The true question is, whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes by which the end of a general government can be attained: the first, by coercion, as proposed by Mr. Patterson's plan; the second, by real legislation, as proposed by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended, also, to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood, and riot in the spoils of their fellow-citizens, and consequently train them up for the service of ambition. We must resort, therefore, to a national legislation over individuals; for which Congress are unfit. To vest such power in them would be blending the legislative with the executive, contrary to the received maxim on this subject. If the union of these powers, heretofore, in Congress has been sufe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body. Congress are, moreover, not elected by the people, but by the legislatures, who retain even a power of recall. They have, therefore, no will of their own; they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the views of the states, who are always encroaching on the authority of the United States. A provision for harmony among the states, as in trade, naturalization, &c.; for crushing rebellion, whenever it may rear its crest; and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes can never be given to a body inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for, notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A national government alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establishing one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair." The committee rose, and the House adjourned.

113

MONDAY, June 18.

In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph. On motion of Mr. DICKINSON, to postpone the first resolution in Mr. Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following, viz.

"That the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the government of the United States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, and the prosperity of the Union,"

the postponement was agreed to by ten states; Pennsylvania divided. Mr. HAMILTON had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities, age, and experience, rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs; and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own state, to whose sentiments, as expressed by his colleagues, he could by no means accede. The crisis, however, which now

marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety and happiness. He was obliged, therefore, to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from New Jersey, being fully convinced that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the states in possession of their sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand, he confessed he was much discouraged, by the amazing extent of country, in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted. As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions and reasonings too subtle. A federal government he conceived to mean an association of independent communities into one. Different confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances, the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others, over individuals, as in the German Diet, and among ourselves, in cases of piracy. Great latitude, therefore, must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs, itself, from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed, more over, with the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) that we owed it to our country to do, on this emergency, whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The states sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said, that the states cannot ratify a plan not within the purview of the Article of the Confederation providing for alterations and amendments. But may not the states themselves, in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists' in 'the legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large? In the senate of New York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding until it should be referred to the people and ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned against it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.

The great question is, what provision shall we make for the happiness of our country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans, prove that there were essential defects in both, and point out such changes as might render a national one efficacious. The great and essential principles necessary for the support of government are - 1. An active and constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the states, in favor of the federal government. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts, their particular plans of finance, &c. All these, when opposed to, invariably prevail over, the requisitions and plans of Congress. 2. The love of power

Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle The states have constantly shown a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them, than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the control of the general government. It remarked, too, that the citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the general government as of the particular governments. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former, would still leave the purposes of government attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a state as Virginia will be in a few years a few compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency! 3. Ap habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the state government. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people; its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize and endear a government to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. Force, by which may be understood a coercion of laws, or coercion of arms. Congress have not the former, except in few cases. In particular states, this coercion is nearly sufficient; though he held it, in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Massachusetts is now feeling this necessity, and making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the states collectively? It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers, also, will not be idle spectators. They will interpose; the confusion will increase; and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. Influence, he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors and emoluments which produce an attachment to the government. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the states; and must continue so as long as the states continue to exist. All the passions, then, we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the states, and do not flow into the stream of the general government. The former, therefore, will generally be an overmatch for the general government, and render any confederacy in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphictyonic Council had, it would seem, ample powers for general purposes. It had. in particular, the power of fining and using force against delinquent members. What was the consequence? Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip. at length, taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The Ger man confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charle magne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs, however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has

succeeded; which, though aided by a prince, at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illus tration of the weakness of confederated governments. Other exam ples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss Cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another. How then are all these evils to be avoided? Only by such a complete sovereignty in the general government as will turn all the strong principles and passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of New Jersey produce this effect? Does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary, it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others, It gives a direct revenue to Congress, but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions ; which experience proves cannot be relied on. If states are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object, of the supplies; and will grant or not grant, as they approve of disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas, too, must, in the nature of things, be so unequal, as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France, or England, with other countries of Europe; Pennsylvania with North Carolina; will the relative pecuniary abilities, in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land? Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule, and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends, too, on situation. Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina, not being commercial states, and contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will, and must, fail in their duty. Their example will be followed, and the union itself be dissolved. Whence, then, is the national revenue to be drawn? From commerce; even from exports, which, notwithstanding the common opinion, are fit objects of moderate taxation; from excise, &c. &c.- These, though not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small states. It is not in human nature that Virginia and the large states should consent to it; or, if they did, that they should long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a government, though slow, are sure in their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Congress at present have a right to keep ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. Patterson's plan provides no remedy. If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Congress is such, that they could never be properly and effectually exercised. The members of Congress, being chosen by the states and subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the

powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power, whatever be its form, if it preserves itself, must swallow up the state powers. Otherwise, it will be swallowed up by them. It is against all the principles of a good government, to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Congress. Two sovereignties cannot coexist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congress must eventuate in a bad government, or in no government. The plan of New Jersey, therefore, will not do. What, then, is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the country to be governed discouraged him. The expense of a general government was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expense, on the side of the state governments, as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great economy might be obtained by substituting a general government. He did not mean, however, to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand, he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities, he was aware, would be necessary. There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But cui bono the vast and expensive apparatus now appertaining to the states? The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the first branch could only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars, or thereabouts, he supposed, would be the utmost. The Senate, he feared, from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers, who wish for particular offices under the government.

This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a republican government could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion, he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British government was the best in the world; and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place, and was still going on. It was once thought, that the power of Congress was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed. were as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British constitution-namely that it is the only government in the world "which unites public strength with individua! security." In every community where industry is encouraged, there