expressed in Lowell's lines:

"We give the critters back, John,

Cos Abram thought 'twas right;
It warn't your bullying clack, John,
Provokin' us to fight.

Ole Uncle S. sez he, 'I guess
We've a hard row,' sez he,

To hoe jest now; but thet somehow
May happen to J. B.

Ez wal ez you an' me.'"

The avoidance, by Lincoln's action, of this great peril did not, however, alter—

on the contrary, it intensified—-the hostile feeling of the loyal people of the North toward England, nor was there anything in the utterances or conduct of those who spoke for England calculated to produce a change. The vilification of the United States and her President and of all her leaders and soldiers in the magazines and newspapers went on without ceasing and without modification. From British ports and British shipyards armed vessels slipped away which, although nominally ships of the Confederate navy, pursued in reality a simple career of privateering closely akin to piracy. The only one of them which actually came into action was destroyed by the Kearsarge, and an English yacht rescued the Southern officers and the British crew of the sinking Alabama. This business of furnishing a Confederate navy from the ports and shipyards of a neutral country went on with the covert support of the British Cabinet until the case of the Laird rams was reached. Protests even then were in vain, and it was not until Mr. Adams wrote down the famous words, "It is superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war," that the rams were stopped and English ports ceased to send forth privateers. In the great life-and-death struggle in which the people of the United States were then engaged the loss of some merchant ships on the high seas was an injury so comparatively trifling in its effect upon the result that it was hardly perceptible; but the course of England which permitted the destruction of merchant vessels in this way was, in the eyes of the American people, a crime of the first magnitude. The leaders of the English Cabinet were not friendly, although Lord Palmerston, fortunately for us, was more indifferent and less actively hostile than was generally supposed, and neither he nor Lord John Russell, who was much less friendly, was disposed to precipitate war. The one outspoken champion of the Confederacy was Gladstone; but fate so willed it that in striving to harm the United States he rendered it a great and decisive service. It was in the autumn of 1862, a very dark hour in the fortunes of the United States. The Ministry were preparing to recognize the Confederacy. The Queen, since the death of Prince Albert, as Mr. Charles Francis Adams has recently shown, had ceased to interest herself in American affairs. A Cabinet meeting was called for October 23, and then the recognition of the

Mr.

Confederacy was to be given. On the 7th of October Mr. Gladstone, anticipating the action of the Cabinet, went to Newcastle and delivered the famous speech in which he declared that → Jefferson Davis had made a nation." Lord Palmerston saw his successor in Gladstone, but he had no intention of letting him rule before his time. He resented the Newcastle speech; he did not propose to have Mr. Gladstone force his hand, and a week later he sent Sir George Lewis down to Hereford to controvert and disavow the Newcastle utterances. The Cabinet meeting on the 23d was postponed. but the accepted time had passed, and never returned. Gladstone's speech, however, did its work in the United States, still further embittering the already intense and deep-seated enmity toward England and her Government. We had friends, it is true-some even in the Cabinet, like Sir George Lewis-but the general attitude of the English Ministry was such that, while it inflamed the enmity of the North, it was far from gaining the friendship of the South, because, while the South was amused with sympathetic expressions and encouraged to hope for substantial support, it never received anything of real value, thus being left with an unpleasant sense of having been betrayed. A system more nicely calculated to incur the hostility of both sides in the great quarrel could not have been imagined, and it does not seem unjust to suggest that such a system did not imply a very high order of intelligence. Only very slowly and entirely outside the Government did it become apparent that the Union and freedom had any friends in England. The first public man to declare for the North was Richard Cobden, and he was followed by John Bright, whose powerful and most eloquent speech on the Roebuck resolution was one of the greatest services rendered by any man, not an American, to the cause of the Union. Lord Houghton, then Monckton Milnes, also spoke for us in the House of Commons. Mr. Forster was our friend, so were John Stuart Mill, Goldwin Smith, and Thomas Hughes; and there were others, of course, like these men, whose support it was an honor to possess.

The workingmen of Lancashire, reduced to misery by the cotton famine, were none the less true in their sympathy for the cause which they believed to be that of human rights and human freedom. But these voices, potent as they were, were lost in the general

clamor which arose from the clubs at London, from the newspapers, and from the reviews. The desire to side actively with the South declined, of course, as the fortunes of the Confederacy sank, but the contemptuous abuse of the North went on without abatement. Even so late as the last year of the war as clever a man as Charles Lever demonstrated, in Blackwood's Magazine," to his own satisfaction the folly and absurdity of Sherman's great movement.. The article appeared just in time to greet Sherman as he emerged triumphant at Savannah.

Sherman's march to the sea, following jeers and predictions like those put forth by Lever, produced a profound impression in England, which then, at last, seemed to become dimly conscious that a great war had been fought out by great armies. The end of the war and the complete triumph of the Union cause soon followed. As in games, so in more serious things, Englishmen are excellent winners, but, as a rule, poor losers, apt to cry out, when they have lost, that there has been something unfair and to try to belittle and explain away their adversary's victory. In this case, however, England showed herself a good loser, for the result was too serious to be treated with contempt or with charges of unfairness. Moreover, England found herself confronted not only by the success of the United States, and the consequent consolidation of the Union, but by a very unfortunate situation which she had herself created. She had managed to secure the bitter hostility of both sides. She had given sympathy to the South, but had done nothing practical for the cause of the Confederacy, and at the same time she had outraged the feelings of the Northern people and developed among them a bitterness and dislike which, when they were flushed with victory, might easily have had most serious consequences. It is quite true that she had not behaved so badly toward the United States as France, which had stopped just short of war. When England, France. and Spain united to exact reparation from Mexico, England and Spain withdrew as soon as they discovered that France intended to establish a government of her own creation on Mexican soil. Not only was the French Government sympathetic with the South, but Napoleon was more than anxious to recognize the Confederacy, and took advantage of our Civil War to fit out the Mexican expedition and estab