CAPTAIN MAHAN'S COUNSELS TO THE UNITED STATES.1 IN 1888 it was my privilege to be present at a lecture given to the officers studying at the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. The subject-the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea in their strategic relations to the United States-was treated with consummate ability. A new light seemed to be thrown upon the whole question of naval warfare; confused pages of naval history took form and order; great principles stood forth clearly revealed. The lecturer was Captain Mahan, who was then preparing to write the books which have brought him well merited and lasting fame. The three volumes dealing with The Influence of Sea Power on History have themselves influenced history. The first appeared at a time when several writers were endeavouring by appeals to the past to awaken the British people to the facts that their ancient kingdom of the sea was in danger of being lost, and that the loss implied national extinction. The importance of the service thus opportunely rendered by the brilliant American writer can hardly be overrated. His book was doubtless intended primarily as an address to his countrymen; but the history of maritime war in the modern world is in the main the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, and to us in a special sense the Influence of Sea Power appealed. Speaking as an outsider, Captain Mahan wielded a force which could not have been exerted by any British writer, even if his equal had appeared among us, and others besides myself felt a sense of thankfulness that the stirring message had come from across the Atlantic. It is not correct to state that the lesson was entirely new. The idea that sea power exercised a peculiar sway over the destinies of nations had been dimly understood at least as far back as the time of Thucydides. Our own naval historians had fully grasped the fact that maritime strength was vital to the security and the prosperity of Great Britain. The Lancastrian poet who could write The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. By Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy. London: Sampson Low, Marston, & Co. Keep then the sea that is the wall of England, England were at peace withouten doubt, had a clear vision of truth. But no one had ever been able to explain in what maritime strength consisted, to trace its action with unerring hand through the long pages of history, to unravel the tangled threads of causation and show forth the controlling influence of naval operations over land campaigns. No one had ever built up a philosophy of the sea. This is the great work which Captain Mahan accomplished, and it is as a philosophic historian of the profound influence of maritime activity in moulding the destinies of the world, rather than as a naval strategist, that he will always be remembered. The secret of this success was the breadth of view of the writer. One felt, in reading his calm and often stately periods, that he was regarding history from a pinnacle whence nothing petty was visible, that he addressed his fellow-men of all nations, and that his judgment in matters where bias might have been looked for was serenely impartial. The books bore the impress of statesmanship in the highest meaning of the word. In magazine articles dealing with questions of the day, descending from the general to the particular, and directed to a limited and special purpose, it would not be just to expect the same lofty standard. Nevertheless, while making full allowance for the change of conditions, I have read this volume of collected essays with disappointment. Only here and there is it possible to trace the hand of the author of The Influence of Sea Power on History. No great nation ever needed guidance more than does the United States to-day-the strong guidance of a master mind, fearlessly offered, in language which could not be misunderstood. No one is so well qualified as Captain Mahan to render this service to his country; but the needed guidance is not forthcoming, for the statesmanship is too frequently wanting. 6 The general purpose of these eight essays is to awaken public opinion in the United States to the importance of a strong navy, and to bid them to look outwards,' taking their rightful place among the nations. All true friends of the American people-and there are many in this country-will cordially agree with Captain Mahan's object. It is a loss to the world that the United States, with their growing trade interests, second only to our own, have so far failed alike to accept the position of a great Power, with its corresponding responsibilities, and to conform to the usages of the family of nations. There are occasional indications that Captain Mahan feels that the external policy of his country has been wanting in dignity; but he cannot be said to have enforced the lesson with all the power at his disposal, and it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to extract a definite meaning from his pages. The first three articles, entitled The United States Looking Outwards,' Hawaii and our Future Sea Power,' and 'The Isthmus and Sea Power,' deal with questions in which the interests of America and Great Britain appear to the author to clash. We have no right to expect that an American, writing for Americans, should accept our views; we do expect recognition of patent facts. Thus it seems to be assumed throughout that, in regard to Hawaii and the construction of an isthmus route to the Pacific, Great Britain is seeking to thwart the legitimate aspirations of the United States, and the superior claims of the latter to the possession of the Sandwich Islands are argued at some length with little relevance to the existing situation. Hawaii stands midway between the Canadian seaboard and the Australian continent, and is a link in a chain of maritime communication of which Great Britain holds the ends. To the United States it is simply an outpost in the Pacific. I cannot, therefore, admit that 'the interest of the United States in' the Sandwich Islands' surpasses that of Great Britain,' 2 or that this superior interest is 'dependent upon a natural cause, nearness, which has been admitted always as a reasonable ground for national self-assertion.' Still less effective is the argument that 'the interests of our sixty-five million people, in a position so vital to our part in the Pacific, must be allowed to outweigh those of the six millions of Canada.' If relative national interests are to be measured by population, it is not 'the six millions of Canada' but the three hundred millions of British citizens who must be placed in the balance. In face of facts, however, reasoning of this nature is wholly beside the mark. It is true that, in the past, the natural wishes of Great Britain and her Colonies' pointed to the occupation of the Sandwich Islands. It is equally true that, in deference to the aspirations' of the United States, the step was never taken, and Captain Mahan must surely be aware that if these islands are now annexed, not the smallest protest, opposition, or resentment will be forthcoming from this country. For many years we have recognised the group as belonging to the sphere of influence of the United States, who have never accepted the responsibilities which such recognition involves. 