INDEX TO SUBJECTS.

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW.

I. MECHANICS' LIENS AND MATERIALMEN AND SUPPLIES.

(a.) The mechanics' lien law of Virginia does not apply to ships while in
the process of being built in a public shipbuilder's yard, under a
contract by which the ships were the property of the owners and
not of the builder from the laying of the keels, in favor of material-
men who gave credit to the builder and not to the ships. Stewart
& Tucker v. Gogorza's Sons, 459.

(b.) What work, material, and supplies are, and what are not liens upon
a domestic vessel under the law of Maryland and the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the Lottawana case.
and McGee v. The Daniel Augusta, 464.

Milbourne

(c.) The relative priorities and dignities of many claims upon the same
vessel asserted by libels and petitions composed, adjusted, and settled
in a careful opinion by the court. Hatton v. The Melita, 494.

(d.) Liens founded upon the necessities of vessels in foreign ports are never
displaced by mortgage titles recorded in home ports. Reeder v. The
George's Creek, 584.

II. COLLISION.

(a.) The statutory rules of navigation as to fog-bells and fog-horns must
not be construed to excuse the faults of bad seamanship.

A vessel must not sail in a fog with too much canvas to allow of prompt
manœuvring to avoid collision with craft lying at anchor.

The presumption of fault is conclusive against vessels sailing with too
much canvas in a fog in fishing waters, and colliding with vessels
at anchor where there is no vis major. Guibert & Sons v. The George
Bell, 468.

(b.) Example of collision happening by violation of rule 17 of the rules of
navigation. The Pepita and The William Slater, 483.

(c.) Where a vessel lying at anchor in a harbor on proper ground showing
lights is run into by a moving steamer and damaged, the presump-
tion of fault is conclusive against the steamer. Mercer v. The
Florida, 488.

(d.) Where a vessel sailing without a light collides with another properly
navigated and equipped, the fault is hers, and she must bear the loss.
McCready v. The Robert I. Poulson, 494.

(e.) Example where both vessels are in fault and the damages are divided.
Boggs v. Parrs, 504.

ADMIRALTY

(f.) A vesse

water,

and he

MARITIME LAW (continued).

t anchor in a fairway or roadstead of a navigable
o anchor-lights burning, and but one anchor-watch,
p, at the time a steamer runs into her by no fault of the
stomer, is solely in fault, and must bear the loss from the collision.
v. The Nurnberg, 505.

B

(g.) Dam.

own

from collision by inevitable accident each party to bear his
1. Jerome v. A Floating-dock, 508.

(h.) Where a' teamtug running free with the current and tide, down a
river in a deep channel 250 yards wide, at the rate of eight miles
an hour, in a fog, fails, within a distance of 30 to 60 yards, to avoid
collision with another tug, having six vessels in tow, coming up the
stream, at the rate of two miles an hour:

Held, That the tug which was running free was at fault in moving with

such speed and such want of caution as to have failed to clear the
approaching vessels, and that the plea of inevitable accident was in-
admissible. Ellis v. The Katy Wise, 589.

(i.) Damages to the person of one on board of a vessel, resulting from col-
lision, may be recovered by libel in admiralty from the vessel in
fault.

It is the duty of a steamer, in the act of backing, to keep a lookout in ́
the stern of the vessel.

Steamers must keep out of the way of sail-vessels, whenever there is
possible danger of collision. Dunstan v. The Tug Kirkland, 641.
III. SALVAGE.

(a.) A derrick-boat raised from the bottom of the channel of a public navi-
gable river may be the subject of a libel for salvage in admiralty.
Maltby v. A Steam Derrick-boat, 477.

(a.) Where a purchaser of a vessel, who takes pains before purchasing to
ascertain the claims against her and to see them settled, is informed
by a claimant (who is afterwards the libellant) that he has but one
small claim, which is afterwards paid, and this claimant fails to
inform him of the existence of a negotiable note given in payment
of another claim which is receipted, and which the vendor shows
as receipted to the purchaser,

Held, That this negotiable note is not a lien upon the vessel. Wood
v. The Tug Lumberman, 542.

As to what may be the subject of a maritime lien see supra Salvage.

APPEARANCE. See Judgments and Decrees.

ASSIGNMENTS.

1. A suit on a note secured by a deed of assignment never prosecuted to final
judgment is not a waiver of the benefit of the assignment. Clark, Dodge
& Co., v. Gibboney et al., 391.

2. See Trusts.

ATTACHMENTS.

1. Whether an attachment can issue from a court of the Uaed States against
the property of a citizen of another State, he not by in the State, at
the suit of a citizen of the State. Mauldin v. Carll. 19.

