as the remonstrance was dated on the 14th of June, and was confessed privately by Mr. to have been in possession of the delegates on Monday last, an unfairness was complained of. They supposed that, if it had been laid before Congress sooner, the copy which would have been sent by the Virginia delegates might hasten the opening of the land-office of that state. Mr. CLARK said, there were still good prospects, and he did not doubt that the time would yet come when Congress would draw a line, limiting the states to the westward, and say, "Thus far shall ye go, and no farther."

Mr. BEDFORD moved, that, with respect to the fourth and fifth conditions of the cessions, "it be declared, that Clark and his men, and the Virginia line, be allowed the same bounty beyond the Ohio as was allowed by the United States to the same ranks." This motion was seconded by Mr. Congress adjourned without debating it; there being seven states only present, and the spirit of compromise decreasing.

From several circumstances, there was reason to believe that Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, if not Maryland also, retained latent views of confining Virginia to the Alleghany Mountains.

Notice was taken by Mr. MADISON of the error in the remonstrance, which recites "that Congress had declared the cession of Virginia to be a partial one.” 49

SATURDAY, June 21..

The mutinous soldiers presented themselves, drawn up in the street before the state-house, where Congress had assembled. The executive council of the state, sitting under the same roof, was called on for the proper interposition. President DICKINSON came in, and explained the difficulty, under actual circumstances, of bringing out the militia of the place for the suppression of the mutiny. He thought that, without some outrages on persons or property, the militia could not be relied on. General St. Clair, then in Philadelphia, was sent for, and desired to use his interposition, in order to prevail on the troops to return to the barracks. His report gave no encouragement.

In this posture of things, it was proposed by Mr. IZARD, that Congress should adjourn. It was proposed by Mr. HAMILTON, that General St. Clair, in concert with the executive council of the state, should take order for terminating the mutiny. Mr. REED moved, that the general should endeavor to withdraw the troops by assuring them of the disposition of Congress to do them justice. It was finally agreed, that Congress should remain till the usual hour of adjournment, but without taking any step in relation to the alleged grievances of the soldiers, or any other business whatever. In the mean time, the soldiers remained in their position, with out offering any violence, individuals only, occasionally, uttering offensive words, and wantonly pointing their muskets to the windows of the hall of Congress. No danger from premeditated violence was apprehended, but it was observed that spirituous drink, from the tippling-houses adjoining, began to be liberally served out to the soldiers, and might lead to hasty excesses. None were committed, however, and, about three o'clock, the usual hour, Congress adjourned; the soldiers, though in some instances offering a mock obstruction, permitting the members to pass through their ranks. They soon afterwards retired themselves to the barracks.

In the evening Congress re assembled, and passed the resolutions on the Journal, authorizing a committee to confer anew with the executive of the state, and, in case no satisfactory grounds should appear for expecting prompt and adequate exertions for suppressing the mutiny, and supporting the public authority, authorizing the president, with the advice of the committee, to summon the members to meet at Trenton or Princeton, in New Jersey.

The conference with the executive produced nothing but a repetition of doubts concerning the disposition of the militia to act unless some actual outrage were offered to persons or property. It was even doubted whether a repetition of the insult to Congress would be a sufficient provocation.

During the deliberations of the executive, and the suspense of the committee, reports from the barracks were in constant vibration. At one moment, the mutineers were penitent and preparing submissions; the next, they were meditating more vioent measures. Sometimes, the bank was their object; then the seizure of the members of Congress, with whom they imagined an indemnity for their offence might be

stipmated. On Tuesday, about two o'clock, the efforts of the state authority being despaired of, and the reports from the barracks being unfavorable, the committee advised the president to summon Congress to meet at Trenton, which he did verbally as to the members present, leaving behind him a general proclamation for the press. After the departure c Congress, the mutineers submitted, and most of them accepted furloughs under the resolution of Congress on that subject. At the time of submission, they betrayed their leaders, the chief of whom proved to be a Mr. Carbery, a deranged officer, and a Mr. Sullivan, a lieutenant of horse; both of whom inade their escape. Some of the most active of the sergeants also ran off.50

