of employing small bodies of troops it was decided to enter on systematic campaigns, worked out on European plans, and calculated to place irresistible odds in the enemies' strongholds, there to remain for prolonged periods, while stringent terms as regards fines and penalties were exacted. This latter system is still in force, and though in some degree more successful than the former ones, it cannot candidly be said to have solved the great question of the pacification of the frontier. If any proof were needed that much has yet to be done, the history of the frontier during the summer of 1897 will perhaps fairly clearly prove it without need of clerical demonstration. It would therefore seem necessary that some new departure should be made if we would escape not only the yearly annoyance and inconvenience of frontier troubles, but the immense drain on the resources of the Indian Empire which those annoyances entail. From the history of the world since the earliest times, the first factor in the pacification of disturbed districts is the complete disarmament of the inhabitants. Had not this step been taken in the case of the Highlanders of Scotland, the whole of the North of Scotland might to this day have been as lawless and unsafe as the Afridi highlands. Had not La Vendee been systematically disarmed by the genius of Hoche, a standing menace to all authority might to this day have existed in the very heart of Europe. Disarmament, therefore, complete and universal, is the first step towards the permanent pacification of a region inhabited by tribes with the attributes and traditions of the warriors who inhabit the mountain fastnesses of our Indian frontiers. The problem is a difficult one, and will undoubtedly be costly in men and money, but the expenditure is a final one, and will, it is anticipated in the long run, be less expensive than the amount represented by the yearly accumulating millions which will have to be spent on checking the armed aggression of the frontier tribesmen. Hand in glove and of equal importance with disarmament as a great civilising medium is the construction of metalled roads giving easy access to every portion of each tribal territory, and allowing of free circulation throughout them. These two main measures will, it is estimated, be found in most cases permanently effective, but in the case of any especially recalcitrant tribe, or section of a tribe, a sovereign remedy may be found in a systematised but enforced emigration from the hills into the open country within our borders. Such a system has been tried on a small scale with the most beneficial results in the plains of Yusafzai, which lie to the south of the Swat Valley. Here whole villages of quondam outlaws are now disarmed and peaceably living on lands rented to them on favourable terms, and, as generation succeeds generation, are losing the martial instincts and warlike skill of their forefathers in the acquisition of the more civilised but equally absorbing attributes which bring wealth and prosperity. It has been said, and with considerable force, that disarmament in theory is excellent; but, it is asked, how is it to be applied to the present case? Undoubtedly the problem is an exceedingly difficult one; but we ourselves, as well as other nations, have had to face the same difficulty before, and by boldly facing overcame it. 1 A fire-arm, and more especially a breechloader of European manufacture, has reached a fictitious value among the tribesmen. A Government Martini-Henry rifle, worth at Government rates about 3l., is valued at and will fetch as much as 500 rupees, or say 30l., in times of popular excitement among these people. To facilitate and as a part of a policy of ultimate disarmament, these arms should be cheapened down till they reach normal figures. As an example of what may be done in this line, it is only necessary to quote the case of Japan. Here for centuries the mark of a gentleman and man of blood was the wearing of two swords stuck through the belt. These swords were handed down from generation to generation, and were in some cases not only from historical association but intrinsically worth immense sums. The edict went forth that from a certain date the whole population was to be disarmed-a stroke aimed at the most powerful military aristocracy that has existed in modern times. The measures for carrying out the disarmament were complete and successful, but the lesson useful to us is that arms which at one time were priceless may now be bought anywhere about the country for a dollar or two. To cheapen down the rifle of the Afridi or of the Waziris we must follow a parallel line and make the carrying of arms illegal. Nor must the measure be partial, but, on the contrary, completely comprehensive. The value of the Afridi's rifle is great, because he has to hold his own against the Orakzai or the Mohmand. But if neither Afridi, nor Orakzai, nor Mohmand is allowed to carry arms, the value of a rifle will become no greater than that of a walking-stick. A system of disarmament, therefore, must not be piecemeal but collective: that is to say, by proclamation it should be announced that on and after such-and-such a date the carrying of arms, or the traffic in arms, by any unlicensed person, either within our own borders or without them up to the bounds of our political influence shall be a capital offence. The most sanguine will, it is needless to say, hardly expect that an instant obedience will be obtained. Though the declaration of policy may have been made simultaneously to all tribes, the military exigencies may not allow of more than a methodical but progressive exaction of the terms. When the political officer in Bajaur was demanding a fine of 26 rifles placed against one tribe, he was offered 500 rupees apiece in lieu to relinquish the Government demand. To place the border in the best condition for exacting the terms imposed, it would be necessary in the first place that the whole section of the frontier to be dealt with should be under the exclusive control of a military governor. Thus, taking for instance that portion of the frontier which extends from Kashmir to Beluchistan, it would be proper to define the limits of the authority of such a governor somewhat thus to the east the boundary would be Kashmir and the River Indus, to the north and west the Durand boundary, and to the south the Beluchistan desert. Under the governor would be a certain number of deputy governors, also military officers, to each of whom would be allotted portions of the frontier. These deputy governors would be responsible for law and order in the districts assigned to them, and would be supplied with sufficient troops to prosecute the policy of