populous, permanent conquest can rarely occur,) unless (which is not our case) there are very powerful neighbors on every side, having a common interest to assist each other, and to subjugate their enemy. It is far otherwise, where there are many rival and independent states, having no common union of government or interests. They are half subdued by their own dissensions, jealousies, and resentments before the conflict is begun. They are easily made to act a part in the destruction of each other, or easily fall a prey for want of proper concert and energy of operations. § 496. Besides, the resources of a confederacy must be far greater than those of any single state belonging to it, both for peace and war. It can command a wider range of revenue, of military power, of naval armaments, and of productive industry. It is more independent in its employments, in its capacities, and in its influences. In the present state of the world, a few great powers possess the command of commerce, both on land and at sea. In war, they trample upon the rights of neutrals who are feeble; for their weakness furnishes an excuse both for servility and disdain. In peace, they control the pursuits of the rest of the world, and force their trade into every channel by the activity of their enterprise, their extensive navigation, and their flourishing manufactures. They little regard the complaints of those who are subdivided into petty states with varying interests; and use them only as instruments to annoy or check the enterprise of each other. Such states are not formidable in peace or in war. (To secure their rights and maintain their independence they must become a confederated nation, and speak with the force of numbers, as well as the eloquence of truth. The navy or army which could be maintained by any single State in the Union would be scarcely formidable to any second-rate power in Europe. It would be a grievous public burden, and exhaust the whole resources of the State. But a navy or army for all the purposes of home defence or protection upon the ocean is within the compass of the resources of the general government, without any severe exaction; and with the growing strength of the Union must be at once more safe for us, and more formidable to foreign nations. The means, therefore, to provide for the common defence are ample; and they can only be rendered inert and 1 The Federalist, No. 11. inadequate by a division among the States, and a want of unity of operations.1 §497. We pass, in the next place, to the clause to "promote the general welfare." And it may be asked, as the State governments are formed for the same purpose by the people, why should this be set forth as a peculiar or prominent object of the Constitution of the United States? To such an inquiry two general answers may be given. The States, separately, would not possess the means. If they did possess the means, they would not possess the power to carry the appropriate measures into operation. § 498. First, in respect to means. It is obvious, that from the local position and size of several of the States, they must forever possess but a moderate revenue, not more than what is indispensable for their own wants, and, in the strictest sense, for domestic improvements. In relation to others more favorably situated for commerce and navigation, the revenues from taxation may be larger; but the main reliance must be placed upon the taxation by way of imposts upon importations. Now, it is obvious, from the remarks already made, that no permanent revenue can be raised from this source, when the States are separated. The evasions of the laws, which will constantly take place from the rivalries and various interests of the neighboring States; the facilities afforded by the numerous harbors, rivers, and bays which indent and intersect our coasts; the strong interest of foreigners to promote smuggling; the want of uniformity in the duties laid by the different States; the means of intercourse along the internal territorial boundaries of the commercial States, these, and many other causes, would inevitably lead to a very feeble administration of any local revenue system, and would make its returns moderate and unsatisfactory. What could New York do with a single seaport, surrounded on each side by jealous maritime neighbors with numerous ports? What could Massachusetts or Connecticut do with the intermediate territory of Rhode Island running into the heart of the States by water communications admirably adapted for the security of illicit trade? What could Maryland or Virginia do with the broad Chesapeake between them with its thousand landing. places? What could Pennsylvania oppose to the keen resent 1 The Federalist, Nos. 24, 25. ments or the facile policy of her weaker neighbor, Delaware? What could any single State on the Mississippi do to force a steady trade for itself with adequate protecting duties? In short, turn to whichever part of the continent we may, the difficulties of maintaining an adequate system of revenue would be insurmountable, and the expenses of collecting it enormous. After some few struggles for uniformity, and co-operation for mutual support, each State would sink back into listless indifference or gloomy despondency, and rely, principally, upon direct taxation for its ordinary supplies.1 The experience of the few years succeeding the peace of 1783 fully justifies the worst apprehensions on this head. § 499. On the other hand, a general government, clothed with suitable authority over all the States, could easily guard the whole Atlantic coast, and make it the interest of all honorable merchants to assist in a regular and punctilious payment of duties. Vessels arriving at different ports of the Union would rarely choose to expose themselves to the perils of seizure, not in a single State only, but in every State into which the goods might be successively imported. The dangers upon the coast, from the vigilant operations of the revenue officers and revenue vessels, would be great; and they would be much