cisely the same as those applied to the determination of the same question in the supreme court, and the adjudicated cases are indiscriminately cited and apply to the question in relation to the jurisdiction of both courts.14 The rules of the common law distinguishing between joint and several causes of action and joint and several liability are also applied to the determination of the question.15 14 Walter v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 147 U. S. 370-375 (37: 206); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391-392 (37:494); Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631647 (39:289); Fishback v. Western Union Tel. Co., 161 U. S. 96-101 (40: 630); Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Cannon, sheriff, 164 U. S. 319324 (41:451); Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353-368 (41: 186); McDaniel v. Taylor, 196 U. S. 415-431 (49:533); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U. S. 379 (45:583). Cranch, 229 15 Green v. Liter, 251 (3:545); Tupper v. Wise, 110 U. S. 398 (28:189); Lynch v. Bailey, 110 U. S. 400 (28:190); Friend v. Wise, 111 U. S. 797 (28:602). In Green v. Liter, supra, the supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, and answering a certified question, can the demandant join in the writ and count several tenants claiming under several distinct, separate and independent original titles, all of which interfere with the land of the demandant? said: "As to the second question, we are of opinion that, at common law, a writ of right will not lie, except against the tenant of the freehold demanded. If there are several tenants claiming several parcels of land by distinct titles, they cannot lawfully be joined in one writ. If the demandant demands against any tenant more land than he holds, he may plead non-tenure as to the parcel not holden; and this plea, by the ancient common law, would have abated the whole writ. But the statute 25 Edw. 3 (St. 5, ch. 16), which may be considered a part of our common law, having been in force at the emigration of our ancestors, cured the defect, and declared that the writ should abate only as to the parcel whereof non-tenure was pleaded, and admitted or proved." And after stating that the state of Kentucky, where the case arose, had enacted substantially the statute of Edward, Justice Story continued: "At common law, in many instances, if the party demanded in his writ more than he proved was his right, he lost the action by the falsity of his writ. It was to cure this ancient evil that the act of Kentucky was made. It enables the party to recover, although he should prove only part of the claim in his declaration. But it does not intend to enable him to join parties in an action who could not be joined at the common law. It could no more entitle a demandant in a real action to recover against several tenants claiming by separate and distinct titles, than it could entitle a plaintiff to maintain a joint action of assumpsit, where the contracts were several and inde § 730. Same-Same-Rule when amount is to be determined from the face of a pleading.-It is settled that when the amount in controversy is to be determined from the face of a pleading, if from the nature of the case stated in the pleading there could not legally be a judgment recovered for the jurisdictional amount, the court cannot take jurisdiction, although the damages be laid in the declaration at a larger sum; but if upon the case stated there could legally be a recovery for the amount necessary to confer jurisdiction, and that amount is claimed by the plaintiff, then, upon an inspection of the pleading, the plaintiff's allegations control and the jurisdiction of the court will attach.16 § 731. Same Same Same Cases justifying exemplary damages. If the plaintiff's declaration states a case which, in law, justifies the recovery of exemplary damages, and claims an amount sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and the amount in dispute is to be determined from the face of the pleading, then, in such case, the allegations and claim of plaintiff are, for jurisdictional purposes, controlling and give the court jurisdiction, although it appears from the declaration that the claim for damages is greatly in excess of his actual, direct and immediate pecuniary loss caused by the wrongful acts of defendant, and the recovery upon a trial upon the merits is very much less than the jurisdictional amount.1 § 732. Same Same-Rule when amount is to be determined upon an issue of fact.-When the amount in dispute is to be ascertained upon an issue of fact raised by a plea to the jurisdiction or a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, stating that the amount of damages laid in the declaration are colorable and have been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case within the jurisdiction of the court, and that the suit does not really and pendent. Infinite inconvenience and mischief would result from such a construction; and we should not incline to adopt it unless it were unavoidable." 16 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550-566 (29:729); Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 468-481 (42: 1111); North American Transp. & T. Co. v. Morris, 178 U. S. 262-269 17 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550-566 (29:729); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58-107 (41:632). substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the court, then the rule is that the court must proceed upon ascertained facts established according to the fixed rules of evidence, and the court must find as a matter of fact, upon evidence legally sufficient, that the amount of damages laid in the declaration was colorable, and laid beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case within the jurisdiction of the court; and, in the absence of such finding, the allegations and claim of the plaintiff, being legally sufficient to justify a recovery equal to the jurisdictional amount, will control and give the court jurisdiction.18 § 733. Same Same Rule when there are several parties plaintiffs or defendants.