1965. wing, and the right wing, under Howard, crossed CHAP. XII. the Peedee and took the town on the 3d of March, with 28 pieces of artillery, 3000 small arms, and a great quantity of stores. Hardee and Hampton retreated rapidly to Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear; Sherman following with equal celerity entered that place on the 11th, and established communications with the splendid force which Schofield had brought from Tennessee to the North Carolina coast. At Fayetteville Sherman destroyed the arsenal with all its valuable machinery. If he could have foreseen the speedy close of the war this would not have been done. There was now apparently no obstruction to the concentration of all his forces at Goldsboro', a place of the utmost value and importance; being the point where the railroads running from the coast to the Tennessee mountains, and from Wilmington to Richmond, crossed each other to hold which was sooner or later to strangle the Confederate army in Virginia. But Sherman was not to accomplish this final stage of his last great march without meeting a more determined resistance than he had as yet encountered. Beauregard, who was enfeebled by long illness, in body and mind, had been superseded on the 23d of February by General Joseph E. Johnston, who had received from Lee the comprehensive order to "concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman." He immediately assumed command, not flattering himself that he could defeat his formidable adversary, but determined to do everything in his power to keep his army together in such condition that when the end came he might obtain fair terms of peace. CHAP. XII. 1865. His army, though wholly inadequate to the task of driving back Sherman, was by no means contemptible. It is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy the numbers of the Confederates at this stage of the war; Jefferson Davis, General Johnston, and General Beauregard differ widely; but a careful examination of all their statements and reports indicates that Johnston could command, with Hardee's troops and the remnants of what Thomas had left on foot of Hood's army, something like 30,000 men. He had to give Bragg a portion of this force to oppose the march of Schofield from the coast, and with the rest he did what he could to delay Sherman's inevitable progress. With the exception of occasional cavalry skirmishes of little importance, in one of whichon the 10th of March-Hampton surprised and came near capturing Kilpatrick, the two armies came into collision only twice. At Averysboro' on the 16th of March, Slocum, with the left wing, found Hardee intrenched between the Cape Fear and a neighboring swamp. Sherman, riding with that wing, personally directed the brief engagement which ensued; Hardee was driven from his position and retired in the night, and Sherman pursued his march, going to the right to join Howard. General Johnston having by this time come to the conclusion that Sherman was moving upon Goldsboro' concentrated nearly all his force, about 20,000 men, at Bentonville, where on the 19th a severe fight took place between him and Slocum, commanding the left wing of Sherman's army. Slocum, finding the enemy too strong in numbers and position to be swept aside, reported the condition of things to Sherman, who instantly started for the CHAP. XII. scene of action, bringing up his right wing to Slocum's support. He found Johnston established on the south side of Mill Creek very much as Hood had found Schofield at Franklin; Johnston's position was even stronger, his whole left being covered by a brook running through a swamp which seemed at first sight impassable. Sherman found among his prisoners representatives of so many brigades and divisions, the phantom relics of Hood's army, that he over-estimated the numbers opposed to him; and therefore instead of at once overpowering Johnston's force he proceeded with unusual caution. On the afternoon of the 21st, General Joseph A. March, 1865. Mower, who held the extreme right of the National line, made his way with great boldness and skill through the difficult swamp in his front, and with two brigades pushed close to the bridges in Johnston's rear. If he had been supported he could have cut off Johnston's retreat. But Sherman did not think it wise to risk a general engagement at that moment, and ordered Mower to withdraw, which he did under the fire of the forces which Johnston hurriedly threw against him. The day's work was the last fight of the two great armies; it elated the Confederates beyond what it was worth; they cannot be made to believe, to this day, that Mower withdrew under orders. Sherman in his "Memoirs" blames himself for not having followed up Mower's success; but the result justified his wise forbearance. The war ended just as soon as it would have done if he had plunged among the swampy thickets at Bentonville, and Vol. II., p. 304. |