MONDAY, February 19, 1787.*

Mr. PINCKNEY, in support of his motion entered on the Journal for stopping the enlistment of troops, argued that he had reason to suppose the insurrection in Massachusetts, the real though not ostensible object of this measure, to be already crushed; that the requisition of five hundred thousand dollars for supporting the troops had been complied with by one state only, viz. Virginia, and that but in part; that it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men who could neither be paid, clothed, nor fed, and that such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the consequences could not be foreseen, of imbodying and arming men under circumstances which would be more likely to render them the terror than the support of the government. We had, he ob

served, been so lucky in one instance- meaning the disbanding of the army on the peace as to get rid of an armed force without satisfying their just claims; but that it would not be prudent to hazard the repetition of the experiment.

Mr. KING made a moving appeal to the feelings of Congress, reminding them that the real object in voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions of the government of Massachusetts; that the silent coöperation of these military preparations under the orders of Congress had had a great and double effect in animating the government and awing the insurgents; that he hoped the late success of the former had given a deadly blow to the disturbances, yet that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could exist as to the critical fact, to withdraw the cooperating influence of the federal measures. He particularly and pathetically entreated Congress to consider that it was in agitation, and probably would be determined, by the legis lature of Massachusetts, not only to bring to due punishment the more active and leading offenders, but to disarm and disfranchise, for a limited time, the great body of them; that for the policy of this measure he would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that there were great and illustrious examples against it; that his contidence, however, in the prudence of that government, would not permit him to cal their determinations into question; that what the effect of these rigors might be it was impossible to foresee. He dwelt much on the sympathy which they probably would excite in behalf of the stigmatized party; scarce a man was without a father, a brother, a friend, in the mass of the people; adding that, as a precaution against contingencies, it was the purpose of the state to raise and station a small military force in the most suspected districts, and that forty thousand pounds, to be drawn from their impost on trade, had been appropriated accordingly; that under these cir cumstances a new crisis more solemn than the late one night be brought on, and therefore to stop the federal enlistments, and thereby withdraw the aid which had been held out, would give the greatest alarm imaginable to the government and its friends, as it would look like a disapprobation and desertion of them; and, if viewed in that light by the disaffected, might rekindle the insurrection. He took n tice of the possibility to which every state in the Union was exposed of being visited with similar calamities; in which event they would all be suing for support in the same strain now used by the delegates from Massachusetts; that the indulgence now requested in behalf of that state might be granted without the least inconvenience to the United States, as their enlistments, without any countermanding orders, would not go on whilst those of the state were in competition; it being natural for men to prefer the latter service, in which they would stay at home, and be sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might, with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight the Indians. He concluded with the most earnest entreaties, and the fullest confidence, that Congress would not, at so critical a moment, and without any ne

cessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring them that, in three or four weeks, possibly in less time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would promote it.

Mr. PINCKNEY, in reply, contended, that if the measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as had been stated, he did not think the United States bound to give them countenance. He thought them impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius of free governments; and if fresh commotions should spring from their. that the state of Massachusetts alone should be at the charge, and abide by the consequences of their own misconduct.

Mr. MADISON would not examine whether the original views of Congress, in the enlargement of their military force, were proper or not; nor whether it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible preparation against the Indians. He admitted, indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile an interference of Congress in the internal controversies of a state with the tenor of the Confederation, which does not authorize it expressly, and leaves to the states all powers not expressly delegated, or with the principles of republican governments, which, as they rest on the sense of the majority, necessarily suppose power and right always to be on the same side. He observed, however, that, in one point of view, military precautions on the part of Congress might have a different aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from any foreign quarter, which of necessity extended itself to the federal concerns, Congress were bound to guard against it; and although there might be no particular evidence in this case of such a meditated interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to take advantage of events in this country, to warrant precautions against her. But, waiving the question as to the original propriety of the measure adopted, and attending merely to the question whether at this moment the measure ought, from a change of circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to think it would be more advisable to suspend than to go instantly into the rescision. The considerations which led to this opinion were — First. That, though it appeared pretty certain that the main body of the insurgents had been dispersed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of them were still in arms in disaffected places.

