[naming the association] theretofore duly organized and established,
and then existing and doing business at [naming the place] under the
laws of the United States," sufficiently states that that bank was orga-
nized under the national banking act, or to carry on the business of
banking under a law of the United States. Ib.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
INFORMER.
See INTERNAL REVENUE.
1. Answers to questions propounded by insurers in an application for life
insurance, unless they are clearly shown by the form of the contract
to have been intended by both parties to be warranties, to be strictly
complied with, are to be construed as representations, as to which
substantial truth in everything material to the risk, is all that is re-
quired of the applicant. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 183.
2. When upon the face of an application for life insurance, a direct ques-
tion of the insurers appears to be not answered at all, or to be imper-
fectly answered, the issue of the policy without further inquiry is a
waiver of the want or imperfection of the answer, and renders the
omission to answer more fully immaterial. Ib.
3. A policy of life insurance stated that it was issued and accepted by the
assured upon certain express conditions, one of which was that "if
any of the declarations or statements made in the application for the
policy, upon the faith of which this policy is issued, shall be found in
any respect untrue, this policy shall be null and void." The applica-
tion contained a number of printed questions “to be answered by the
person whose life is proposed to be insured," and "declared that the
above are fair and true answers to the foregoing questions," and that
it was agreed by the applicant "that this application shall form the
basis of the contract for insurance," " and that any untrue or fraudu-
lent answers, or any suppression of facts" should avoid the policy.
One of those questions was: "Has any application been made to this
or any other company for assurance on the life of the party? If so,
with what result? What amounts are now assured on the life of the
party, and in what companies?" To this question the applicant
answered, “$10,000, Equitable Life Assurance Society." A policy of
that society was in fact the only other existing insurance. Held: that
the answers were not warranties, but representations; and that the
issue of a policy without further inquiry, was a waiver of the right of
the insurers to require further answers as to the particulars mentioned
in this question, and estopped them to set up that the omission, though
intentional, to disclose unsuccessful applications for additional insur-
ance was material and avoided the policy. Ib.
4. The acceptance by insurers of payment of a premium, after they know
that there has been a breach of a condition of the policy, is a waiver
of the right to avoid the policy for that breach. Ib.
5. Where the declaration in an action on a policy of insurance alleges that
the consideration of the contract was the payment of a certain pre-
mium at once, and of future annual premiums, and the policy given
in evidence is expressed to be made "in consideration of the repre-
sentations made in the application for the policy" and of the sums
paid and to be paid for premiums, and this application contains no
promise or agreement of the assured, there is no variance. Ib.
6. A policy of insurance against "bodily injuries, effected through exter-
nal, accidental and violent means," and occasioning death or complete
disability to do business; provided that "this insurance shall not ex-
tend to death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in
part by bodily infirmities or disease, or by suicide, or self-inflicted in-
juries;" covers a death by hanging one's self while insane. Acci-
ent Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 527.
7. Statements in an application for a policy of insurance, expressing the
applicant's understanding of what will be the effect of the insurance,
cannot control the legal construction of the policy afterwards issued
and accepted, although the application warrants the facts stated therein
to be true, and the policy is expressed to be made "in consideration of
the warranties made in the application." Ib.
INTEREST.
See RAILROAD, 1;
SUBROGATION.
On the 29th April, 1871, A gave notice to a collector of internal revenue of
frauds upon the revenue by a railroad company, whereby it had be-
come liable to penalties. In consequence of this information, an
action was commenced for the recovery of the penalties, which re-
sulted in a compromise in June, 1874, and the payment of a sum by
the company in discharge of its liability. A applied for the inform-
er's share of this sum under the provisions of § 179, act of June 30,
1864, 13 Stat. 305, as amended by the act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat.
145. It was conceded that A was the informer as claimed, and that
he was entitled to the amount claimed, if the duty and power to
make the payment were not taken away by § 39 of the act of June 6,
1872, 17 Stat. 256, repealing those previous provisions. Payment was
refused at the treasury, whereupon claimant bronght suit in the Court
of Claims, and obtained judgment for the recovery of his claim. On
appeal this court affirms that judgment by a divided court. United
States v. Ramsay, 214.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
See LAW OF NATIONS;
LOCAL LAW, 1;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6, 7, 8, 9.
1. A judgment entered upon motion of defendant's attorney of record that
"it appearing that the subject-matter in this suit has been adjusted
and settled by the parties, it is therefore ordered that this cause be,
and the same is, hereby dismissed," is a judgment on the merits, final
in form and nature, and is a bar to a subsequent suit against the de-
fendant for the same cause of action. This rule also prevails in
Nevada by statute. Gen. Stat. Nevada, 1885, § 3173. United States
v. Parker, 89.
2. The difference between a retraxit and a non-suit pointed out. Ib.
3. A judgment recovered in one court may be pleaded as a defence to a
suit on the same cause of action pending in another, when by law the
cause of action is merged in the judgment. Schuler v. Israel, 506.
4. The question of what is a final decree, from which an appeal can be
taken, considered. Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 649.
5. The denial of compulsory process to enable a person charged with crime
to obtain witnesses at the trial in the court below, does not invalidate
the judgment. Ex parte Harding, 782.
