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Opinion of the Court.

of which the selection was made, should be found outside the Mexican grant, the United States would accept that in lieu of the selected land, and confirm the selection. If, however, there was no such sixteenth or thirty-sixth section, and the land certified was held by an innocent purchaser from the state for a valuable consideration, such purchaser would be allowed to purchase the same from the United States at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres for any one person.

The statute relates only to such selections as had been certified to the state, and, taken as a whole, it meets the requirements of all the cases of defective selection which could be so certified. These are: 1. Cases where the state was entitled to indemnity, but the selection was defective in form; 2. Cases where the original school sections were actually in place, and the state was not entitled to indemnity on their account; and 3. Cases where the state was not entitled to indemnity, because there never had been such a section sixteen or section thirty-six as was represented when the selection was made and the official certificate given. As to the first of these classes, the certificate was simply confirmed because the state was entitled to its indemnity, and nothing was needed to perfect the title but a waiver by the United States of all irregularities in the time and manner of the selections. As to the second, the selection was confirmed, and the United States took in lieu of the selected land that which the state would have been entitled to but for the indemnity it had claimed and got. In its effect this was an exchange of lands between the United States and the state. And as to the third, in lieu of confirmation, bona fide purchasers from the state were given the privilege of perfecting their titles by paying the United States for the land at a specified price. Under these circumstances, it was a matter of no moment to the United States whether the original selection was invalid for one cause or another. If the state was actually entitled to indemnity, it was got, and the United States only gave what it had agreed to give. If the state claimed and got indemnity when it ought to have taken the

Opinion of the Court.

original school sections, the United States took the school sections and relinquished their rights to the lands which had been selected in lieu. And if the state had claimed and sold land to which it had no right, and for which it could not give school land in return, an equitable provision was made for the protection of the purchaser by which he could keep the land, and the United States' would get its value in money. In this way all defective titles, under the government certificates, would be made good without loss to the United States.

It may be, as was claimed in argument, that when the bill was originally prepared the framer had it in mind only to pro

vide for selections made in lieu of school sections within Mexican grants before the final survey of the grants, and for selections made in lieu of sections not finally included within the survey of a grant; but to our minds it is clear that before the bill finally became a law, Congress saw that, as ample provision had been made for the protection of the United States in all cases, it was best to include all certificates which were defective, no matter for what cause, and so the words " or are otherwise defective or invalid" were added in what seemed to be the most appropriate place to carry that purpose into effect. No selection was made good unless it had been certified, and not then unless the United States got an equivalent either in land or in money, or in carrying out their original school-land grant. In this way the titles of all bona fide purchasers from the state were or could be perfected without loss to the United States, and that, we have no doubt, was the intention of Congress when the statute was enacted.

It is true that Durand and Thompson had entered on the land, and had excluded Martin from the possession, before the statute was passed, but that gave them no rights either under this statute or any other. As we have already shown, their entry was of no avail under the general preëmption laws, and this statute saves the rights of no homestead or preëmption settlers, except such as had entered on the lands in good faith prior to the date of their certification to the state.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

MARTIN v. THOMPSON.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.

Submitted January 24, 1887. — Decided February 7, 1887.

An action at law in a state court of California by A against B, to recover the value of a crop raised on land occupied by B who claims as preëmptor, adversely to A, claiming under the State, by B's labor and at B's expense, does not involve the title to the land, and the issue presents no Federal question.

THIS was a motion to dismiss, united with a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Mich. Mullany for the motion.

No appearance against it.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by Martin, the defendant in error in Durand & Thompson v. Martin, just decided, to recover of Thompson, one of the plaintiffs in error, a crop of wheat raised by him during the year 1878 on the land described in that case, which he took from the possession of Martin in 1876, and occupied adversely thereafter. The court has found as a fact that Martin never had possession of the crop before the commencement of this suit, and that it was raised by Thompson with his own labor and at his own expense while he held exclusive possession of the land adversely to Martin and claiming title.

From this it is clear that the question of the title to the land was not necessarily involved in this case, and on looking into the opinion, which in California forms part of the record, we find that the decision was put entirely on the ground that the owner of land out of possession cannot recover from one in possession, holding adversely under claim of title, the crops raised by him in cultivating the soil. The remedy in such a

Statement of Facts.

of the posses

case is by an appropriate action for the recovery of the sion of the land and damages for the detention. This does not present a Federal question, and

The motion to dismiss is granted.

SPEIDEL v. HENRICI.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Argued December 14, 1886. - Decided March 7, 1887.

The general rule that express trusts are not within the statute of limitations does not apply to a trust openly disavowed by the trustee with the knowledge of the cestui que trust.

Implied trusts are barred by lapse of time.

A court of equity will not assist one who has slept upon his rights, and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them.

If a bill in equity shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer.

A bill in equity against persons holding a fund avowedly in trust for the common benefit of the members of a voluntary association, living together as a community and subject to its regulations, cannot, whether the trust is lawful or unlawful, be maintained by one who has left the community, and for fifty years afterwards taken no step to claim any interest in the fund.

THIS was a bill in equity, filed June 7, 1882, by Elias Speidel, a citizen of Ohio, against Jacob Henrici and Jonathan Lenz, trustees of the Harmony Society of Beaver County in the State of Pennsylvania, and citizens of Pennsylvania, and containing the following allegations:

That the plaintiff's parents lived in the kingdom of Wurtemburg in Germany up to the year 1804, "engaged in farming and well to do, and without any education or knowledge of the world or of business, but devout Christians, members of the Established Protestant Church of that country, and earnest seekers after spiritual light and their salvation."

That at the same time there lived in the same neighbor

Statement of Facts.

hood one George Rapp, "a farmer and vintner, of an education superior to that of the plaintiff's parents and of the simple farming people of that country, and who was a person of great intellectual power, clear-sighted, sharp-witted, eager for superiority, and a born leader of men.”

That about 1800 Rapp, without license or ordination, and in violation of law, began to preach clandestinely to his countrymen, including the plaintiff's parents, and "preached to them the doctrine that the Lord had chosen him as their spiritual leader, that the second advent of Christ and the beginning of the millennium, as taught by the Revelation of St. John, was near at hand, and that, in order to be saved from eternal damnation, it would be necessary for them to separate from the established church of their country, to form a settlement by themselves under his guidance and control, and thus fit themselves for the second coming of Christ and accomplish their salvation."

That Rapp, "by means of such clandestine teachings, and by the exercise of strong will power over the weaker minds of his said disciples, obtained such overpowering influence over about three hundred families of them," including the plaintiff's parents, that he caused them to separate from their established church, to believe in and accept Rapp as their only spiritual leader and as a necessary medium of their salvation, and to believe that it was necessary for their salvation that they should sell all their land and possessions for cash in hand, leave their country and friends, and, "as the chosen of the Lord, form a colony by themselves, either in the Holy Land or in the United States of America, in which places Christ would first reappear on earth;" that during the year 1804 and 1805, "in pretended furtherance of the said pretended plan of their salvation," Rapp made about one hundred and twentyfive families of them, the plaintiff's parents included, sell all their land and possessions, emigrate to the United States, and settle near Zelienople, in Butler County, in the State of Pennsylvania, upon a wild, uncultivated tract of land, selected by said Rapp and by him called Harmony, "where the plaintiff was born, in the year 1807, and where he was raised;" and

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