Secondly. That great respect is due on such occasions to the wishes and representations of the suffering member of the federal body, both of which must be judged of by what comes from her representatives on the floor. These tell us that the measures taken by Congress have given great sit sfaction and spirits to their constituents, and have cooperated much in baffling the views of their internal enemies; that they are pursuing very critical precautions at this moment for their future safety and tranquillity; and that the construction which will be put on the proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot fail to make very unhappy impressions, and may have very serious consequences. The propriety of these precautions depends on so many circumstances better known to the government of Massachusetts than to Congress, that it would be premature in Congress to be governed by a disapprobation.

Thirdly. That every state ought to bear in mind the consequences of popular commotions, if not thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene of them. Every state ought, therefore, to submit with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had been a witness of the temper of his own state (Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood by the legislature that the real object of the military preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massachusetts, and that very consideration inspired the ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on tobacco, which would not have been granted for scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax operating very partially, in the opinion of the people of that state who cultivate that article; yet this class of the legislature were almost unanimous in making the sacrifice, because the fund was considered as the most certain that could be provided.

Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments, for the reasons given, would be suspended without an order from Congress; in which case, the inconvenience suggested would be saved to the United States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satished, at the same time.

Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the troops, an they could be dismissed at any time, the objections drawn from the consideration of expense would have but

little force.

Sixthly. That it was contended for a continuance of the apparent aid of Con. gress for only three or four weeks, the members from Massachusetts themselves considering that as a sufficient time.

After the rejection of the motion, as stated on the Journal, a dispute arose whether the vote should be entered among the secret or public proceedings. Mr. PINCKNEY insisted that, in the former case, his view, which was to justify himself to hi constituents, would be frustrated. Most of those who voted with him were opposed to an immediate publication. The expedient of a temporary concealment was proposed as answering all purposes,51

Nothing of consequence was done.

TUESDAY, February 20.

WEDNESDAY, February 21.

The report of the convention at Annapolis, in September, 1786, had been long under the consideration of a committee of Congress for the last year, and was referred over to a grand committee of the present year. The latter committee, after considerable difficulty and discussion, agreed on a report, by a majority of one only, (see the Journal,) 52 which was made a few days ago to Congress, and set down as the order for this day. The report coincided with the opinion, held at Annapolis, that the Confederation needed amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most eligible means of effecting them. The objections which seemed to prevail against the recommendation of the convention by Congress were, with some, that it tended to weaken the federal authority by lending its sanction to an extra-constitutional mode of proceeding; with others, that the interposition of Congress would be considered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish to get power into their hands by any plan whatever that might present itself. Subsequent to the report, the delegates from New York received instructions from its legislature to move in Congress for a recommendation of a convention; and those from Massachusetts had, it appeared, received information which led them to suppose it was becoming the disposition of the legislature of that state to send deputies to the proposed convention, in case Congress should give their sanction to it. There was reason to believe, however, from the language of the instruction from New York, that her object was to obtain a new convention, under the sanction of Congress, rather than to accede to the one on foot; or, perhaps, by dividing the plans of the states in their appointments, to frustrate all of them. The latter suspicion is in some degree countenanced by their refusal of the impost a few days before the instruction passed, and by their other marks of an unfederal disposition. The delegates from New York, in consequence of their instructions, made the motion on the Journal to postpone the report of the committee, in order to substitute their own proposition. Those who voted against it considered it as liable to the objection above mentioned. Some who voted for it, particularly Mr. MADISON, considered it susceptible of amendment when brought before Congress; and that if Congress interposed in the matter at all, it would be well for them to do it at the instance of a state, rather than spontaneously. This motion being lost, Mr. DANE, from Massachusetts, who was at bottom unfriendly to the plan of a convention, and had dissuaded his state from coming into it, brought forward a proposition, in a different form, but liable to the same objection with that from New York. After some little discussion, it was agreed on all sides, except by Connecticut, who opposed the measure in every form, that the resolution should pass as it stands on the Journal, sanctioning the proceedings and appointments already made by the states, as well as recommending further appointments from other states, but 'n such terms as do not point directly to the f rmer appointments.

