made the capital mistake of the expedition. Grant's CHAP. III. orders were clear and explicit; the landing itself was to be regarded as a success; if the work did not fall at once, the troops were to stay there and intrench themselves, and, with the help of the navy, reduce and capture the place. General Butler chose to assume that he had not effected a landing, because all of his troops had not yet got ashore; the weather began to look unfavorable; he therefore resolved to abandon the enterprise and return to Fort Monroe. Even then he did not show his orders to Weitzel, who said afterwards that if he had known of their existence he would have advised differently.

While the generals afloat were coming to this unfortunate conclusion, one of the officers ashore had made up his mind in the opposite sense. General N. M. Curtis, a man of unusual physical strength, courage, and energy, had pushed his advance almost to the parapet of the fort. The fire of the navy had been so severe as to confine the garrison in great part to the bomb-proof, so that Curtis's men were hardly molested in their approach. They came so near that they captured a mounted courier; one man climbed the parapet and brought away a flag which had been shot away. Curtis was burning with eagerness to assault; his men shared his enthusiasm. Of course it cannot be said whether he would have succeeded or not, though his spirit so infected General Comstock that he changed his mind, and now believed the movement practicable. But the orders were given to reembark, and slowly and reluctantly Curtis drew away his men from the coveted prize

committee Conduct of

Report

on

the War, 1864-65. Part II., p. 80.

CHAP. III. he believed was in his hands. The reëmbarkation of the 2500 who had landed took as much time as would have been required to put the whole force on shore. The weather grew worse the next day, and a portion of Curtis's brigade remained on shore until the 27th without molestation by the Confederates.

On the evening of that day General Butler arrived at Fort Monroe and sent a brief telegram to General Grant announcing his return and the failure of the expedition. On the 3d of January he made a more detailed report, throwing the blame of the failure upon Admiral Porter, saying that the first delay of three days of good weather, was due to the navy not being on hand when the army arrived; that the powder boat was prematurely exploded; that Porter should have run by the fort and thus blockaded Wilmington; that Hoke's division was in front of him, making the enemy's force greater than his own; that the experience of Port Hudson and Fort Wagner convinced him that so strong a work as Fisher could not be taken by assault. Upon this General Grant made a merciless indorsement to the effect that he had never intended that Butler should go with the expedition, and that he was in error in stating that he came back in "obedience to his instructions." Grant immediately relieved General Butler from command, which closed his military career. He was summoned before the Committee on the Conduct of the War a few days later, and defended himself with his usual vigor and adroitness, and the Committee in their report, after hearing Grant and Porter, fully justified the action of Butler.

Welles to
Grant,

Dec. 29,

1864.

Secretary

The President was deeply disappointed by the CHAP. III. untoward result of the expedition. Finding that Admiral Porter and the Navy Department were still confident that an attack, if properly made, would succeed, without losing a moment of time in regrets and without even waiting for the official reports of the affair, he directed that Admiral Porter should hold his position off Fort Fisher and Report of that the Secretary of the Navy should send in his name a telegram to General Grant inviting him to a renewed coöperation in attacking the fort. To this Grant instantly acceded. He sent back the same force which had gone before, Adelbert Ames's and Charles J. Paine's divisions, adding Joseph C. Abbott's brigade of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and assigned to command the expedition General Alfred H. Terry.

of the Navy, 1865,

p. 71.

1865.

A landing was effected on the 13th of January. In this case there was no room for doubt or vacillation. The failure of Butler was a sufficient education for Terry. He knew he was sent there to take the fort. He proceeded with the greatest energy and singleness of purpose to do this. His first work was to draw a strong line of contravallation across the narrow sandspit about two miles north of the fort to protect his rear against any attack from Wilmington; this was completed by a hard night's work; at eight in the morning Terry's foothold Jan. 25, 1865. on the peninsula was secured; Paine and Abbott were placed in this line. Under cover of the fire of the fleet, which now worked with splendid zeal and activity under the stimulus of the hope and gratification occasioned by the return of the army, Ames's division, with Curtis in the lead, moved VOL. X.-5

Terry, Report,