1. A discharge in bankruptcy is only a personal release of of bankrupt from
a debt, and does not release any lien of the debt upon property; and
such property may be subjected by a State court to the lien when the
property does not form part of the assets in bankruptcy, or by the bank-
ruptcy court when it does, if it comes, after the discharge, again into
possession of the bankrupt. Dixon v. Barnum, 207.

2. An assignee in bankruptcy filed a petition asking a reference to the regis-
ter, with instructions to take an account of liens binding upon the bank-
rupt's real estate, and of their priorities, and to summon lien creditors to
show cause against a sale of the real estate free of incumbrances.
Pending that petition in court, in term, and in consequence of it, the bank-
rupt's wife preferred her petition in court, praying a settlement out of a
certain parcel of the bankrupt's real estate.

By the same order of court which granted the prayer of the assignee's peti-
tion the wife's claim for a settlement was also referred to the register,
with instructions to take evidence and to make report in regard to it, as
well as in regard to liens and their priorities.

Six weeks after this order of reference, to wit, on the 8th of December,
1877, the assignee and all lien creditors having been summoned before
the register and been present before him, and being still before him, the
register made up his report as to the liens, and as to the wife's claim for
a settlement.

On the 12th of December, 1877, the register presented s report in court,
in term, the assignee and lien creditors being present in person or by
counsel; and the assignee then filed exceptions to the report, these ex-
ceptions relating only to that part of the register's report which treated
of the bankrupt's wife's claim for a settlement.

On this state of facts, it was, on sundry exceptions,
Held, That although the wife could not have been required to submit her
claim to the judgment of the bankruptcy court in the summary bank-
ruptcy proceeding, yet that it was competent for her to waive her right
to an adjudication on plenary proceedings, and to submit voluntarily to
the adjudication of the bankruptcy court.

Held, That in the summary bankruptcy proceeding it was sufficient that
the assignee and lien creditors had had opportunity to produce evidence
and make argument before the register against the wife's claim for a set-
tlement, and to file exceptions to the register's report; and that they had
had a day in court to object to the report of the register; and that, there-
fore, they had no right to insist that the wife, against her wish, should
be driven to a plenary proceeding in another court.

Held, That clause third of section 4972, Revised Statutes of the United
States, gave full jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over the subject-
VOL. III.-44

BANKRUPTCY (continued).

matter of a wife's "specific claim" to a settlement out of the bankrupt's
estate; and that her coming voluntarily into the bankruptcy court, by
petition, to assert that claim, gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction,
personally as to herself, to "ascertain and liquidate" that claim.
Held, That where a wife's separate estate has been changed from one form
of investment to another by agreement between herself and her husband,
and, before the title in the property newly acquired had been made to
her, the husband becomes bankrupt, the bankruptcy court, as a court of
equity, in a case where its jurisdiction is clear, will treat that as done
which ought to have been done, and decree a settlement upon the wife
of property acquired with her separate means. Campbell, in re, 276.
3. Where an order of seizure was given in an involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding against goods in the hands of a purchaser, by sale afterwards
adjudged to have been fraudulent; and on this purchaser's petition the
goods were released to him on his giving a joint and several bond to the
marshal, with sureties for the forthcoming of the goods, or else to answer
the future judgment of the court in the matter; and plenary proceedings
were afterwards instituted in the District Court on its equity side against
the purchaser and his securities on this bond to set aside the sale; and a
decree was in due course rendered declaring the sale to have been fraudu-
lent, and decreeing the value of the goods to be paid by the fraudu-
lent purchaser and his sureties; and the purchaser (not joined by his
sureties) appealed to the Circuit Court, giving an appeal bond with new
sureties; and, after decree of the Circuit Court affirming the decree below,
the said purchaser appealed to the Supreme Court, giving an appeal
bond with still new surety and that appeal was dismissed; and then exe-
cution was taken out against the fraudulent purchaser, on which only a
small part of the debt was made, leaving a large balance unpaid; and a
petition was filed in the bankruptcy proceeding by the assignees against
the sureties in the original delivery bond (not making the fraudulent
purchaser a party) for the payment of the balance due under the decree;
and the said purchaser soon after died insolvent, but leaving real estate
not sufficient to satisfy by sale the amount of the decree:
Held, On demurrer and answer, that the assignee in bankruptcy could select
which of the several bonds to proceed upon, and might proceed upon
the original delivery bond, and this being joint and several, he might
proceed against any one or more of the obligors without the actual

motion.

Held, also, That the assignee might proceed by summons or petition, and
need not resort to a plenary suit upon the bond.

Held, also, That the assignee might proceed at once against the sureties in

the original bond, and need not first subject the real estate of the fraudu-
lent purchaser of the goods replevied before so doing. Storrs Bros. v.
Engel & Son, 414.

4. Any creditor holding a lien upon lands of the bankrupt may appeal from
a decree affecting his rights to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court.

Before lands of bankrupt covered with liens can be sold free of liens by