ments were in excess of the authority of the trial court, the writ was
refused. On appeal to this court, Held, (1) There was but one entire
offence for the continuous time. (2) The trial court had no jurisdic-
tion to inflict a punishment in respect of more than one of the convic-
tions. (3) As the want of jurisdiction appeared on the face of the
proceedings, the defendant could be released from imprisonment on a
habeas corpus. (4) The order and judgment of the court below must
be reversed, and the case be remanded to that court, with a direction
to grant the writ of habeas corpus prayed for. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10, 11;
COURT AND JURY;
EVIDENCE, 3;
INDICTMENT;
JUROR, 2;
STATUTE, B, 1, 2, 3.
1. Wool of the third class was dutiable under § 1 of the act of March 2,
1867, c. 197, 14 Stat. 560, at three cents per pound, if its value at the
last port or place whence exported into the United States, excluding
charges in such port, was twelve cents or less per pound; and at six
cents per pound, if such value exceeded twelve cents per pound. On
January 5, 1874, such wool, bought in Russia, in October, 1873, the
actual cost of which, exclusive of charges, was below twelve cents per
pound, at the time and place of exportation, was entered at the custom-
house at the port of New York, at an invoice value stated in Russian
silver roubles. The collector computed the rouble at 77.17 cents, under
the authority of a proclamation to that effect made by the Secretary of
the Treasury in December, 1873, in pursuance of an estimation of the
value of the rouble for the year 1874, made by the director of the mint,
as required by the act of March 3, 1873, c. 268, 17 Stat. 602. Prior to
that act the value of the rouble had been fixed by statute at seventy-
five cents. If the rouble had been computed at seventy-five cents, the
invoice value of the wool would have been less than twelve cents per
pound. Computing it at 77.17 cents raised such invoice value above
twelve cents per pound. The collector exacted a duty of six cents per
pound. In an action to recover back the excess of duty over three
cents per pound, Held, (1) The effect of the act of 1873 was to repeal
the prior statute; (2) the requirement of § 7 of the act of March 3,
1865, c. 80, 13 Stat. 493, forbade the assessment of duty on an amount
less than the invoice or entered value; (3) the collector was, therefore,
required to compute the rouble at 77.17 cents, although the cost of the
goods, computing the rouble at seventy-five cents, was twelve cents or
less per pound. Heinemann v. Arthur, 82.
2. Construing together §§ 2931 and 3011 of the Revised Statutes, the de-
cision of the Secretary of the Treasury, on an appeal from a collector
of customs, as to the rate and amount of duties, is not final and con-
clusive, except in a case where, after a protest and appeal, a payment
of duties is made in order to obtain possession of goods, and then a
suit is not brought to recover back the duties within the times and
under the limitations prescribed by § 2931. United States v. Schle-
singer, 109.
3. Such decision is not final, in a suit brought by the United States against
an importer, where, on entering goods, he paid the estimated duties,
and the goods were delivered to him, and on a reliquidation of the
entry further duties were assessed, and he duly protested, and appealed
to the Secretary, who sustained the action of the collector, the suit be-
ing brought to recover such further duties. Ib.
4. In such suit the defendant may show, as a defence, that the further
duties were illegally assessed. Ib.
5. Webbing made of india-rubber, wool, and cotton, and known as "wool
elastic webbing," is not subject to duty as webbing made of wool, or
of which wool is a component material, at fifty cents per pound and in
addition thereto fifty per cent. ad valorem; but as webbing composed
wholly or in part of india-rubber, at thirty-five per cent. ad valorem.
Beard v. Nichols, 260.
6. Punchings and clippings of wrought iron boiler plates and of wrought
sheet iron, left after the completion of the process of the manufacture
of the boiler plates into boilers, and of the ends of bridge-rods and
beams of wrought iron, cut off to bring the rods and beams to the re-
quired length and to remove imperfections, were in "actual use,"
within the meaning of the statute, in the manufacture of those respec-
tive things, and on importation into the United States are subject to
duty as "wrought scrap iron." Schlesinger v. Beard, 264.
DAMAGES.
See ASSUMPSIT, 1, 2;
EVIDENCE, 9.
DEED.
1. A deed, dated May 26, 1856, by C. L., grantor, described as "sister and
heir-at-law of H. M.," and as "of the county of St. Clair and state of
Michigan," which conveyed to the grantee a tract of land in Illinois,
and was signed and sealed by C. L. and by W. L., the name of W. L. not
appearing in the granting clause of the deed, and which was acknowl-
edged May 27, 1856, by said "C. L. and W. L. her husband," held
sufficient to pass said title of husband and wife, under the statute of
Illinois of February 22, 1847, then in force, respecting the conveyance
of lands or real estate situate in Illinois by a feme covert not residing
within the state, and respecting her joining with her husband in the
execution of the deed. Schley v. Pullman Car Company, 575.
2. A magistrate's certificate, attached to a deed of land in Illinois, that on
the 27th of May, 1856, personally came C. L. and W. L., her husband,
"known to me to be the persons who executed the foregoing instru-
ment, and acknowledged the same to be their free act and deed," is
equivalent to stating that they came before the officer, and were per-
sonally known to him to be the real persons who subscribed the deed,
and in this respect complied with the requirements of the statutes of
Illinois then in force. Ib.
3. An officer's certificate of the acknowledgment on the 27th May, 1856, of
a deed of land in Illinois by a married woman, showing her privy ex-
amination separate and apart from her husband, and which shows
that she, "fully understanding the contents of the foregoing instrument,
acknowledged," &c., is a sufficient compliance with the statutes of the
state in force at that time respecting the communicating the contents
of such a deed to her. Ib.
