real value as bases of comparative fighting power. The tables are to experts more remarkable for what they leave out than for what they contain. A single illustration will suffice for the present purpose. I will take the table (p. 552) in which the Renown and the Japanese ironclads are compared. Mr. Hurd appears to consider that it indicates some greatly superior constructive skill on the part of the designers of the Japanese ships. He is probably unaware of the history of this design. The Japanese naval authorities, after full investigation of various types of ironclads in existence, did us the honour to conclude that, on the whole, the Royal Sovereign class was to be preferred. They prepared a sketch design (based on the Royal Sovereign) in which they practically adopted the system of protection and armament which we had carried out in 1889. The secondary armament was almost identical with that of the Royal Sovereign. The principal armament was made practically the same as that which had been adopted by the Admiralty for the Majestic class. No handsomer acknowledgment of their obligation to us could have been made than was made by the Japanese. Their vessels were equipped, however, for service in home waters; they carried less weights of provisions, stores, and coal, and so were made of less 'displacement tonnage. For the benefit of the non-technical reader it may be explained that 'displacement' simply means the total weight of a ship and all she carries-propelling apparatus, coals, armament, armour, equipment of all kinds. The two eminent English firms to whom the construction of these Japanese vessels was entrusted undertook the responsibility of the designs and the fulfilment of the stipulated conditions. They have been eminently successful, but they must have been surprised to find themselves credited by Mr. Hurd with such a triumph over the Renown. Instead of being designed for service in home waters the Renown was avowedly built for service on distant foreign stations. Consequently she is equipped with weights of provisions, stores, &c., exceeding by more than 200 tons the corresponding weights in the Japanese ships. Besides this her steel hull is sheathed over with wood planking and coppered; so that she can keep the sea without foulness of bottom, and consequent loss of speed, for much longer periods than the Japanese ships, which are steel-bottomed. To provide the Renown with this sheathing involves not much less than 450 tons of weight, and probably from 25,000l. to 30,0007. in additional cost. Mr. Hurd does not mention this; perhaps he might have modified or omitted his reference to the Renown as 'the most expensive armoured vessel of her size' if he had realised the facts. He does admit that 'the Renown can carry considerably more coal' than the Japanese ships, but probably is not aware that, whereas the latter carry 700 tons on their displacement of about 12,400 tons, the Renown carries 1,200 to 1,300 tons on the same displacement. Summing up these excesses of load carried by the Renown, and necessary for the special services she was designed to fulfil on distant foreign stations, where independent sea-keeping for long periods might be required, it will be seen that she carries on the same displacement about 1,200 tons more than the Japanese shipsin the form of extra equipment, coals, and sheathing. The Japanese authorities were undoubtedly well advised in leaving their battle ships unsheathed, just as we do with our Channel and Mediterranean battle ships; and in accepting less weights of coal and equipment, since their ships were not intended to go far from their base of supplies. In this manner they were able to increase the weights assigned to armament and armour, and so to obtain increased fighting power. The weight assigned to propelling machinery was practically the same in the Renown and the Japanese ships. As Mr. Hurd says the ships are of approximately the same speed. Taking natural draught' in stokeholds, the Renown on trial had an advantage of about half a knot over the Yashima. The latter was run for a short time at higher 'forced draught' than is accepted in the Royal Navy, and much higher than in the corresponding trial of the Renown. This gave her a maximum speed of a little under 194 knots, as against 183 knots for the Renown. With equal forcing the development of power and speeds would be practically identical, and on service high forced-draught is not used. All this refers to the speeds with clean bottoms. When the ships had been two or three months out of dock the copper-sheathed Renown would 'have the heels' of the others, and after longer periods afloat her superiority in speed would rapidly increase. It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. It will be obvious that the differences between the British and Japanese ships are not due to any superior constructive skill, but simply to different distribution of the weights. In other words the keynote of the Renown's design was adaptability to carrying a specified armament and defensive armour, in association with qualities essential for distant foreign service. About two years later the Japanese decided to build their ships for service in home waters, and to restrict their supplies of coal and equipment, as well as to leave them unsheathed. They were thus able to increase the weight of armour and to mount 12-inch