Nov. 1893.] Opinion of the Court -STILES, J. [No. 1049. Decided October 20, 1893. | TOWN OF MEDICAL LAKE, Respondent, v. J. M. LANDIS et al., Ap pellants. [No. 1048. Decided October 20, 1893.] TOWN OF MEDICAL LAKE, Respondent, v. J. M. LANDIS et ux., Ap pellants. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County. Prather & Danson, for appellants. Jones, Belt & Quinn, for respondent. HOYT, J.- These two cases present the same questions decided in the case of Town of Medical Lake v. Smith, ante, p. 195, and for the reasons therein given the judgments herein must be reversed, and the causes remanded with instructions to dismiss the actions. DUNBAR, C. J., and STILES, ANDERS and SCOTT, JJ., concur. [No. 951. Decided November 22, 1893.] CHARLES H. HOLM, Appellant, v. CHARLES GILCHRIST et al., Re spondents. Appeal from Superior Court, Pacific County. Fulton Bros, for appellant. Arthur, Lindsay & King. for respondents. STILES, J.-This was an equity case, and upon the 4th day of January, 1893, the judge who tried the cause made a certificate to a statement of facts on appeal, stating that it contained all the testimony and objections and exceptions to the acceptance and rejection of testimony. This is precisely the state of facts passed upon in Clark-Harris Company v. Douthitt, 4 Wash. 465 (30 Pac. Rep. 744). The motion to strike must, therefore, prevail, and the appeal be dismissed. DUNBAR, C. J., and HOYT, SCOTT and ANDERS, JJ., concur. OPINIONS HERETOFORE WITHHELD FROM PUBLICATION, PENDING [No. 589. Decided February 23, 1893.] HUBERT C. WARD, Appellant, v. EDWARD HUGGINS, Respondent. APPEAL -STATEMENT OF FACTS POSTPONEMENT OF SETTLEMENT -TAX SALES ACTION TO RECOVER LANDS-LIMITATION— EVIDENCE-TAX DEEDS - EQUITY. When a respondent has failed to notify an appellant that he contests the correctness of the statement of facts, as required by Code Proc., § 1422, he cannot have the statement stricken from the record on the ground that it was settled, without further notice to him, on a day subsequent to that named in the notice, where it does not appear that the statement as settled was different from that originally filed, and of which he had notice. Under Laws 1875, p. 72, 41, declaring that a tax deed should be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all former proceedings, such deed is admissible in evidence without preliminary proof on the part of the grantee of the prior proceedings under which the deed was issued. A tax deed which fulfills the express requirements of the statute as to what it shall contain, but also recites enough of the prior proceedings to show the sheriff's authority to sell the land, and the treasurer's authority to make the deed, is neither void nor irregular on its face. A void tax deed under which the grantee has entered and held possession of the land in controversy constitutes such color of title as will sustain the bar of the statute of limitations provided for actions relating to tax deeds. In an action at law to recover the possession of land sold for taxes after the purchaser's title has, by force of the statute of limitations, become indefeasible, plaintiff cannot invoke equity on the ground that, at the beginning of the controversy, he offered to pay all back taxes and redeem the land. 7 617 7 629 7 639 32* 740 32*1015 36* 285 26* 286 7 617 9 461 32* 740 37 710 7 617 $16 533 7 617 23 653 23 654 Opinion of the Court- ANDERS, J. [7 Wash. Sec. 2939, Code 1881, limiting actions for the recovery of lands sold for taxes to three years from the time of recording the tax deed, has no application to tax sales upon levies made prior to January 1, 1882. Under the revenue laws of 1875, 1877 and 1879, it was the duty of the county treasurer, and not of the sheriff, to execute deeds in redemption of certificates issued for tax sales prior to the taking effect of the act of 1879, although at the time of the execution of the deed the law may have provided that the sheriff was the proper party therefor. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County. John M. Boyle, and M. Mulligan, for appellant. The opinion of the court was delivered by ANDERS, J. The respondent moves the court to strike the statement of facts and the exhibits from the transcript, on the grounds-First, Because the same are improperly made a part of the transcript; being originals and not copies as required by law; second, because the statement of facts was settled without having given the respondent any notice thereof as required by law; third, because said statement is not certified to as required by law. While the law contemplates that the clerk shall send up to this court a copy of the statement of facts, we do not think that the fact that the original has been embodied in the transcript can work any injury to the respondent, and therefore deny the motion on that ground, as we have heretofore done in similar cases. Nor do we think the motion should be sustained on either of the other grounds stated. The notice of settlement was duly given and served, but at the time fixed by the court for the hearing the judge was absent. On his return two days afterwards he fixed another date for the settlement of the statement, of which respondent appears to have had no notice, and at which time he was not present in person or by his counsel. Neither Feb. 1893.] Opinion of the Court- ANDERS, J. is it shown by the record that the hearing was continued by order of court. And this being so, the respondent's objection would be valid under many decisions of this court, if he were in a position to make the objection. It was his duty to serve a written notice upon the opposite party, stating whether or not the correctness of the statement of facts was contested, and if contested, in what particular or particulars it was deficient, incorrect or incomplete. Code Proc., 1422. And having failed to do so, and it not appearing that the statement as settled was different from that originally filed, and of which respondent had notice, he cannot now be heard to urge his objection. The certificate of the judge states all that the law requires and is, therefore, sufficient. The appellant brought this action against the respondent to recover the possession of certain land in Pierce county. The respondent, in his answer, denied all of the allegations of the complaint, and set up as a further defense the sale of the land on July 24, 1877, for non-payment of taxes for the year 1876, the delivery of a certificate of purchase therefor; that said taxes were never paid or the land redeemed, and that a deed was delivered to defendant by virtue of said tax sale from the treasurer of Pierce county, on March 14, 1883, and that plaintiff's action was barred by $51 (67) of the act of November 9, 1877, and by $2939 of the Code of 1881. A demurrer to the defense of the statute of limitations was sustained by the court as to § 2939 of the Code, but by leave of the court the defendant subsequently amended his answer so as to plead the statute of limitations, as set forth in said 2939, by stating the date when the tax deed was recorded. At the trial in the superior court the appellant proved that he purchased the land in controversy in the year 1871, from one J. W. Brazee, who purchased the same from the grantee of the United States; but his deed was not placed |