the landed aristocracy in very similar terms-to their judicial and administrative duties, and to the manners and associations which are naturally formed by such a class-went on to say of it that it was

an immense element of political power and stability: that we should never have been able to undertake the great war in which we embarked, in the memory of many present, that we could never have been able to conquer the greatest military genius the world ever saw, with the greatest means at his disposal, and to hurl him from his throne, if we had not had a territorial aristocracy to give stability to our constitution.

Am I wrong in saying that this immense element of political power and stability' is no longer what it was during the Napoleonic war, no longer what it was in 1843, no longer quite what it was even in 1870? When it corresponded to the terms in which it was described by Mr. Gladstone it was to all intents and purposes the governing class in every English county. The discharge of all these public duties gave it a dignity in the eyes of the people which cannot fail to have been diminished by the gradual reduction of them. The people felt that the country gentlemen were really leaders and rulers, and respected them in proportion. Their public position in the country has therefore been to some extent lowered, and with it the moral influence which they possessed in virtue of it. In the next place, their private fortunes have of late years been so reduced that they are no longer able to make the most of what is still left to them of their former functions and privileges. They no longer, as a matter of course, represent their counties in Parliament. They are no longer masters on their own estates; and though they have displayed both public spirit and a true sense of their own interests in taking part in the new system of local administration, it can never be to them all that the old one was, or give them the same position in the public eye.

If our next great war is in defence of our trade, our battles at least must be fought in the same spirit which won Waterloo and Trafalgar. We always associate with an aristocracy the idea of fighting qualities; and I believe that its presence and its unconscious influence do much to cherish such qualities. Our aristocracy form a solid and united body rooted in their native soil, and inspired by all the traditions and associations which attach to ancient birth. They have their ancestors to think of as well as themselves, and the honour of England is one of their heirlooms. England is all in all to them. Whatever tends to abate the force of such a body must diminish one source of strength which we have possessed in previous I do not mean that the aristocracy have deteriorated in themselves—far from it. But social and political changes, which could not perhaps have been averted, and were in some respects practical improvements, have deprived them in part of that status in the

wars.

remains.'

country to which they owed so much of their former weight, and which caused them to be regarded by the people as their natural guides and representatives. Whatever advantage the nation in time of war derived from those conditions will now be so much the less, though assuredly not wholly lost. Though much is taken, much But, combining together the change in the position of the aristocracy with the preponderating strength of the working classes, and seeing the ends for which the enormous power of the trades unions is commonly exerted, it is difficult not to feel that English society on the whole is less fitted than it was formerly to bear the strain of a great war, and that for these reasons, if for no other, it is quite true that England cannot fight two great Powers by herself.

I have already disclaimed all intention of deciding on the abstract merits of those Radical theories which, in my humble opinion, have worked so much practical mischief. All I have said is that, if we must have a great Empire,' these ideas are not conducive to its stability. There are two theories of national life, one that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the end and aim of all Governments; the other, that the greatest greatness of the greatest number should fill that place. If we accept the former, it is not by any means certain that Imperial cares and responsibilities are things to be sought after. Mr. Froude somewhere contemplates the possibility of England, after losing all her colonies and commerce, becoming a nation of shepherds and herdsmen, and it is quite possible that such an England might be happier than our own. Those who are in favour of the opposite theory are so because they think that the development of man's faculties, and the elevation of his character, it may be through sufferings and hardships, is the end for which he is placed on earth, and that the exercise of those governing powers which have been bestowed more freely on some races than on others is one of the most proper works in which he can be engaged. On the one side we place the toil and danger of conquest, colonisation, and civilisation; on the other, the quiet enjoyment of an easy life, innocent of culture and undisturbed by emulation, but with sufficient comfort and freedom, and no anxieties beyond the silver streak. England has practically to choose between the two. She would not become exactly the nation of shepherds and herdsmen which Mr. Froude saw in his imagination, but she would subside into a country where the social inequalities of our own time would probably be much lessened, where society would be more of a dead level, and where the thousand-and-one Imperial interests and troubles which now encompass us would be unknown. I can understand the preference for this state of things over the other, though I do not share in it. Greatness is not essential to happiness, nor is happiness always the result of

greatness. Our judgment must be determined by the nature of our belief in the destiny of the human race, and in the purpose for

which they are placed in this mysterious world.

