Let it have a negative, in all cases whatsoever, on the legislative acts of the states, as the king of Great Britain heretofore had. This I conceive to be essential, ana the least possible abridgment of the state sovereignties. Without such a defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper will be unavailing. It will also give internal stability to the states. There has been no moment, since the peace, at which the federal assent would have been given to paper money, &c. &c.

Let this national supremacy be extended also to the judiciary department. If the judges in the last resort depend on the states, and are bound by their oaths to them and not to tite Union, the intention of the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the policy or prejudices of the states. It seems at least essential that an appeal should lie to some national tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or inhabitants of other states. The admiralty jurisdiction may be fully submitted to the national government.

A government formed of such extensive powers ought to be well organized. The legislative department may be divided into two branches - one of them to be chosen every years by the legislatures, or the people at large; the other to consist of a more select number, holding their appointments for a longer term, and going out in rotation. Perhaps the negative on the state laws may be most conveniently lodged in this branch. A council of revision may be superadded, including the great ministerial officers.

A national executive will also be necessary. I have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed.

An article ought to be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquillity of the states against internal as well as external dangers.

To give the new system its proper energy, it will be desirable to have it ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by that of the legislatures.

I am afraid you will think this project, if not extravagant, absolutely unattainable, and unworthy of being attempted. Conceiving it myself to go no farther than is essential, the objections drawn from this source are to be laid aside. I flatter myself, however, that they may be less formidable on trial than in contemplation. The change in the principle of representation will be relished by a majority of the states, and those too of most influence. The Northern States will be reconciled to it by the actual superiority of their populousness; the southern by their expected superiority on this point. This principle established, the repugnance of the large states to part with power will in a great degree subside, and the smaller states must ultimately yield to the predominant will. It is also already seen by many, and must by degrees be seen by all, that, unless the Union be organized efficiently on republican principles, innovations of a much more objec ionable form may be obtruded, or, in the most favorable event, the partition of the empire into rival and hostile confederacies will ensue.

DEBATES

IN THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.

INTRODUCTION.

NOTE.-The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the handwriting of Mr. Madison. As it traces the causes and steps which led to the meeting of the Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of that body. The paper bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion, that it was written at a late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of ill health combined with his great age in preventing a final revision of it.

As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association of individuals under a common authority, whereby each may have. the protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy in safety within the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of the necessaries and comforts of life; in like manner feeble communities, independent of each other, have resorted to a union, less intimate, but with common councils, for the common safety against powerful neighbors, and for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient history furnishes examples of these confederate associations, though with a very imperfect account of their structure, and of the attributes and functions of the presiding authority. There are examples of modern date also, some of them still existing, the modifications and transactions of which are sufficiently known.

It remained for the British Colonies, now United States of North America, to add to those examples one of a more interesting character than any of them; which led to a system without an example ancient or moderna system founded on popular rights, and so combining a federal form with the forms of individual republics, as may enable each to supply the defects of the other and obtain the advantage of both.

Whilst the colonies enjoyed the protection of the parent country, as it was called, against foreign danger, and were secured by its superintending control against conflicts among themselves, they continued independent of each other, under a common, though limited, dependence on the parental authority. When, however, the growth of the offspring in strength and in wealth awakened the jealousy, and tempted the avidity, of the parent into schemes of usurpation and

exaction, the obligation was felt by the former of uniting their coun sels and efforts, to avert the impending calamity.

As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a design in the British government to levy contributions on the colonies without their consent, a meeting of colonial deputies took place at Albany, which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights from violation. The attempt had no other effect than, by bringing these rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attachment to them, on the one side, and to nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the other.62

In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in the open assertion of her pretensions, and the apprehended purpose of otherwise maintaining them by legislative enactments and declarations, had been such, that the colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; without, however, losing sight of an eventual reconciliation. 63

The dissuasive measures of that Congress being without effect, another Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about a change in the views of the other party being equally unavailing, and the commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an end to all hope of reconciliation, the Congress, finding, moreover, that the popular voice began to call for an entire and perpetual dissolution of the political ties which had connected them with Great Britain, proceeded, on the memorable Fourth of July, 1776, to declare the thirteen colonies Independent States.

