the capital stock of a railroad company, and issued its negotiable cou-
pon bonds in payment of the subscription. Subsequently Boyd and
Elliott counties were created, in each of which were included town-
ships which formed part of Carter County when the subscription was
made and the bonds issued, and in each case legislative provision was
made for the continuation of the liability of the persons and property
set off to the new counties on the subscription. Default being made
in the payment of interest, an act was passed in 1878 authorizing the
County Court of Carter County to compromise and settle with the
holders of the bonds on behalf of Carter County, and on behalf of
the parts of the other counties taken from Carter County, and a com-
promise was made under which new bonds of Carter County and of
those parts of each of the other counties taken from Carter County
were issued. Default being made in the payment of interest due on
these latter bonds, a holder of the coupons brought suit against Carter
County to recover on them. Held: (1) That the legislature had au-
thority under the constitution of Kentucky to authorize the County
Court of Carter County to bind those parts of the counties of Boyd
and Elliott taken from Carter County; (2) that under the act of 1878
the County Court of Carter County was authorized to contract for the
issue of negotiable bonds of the county and of the parts of the county
in order to retire the old negotiable bonds of the county; (3) that in
the suit to recover upon the coupons of the new bonds, it was not
necessary to make the parts of Boyd and Elliott counties, which had
been parts of Carter County, parties to the suit. Ib.

17. The restriction upon the right of a congregation, formed for religious
purposes, to receive "land not exceeding in quantity . . ten
acres," which is imposed by § 42 of the act of the legislature of Illinois
of April 18, 1872, applies to congregations incorporated for the object.
named in § 35 of that act, viz.: "the purpose of religious worship;"
and does not affect foreign benevolent or mission societies incorpo-
rated either with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States,
or with the objects named in the incorporation of the Board of Home
Missions of that church, although both organizations are important
agencies in the general religious work of that church. Gilmer v. Stone,
586.

18. A statute of Washington Territory enacts that "a part of several co-
parties may appeal or prosecute a writ of error; but in such case they
must serve notice thereof upon all the other parties." One of two de-
fendants in a cause served upon the other written notice, entitled in
the cause, that he would, on a day therein named, "file a notice of ap-
peal and stay bond and appeal said cause," and added, “You are here-
with requested to join in said appeal." The other defendant answered
in writing, "I hereby accept service of the above notice," " and decline
to join in an appeal in said cause." Held, that this was an exact and

effectual compliance with the provision of the statute. Ex parte Par-
ker, 737.

19. A statute of Washington Territory relating to appeals provides that
"in an action by equitable proceedings, tried upon written testimony,
the depositions and all papers which were used as evidence are to be
certified up to the Supreme Court, and shall be so certified, not by
transcript, but in the original form: but a transcript of a motion, affi-
davit, or other paper, when it relates to a collateral matter, shall not
be certified unless by direction of the appellant. In an appeal in
equity the appellant requested the clerk to "transmit to the Supreme
Court all the papers filed in this cause except subpoenas as by law pro-
vided." The cause had been referred to a referee, who had returned
with his report and finding, five packages, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
with a certificate that it was "the evidence written down before me
and taken in said action, and that the same, with the documentary
evidence returned herewith by me into court, constitutes the evidence
submitted to and taken by me in said action." The clerk of the court
transmitted these packages to the Supreme Court with a certificate
that "the letters, papers, and exhibits herewith transmitted and num-
bered
are all the papers, letters, and evidence introduced in
said cause before said referee, and by him deposited with the clerk of
said court," and further certified that the transcript on appeal was a
"full, true, and correct transcript of so much of the record . . . as
I am by statute and directions of attorneys in said cause required to
transmit to the Supreme Court." Held, that the certificates showed
that the transcript contained all the evidence introduced by the parties
on the trial below, and that the appeal had been duly taken and per-
fected. Ib.

...

20. In Louisiana a holder of a first mortgage on real estate, duly executed
before a notary with pact de non alienando, is not bound to give notice
to subsequent mortgagees, or to any person but the debtor in posses-
sion, when he proceeds by executory process to obtain seizure and sale
of the mortgaged property to satisfy the mortgage debt. New Orleans
Banking Association v. Le Breton, 765.

21. In Louisiana a mortgage given to secure a future balance on an open
unliquidated account is valid; and the acknowledgment of the amount
of the balance by the debtor, before a notary, is all that is necessary to
be done under the code, in order to ascertain it for the purposes of
executory process. Ib.
22. In Louisiana informalities connected with or growing out of any pub-
lic sale, made by any person authorized to sell by public auction, are
prescribed against by those claiming under the sale after the lapse of
five years from the time of making it, whether against minors, married
women, or interdicted persons. Ib.