T. E. KEBBEL.

P.S. Since the above was written, the report of French aggression in West Africa has brought the shadow of war nearer to us. The advance into British territory, if not disavowed by the French Government, would have been something more than an insidious encroachment. It would be an open challenge; and if the gauntlet is really thrown down, England has no alternative but to take it up, in which case the views expressed in this article may be put to the test sooner than its author anticipated. For I do not disguise from myself that part of it is applicable, though, of course, with much diminished force, to a conflict with any one great Power, if it only last long enough.

THE ARMY AND THE GOVERNMENT'S

OPPORTUNITY

TOWARDS the close of the Session of 1897, the Government allowed it to become known that a certain amount of public support, or even of public pressure, would not be unacceptable to them before entering upon the work of Army Reform, which they had then begun to take under consideration. It cannot be said that in this matter the Government have been disappointed, or that public opinion has failed to furnish them with the impetus which they desired to receive. The whole question of the condition of the Army has been discussed with thoroughness, and from many differents points of view. On some points there has been agreement, and on others differences still remain. But as far as the available evidence can be trusted, there is no class and no party which has remained indifferent to the appeal which has been made to it, or which has refused to admit that a change of some kind in the organisation of our Army is necessary and desirable.

Those who are acquainted with the history of popular movements in this country are aware that the existence of a strong public opinion is essential to the success of any Government which is about to undertake any serious project of reform. It is not always easy to create and give expression to this opinion, but when it has been created and expressed, it is of the greatest possible value to the Minister who knows how to make use of it. There are probably few matters upon which it is harder to create and maintain general public interest than those which concern the Army. Popular sentiment has never attached itself to the Army to the same degree and in the same way as to the Navy. The value of the Navy is apparent to all sections of the community, and the services which it. has rendered have been of a character very easily understood and appreciated. The Army, represented at home by its least efficient and least imposing detachments, has suffered somewhat in the popular estimation from the fact that it is, and must always be, a second line of defence only. It has suffered far more from the humiliations which have been imposed upon it by those who were

charged with its administration. No tradition is more deeply rooted in the minds of the poorer classes in all parts of the United Kingdom, than that which represents enlistment as the last step on the downward career of a young man. For years past many influences have been at work to combat this unhappy misconception, and much progress has been made towards the attainment of a healthier and more rational state of opinion, but the old prejudice exists, and has to be taken into account. Lastly, it cannot be disputed that the administration of the Army for nearly a century past has not been of a kind to inspire confidence or to create enthusiasm.

All these circumstances have undoubtedly combined to render the public mind apathetic with regard to Army matters. It has not been easy to excite the interest, or to procure the goodwill, of the public at large. Without, however, desiring to exaggerate the value and effect of such a public controversy as has recently taken place, it may fairly be claimed that at the present moment the public mind is more alert with regard to Army questions than it has been for many years past, that public interest has been aroused, and that, coupled with the conviction that energetic reform is required, there is a general disposition to accede to any well-judged proposals which may be made in the interests of efficiency. Under these circumstances, it is not strange that those who are most anxious to see the Army strengthened and made efficient should desire to see the fullest use made of the favourable opportunity which has presented itself, or rather which has been created, by the expenditure of a considerable amount of effort. It is not easy in a matter of this kind to 'get up steam' twice. Unluckily, no one knows this better than the Anti-Reform party at the War Office. If once they can tide over the present Session, if by conceding a very little they can divert attack from the venerable institutions, the inefficiency of which they have so long and so fully demonstrated, and the continuance of which they so ardently desire, they will have gained their point, and they know it. Another ten or twenty years may go by before a War Minister has such a chance as that which is now offered to Lord

Lansdowne. To possess at the same time the goodwill of both parties, the acquiescence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, an intelligent appreciation on the part of the public of the danger to be guarded against, to have a sympathetic House of Commons and a corps of officers grateful for the slightest concession to their views, is a combination so fortunate that no Minister has a right to reckon upon its early recurrence. It is not too much to say that in the. present Session of Parliament the fate of the British Army for twenty years to come will be settled. What is left undone this year will not be accomplished next year or the year after. In one contingency alone, a contingency not pleasant to contemplate, the