enhanced by the expenses of concealment after the goods were landed.2 And the fact has corresponded with the theory. Since the establishment of the national government, there has been comparatively little smuggling on our coasts; and the revenue from the duties upon importations has steadily increased with the development of the other resources of the country. § 500. And this leads us to remark, in the next place, that the establishment of a general government is not only beneficial, as a source of revenue, but as a means of economy in its collection, distribution, and expenditure. Instead of a large civil list for each State, which shall be competent of itself to discharge all the functions applicable to a sovereign nation, a comparatively small one for the whole nation will suffice to carry into effect its powers, and to receive and disburse its revenues. sides the economy in the civil department, we have already seen how much less actual expenditures will be necessary for the military and naval departments, for the security of all the States, 1 The Federalist, No. 12. 2 The Federalist, No. 12. Be than would be if each were compelled to maintain at all points its independent sovereignty. No fortifications, no commanding posts, no naval flotilla, will be necessary to guard the States against each other; nor any corps of officers to protect the frontiers of each against invasion or smuggling. The exterior boundary of the whole Union will be that alone which will require to be protected at the national expense.1 Besides, there will be a uniformity of operations and arrangements upon all subjects of the common welfare under the guidance of a single head, instead of multifarious and often conflicting systems by distinct States. § 501. But if the means were completely within the reach of the several States, it is obvious that the jurisdiction would be wanting to carry into effect any great or comprehensive plan for the welfare of the whole, The idea of a permanent and zealous co-operation of thirteen (and now of twenty-four) distinct governments in any scheme for the common welfare, is of itself a visionary notion. In the first place, laying aside all local jealousies and accidental jars, there is no plan for the benefit of the whole which would not bear unequally upon some particular parts. Is it a regulation of commerce or mutual intercourse which is proposed? Who does not see that the agricultural, the manufacturing, and the navigating States may have a real or supposed difference of interest in its adoption? If a system of regulations, on the other hand, is prepared by a general government, the inequalities of one part may, and ordinarily will, under the guidance of wise councils, correct and ameliorate those of another. The necessity of a sacrifice of one for the benefit of all may not, and probably will not be felt at the moment by the State called upon to make it. But in a general government, representing the interests of all, the sacrifice, though first opposed, will, in the end, be found adequately recompensed by other substantial good. Agriculture, commerce, manufactures, may each in turn be compelled to yield something of their peculiar benefits, and yet, on the whole, be still each a gainer by the general system. The very power of thus redressing the evils, felt by each in its intercourse with foreign nations, by prohibitory regulations or countervailing duties, may secure permanent privileges of an incalculable value.2 And the fact has been as theoretical reasoning would lead us to suppose. The navigation 1 The Federalist, Nos. 13, 14. 2 The Federalist, No. 11. and commerce, the agriculture and manufactures, of all the States have received an advancement in every direction by the union, which has far exceeded the most sanguine expectation of its warmest friends. § 502. But the fact alone of an unlimited intercourse, without duty or restriction, between all the States, is of itself a blessing of almost inconceivable value. It makes it an object with each permanently to look to the interests of all, and to withdraw its operations from the narrow sphere of its own exclusive territory. Without entering here into the inquiry, how far the general government possesses the power to make or aid the making of roads, canals, and other general improvements, which will properly arise in our future discussions, it is clear, that if there were no general government, the interest of each State to undertake or to promote in its own legislation any such project would be far less strong than it now is; since there would be no certainty as to the value or duration of such improvements, looking beyond the boundaries of the State. The consciousness that the union of the States is permanent, and will not be broken up by rivalries or conflicts of policy, that caprice or resentment will not divert any State from its proper duties, as a member of the Union, will give a solid character to all improvements. Independent of the exercise of any authority by the general government for this purpose, it was justly foreseen that roads would be everywhere shortened and kept in better order; accommodations for travellers would be multiplied and ameliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side would be opened throughout the whole extent of our coast; and, by canals and improvements in river navigation, a boundless field opened to enterprise and emigration, to commerce and products, through the interior States, to the farthest limits of our western territories.1 - § 503. Passing from these general considerations to those of a direct practical nature, let us see how far certain measures, confessedly promotive of the general welfare, have been, or would be, affected by a disunion of the States. Take, for example, the post-office establishment, the benefits of which can scarcely be too strongly stated in respect to the public interests or to private convenience. With what wonderful facility it now communicates intelligence, and transmits orders and directions, and 1 The Federalist, No. 14. |