See CORPORATION, 4;
JURISDICTION A, 3;
PROBABLE CAUSE, 2.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.
1. In an action in which a jury has been waived in writing, and the judg
ment of the Circuit Court is for more than $5000, the question whether
the facts set forth in a special finding of the court are sufficient in law
to support the judgment may be reviewed on writ of error, without
any bill of exceptions or Certificate of Division of Opinion. Allen v.
St. Louis Bank, 20.
2. An averment in a motion for a new trial (contained in a record, brought
up in error from a state court) that a statute of the state upon which
the suit was based is "unconstitutional and void," may apply to the
constitution of the state, and, taken by itself, raises no question for
decision below, which this court can review in error. Kansas Endow-
ment Association v. Kansas, 103.
3. The judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of the United States,
sitting in a particular state, are to be accorded in the courts of that
state, whether as the foundation of an action, or of a defence, either
by plea or in proof, such effect, and such effect only, as would be ac-
corded in similar circumstances to the judgments and decrees of a
state tribunal of equal authority; and whether such due effect has
been given by a state court to a judgment or decree of a court of the
United States is a Federal question within the jurisdiction of this
court, on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State. Crescent
City Co. v. Butchers' Union Co., 141.
4. Where a District Court in the Territory of Utah refuses to issue a writ
of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom, an appeal
lies to this court from its order and judgment of refusal. In re Snow,
274.
5. An action at law in a state court of California by A against B, to re-
cover the value of a crop raised on land occupied by B who claims as
preemptor, adversely to A, claiming under the state, by B's labor and
at B's expense, does not involve the title to the land, and the issue
presents no Federal question. Martin v. Thompson, 376.
6. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, affirmed on the point that this court
cannot discharge ou habeas corpus a person imprisoned under the
sentence of a Circuit or District Court, in a criminal case, unless the
sentence exceeds the jurisdiction of that court, or there is no authority
to hold the prisoner under sentence. Ex parte Harding, 782.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus to determine whether one of the crew of a foreign ves-
sel in a port of the United States, who is in the custody of the state
authorities, charged with the commission of a crime, within the port,
against the laws of the state, is exempt from local jurisdiction under
the provisions of a treaty between the United States and the foreign
nation to which the vessel belongs. Wildenhus's Case, 1.
2. The parties in this case on both sides being all citizens of Louisiana, it
is held that the facts as stated in the opinion of the court show no real
and substantial dispute or controversy arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, so as to authorize the removal of the
case from the state court of Louisiana, to the Circuit Court of the
United States. Gibbs v. Crandall, 105.
3. An averment that the complainant in a bill of equity "resides" in a
state is not an averment that he is a citizen of the state, so as to give
a Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction over the subject-
matter by reason of citizenship of the parties. Everhart v. Huntsville
College, 223.
4. When the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court depends upon the citizenship of
the parties, and that court takes jurisdiction and renders judgment,
and the record in this court in error or on appeal fails to show the
requisite citizenship, the judgment will be reversed and the case re-
nanded by this court on its own motion, and the party in default
adjudged to pay costs here. Ib.
5. An order drawn upon a county treasurer by county officials in favor of
A or order unindorsed, and a like order in favor of A, both assigned
by A to B for a valuable consideration, constitute no cause of action
in B's favor on which B can maintain an action in a Circuit Court of
the United States on the ground of citizenship, if A could not main-
tain the action there on the same ground; and if, in such action in
B's favor A's necessary qualification of citizenship does not affirma-
tively appear in the record in this court, the writ of error will be dis-
missed whether the question of jurisdiction be made or not, and plain-
tiff in error adjudged to pay costs in this court. King Bridge Co. v.
Otoe County, 225.
6. This suit is brought to compel state officers to do what a statute of the
state requires them to do, and is not a suit against the state, but
against the officers. Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 390.
7. A Circuit Court of the United States cannot acquire jurisdiction, by re-
moval from a state court, under § 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137
(18 Stat. 470) of an original proceeding to obtain a mandamus against
the treasurer or the board of supervisors of a city, to compel them to
take action, in accordance with a statute of the state, to pay the inter-
est or principal of bonds issued by the city. Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 450.
8. Section 716 of the Revised Statutes, giving power to a Circuit Court to
issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be
necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law, construed in connection with §§ 1 and 2
of the act of 1875, operates to prevent the issuing by the Circuit Court
of a writ of mandamus, except in aid of a jurisdiction previously ac-
quired by that court. Ib.
9. In an action to recover less than $5000, in which the defendant asks for
judgment upon a counterclaim for more than that sum, and the Cir-
cuit Court renders a general judgment for the plaintiff, a writ of error
sued out by the defendant is within the jurisdiction of this court,
under the act of February 15, 1875, c. 77, § 3. Dushane v. Benedict,
630.
C. OF TERRITORIAL Courts.
A territorial court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to try a person in-
dicted for a criminal offence by the fact that an alien sat on the grand
jury that found the indictment, under a provision of a territorial statute
permitting it. Ex parte Harding, 782.
D. OF STATE COURTS.
See TREATY.
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