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1. Various significations of the

word reason.

2. Wherein reasoning consists.
3. Its four parts.

4. Syllogism, not the great in-
strument of reason.

5. Helps little in demonstration,
less in probability.

6. Serves not to increase our

knowledge, but fence with

it.

7. Other helps should be sought.
8. We reason about particulars.
9. First, reason fails us for want
of ideas.

10. Secondly, because of obscure
and imperfect ideas.
11. Thirdly, for want of interme-
diate ideas.

12. Fourthly, because of wrong

principles.

13. Fifthly, because of doubtful

terms.

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1. Necessary to know their boun-

daries.

2. Faith and reason what, as

contra distinguished
3. No new simple idea can be
conveyed by traditional re-
velation.

4. Traditional revelation may
make us know propositions,

knowable also by reason,

but not with the same cer.

tainty that reason doth

5. Revelation cannot be admit-
ted against the clear evi-
dence of reason.

6. Traditional revelation much
less.

7. Things above reason.
8. Or not contrary to reason, if

revealed, are matter of faith,

9. Revelation in matters where

reason cannot judge, or but

probably, ought to be heark-
ened to.

10. In matters, where reason can

afford certain knowledge,

that is to be hearkened to.

If the boundaries be not set
between faith and reason,

no enthusiasm, or extrava-

gancy in religion, can be

contradicted.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

1. Love of truth necessary.

2. A forwardness to dictate,

from whence.

3. Force of enthusiasm.

4. Reason and revelation.

5. Rise of enthusiasm.

6, 7. Enthusiasm.

8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for

seeing and feeling.

10. Enthusiasm, how to be

discovered.

11. Enthusiasm fails of evi-
dence, that the proposi-
tion is from God.
12. Firmness of persuasion,
no proof that any propo-
sition is from God.

13. Light in the mind, what.
14. Revelation must be judg
ed of by reason,
15, 16. Belief, no proof of re-
velation.

4. People hindered from in-
quiry.

5. Secondly, want of skill to

use them.

6. Thirdly, want of will to

use them.

7. Fourthly, wrong measures

of probability; whereof.

8-10. First, doubtful proposi

tions, taken for principles.

11. Secondly, received hypo-

theses.

12. Thirdly, predominant

passions.

13. The means of evading

probabilities, 1st, suppos.
ed fallacy.

14. 2dly, supposed arguments
for the contrary.
15. What probabilities deter-
mine the assent.

16. Where it is in our power

to suspend it.

17. Fourthly, authority.
18. Men not in so many er-
rours, as is imagined.

OF

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK III. CHAP. VII.

OF PARTICLES.

1. Particles connect arts, or whole sentences together.

BESIDES words which are names of ideas in the mind,

there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or propositions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways; as is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

§. 2. In them consists the art of well-speaking.

The words, whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called particles; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them; but

he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what connection, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that those words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

§. 3. They show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts.

But

This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in these, and the like, there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. though prepositions and conjunctions, &c. are names well' known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

§. 4.

Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signification; for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all marks of some action, or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consiste

ing of but one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty several significations.

§. 5. Instance in But.

But is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers sed in Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several prepositions or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

First," but to say no more:" here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.

Secondly, "I saw but two plants :" here it shows, that the minds limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly, "you pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion."

Fourthly, "but that he would confirm you in your own." The first of these Buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, all animals have sense; but a dog is an animal:" here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism.

§. 6. This matter but lightly touched here.

To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many o ther significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discretive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles; some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

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