Genesis, on which you found your notion of two natures in man, and find no authority for its support. We have seen that there is no more evidence that man was created in Jesus Christ, than there is that he was created in himself; that the two first chapters of Genesis allude to the same events; that there is no more proof that men were created spiritual beings, than there is that the brutes were created such; that what is ascribed to man in the first chapter, is as indicative of a corporeal body, as what is ascribed to him in the second; that the words create and form have one and the same meaning in Moses' account, and that on your system it is hardly possible to give them different significations; that all your arguments prove too much, and of course prove nothing at all ;— In word, that your whole scheme of two distinct, complex natures in man, is nothing but a phantom too mystical for belief.

Having shown that the idea of two natures in man, the one created and pure, the other formed and sinful, is unfounded, we will now inquire further into the truth of your repeated assertion, that all sin originates in the flesh. Though you lay this down as an axiom, it is a position which is by no means admitted. Before attending to this particular, we will observe, that this is a necessary part of the two natures in man. This grows out of your notion of the formation of man. If what has been offered against that visionary idea be valid, the point we are now upon, is already decided. Every argument which weighs against one, opposes the other. Now we ask proof of the assertion that all sin originates in the flesh. This assertion, though constantly made, is not accompanied with evidence. You will probably say, that sin arises from lust, and lust originates in the flesh. To this let it be replied, that lust, or temptation, selfconsidered, is not vicious. It is no crime in me that an evil suggestion presents itself to my mind. It is the

assent of the mind to the suggestion, or the resolution to commit the act, which constitutes the criminality. The body is a mere instrument in the hands of the mind, if I may so express it. An act of the body, considered by itself, is neither virtuous nor vicious. It is the motive or disposition of the mind, which gives the character to the act. Take away the motive of the mind, and the act has no more character, either good or bad, than the drawing of the breath, or the motion of the eyelids. This is the common sense of mankind; this principle is ever admitted in all courts of justice.

If sin lies in the act of the body, then the surgeon who amputates, is as guilty as the felon who breaks a limb of his victim, and the sheriff is as guilty as the murderer he executes. But there is no end of examples of this, nature, all of which show the absurdity of the principle I am opposing. It is so obvious that sin lies in the motive of the mind, and not in the act of the body, that it seems a waste of time to labor this point any further. You yourself, when your system is out of view, contend for the principle I here advocate. When opposing the infinity of sin, you say, "It will be granted on all sides, that no action, unconnected with design, ought to be considered sin; it is then an evil intention that constitutes an evil action. For instance, a man exerting himself to the utmost of his abilities to save the life of his neighbor, accidentally takes his life; the consequence is not the guilt of murder, but a heartaching grief for the loss of his friend. Again, a man exerting himself with all his ingenuity and strength to take the life of his neighbor, misses his intention, and saves his life from immediate danger; the consequence is not the approbation of a good conscience for having saved the life of his neighbor, but condemnation for having designed his death, and perhaps mortification in his disappointment. By these instances the reader may

see that no act can be determined to be morally good or evil by the consequences which follow, but only by the disposition or intention which the actor possesses, when the act is done." Again you say, "The fact is, the moral distinction between virtue and vice, is the difference between meaning well and meaning evil.Ӡ

In these passages you declare in the most unequivocal manner, that every moral act proceeds from the evil intention, disposition, or motive of the mind, and not from the act of the body. According to your confession, an act is criminal, not because it was suggested by any bodily appetite, but because the motive of the mind was evil. You say that an act can be determined to be good or bad, "only by the disposition or intention" of the actor; and this you lay down as an established principle, which "will be admitted on all sides." Thus, Sir, when your mind is free from the bias of system, we find you advocating views which appear rational and self-evident to every reflecting man. You ascribe all moral actions, and consequently all sin, to the evil disposition of the mind. And if all sin proceeds from the evil intentions of the mind, then surely it does not proceed from the appetites of the body. As it is unphilosophical to admit of any effect without an adequate cause, so it is equally unphilosophical to ascribe any effect to more than one adequate cause. So after ascribing every sinful act to the evil disposition of the mind, it would be absurd to ascribe it to any other cause. Once more; you ascribe sin to ignorance. Your words are these "Ignorance was and ever is the cause of sin."+ I will not in this place attempt to show the impropriety of this statement, but will observe that ignorance, as far as it is any thing, is a state or condition of the mind, and not of the body. Knowledge is a mental acquisi+ U. Mag. vol. IV. p. 153.

Aton. pp. 21, 22.
Lect. p. 10.

tion, and as ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, so it must be a state, not of the body, but of the mind. Hence sin cannot proceed from the body.

Perhaps you may say, though the immediate cause of sin may be the evil design or motive of the mind, still its more remote cause may be the wants and appetites of the flesh, for without these no evil action would be committed. This does not affect the argument in the least. For if the wants and appetites of our nature move us to action, this action is not sinful till such a character is given it by the motive or intention of the mind. We are free to acknowledge, that the wants of our nature move us to action, and this activity is a duty. Our wants then only impel us to action, and were it not for the evil disposition of the mind, we should act aright. For instance, the appetite, hunger, prompts us to obtain food, but it does not prompt us to steal. Theft is suggested by the evil disposition of the mind, and not by hunger; for hunger would have been as well satisfied with the food obtained lawfully, as with that got by stealth. The most that can be said of our appetites, is, that they impel us to action; but whether the act is good or bad, depends entirely on the intention of the actor. If an act be criminal, because its remote cause is the wants and appetites of our nature, then all actions are criminal; for in a certain sense all actions proceed from the wants and imperfections of men. These remarks will meet your approbation; for you say, "The most distant of the immediate causes of sin, are the same as the most distant of the immediate causes of virtue." After instancing a case of two laborers, one of whom made a bad, the other a good use of his earning, you add; "The reader may see that those two men acted equally alike from their natural wants, appetites, and passions. Had neither of them any wants, appetites, or passions, neither of them would have done any thing

at all. Therefore we see that want, appetite, and pas sion in one produced virtue, and in the other, vice; bu still the more immediate causes were not the same i both persons.""*

Here you admit that sin arises from our appetites an passions no more than virtue. Good actions arise from the flesh in the same sense that bad ones do. So fa then, as actions proceed from the wants and appetites our nature, so far they possess no moral character; s far they are neither virtuous nor vicious. The sam earthly nature which produces one, produces the othe also. But you say, "the immediate causes are different. True, but what are these immediate causes? The cannot be our appetites and passions; for you acknow ledge that these produced virtue in one person. appetites and passions produced virtue in one, and vic in the other, then they could not be the sole cause either. There must be some other cause which renders on action good, and the other bad. And what is this cause You have confessed that it is the disposition or motiv of the mind, and that only, which renders an act vicious Thus it will be seen according to your own confession that sin does not arise from the flesh, any more tha virtue, and that all sin is produced by the evil disposi tion or motive of the mind. After the arguments have adduced, and these concessions on your part, wha becomes of your numerous assertions, that all sin arise from the flesh? Will you still maintain that idea, an continue to contradict what you have said in thes passages ?

But there are various other arguments which migh be alledged to confute this notion. If vice lies in temptation or the possession of appetites, then Jesu Christ was a sinner; for the was tempted in all points as

Aton pp. 41, 42.

Apostle testifies that h we are, and yet withou