'Have we no right or no call to progress further in any direction?' asks Captain Mahan. there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights?' No one ever has denied, or ever will deny, either the interests or the rights; but interests and rights involve responsibilities, which the United States have so far declined to recognise. 3 Are * Elsewhere the author refers to the preponderating natural interest' of Great Britain in every new route opened to commerce.' 3 This article, written in 1893, might have been modified with advantage before republication. Similarly, in regard to the future trans-isthmian canal, Captain Mahan altogether fails to appreciate the present attitude of Great Britain. The canal, when made, will, like any other trade route, confer benefit upon our commerce; but the advantages to the United States will be equal or greater. Nothing would less suit our interests and those of the rest of the world than that the control of an important waterway should be in the hands of such States as Columbia or Nicaragua, vaguely supported by Monroe doctrine left to the interpretation of the moment. Let the United States make the canal, and assume full control over it; we shall then know where we stand. I believe that this is the view of every thoughtful Englishman, and at the present time it is beside the question to go back to the ClaytonBulwer treaty and charge us with a breach of its provisions because our ancient 'settlement' of Honduras has grown into a 'colony.' We cannot arrest the internal progress of our dependencies in regions where the United States have no possessions and accept no responsibilities. The policy of seeking 'to keep others out, while refusing ourselves to go in,' is, as the author elsewhere intimates, unworthy of a great nation. Again, in view of a recent arbitration, it is surely too late to speak of our perfectly just claim to the seal fisheries,' and, having regard to the considerable number of American citizens who have been engaged in pelagic sealing, the international difficulty cannot be rightly ascribed to 'the purely local and selfish wishes of Canadian fishermen.' If it is the case that a useful and peculiarly interesting animal is in danger of extermination from pelagic sealing, the strong feeling which has been aroused in America is explained and justified. I do not think that the handling of this question on our side has been uniformly judicious; but I cannot admit that the novel and strange doctrine of the mare clausum constitutes a 'perfectly just claim,' and at least such a doctrine violently conflicts with the lofty teaching of the author of The Influence of Sea Power on History. 'It should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy,' writes Captain Mahan, that no foreign State should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles 4 of San Francisco.' From every point of view, I venture to think that it is unwise to press an abstract policy of this description upon the United States without any explanation of what is implied. A nation whose vital interests are imperilled because a foreign Power owns territory at a distance from one of its ports considerably exceeding that of Brest from New York, must indeed be in a parlous state. To the peoples of the Old World, this 'inviolable resolution' seems necessarily preposterous. The earth's surface is not large enough for the general adoption of this amazing programme, and the United States cannot expect immunity from the common lot of all other Powers, except on • Reduced to 2,500 miles in a subsequent article. • We are at the present moment witnessing the establishment by a foreign Power, terms which Captain Mahan refrains from pointing out. According to the accepted usage of nations, a policy of this description demands that the United States should either annex all territory falling within this comprehensive zone, or should assume control of the foreign relations of all States owning such territory. This is the only logical course, and if the United States are prepared to adopt it, other Powers will have no cause for complaint. Elsewhere Captain Mahan seems to deplore the 'actual remoteness of this continent from the life of the rest of the world.' No more striking illustration of that' remotecan be imagined than the fact that an American so thoughtful and so gifted should have borrowed a policy from the Popes of the Middle Ages. It is refreshing to turn to a passage where Captain Mahan, the historian, derides the claim of Spain 'to exclude all others' from the Caribbean and the Spanish Main, and praises the stout Elizabethan seamen, who 'brilliantly' and successfully resisted that claim. Having carefully studied these important articles, I fail to trace what are the precise steps which it behoves the United States to take. Their readers will gather that expansion of some kind is necessary; that Great Britain is, in some unexplained way, seeking to oppose the annexation of Hawaii and to create difficulties in relation to the trans-isthmian canal; that the Atlantic seaboard is in grave peril, and that the existence of coal within 3,000 miles of San Francisco would be a national danger. This is not guidance; a forward policy needs to be defined. I cannot help fearing that the result must be to deepen misconceptions already sadly too prevalent. We know that Senator Lodge regards our old possessions of Bermuda and of Halifax, whose docks are freely and frequently placed at the disposal of United States warships, in the light of a standing menace. He will here find some confirmation of his peculiar views. It is true that he will read that a cordial understanding' with Great Britain is one of the first of our external interests;' but this vitally important proposition remains undeveloped. It is a pious opinion, and nothing more. In the article on the 'Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion,' as throughout the volume, Captain Mahan speaks in kindly terms of the old country, whose wonderful history has fired his imagination; but he holds out few hopes of a better mutual understanding. 'Formal alliance' between the two nations is, we are told, 'out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a co-operation beneficial to both.' This does not lead us far, and it is to be feared that Captain Mahan's latest volume will not tend to give birth to sympathy' in the United States towards their ancient mother.' in defiance of a treaty, of a naval station within twenty miles of one of our greatest trade routes. |