CHAP. IV. not been experienced in it at all. It may have PART I. been experienced in some of its subordinate arguments; but subordinate arguments are subordinate considerations. In philosophy and science, we are supposed to speak, first, of first principles; and, certainly, there is no savour of the philosophy of Newton in this first, fundamental principle, or root, of the mineral geology. But it will be highly important that we should proceed further with this subject, and that we should investigate the cause of this extraordinary discordance; in order that we may ascertain, precisely, how it has come to pass, that the mineral geology, while it professed, and while it really intended, to follow the method of analysis and induction taught by Newton, should nevertheless have concluded in direct contradiction to him. It will, perhaps, say, that it draws its conclusions from a series of facts and observations which were wholly unknown to the age of Newton; that if Newton had lived to witness the vast progress that physical science has made in mineralogy and chemistry since his time, he would have changed in toto, or, at least, would have very materially modified, his conclusion. But, I reply; that it could only urge that plea, by continuing under the same misapprehension of Newton's principles, which has CHAP. IV. PART 1. already caused it to conclude in contradiction to him. Those principles, with relation to the great question with which we are engaged, are not alterable by any possible contingency in the progress of the physical sciences. They are derived from a far higher science, a science which must ever govern and control the natural sciences. His "rules of philosophizing," though prefixed, and immediately applied by himself to the mathematical science, are not, therefore, exclusively mathematical; they are general rules, deduced from that universal science which Bacon denominates, prima philosophia;" viz. the science of universal logic, that is, of universal and immutable reason1. 66 1 1 Regula philosophandi:-Reg. 1. "More causes of natural things ought not to be admitted, than are true, and suffi"cient for explaining their phænomena. Reg. 2. "Therefore, to natural things of the same kind, "the same causes ought to be assigned, as far as it is pos "sible. 86 Reg. 3. " Qualities of bodies which cannot be increased or lost, and which pertain to all bodies which we can "subject to our experiment, are to be accounted qualities of "all bodies universally. Reg. 4. "In experimental philosophy, propositions, drawn "from phænomena by induction, are to be accounted as "true, either strictly, or nearly approaching to it, until other phænomena occur, by which they may be rendered either more accurate, or open to exceptions." 66 CHAP. IV. Mineralogy, however valuable and excellent PART 1. in its own proper sphere, is, in itself, merely a physical science; the science of mineral characters and mineral qualities; and if it reasons wrong within its sphere, it can never transmute its false reasoning into true reasoning, by virtue of any physical resources of its own: whereas, Newton's philosophy, being essentially logical, that is, rational, possessed always a rectifying and conservative principle within itself. In Newton, intuitive logic was dominant; and mathematics were the steps by which his logic ascended to the elevation to which it attained; in the mineral geology, physical impressions are dominant, and logic is only an artificial instrument which it seeks to employ for arranging those impressions. How many eminent mathematicians had seen apples fall to the ground, before the intuitive logic of Newton apprehended the phænomenon? How different that logic was from the logic of the mineral geology, we have seen by the difference of their conclusions. CHAP. V. CHAPTER V. PART I. IT will be easy to point out, according to the preceding distinction, the cause of the signal contradiction thus subsisting between Newton and the mineral geology. It is simply this; that, in attempting to reason of the MODE of first formations, by Newton's method of analysis and induction, the mineral geology has not carried the process of analysis far enough back; whereas, Newton carried it as far back as it could extend. Let us hear Newton himself. 66 "By this way of analysis," said he, "we may "proceed from compounds to ingredients, and "from motions to the forces producing them; "and, in general, from effects to their causes, "and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the MOST GE NERAL. This is the method of analysis. And "the synthesis consists in assuming the causes, "discovered and established, as principles, and by them explaining the phænomena pro"ceeding from them, and proving the explanations 1." 66 66 To set this doctrine in all its light, I shall 1 Optics, lib. iii. in fin. subjoin the commentary of his exact reporter PART I. upon this passage. "In order to proceed with perfect security, "and to put an end for ever to disputes, he 66 proposed that, in our inquiries into nature, "the methods of analysis and synthesis should "be both employed in a proper order; that we "should begin with the phænomena or effects, "and from them investigate the powers or causes that operate in nature; that from 66 66 particular causes we should proceed to the "more general ones, till the argument end in "the most general: this is the method of analysis. Being once possessed of these causes, "that we should then descend, is a contrary order; and from them, as established prin 66 66 66 ciples, explain all phænomena that are their consequences, and prove our explanations: " and this is synthesis. It is evident, that as "in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, "the investigation of difficult things by the "method of analysis ought ever to precede the "method of composition, or the synthesis. For, "in any other way, we can never be sure that we assume the principles which really obtain in "nature; and that our system, after we have composed it with great labour, is not mere dream " and illusion1." 66 1 MACLAURIN, Account of Sir I. Newton's Phil. p. 9. CHAP. IV. |