guns. For their purposes they were undoubtedly right; but the Renown can perform many services which would be impossible to the Japanese ships. Enough has been said to show how necessary it is for fairness of comparison to have full information respecting the designs of ships, their intended service, and how the displacement tonnage' is distributed. Such information is not afforded by Mr. Hurd's tables either for battle ships or cruisers. Did space permit, it could be shown for the latter how much is lacking, and how easy it is by reducing supplies of ammunition to increase the numbers or calibres of the guns. With the same total weight assigned to armament there is no difficulty in practically doubling the number of guns of a given calibre; but the table gives no indication of how the thing is done.' Of course it may be argued that in the Royal Navy unduly large supplies of ammunition are carried. That is an independent question, into which I will not enter, except to say that the existing regulations were laid down after full consideration by the highest naval authority. It is possible that Mr. Hurd has, in the back of his mind,' an idea that there is a lack of ability on the part of the officer responsible for the design of Her Majesty's ships, which explains their alleged inferiority 'tonnage for tonnage' to ships built in this country for foreign navies. This is a matter on which I will offer no opinion. But there may be no harm in saying that, at least, there is no lack of experience on my part as compared with my professional friends. No inconsiderable number of the foreign ships enumerated by Mr. Hurd on p. 553 were built by myself or from my designs. It may be admitted, therefore, that my knowledge of both sides of this subject-viz. Admiralty and private practice-is competent and extensive. On the basis of that experience and knowledge I do affirm (pace Mr. Hurd) that the conditions required of British ships are entirely different from those of any other country.' On the policy of building and arming large numbers of war ships for foreign countries one remark may be added. Mr. Hurd appears to doubt its wisdom. His argument, pushed to its logical conclusion, would involve our abdication of our position as the leading manufacturing country of the world. We should cease to build mercantile ships for foreigners, and to export machinery of all kinds, coals, and all other manufactured products which might eventually be used against us by possible competitors. The simple fact is we are the greatest ship-builders in the world, and the development and maintenance of the ship-building and engineering industry has been largely the result of foreign orders. Apart from such orders the great private establishments capable of building and arming war ships of all classes would not have attained their present positions. Government patronage alone could not have produced this result. The balance of advantage to the national defence undoubtedly lies on the side of the existing condition of things. Other manufacturing countries recognise the fact and are striving to emulate our example. W. H. WHITE. The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake THE NINETEENTH CENTURY No. CCLVI-JUNE 1898 'SPLENDID ISOLATION' OR WHAT? THE uncovering of the fierce dragon mask of the Chinese Empire by Japan has exposed the trembling and effeminate youth that hid behind it. We all know now that it was only a big voice that kept the white barbarians so long at a respectful distance from the puny Celestial's treasures. In the reaction that has come from the discovery we begin to perceive a great danger to the peace of the world. Great Powers, whose aspirations were until lately vague and illformed, have suddenly given them shape, and are on fire to realise them. Some few weeks ago I was tempted to speak in my constituency on foreign politics, and knowing how anxious people were in regard to them, I spoke about China and West Africa, and concluded my remarks by declaring somewhat imprudently that our 'Splendid Isolation had been proved to be nothing more than 'Splendid Dotage.' At the Society of Arts last week I took up the other alternative, and suggested that the time had come for us to respond to gratuitous insolence and unjustifiable provocation with something more than mannerly protests and an ever-forgiving temper. The suggestion was ill received-the speakers who followed denounced it as 'aggressive,' that I was making too much ado about a 'swamp.' It has of late become a custom to speak of any African territory that may be in dispute as a swamp. We must not, however, be indifferent to the fact, that in principle an acre of swamp is as important as a realm. VOL. XLIII-No. 256 3 M Being permitted by the editor of this Review to give my opinions more at large, the object of this article will be to discuss which of two alternatives we ought to adopt for the preservation of our rights, our dignity, and our prestige. If we cling to our isolation, we assume that we are self-sufficient, and there should be no hesitation to prove that we are able to hold our own. But so far, though our rights have been invaded, our dignity questioned, and our prestige lowered, we have done nothing to vindicate them; and the mere suggestion that we should demonstrate to those who have offended us that we are well able to do so evoked strong expressions