It appeared from the debates, and still more from the conversation among the members, that many of them considered this resolution as a deadly blow to the existing Confederation. Dr. JOHNSON, who voted against it, particularly declared himself to that effect. Others viewed it in the same light, but were pleased with it as the harbinger of a better Confederation.

The reserve of many of the members made it difficult to decide their real wishes and expectations from the present crisis of our affairs. All agreed and owned that the federal government, in its existing shape, was inefficient, and could not last long. The members from the Southern and Middle States seemed generally anxious for some republican organization of the system which would preserve the Union, and give due energy to the government of it. Mr. BINGHAM alone avowed his wishes

that the Confederacy might be divided into several distinct confederacies, its great extent and various interests being incompatible with a single government. The eastern members were suspected by some of leaning towards some anti-republican establishment, (the effect of their late confusions,) or of being less desirous or hope. ful of preserving the unity of the empire. For the first time, the idea of separate confederacies had got into the newspapers. It appeared to-day under the Boston head. Whatever the views of the leading men in the Eastern States may be, it would seem that the great body of the people, particularly in Connecticut, are equally indisposed either to dissolve or divide the Confederacy, or to submit to any anti-republican innovations.53

Nothing noted till

TUESDAY, March 13.

Colonel GRAYSON and Mr. CLARK having lately moved to have the military stores at Springfield, in Massachusetts, removed to some place of greater security, the motion was referred to the secretary at war, who this day reported against the same, as his report will show. No opposition was made to the report, and it seemed to be the general sense of Congress that his reasons were satisfactory. The movers of the proposition, however, might suppose the thinness of Congress (eight states only being present) to bar any hope of successful opposition.

Memorandum. Called with Mr. Bingham to-day on Mr. Guardoqui, and had a long conversation touching the western country, the navigation of the Mississippi, and commerce, as these objects relate to Spain and the United States. Mr. Bingham opened the conversation with intimating, that there was reason to believe tho western people were exceedingly alarmed at the idea of the projected treaty which was to shut up the Mississippi, and were forming committees of correspondence, &c., for uniting their councils and interests. Mr. Guardoqui, with some perturbation, replied, that, as a friend to the United States, he was sorry for it, for they mistook their interest; but that, as the minister of Spain, he had no reason to be so. The result of what fell in the course of the conversation from Mr. Madison and Mr. Bingham was, that it was the interest of the two nations to live in harmony; that if Congress were disposed to treat with Spain on the ground of a cession of the Mississippi, it would be out of their power to enforce the treaty; that an attempt would be the means of populating the western country with additional rapidity; that the British had their eye upon that field, would countenance the separation of the western from the eastern part of North America, promote the settlement of it, and hereafter be able to turn the force springing up in that quarter against Spanish America, in coöperation with their naval armaments; that Spain offered nothing in fact to the United States in the commercial scale which she did not grant to all the other nations from motives of interest.

Mr. Guardoqui would not listen to the idea of a right to the navigation of the Mississippi by the United States, contending, that the possession of the two banks at the mouth shut the door against any such pretension. Spain never would give up this point. He lamented that he had been here so long without effecting any thing, and foresaw that the consequences would be very disagreeable.

What would those consequences be? He evaded an answer by repeating general expressions. Spain could make her own terms, he said, with Great Britain. He considered the commercial connection proposed as entirely in favor of the United States, and that in a little time the ports of Spain would be shut against fish. He was asked, whether against all fish, or only against fish from the United States. From all places not in treaty, he said, with Spain. Spain would act according to her own ideas. She would not be governed by other people's ideas of her interest.

He was very sorry for the instructions passed by Virginia; he foresaw bad consequences from them. He had written to soften the matter as well as he could, but that troops and stores would certainly reinforce New Orleans in consequence of the resolutions.

He had not conferred at all with the minister of foreign affairs since October, and did not expect to confer again. He did not expect to remain much longer in America. He wished he might not be a true prophet; but it would be found that we mistook our interest, and that Spain would make us feel the vulnerable side of cur commerce by abridging it in her ports.

With an air of ostensible jocoseness, he hinted that the people of Kentucky would 9

VOL. V.

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