During the discussions of this solemn act, a committee, consisting of a member from each colony, had been appointed, to prepare and digest a form of Confederation for the future management of the common interests, which had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided by the exigencies of the contest, and by the known intentions or occasional instructions of the colonial legislatures.

It appears that, as early as the 21st of July, 1775, a plan, entitled "Articles of Confederation and perpetual union of the Colonies," had been sketched by Dr. Franklin-the plan being on that day submitted by him to Congress, and, though not copied into their Journals, remaining on their files in his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term "perpetual" observed in the title, the articles provided expressly for the event of a return of the colonies to a connection with Great Britain.64

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the committee on the 12th of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress in the handwriting of Mr. Dickinson. The plan, though dated after the declaration of independence, was probably drawn up before that event, since the name of colonies, not states, is used throughout the draught.65 The plan reported was debated and amended from time to time, till the 17th of November, 1777, when it was agreed to by

Congress, and proposed to the legislatures of the states, with an explanatory and recommendatory letter.66 The ratifications of these, by their delegates in Congress, duly authorized, took place at successive dates, but were not completed till the 1st of March, 1781, when Maryland, who had made it a prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired from the British crown should be a common fund, yielded to the persuasion that a final and formal establishment of the federal union and go nment would make a favorable impression, not only on other foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself.67

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the federal system as to obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred from the long interval and recurring discussions between the commencement and completion of the work; from the changes made during its progress; from the language of Congress when proposing it to the states, which dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system acceptable to all of them; from the reluctant assent given by some, and the various alterations proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others, again, which produced a special address to them from Congress, enforcing the duty of sacrificing local considerations and favorite opinions to the public safety and the necessary harmony nor was the assent of some of the states finally yielded without strong protests against particular articles, and a reliance on future amendments removing their objections. It is to be recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned, in some degree, by an occupation of the public councils, both general and local, with the deliberations and measures essential to a revolutionary struggle; but there must have been a balance for these causes in the obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular and efficient government; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and pretensions which might be inflexible in another state of things.

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the progress, and retarded the completion, of the plan of Confederation, may be traced to-first, the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their military or free population; fourthly, the selection and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal head, and safe to the several members.

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such confederacies, were added two others -one of a temporary, the other of a permanent nature. The first was the case of the crown lands, 30 called because they had been held by the British crown, and, being ungranted to individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by the states within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as devolving on them; whilst it was contended by the others that, being wrested from the dethroned authority by the equal exertions of all, they resulted of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands

being of vast extent, and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion and heart-burning, and proved the most obstinate of the impediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of federal government. The state of Maryland, the last that acceded to it, held out, as already noticed, till the 1st of March, 1781, and then yielded only to the hope that, by giving a stable and authoritative character to the Confederation, a successful termination of the contest might be accelerated. The dispute was happily compromised by successive surrenders of portions of the territory by the states having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by Congress.

The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some of the states, which, having no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia and South Car olina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. The articles of Confedera. tion provided no remedy for the complaint, which produced a strong protest on the part of New Jersey, and never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction and discord, until the new constitution superseded the old.

But the radical infirmity of the "Articles of Confederation" was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its requisitions by so many independent communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congress continued to circulate, they were employed as a sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that ceased to be the case, and the fatal defect of the political system was felt in its alarming force, the war was merely kept alive, and brought to a successful conclusion, by such foreign aids and temporary expedients as could be applied a hope prevailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it, would give to the Confederacy, in practice, the efficiency which had been inferred from its theory.

The close of the war, however, brought no cure for the public embarrassments. The states, relieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign power, instead of a diminished disposition to part with it, persevered in omissions and in measures incompatible with their relations to the federal government, and with those among themselves.

Having served as a member of Congress through the period between March, 1780, and the arrival of peace, in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted with the public distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy by new grants of power to Congress. I had found, moreover, that despair of success hung over the compromising principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities, which had been so elab