of dissent. I am, therefore, forced to conclude from these that there is a disposition to shirk the obligations imposed upon us by our isolation, and that it is preferable to make no resistance to aggression. As this craven fear of resisting an invader may involve very soon larger and larger surrenders, we must constrain ourselves to examine the second alternative, which is to make an Alliance, offensive and defensive, with some Power, or combination of Powers. For, as I understand it, peace is preferable to the expense and the horrors of war, and at the same time we must have security for our rights and liberty to trade in all countries; but to my mind it does not seem possible that peace with security could be enjoyed without joining either the Dual or the Triple Alliance. The murmurs at the Society of Arts confirmed me in my suspicion that the splendid isolation' was a gaudy air-bladder, and as it is liable to be pricked at any moment by a French sword, and our people do not want to fight, why should we cling to the conceit that we are self-sufficient, and remain aloof from the other Powers? From the moment we broached the idea of isolation we became suspected by the Alliances. As we were not of them, and might rise against one of them, or both, upon some question or other, suspicion became dislike, and the two European combinations, as the fancy possessed them, were able to thwart every policy we favoured upon the ground that it was mischievous or detrimental to their own. Two combinations of equal strength may exist-though opposed in some matters of general policy-on fairly peaceful terms, but for a third-supposed to be uncertain in its favours, ready to take one side to-day and shift to the other to-morrow-there is no place. Such a party is a source of irritation because of the doubt it engenders; it is incalculable, and therefore a danger. Take any recent question-Armenia, Turkey, Crete, or Greeceand note the effect of our isolation. We succeeded in nothing that concerned either of them. The massacres of Armenia continued in spite of our protests and Guildhall warnings, Turkey was encouraged and upheld in its contumacy. King George persevered in his foolish enterprise despite friendly advice. The Cretan Question is not yet settled. The Dual Alliance professed to see a selfish design in all that we proposed; the Triple Alliance assumed the indifferent rôle and said the whole Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier.' The threat of Russia to meet coercive measures towards Turkey with force paralysed us, for behind Russia was France. We were indeed 'splendidly isolated.' The late events in China have still more demonstrated the inconveniences and the perils of isolation, as well as the futility of attempting single-handed to check any of the disturbing forces. Being disinterested and only seeking the general good of commercial nations, we see that the violent partition of China must end in a general upheaval and disintegration of nations. England's aloofness will only hasten the catastrophe. The most earnest pleading for the open door is unheeded. Russia, conscious of the support of France, has marched on and annexed the whole of Manchuria, and Port Arthur and Talienwan in a few months will be the Sevastopols of the Far East. France, in her turn, supported by Russia, is drawing closer to the Upper Yangtse Valley, and will make as short work with the Yunnanese as she did with the people of Tonking. As this is not what our diplomacy strove for, we have again failed. It is not the fault of our Foreign Office, as the Opposition leaders wish to make out; it is our 'splendid isolation' that causes us to be disregarded. We know what will be the result in China of this action of the Dual Alliance; but while alone what can we do to avert the danger? Germany, the head of the Triple Alliance, has no need to be uneasy just yet. Any interference with her in China from France and Russia would send her precipitately to our side. Besides, is she not justified in looking after her own interests? She knows as well as we do that her commercial interests would be best served by keeping the gates of the interior of China open; but as we have not chosen to range ourselves on her side, she dare not stand, as we do, unprofitably waiting for the Millennium, lest there will be nothing left for her. Besides, she is not the object of envy and spite as we are. Her colonial possessions are as yet lean and immature, and hard knocks rather than material advantages are sure to be the result of meddling with them. Her military strength, an Imperial Commander of high spirit, with no fat colonies to excite cupidity, put Germany in a position impervious to fear and weakness; while, on the other hand, her objections to Franco-Russian policy may be overruled by substantial considerations. Dismal as the outlook is for us, our Government is apparently not without hopes. Let us analyse these hopes. It is said that we declined to stir while Port Arthur and Talienwan might have been seized, for the reason that behind them lay the strength of the Russian Empire. It was accepted as a good and sufficient reason, for we are too practical to undertake to defend the Liao-tong Peninsula with a few thousands against the hundreds of thousands Russia could bring to bear against us. Therefore we selected Wei-hai-wei as a point of vantage. |