disarmament. The whole government of the military governor would be placed under martial law in so far as that portion of it which lies between the British border proper and the Durand boundary 2 is concerned, while special powers would be given to civil courts in dealing with offences connected with the traffic in arms. The headquarters of the military governor might conveniently be established at Peshawur, while the deputy governors would be well placed as follows: (1) Abbottabad :-For dealing with the tribes known collectively as the Black Mountain tribes. (2) Hôti-Mardan:-To deal with Swat, Buner Bajaur, Dir, and Utman Kheyl. (3) Peshawur:-To deal with Mohmands and Afridis of Tirah and Khyber. (4) Kohat:-Orakzais, Kohat-Pass Afridis, Jowakis, and Kurram tribes. (5) Bannu :-Darwesh Kheyl Waziris and Northern Mahsud Waziris. (6) Dera Ismail Khan:-Mahsud Waziris. It will be noticed that in most cases, from motives of economy, the present stations of the regiments of the frontier force have been mentioned, and it would perhaps appear that no new scheme, but merely a modification of an old one, has been proposed; but the scheme under discussion lies not in the rigid adherence to this or that station, but in a change from masterly inactivity to ubiquitous activity-a change which in a couple of years should make the appearance of an armed tribesman on the border an impossibility. It will be at once suggested that, however careful we may be on our own side of the border to stop the traffic in arms, yet that there is nothing to prevent an unlimited supply flowing into that intermediate territory which is occupied by the tribes from the 2 This boundary defines the outer edge of the British sphere of influence. direction of Afghanistan. Undoubtedly the difficulty exists, but here is a matter of policy which a little statesmanship may be reasonably expected to grapple with. To the military mind it will at once suggest itself that a temporary diminution in the immense subsidy which is yearly paid to the Amir by the British Government might reasonably be used as a persuasive agency, should his Highness find himself at first unable to cope with the difficulty. As a matter of fact, it is clearly understood on the frontier that, if the Amir were to set his face against the export of arms from his kingdom, there is no monarch more entirely capable of insuring that his orders are obeyed. It may be objected that the present finances of India cannot stand the strain of extensive road-making projects, and it may further be urged that roads, though excellent mediums for introducing civilisation, are at the same time apt to destroy the defensive value of a mountain frontier-in other words, that roads made now with one object would in some future generation facilitate the movement of some great invading force which might come from the west. As regards the cost of such a project it may reasonably be maintained that it should be practically nothing, and that the tribesmen themselves should be compelled to furnish free labour for a project which will eventually add to their own wealth and prosperity. With regard to the general direction of the roads made it would be necessary to study carefully the geography of each district, and so to construct them that, while strengthening internally our own general line of defence, they would not afford a possible enemy any greater facilities than at present exist for breaking through the barrier of mountains. The mercantile communities and the taxpayers generally in India have through the press given free vent to their disapproval of a policy which entails apparently an immense annual expenditure on military expeditions. It is, on the other hand, claimed for a policy of total disarmament that though the initial cost might be great, yet that the money spent would be given in exchange for permanent value received, and that in the long run an immense saving to the State would be effected. Without appearing over-sanguine and relying confidently on the lessons to be learnt from the past history of the world, it is perhaps not taking too hopeful a view of the situation to claim that a system of complete disarmament would not only strengthen our borders but would remove a source of never-ceasing anxiety, a cause of perennial expenditure. G. J. YOUNGHUSBAND. MORE ABOUT SHERIDAN MR. GLADSTONE's most suggestive and graceful comments upon Sheridan as a patriot and statesman made in this Review for June, 1896, refer in part to Sheridan's exclusion from the Cabinet in the Administration of All the Talents. Since the publication of the work which formed the subject of Mr. Gladstone's Article,' I have received fresh and curious information concerning Sheridan as a member for Stafford, and as an active and a leading member of the Whig Party. Mr. William Horton, a banker and promoter of the shoe-making industry, was one of Sheridan's first and heartiest supporters at Stafford, and, in return, Sheridan introduced him to foreign merchants who gave orders which ended in large exports of boots and shoes, and the enrichment of the townspeople. Horton's purse was always open to Sheridan, who once arrived at Stafford with money wherewith to pay his debts and meet future expenses. He presented a cheque to Horton for 2,000l., Horton twisted the paper and used it to light his pipe, throwing the unburnt fragment into the fire, whereupon Sheridan exclaimed, By God, Will, you're the King of the Cobblers!' Horton added: 'It shall never be said that Will Horton took one shilling from Richard Brinsley Sheridan.' Giving the cheque was not a practical joke, because Mr. Peake, treasurer to Drury Lane Theatre, affirmed that it was as good as the Bank of England.' 6 6 When official duties hindered Sheridan from visiting Stafford for re-election, after accepting office in 1806, Horton acted as his representative, and underwent the honour and ordeal of being chaired' through the town. In 1809, the principal burgesses dined together to celebrate the King's Jubilee, and they enthusiastically drank these two toasts, 'R. B. Sheridan, and may the sun of his genius illumine the world of politics and literature;' 'Mr. T. Sheridan, and better health to him.' The greatest disappointment of his life befell Sheridan when, three years later, he was rejected by Stafford, owing to some of his older friends being dead, and the younger burgesses insisting upon being paid what they accounted their dues. Though 12,000l. was owing to Sheridan by the Committee of Drury Lane Theatre, he could not find 2,000l. for election expenses. If Whit 1 Sheridan: a Biography, by W. Fraser Rae, with an Introduction by the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava. 2 vols. Bentley & Son. |