23. W, owning a plantation in Louisiana, and being embarrassed, agreed
with several of his creditors and with K, that W should remain in
possession and work the plantation; that K should make annual ad-

vances to a stipulated amount to enable him to work it, and should
receive and dispose of the crops and apply their products, first to the
payment of his own account, and next to the payment of the debts of
the creditors; and that for these advances and the balance on his ac-
count K should have a first mortgage on the plantation with pact de
non alienando, and the debts of said creditors should be secured by a
mortgage subsequent to the lien to secure K's account. A second
mortgage was afterwards made to K, with a like pact, and with an
agreement, in which all joined, that it should have priority over the
first mortgage. The plantation was worked at a loss, and K having
made large advances, W acknowledged the amount of them before a
notary, and K proceeded by executory process to obtain a sale of the
plantation, and it was sold under judicial process. In a suit brought
after the lapse of eight years by one of said creditors to foreclose the
creditor's mortgage, and to set aside the sale under the mortgage to K :
Held, (1) That no notice to the creditors of the proceedings to fore-
close K's mortgage was necessary; (2) That W's acknowledgment of
the balance due on K's account was all the ascertainment that was
required (3) That the relation of trustee and cestuis que trust did not
arise between K and the creditors; (4) That the creditors were
guilty of laches in allowing so long time to elapse after knowledge
of the sale, before commencing proceedings to disturb it. Ib.

1. Under that claim in the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 473, which pro-
vides for crediting an officer of the navy with his time of service in
the regular or volunteer army or navy, or both, in the same manner as
if all the service "had been continuous, and in the regular navy in
the lowest grade, having graduated pay held by" him "since last
entering the service," officers are entitled to be credited as of the low-
est grade with graduated pay held by them after reëntering the ser-
vice, and not as of a still lower grade in which they may actually have
served, but to which no graduated pay was attached. United States

v. Rockwell, 60.

2. Service by an officer of the navy as an enlisted man in the marine corps
is to be credited to him in calculating his longevity pay under the act
of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 472, 473, c. 97. United States v. Dunn, 249.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

In Louisiana, an action for malicious prosecution is founded on the prin
ciples, and is subject to the defences, established by the common law;

and in order to sustain it, it is necessary to show: (1) that the suit
had terminated unfavorably to the prosecutor; (2) that in bringing it
the prosecutor had acted without probable cause; (3) that he was
actuated by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motives; and
that these three elements concur. Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union
Co., 141.

See PROBABLE CAUSE, 1, 2.

MANDAMUS.

The writ of mandamus properly lies in cases where the inferior court refuses
to take jurisdiction where by law it ought so to do, or where, having
obtained jurisdiction in a cause, it refuses to proceed in the due exer-
cise thereof; but it will not lie to correct alleged error occurring in the
exercise of its judicial discretion while acting within its jurisdiction.
In this case it is ordered that it be issued. Ex parte Parker, 737.
See JURISDICTION, B, 7, 8.

MARINE CORPS.

The marine corps is a military body, primarily belonging to the navy, and
under control of the Naval Department, with liability to be ordered
to service in connection with the army, and in that case under the
command of army officers. United States v. Dunn, 249.

See LONGEVITY PAY.

MARRIED WOMEN.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MEXICAN LAND GRANTS.

See TEXAS LAND GRANTS.

MILITARY NECESSITY.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

MOIETY.

See INTERNAL REVENUE.

MORTGAGE.

In a suit for foreclosing a mortgage, it appearing that a receiver has been
appointed of the mortgaged premises, and that the mortgagor, appel-
lant, is unable to pay the cost of printing the record on appeal, and
that there are rents and profits in the receivers' hands collected during
the pendency of the suit, the court orders the receiver to pay to the
clerk the sum estimated to be necessary to complete the cost of print-
ing the record. Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 271.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 4;

EVIDENCE, 1;

LOCAL LAW, 19, 21, 22, 23;
RAILROAD, 1, 2, 3;

TRUST.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

If the other appellants oppose a motion, made by one of several appellants,
to dismiss an appeal on the ground that since it was taken the Su-
preme Court of a state has enjoined all the appellants from enforcing
the claims which form the subject matter of the appeal, it will be de-
nied. Marsh v. Shepard, 595.

MUNICIPAL BOND.

1. It has been settled by this court in Davenport v. Dodge County, 105 U. S.
237, and Blair v. C'uming County, 111 U. S. 363, that coupons like
those sued on in this case are obligations of the county, and that an
action may be maintained against the county upon them. Nemaha
County v. Frank, 41.

2. By the act of the legislature of Illinois incorporating the Dixon, Peo-
ria and Hannibal Railroad Company, passed March 5, 1867, author-
ity was given to certain cities, incorporated towns, and townships, to
subscribe to its stock not exceeding $35,000. At an election duly
called and held, August 3, 1868, the town of Brimfield voted to sub-
scribe $35,000, and at the same time and place, but without legislative
authority therefor, the same electors voted to make an additional sub-
scription of $15,000. March 31, 1869, the legislature passed an act
reciting that the latter sum had been voted by a majority of the legal
voters in said township at said election, and provided that said elec-
tion is hereby legalized and confirmed, and is declared to be binding
upon said township in the same manner as if said subscription had
been made under the provisions of said charter." The township, by
its proper officers, May 5, 1869, issued bonds for both the subscrip-
tions: Held, (1) At the time the bonds were issued there was no de-
cision of the highest court of Illinois denying the power of the legis-
lature, by subsequent enactment, to legalize a municipal subscription
to railroad stock which would have been originally lawful if it had
been made, in the mode in which it was made, under legislative
authority previously granted. (2) In such case this court is at liberty
to exercise its independent judgment as to the validity of such cura-
tive statutes. (3) The act of March 31, 1869, is not in violation of
the constitution of Illinois of 1848. It only gave effect to the wishes
of the corporate authorities—the electors-of Brimfield, as ascer-
tained in the customary mode. Bolles v. Brimfield, 759.