The question whether either of the counts in an indictment charges an
offence under the laws of the United States, is too vague and general
to be certified in a Certificate of Division of Opinion. United States v.
Northway, 327.
EJECTMENT.
See EVIDENCE, 5, 6, 7, 8;
LOCAL LAW, 6, 11, 12, 14.
1. The city of Quincy, Illinois, in 1877 contracted with an Illinois corpora-
tion to supply it with gas for four years. Disputes arose, payments
were in arrear, and in May, 1881, the city notified the company that it
would be no longer bound by the contract. A, a citizen of Alabama,
on the 13th August, 1885, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, setting forth
that the company had a claim against the city recoverable at law, that
he had at different times tried to induce the directors to enforce it,
that he was, and for more than four years had been, a stockholder in
the company, that he had not succeeded in inducing the directors to
institute suit, that his last request was made August 1, 1885, and that
the claims were about to be barred by the statute of limitations, and he
asked for a mandamus to compel the payment of the company's debt.
The respondent demurred. This court sustains the demurrer, on the
ground that the real contest being between two Illinois corporations,
the proper remedy was an action at law by one of those corporations
against the other upon the contract, and that A has not, by the aver-
ments in his bill, brought himself within the directions prescribed by
Equity Rule 94, 104 U. S. ix-x, respecting suits brought by stock-
holders in a corporation against the corporation and other parties,
founded on rights which might be properly asserted by the corpora-
tion. Quincy v. Steel, 241.
2. At the hearing upon a plea in equity and a general replication, no fact is
in issue but the truth of the matter pleaded. Farley v. Kittson, 303.
3. A bill in equity to enforce a contract between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants to purchase for their joint benefit the bonds, secured by
mortgages, of two railroads, of one of which the plaintiff was receiver,
and of the other general manager under the trustees in the mortgage,
alleged that he performed the agreement on his part; that the defend-
ants purchased the bonds through an agent of the bondholders, and
afterwards purchased the railroads under decrees of foreclosure, and
entered into possession and made large profits, and refused to account
to the plaintiff for his share; and that the plaintiff, pleading the nego-
tiations for the purchase of the bonds, informed the agent of the bond-
holders of his interest, and at all times answered to the best of his
knowledge and ability all inquiries of the bondholders or their agent,
or of the trustees or any person interested in the property, and always
acted honestly and in good faith towards all such persons. The de-
fendants filed a plea, averring that neither the agent nor the bond-
holders had any notice of the plaintiff's interest until after the sale of
the railroads under the decrees of foreclosure, and that the agreement
sued on was a breach of his trusts as receiver and as manager, and did
not entitle him to relief in equity. A general replication was filed,
and at the hearing the truth of the fact averred in the plea was dis-
proved. Held, that the plea must be overruled, and the defendants
ordered to answer the bill. lb.
4. A court of equity will not assist one who has slept upon his rights, and
shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. Speidel v. Henrici,
5. If a bill in equity shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of
lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objec-
tion may be taken by demurrer. Ib.
6. A bill in equity against persons holding a fund avowedly in trust for
the common benefit of the members of a voluntary association, living
together as a community and subject to its regulations, cannot, whether
the trust is lawful or unlawful, be maintained by one who has left the
community, and for fifty years afterwards taken no step to claim any
interest in the fund. Ib.
See EQUITY PLEADING;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 1, 4, 5;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2.
1. A bill in equity against husband and wife by the assignees in bank-
ruptcy of the husband, which alleges that the husband before the
bankruptcy transferred a large amount of personal property in the
form of bonds, stocks, &c., to the wife for the purpose of concealing
the same from his creditors, and delaying, hindering, and defrauding
them, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, and which does not de-
scribe the property, but avers inability to do so, and which waives
answer under oath and asks as relief for a transfer to the assignee of
the property in whatever form it may exist, as assets of the bank-
rupt, sets forth no case for relief in equity, and should be dismissed on
demurrer. Huntington v. Saunders, 78.
2. Objections to the equity of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in his bill,
cannot be taken by plea. Farley v. Kittson, 303.
3. A plea in equity, though under oath, and negativing a material aver-
ment in the bill, is no evidence in the defendant's favor. Ib.
See EQUITY, 2, 3, 4, 5;
ESTOPPEL.
See JUDGMENT, 1.
The refusal of the court to instruct the jury, at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence, that he is not entitled to recover, cannot be assigned for
if the defendant afterwards introduces evidence.
Co. v. Crandal, 527.
1. In an action by an attorney to recover for services rendered in defending
a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon a tract of land near a
large town, and in preventing the foreclosure, and in bringing about
a favorable sale of the property, evidence as to the character of the
land and its possible value as a future suburb of the town is admissi-
ble. Forsyth v. Doolittle, 73.
2. As the length of hypothetical statements presented to a witness to
ascertain his opinion upon any matter, growing out of the facts sup-
posed, necessarily depends upon the simple or complicated character
of the transactions recited, and upon the number of particulars which
must be considered for the formation of the opinion desired, it must
in a great degree be left to the discretion of the court; and in this
case that discretion was properly exercised. Ib.
3. Evidence, or what purports to be evidence, in a criminal case, printed in
a newspaper, is a statement in a public journal" within the meaning
of the act of Utah declaring that no person shall be disqualified as a
juror by reason of his having formed or expressed an opinion upon
the matter or cause to be submitted to him, "founded upon public
rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety, provided
it appear to the court, upon his declaration under oath or otherwise,
that he can and will, notwithstanding such an opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matters submitted to him." Hopt v. Utah, 430.
4. The opinion of a physician, after making a post-mortem examination of
the deceased, who came to his death by a blow inflicted upon his head,
as to the direction from which the blow was delivered, is admissible
in evidence. Ib.
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