CHAP. III. The land face looked north; the sea face east, running along the beach for thirteen hundred yards. The northern front mounted twenty-one guns and three mortars, the sea front twenty-four. The work was so extensive that if it had consisted of its vast parapet alone it would have protected only those immediately under the wall. They had therefore built an extraordinary series of traverses, made bomb-proof; so that Fort Fisher really consisted of something like a dozen small forts in one inclosure. Report Committee on the Conduct of the War, 1864-65. Part II., p. 68. Weitzel returned and reported the result of his observations to Grant, who told him he did not think he would start the expedition; that the navy had advertised it too widely by rendezvousing the fleet at Hampton Roads - a charge which seems hardly reasonable, as the fleet could not sail without a rendezvous. The plan lay in abeyance for several weeks. It was taken up with renewed spirit on account of an idea conceived by General Butler, suggested by reading of the great destruction consequent upon an explosion of gunpowder at Erith, England. He supposed that firing a large mass of powder some four hundred yards from Fort Fisher would for the moment paralyze the garrison, and so injure the work as to render its capture easy. This plan, after it had been tried and failed, seemed very ridiculous, and every one concerned in the affair, except Butler, made haste to disavow all responsibility for it. But no one thought it ridiculous when it was suggested. General Butler says: "It was readily embraced by the Secretary of the Ibid., p. 4. Navy, and with more caution by the President." After a thorough study of the subject by accom plished officers of the army and navy it was de- CHAP. III. cided that the experiment was worth trying; the Louisiana, a boat of little value, was selected and fitted out, and loaded with two hundred and thirtyfive tons of powder. 1864. Report Committee of the War, 1864-65. Part II., p. 52. Ibid., It was then the first week in December; Sherman was approaching Savannah, and General Grant, in view of the weakening of the garrison of Wilmington by the detachment of troops to meet the victors of Atlanta, was anxious for the expedition to be off. He afterwards said that he had never dreamed of General Butler's going with it; that he had given his orders to Weitzel on Conduct through Butler, his department commander, as required by military courtesy, without any thought of his going in person. Butler contradicted this statement, insisting that his purpose was known to Grant from the beginning. However this may pp. 10, 11. be, the expedition started under the worst possible auspices. Weitzel, who had been selected to command it, never read his orders, which had been communicated by Grant to Butler, and not shown to Weitzel. In these orders Grant had said: "The object of the expedition will be gained on effecting a landing on the mainland between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected, whether the enemy hold Fort Fisher or the batteries guarding the entrance to the river there, the troops should intrench themselves, and by coöperating with the navy effect the reduction and capture of those places." It was an oversight almost incredible that General Butler did not say a word to Weitzel of these clear and important in Grant to Butler, Dec. 6, 1864. Ibid., p. 10. CHAP. III. structions. To make a bad matter worse neither 1864. D. D. Porter, "Naval History of the Civil War," p. 693. Butler nor Weitzel was on good terms with Admiral Porter, who was to command the fleet. The history of this unfortunate expedition, as written by the principal participators, is little more than a series of mutual recriminations. The fleet sailed from Hampton Roads on the 13th of December, and the transports with six thousand five hundred troops on the next day. From the lack of a good understanding, so essential in such cases, they did not arrive together at the rendezvous. Butler went at once to New Inlet, but Admiral Porter put in at Beaufort to "coal and receive ammunition," as he says, "for now that the expedition had waited two months there was no particular hurry." When the admiral was ready to go in and explode the powder boat, on the 18th, Butler suggested delay until the sea, which had grown rough, should subside. A gale came on which lasted several days, and which the fleet at anchor rode out in the most creditable manner. When the storm abated Porter again informed Butler, who in his turn had gone to Beaufort for coal and water, that the powder boat would be exploded on the night of the 23d of December. Admiral Porter seems up to this time to have expected a great effect from the explosion. He suggested to Butler that even at a distance of 25 miles the explosion might Committee affect the boilers of his steamers; and in another letter he says, "The powder vessel is as complete as human ingenuity can make her." Report on Conduct of the War, She was towed to her place near the beach, four hundred yards from the fort, by the Wilderness, under the charge of two of the bravest and most ac complished officers of the navy, Commander Alex. CHAP. III. C. Rhind and Lieutenant S. W. Preston, both of them volunteers. Every contingency was provided for; it was even arranged between those two de- Dec., 1864. voted sailors that if she were boarded by the enemy and in danger of capture, Preston, at a signal given by Rhind, was to stick a lighted candle into a bag of powder. All this devotion, however, was to go for nothing; there is even a touch of the comic about this daring deed of two of the most heroic men our navy has known. They lighted their fuses, and kindled a fire of pine knots in the cabin of the Louisiana, and then jumped into their boats and pulled for the Wilderness. The fuses were set for an hour and a half; the Wilderness steamed out to sea. The whole fleet waited with breathless apprehension for the result. The explosion took place at forty-five minutes past one; there was a blaze on the horizon, a dull detonation, and nothing more. There was little or no concussion felt on ship or shore. It was General Butler's opinion that the ignition was imperfect; in fact, that not more than one-tenth of the powder was burned. At daylight, the admiral got his fleet under way and stood in towards the fort in line of battle. He attacked in fine style and soon silenced the guns of the fortress, to all appearance; though, as it turned out, little damage was done. At evening General Butler arrived with some of the transports, but as it was too late to land the fleet retired to a safe anchorage. The next day was Christmas; the transports were all on hand, and under cover of the guns of the fleet, which kept up an annoying CHAP. III. fire all the morning, the troops began to land about five miles north of the fort. Weitzel took the first five hundred as a reconnoitering party and pushed Dec. 25,1864. rapidly towards the fort, capturing on the way the small garrison of an outlying earthwork. On questioning the prisoners, he found they belonged to Hoke's division, which he had left at Richmond; and that the rest of the brigade to which they belonged was a mile and a half to the rear. This convinced him that the garrison of Fort Fisher had been newly strengthened, and this impression was deepened by the fact that the next squad he captured said they were outside the fort because the bomb-proofs were full. This was not encouraging information, but he pushed on, advancing his skirmish line to within 150 yards of the fort, and from a knoll had a good view of the interior of the work. What he saw powerfully impressed him; the fort was practically uninjured, and seemed to him, with its thick parapets, its bastions in high relief, its bomb-proof traverses, the strongest work he had seen during the war. Weitzel was a brave and intelligent soldier, but he had been engaged in five assaults of intrenchments, three times attacking, twice defending the works. On all five occasions, the party attacking Testimony was repulsed; and Weitzel decided naturally on Conduct enough that he would not advise an attack upon a work stronger than any he had ever attacked Weitzel, Report Committee of the War, 1864-65. Part II.. pp. 72, 73. in vain or defended successfully. Weitzel reported to Butler the result of his reconnaissance, which was confirmed by General C. B. Comstock of Grant's staff, who had also reconnoitered the work. Upon this report, General Butler |