telling the employees that the trucks contained "hot cargo" and not to "handle it," induced and encouraged the employees of L. A. Seattle, by orders, force, threats, or promises of benefits, not to transport or handle the goods of Sealright. After November 14, 1947, as a result of the above conduct of local 388, the employees of L. A. Seattle refused to transport or handle the goods of Sealright. West Coast Terminals Co., is a public wharfinger * * On or prior to November 17, 1947, West Coast received from Panama Pacific Lines vessel steamship Green Bay Victory, a consignment of rolls of paper destined for Sealright's Los Angeles plant. On November 17, 1947, while employees of West Coast were engaged in loading the rolls of paper onto freight cars consigned to Sealright in Los Angeles, a group of pickets representing local 388 appeared at the docks of West Coast and, by forming a picket line around the freight cars being loaded with the rolls of paper for Sealright, induced and encouraged the employees of West Coast, by orders, force, threats, and promises of benefits, not to handle or work on the paper consigned to Sealright. Since November 17, 1947, as a result of the above conduct of local 388 and the continued picketing by local 388 of the docks of West Coast, the employees of West Coast have refused to handle or work on the goods consigned to Sealright.

In this case the business of a supplier (West Coast) and the business of a customer (L. A. Seattle) was stopped not because of any dispute with either of them but to stop them from doing business with the primary employer (Sealright) with whom the union had a dispute. The bill, S. 249, provides no relief for either.

Evans v. United Electrical Workers (22 L. R. R. M. 2459): The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found:

That Bucyrus Erie Co.

* * *

* * * maintains and operates a plant at Evansville, Ind. * * * That Ryan Construction Corp. is generally engaged in construction work. * * That on or about April 28, 1948, Bucyrus Erie placed an order with Ryan for the construction of a building on the premises of the existing Bucyrus Erie plant at Evansville, Ind.; that construction of the building by Ryan began in April 1948; that a special gate was cut through the fence surrounding the Bucyrus Erie plant which gate was for the sole and exclusive use of Ryan's employees, equipment, and materials; that the employees of Bucyrus Erie were instructed not to use and did not use the Ryan gate.

That since on or about July 31, 1948, the respondents (United Electrical Workers, CIO) have engaged in a strike against Bucyrus Erie; that respondents have picketed all gates including the Ryan gate; that respondents have engaged in mass picketing at the Ryan gate by picketing with approximately 10 to 20 pickets; * * * that respondents have induced and encouraged the employees of Ryan and of Ryan's materialmen and subcontractors to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services for Ryan with the object of forcing Ryan to cease doing business with Bucyrus Erie. That as a result of the acts of the respondents, the employees of Ryan, because of their affiliation with other labor u ions, have refused to pass the picket line at the Ryan gate, and consequently have refused to perform services for Ryan; that there is no dispute between Ryan and its employees.

Ryan obtained an injunction under the provisions of the TaftHartley Act. He could not have obtained relief had the bill, S. 249, been the law.

LeBaron v. Kern County Farm Union (22 L. R. R. M. 2435): The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that local 87 of the teamsters union by orders and threats of disciplinary action induced the employees of Oilfields Trucking Co. (who were also members of such union) to refuse to transport goods. to or from the Di Giorgio Wine Co.; that local 87 also by similar conduct induced the employees of Pacific Motor Trucking Co., the Arvin Line, and Turner Bros., all common carriers of freight to and from the Di Giorgio Co., to refuse to transport freight to or from the Di Giorgio Co.; that local 45 of the Distillery Workers Union, AFL, by intimidation, coercion, orders and threats induced the employees of Swiss

Colony Co. (who were members of such union), to refuse to work on products of Di Giorgio Co. in order to force the Swiss Colony Co. to cease doing business with Di Giorgio; that local 848 of the teamsters union by intimidation, coercion, orders and threats of disciplinary action induced the employees of Safeway Stores, Inc., and Eastwest Produce Co. (who were members of such union) to refuse to perform any services for such companies to force Safeway Stores and Eastwest Produce to cease doing business with Di Giorgio.

All of these strikes by the various unions against the various customers and suppliers of Di Giorgio were in aid of the farm union's strike against the Di Giorgio Co. None of the suppliers, customers, or shippers had any dispute whatsoever with their employees or the unions representing their employees. An injunction was obtained under the Taft-Hartley Act, but they would have been helpless had S. 249 been the law.

The Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations summarized the facts in the cases in which injunctions had been sought by the general counsel on pages 24-27 of its December 31, 1948, report and stated:

The Board has sought injunctions in 31 cases under section 10 (1) involving various forms of secondary boycott restrictions of section 8 (b) (4) (A), (B), and (C). Injunctions were granted by the court in 15 of the 31 cases, denied in 4, and 5 still pending, and 7 disposed of by action of the parties.

