CASES OVERRULED, DOUBTED AND DENIED.

Brewster v. Doan (2 Hill, 537), denied; Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565. Brewster v. Silence (8 N. Y. 207), overruled, Evansville National Bank v. Kaufman (93 N. Y. 273), 206.

Bullock v. Taylor (39 Mich. 137; 33 Am. Rep. 356), denied; Maryland Fertilizing & Manuf'g Co. v. Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

Clark v. Barnwall (12 How. 279), denied; Chicago, etc., Railroad Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Cochran v. Dinsmore (49 N. Y. 249), denied: Chicago, etc., Railroad Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Commonwealth v. Mead (12 Gray, 167), overruled; Commonwealth v. Barnacle (134 Mass. 215), 321.

Cooper v. Marsden (Esp. 1), denied; Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565. Corbett v. Waterman (11 Iowa, 86), denied: George v. Andrews (60 Md. 26), 710.

Colton v. Railroad (67 Penn. St. 500), denied; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

County of Mahaska v. Ingalls (16 Iowa, 95), denied; Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565.

Danforth v. Dart (4 Duer, 101), overruled in part; Parker v. Conner (93 N. Y. 118), 183.

Draper v. Snow (20 N. Y. 331), overruled: Evansville National Bank v. Kauf. man (93 N. Y. 273), 206.

Ex parte Stokes (De . 618), denied; New Bedford Inst. for Savings v. Hathaway (134 Mass. 69), 292.

Farmers' Bank v. Whitfield (24 Wend. 419), denied; Langworthy v. Connelly (14 Neb. 340), 118.

Hard v. Vermont and Canada R. Co. (32 Vt. 473), overruled; Davis v. Central Vt. R. Co. (55 Vt. 84), 593.

Hess' Estate (69 Penn. St. 272), denied; New Bedford Inst. for Savings v. Hathaway (134 Mass. 69), 292.

Lamb v. Railroad (46 N. Y. 271:7 Am. Rep. 327), denied ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Magnin v. Dinsmore (56 N. Y. 168), denied; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 428.

Maynard v. State (46 Ala. 85), doubted; Henderson v. State (70 Ala. 23), 73. Merrill v. Ithaca, etc., R. Co. (16 Wend. 600; 30 Am. Dec. 130), denied, Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565.

Monroe v. Andrews (5 Port. 107), denied; Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565.

Xxxii CASES OVERRULED, DOUBTED AND DENIED.

Murray v. De Rottenham (6 Johns. Ch. 52). denied: McDougall y Page (55 Vt. 187), 607.

Maynard v. R. Co. (7 Hun, 399), denied ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 Miss (1008), 428. Newcomb v. Clark (1 Denio, 226), overruled; Evansville Nat. Bk. v. haufman (93 N. Y. 273), 206.

New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co. (20 La. Ann. 302; 24 id. 100), denied ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Patterson v. Clyde (67 Penn. St. 500), denied; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Penniman v. Meigs (9 Johns. 325), denied ; McDougall v. Page (55 Vt. 187), 607. People v. Douglas (4 Cow. 36), denied; Jones v. People (6 Col. 452), 527. Pringle v. Phillips (5 Sandf. 157), overruled in part; Parker v. Conner (93 N. Y. 118), 183.

Randall v. Beatty (4 Stew, 643), denied; Pickens v. Davis (134 Mass. 252), 325. Read v. Railroad Co. (60 Mo. 199), denied; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Richmond Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt (1 Hill, 480), denied; Wallace v. Merrimack River, etc., Co. (134 Mass. 95), 303.

Ryan v. Harrow (27 Iowa, 494), denied; Jones v. People (6 Col. 452), 528. Schumaker v. State (5 Wis. 324), denied; State v. Powers (10 Oreg. 145), 139. Seaton v. Scoville (18 Kans 433; 26 Am. Rep. 779), denied; Maryland Fertilizing & Manuf'g Co. v. Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

Single v. Schneider (30 Wis. 57), denied; Skinner v. Pinney (19 Fla. 42), 3. Smith v. Cent. R. Co. (24 N. Y. 222), denied: Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 428.