-When two or more plaintiffs join in one suit, each suing upon a separate and distinct cause of action, or upon a separate and distinct title, upon which each might have sued in separate actions, then, and in such case, the matter in dispute as to each plaintiff, upon his separate and distinct cause of action or title, must, in order to maintain the jurisdiction as to him, exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and the sum or value of the separate claims of the different plaintiffs cannot be added together to make up the jurisdictional amount; and when two or more defendants are sued in one suit, each being sued upon a separate and distinct cause of action, or upon a separate and distinct title, upon which each might have been sued in a separate action, then, and in such case, the matter in dispute as to each defendant, upon the separate and distinct cause of action or title upon which he is sued, must, in order to maintain the jurisdiction of the court as to him, exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and the sum or value of the separate claims of the different defendants cannot be added together to make up the jurisdictional amount. But where two or more plaintiffs claim under the same title or cause 18 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550-566 (29:729); Wetmore v. Ry. ner, 169 U. S. 115-128 (42:682); Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 241260 (33:923); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58-107 (41:632); Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632-646 (51: 19 565); 1 Bates Fed. Eq. Proc. secs. 250, 251, 253. 19 Walter V. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370-375 (37:206); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391-392 (37:494); Fishback v. Western Union T. Co., 161 of action, and the determination of the suit necessarily involves the validity of the title or action sued on, then in such case the jurisdiction will be maintained as to all of the plaintiffs, if the aggregate of the matters in dispute as to all of them exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, even though the claim of no one of them is equal to or exceeds the jurisdictional amount; and when two or more defendants, having separate interests are sued upon a joint title or a joint cause of action, upon which they are all jointly liable, and the determination of the suit necessarily involves the validity of that title or cause of action, and the enforcement of their joint liability, then, in such case, the court has jurisdiction as to all of the defendants if the aggregate of the matters in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, although the claim of no one of them exceeds that amount.20 § 734. Same-Same-When interest is a principal demand, and when an accessory demand.-The federal judiciary act, in fixing the jurisdictional amount, requires that the matter in dispute must exceed, "exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars;" but interest may be, according to the circumstances of the case, a principal demand, or an accessory demand, and when it takes the character of the former it should be estimated as a part of the principal debt, and so estimated in determining the amount in dispute, whilst interest as an accessory demand can never be computed in determining the jurisdiction.21 The distinction between interest as a principal and as an accessory demand, is aptly illustrated by cou U. S. 96-101 (40:630); Citizens' 20 McDaniel v. Taylor, 196 U. S. 415-431 (49:533); Shields V. Thomas, 17 How. 3-6 (15:93); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214229 (44::741); Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464-483 (34:1044); Wash- 21 Edwards v. Bates County, 163 . pons attached to negotiable bonds. Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money on a given day, and being drawn and executed in a form and mode that they may be separated from the bond, they are negotiable instruments, and a suit may be maintained on them without the necessity of producing the bonds to which they were attached. Each matured coupon upon a negotiable bond is a separable promise, distinct from the promise to pay the bond or other coupon, and gives rise to a separate cause of action. Not only may a suit be maintained upon an unpaid coupon in advance of the maturity of the principal debt, but the holder of such coupon is entitled to recover interest thereon from its maturity. It results, logically, that when the interest evidenced by a coupon has become due and payable, the demand based upon the promise contained in it has ceased to be a mere incident of the principal indebtedness represented by the bond, and has itself become a principal obligation. It has, therefore, been held that in determining the amount in dispute, in a suit on a negotiable bond, the amount of the matured interest coupons attached to the bond may be added to the bond as a part of the principal debt.22 It has also been held that in an action for damages for a breach of warranty of title of land, interest on the amount of money paid by plaintiff for the land is a principal demand and a part of his damages to be added to the price paid in determining the matter in dispute, and whether or not that amount is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.23 § 735. Same-Jurisdictional amount not required in ancillary suits. The jurisdictional amount specified in section one of the present judiciary act applies to suits commenced by original process, and not to ancillary suits; for, in the latter class of suits, the court has jurisdiction without regard to the sum or value in dispute, or the citizenship of the parties or the nature of the suit. An ancillary suit is a dependency upon some other suit or proceeding commenced, by original process, and in which the jurisdictional facts existed, and the jurisdiction of the court based on those facts extends to and supports the authority of the court over the dependent suit or proceeding, the very idea of ancillary jurisdiction embodying the principle of a continuity 22 Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. S. 269-273 (41:155). 23 Brown v. Webster, 156 U. S. 328-330 (49:440). |