While court action was only sought in 31 cases during the period August 1947 to November 1948, many additional cases were disposed of by voluntary settlement by the parties involved. During such period a total of 342 charges alleging a violation of section 8 (b) (4) were filed. Of greater importance is the fact that the use of secondary boycotts by labor organizations has rapidly decreased. Where they occur the mere filing of a charge or the suggestion that a charge will be filed has often been sufficient to stop this unfair labor practice.

Employers have claimed damages against unions engaging in illegal secondary boycotts in only 12 reported cases. Many of these were settled by agreement of the parties and in none did the plaintiff recover damages (report of joint committee, p. 31).

It is significant that only two of the 31 secondary boycott cases in which injunctions have been sought under the Taft-Hartley Act would be covered by S. 249. The only remedy provided by S. 249 is a ceaseand-desist order issued by the Board, which, if the case follows the usual time pattern, might be obtained in about 18 months after the offense is committed. With rare exceptions, secondary boycotts, because of the strong economic pressure on the victim, have either accomplished their purpose or failed in a month or two. The minority believe it to be imperative that the suit for damages and at least a discretionary injunction for use of the Board in aggravated cases must be retained in the law if the favorable trend in the elimination of unjustifiable secondary boycotts is to continue.

1949 hearings

In the 1949 Senate hearings most of the testimony against the treatment of secondary boycotts provided by the 1947 act centered on a few cases where the unions charged that a "struck" employer had contracted out his "struck work" to another employer and that members of the same local which was striking were forced to act as

"strikebreakers" against their fellow members. We agree that in this instance criticism of the law is justified and the amendment proposed below provides an exception where the secondary employer has allied himself with the primary employer to the extent of performing the work which but for the strike would have been performed in the primary employer's place of business.

Almon E. Roth of the San Francisco Employers Association, testified that the 1947 law had eliminated boycotts in his area where it used to be "our most troublesome problem" (pp. 8978-8979). Donald Kirkpatrick of the American Farm Bureau Federation, and J. T. Sanders of the National Grange both testified that their organizations believed that injunctive provisions were desirable in order that all secondary boycotts be eliminated (pp. 4393-4394), 4465-4466, and 4485).

Edgar S, Idol, of the trucking industry, supported the boycott provisions of the present law and cited the following case:

On October 15, 1947, a business representative of teamster union, local 294, was refused permission to enter the premises of Montgomery Ward at Menands, N. Y., without a pass. He immediately called upon all union drivers who were transporting merchandise in or out of the plant to cease working, regardless of the fact that none of them were employed by Montgomery Ward and that there was no strike or dispute between them and their employers. A charge was filed with the NLRB under the provisions of section 8 (b) (4a) of the L. M. R. A. and the boycott was called off within 48 hours.

Jurisdictional disputes

There is already a general public understanding of what is meant by jurisdictional disputes. No labor spokesman has been found to defend a jurisdictional dispute as such. The Thomas bill (S. 249) makes jurisdictional strikes unfair labor practices and empowers the Board to settle them.

Regarding such practices, President Truman stated in his state of the Union message in 1947:

Point No. 1 is the early enactment of legislation to prevent certain unjustifiable practices.

"First, under the point, are jurisdictional strikes. In such strikes, the public and the employer are innocent bystanders who are injured by a collision between rival unions. This type of dispute hurts production, industry, and the publicand labor itself. I consider jurisdictional strikes indefensible.

The National Labor Relations Act provides procedures for determining which union represents the employees of a particular employer. In some jurisdictional disputes, however, minority unions strike to compel employers to deal with them despite a legal duty to bargain with the majority union. Strikes to compel an employer to violate the law are inexcusable. Legislation to prevent such strikes is clearly desirable.

Another form of interunion disagreement is the jurisdictional strike involving the question of which labor union is entitled to perform a particular task. When rival unions are unable to settle such disputes themselves, provision must be made for peaceful and binding determination of the issues.

A second unjustifiable practice is the secondary boycott, when used to further jurisdictional disputes or to compel employers to violate the National Labor Relations Act.

The present provisions of the Taft-Hartley law prohibit all forms of strikes and boycotts in support of jurisdictional disputes. The law's restrictions were the impetus for the voluntary action of labor organizations to settle their own jurisdictional disputes. Pages 57-58 of the December 31, 1948, report of the Joint Committee on LaborManagement Relations describe the creation and operation of a

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Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the building construction industry. That board has almost eliminated the necessity for determination of such disputes by the National Labor Relations Board.

Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizing suits for damages sustained because of illegal secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes, and strikes to force an employer to bargain with the striking union when another union has been certified as the bargaining representative provided additional discouragement of such indefensible practices. Since elsewhere in this report the minority has recommended the elimination of the requirement that an injunction be sought to stop these practices, it is all the more important that the damage action be retained. We do not believe the "cease and desist" remedy of the Board is sufficient to continue that situation which has existed under the Taft-Hartley Act wherein secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes have become uncommon. Providing the additional penalty of suits for damages recognizes the fact that the innocent third parties, who are usually the victims of such practices, are likely to suffer severe and sometimes irreparable damages unless such practices are promptly stopped. The possibility of a suit for damage by an injured party, even though utilized only a dozen times in 16 months, has nevertheless contributed to the excellent record of the law in eliminating from the industrial scene this particularly indefensible practice.

Compulsory unionism

The complete surrender which the majority have made to the demands of organized labor is nowhere better illustrated than in the provision authorizing all types of compulsory membership. The Wagner Act's only restriction upon such contracts was that the union be the unassisted majority choice of the employees affected. The Thomas bill, S. 249, goes back to the Wagner Act and then seeks to also nullify any and all State laws which in any way restrict compulsory unionism or check-off of "membership obligations". Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have made it clear that States may prohibit or regulate the making and enforcement of contracts requiring union membership in the absence of a Federal statute providing to the contrary, Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (decided March 7, 1949).

Seventeen States now have in their constitutions or statutes prohibition or regulation of compulsory unionism within their borders. Since most business by court decision may now be determined to affect interstate commerce, the Thomas bill would have the practical effect of wiping out those State laws.

The right of an individual American citizen to work at a job of his own choosing without interference by a labor union is fundamental. More words have been used in criticizing labor abuses arising from closed-shop contracts than any other normal practice of organized labor. Considerable segments of the population are already convinced that closed-shop contracts are not essential to the well-being of organized labor, are in themselves restrictive on production, and result in higher consumer costs.

The minority believes that the individual's right to work and earn a livelihood is fundamental to freedom, and that to make this right con

tingent upon existing membership in or acceptance into a union is abhorrent to every concept of individual liberty. In addition to this principle of individual freedom, the record of House and Senate hearings for recent years are replete with specific cases showing how closed-shop contracts tend to breed closed unions, completely destroying a free labor market, and setting the stage for the sort of purely monopolistic practices illustrated by the conduct of Local 3, IBEW, in the Allen-Bradley case in New York City (Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3 (325 U. S. 797)).

One of the methods by which some trade unions have secured a monopoly of the labor market has been by forcing employers to sign closed shop agreements which make it impossible for an employee to work at his trade unless the union was willing to accept him into membership. Some unions have abused such contracts by placing limitations on the number of employees who would be admitted to membership, restricting membership to relatives of present members, cutting down the number of apprentices and charging exorbitant initiation fees. As a result men who would like to work in certain trades have been denied opportunities for employment in plants where such closed-shop contracts exist.

A true liberal, Justice Brandeis, said:

The closed shop seems to be opposed to our ideas of liberty, as presenting a monopoly of labor which might become as objectionable a monopoly as that of capital (The Brandeis Guide to the Modern World, pp. 139, 140).

Along with the prohibition of secondary boycotts in the TaftHartley Act, the prohibition of the closed shop and restrictions on the union shop are the most violently opposed by union leaders. Three main arguments are advanced against the Taft-Hartley provisions on this subject:

1. Fundamentally, union leaders are convinced that all workers should and eventually must belong to unions. They can see nothing but evil forces at work when any individual chooses not to join their union. Arthur J. Goldberg, general counsel of the CIO, expressed this attitude when he stated his conviction that "no employee has any moral right to be nonunion." This attitude is understandable in union leaders, wrapped up in their organization drives, but we do not agree with it.

2. Much is made of the freedom of contract argument throughout the hearings, the contention being that if employers and unions want voluntarily to provide that only union members may be employed (and some employers do favor the closed shop) Government has no business to interfere and tell them they cannot do it.

Of course the fact is that Government is continually limiting freedom of contract when it believes the ends undesirable for society as a whole, as in the Norris-LaGuardia ban on yellow-dog contracts, the Wagner Act restrictions on individual employees' freedom to contract, and such legislation as wage and hour, SEC, and antitrust laws.

In a free society, there must be limits on freedom of contract to protect individual freedom; otherwise it would be possible for freedom itself to be contracted away.

3. The third argument generally advanced for the closed shop and against the Taft-Hartley Act's restrictions on the union shop (that employees cannot be required by the collective bargaining contract to