Sperry v. Horr (32 Iowa, 184), denied: Maryland Fertilizing & Manuf'g Co. v.
Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

Spirey v. State (26 Ala. 90), doubted; Henderson v. State (70 Ala. 23), 73.
State v. Babcock (1 Conn. ), denied: State v. Powers (10 Oreg. 145), 139.
State v. Baldy (17 Iowa, 39), denied: Jones v. People (6 Col. 452), 527.
State v. Vogel (22 Wis. 471), doubted; State v. Powers (10 Oreg. 145), 139.
Steers v. Steamship Co. (57 N. Y. 1; 15 Am. Rep. 458), denied; Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Stoneman v. Pyle (35 Ind. 103; 9 Am Rep. 637), denied, Maryland Fertilizing & Manuf'g Co. v. Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

Taylor v. State (42 Ala. 529), doubted; Henderson v. State (70 Ala 23), 73. Taylor v. Taylor (2 Nott & McC. 482), denied: Pickens v. Davis (134 Mass. 252), 324.

Transportation Co. v. Downer (11 Wall. 129), denied: Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Moss (60 Miss. 1003), 429.

Union Bank v. Coster (3 N. Y. 211), overruled; Evansville Nat Bk. v. Kaufman (93 N. Y. 273), 206.

Walsh v. Barrett (15 Mass. 380), denied; Vinal v. Gilman (21 W. Va. 301), 565. Witherspoon v. Musselman (14 Bush, 214; 29 Am. Rep. 404), denied; Maryland Fertilizing & Manuf'g Co. v. Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

Wright v. Wilcox (19 Wend. 343), denied; Wallace v. Merrimack River, etc., Co. (134 Mass. 95), 303.

Wyant v. Pottorf (37 Ind. 512), denied; Maryland Fertilizing & Manufg Co. v. Newman (60 Md. 584), 752.

CASES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

Ог

FLORIDA.

SKINNER V. PINNEY.

(19 Fla. 42.)

Damages — measure of — trover for logs.

in an action of trover for logs willfully cut by the defendant on the plaintiff's land, the measure of damages is the value of the logs at the time and place of conversion, with interest.*

TROVER.

ROVER. The head-note and opinion show the facts. The plaintiff had judgment below.

W. A. Blount, for appellant.

John C. Avery and John A. Henderson, for appellee.

RANDALL, C. J. [Omitting minor considerations.] The offer of the defendant to prove the value of the standing trees as the measure of damages for the conversion was properly rejected, because the action was brought to recover the value of the logs taken away and not for the trespass in cutting them down. And the offer of the defendant to prove the value of logs at some other

*See Tuttle v. White (46 Mich. 485), 41 Am. Rep. 175.

VOL. XLV-1

1

Skinner v. Pinney.

place to which he had removed them was properly rejected because plaintiff was entitled to the value at the time and place of conversion. The counsel of the respective parties agree that "the measure of damages is the value of the thing converted at the time of conversion."

Defendant's counsel cites the case of Weymouth v. Chicago & N. W. R'y Co., deciding that where wood was piled on defendant's land for the purpose of selling it to defendant and was taken away by mistake by defendant before the sale was completed, the measure of damages was the value of the wood where plaintiff had deposited it, and not at the place to which defendant had carried it and mingled it with other wood so that its identity was lost. This was upon the ground stated, that where the owner waives the right to reclaim the property itself and sues for damages, the diffi culty of separating the enhanced value from the original value no longer exists. It is then entirely practicable to give the owner the entire value that was taken." The court held that in trover, where the property was taken by mistake, the rule of damages should be the value where first taken. The court cites approvingly the case of Curtis v. Groat, 6 Johns. 168, where plaintiff had trespassed upon defendant's land and manufactured his timber into coal, which remained upon the land. The trespasser sued the owner of the land for the coal, and it was held that he had no cause of action, for the coal belonged to the owner of the timber out of which it was made. "For it is conceded by all the cases that a wrong-doer cannot, by bestowing labor upon the property of another, which he has tortiously taken, thereby divest the title of the original owner, but the latter may retake it in whatever form, so long as its identity can be established. And in determining the question of recaption the law must allow the owner to retake the property, or it must hold that he has lost his right by the wrongful act of another. If retaken at all it must be taken as found, though enhanced in value by the trespasser. It cannot be restored to its original condition. The law therefore being obliged to say either that the wrong-doer shall lose his labor, or the owner lose the right to take his property wherever he may find it, very properly decides in favor of the latter."

This case comes far short of establishing the rule contended for, that this defendant is liable only for the value of the standing trees, and that he ought not to be made to pay for the enhanced value consequent upon his labor in converting plaintiff's trees into timber