Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making

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Oxford University Press, 2008 M08 15 - 248 páginas
The U.S. Supreme Court is a public policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing of amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs. In Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Paul M. Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices' decision making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to author concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice derived from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and social psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment of decision-making on the nation's highest court, which represents the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play a significant role in shaping the justices' choices.

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Contenido

1 Introduction
1
2 Interest Group Litigation
17
3 Amicus Curiae Participation in the Supreme Court
37
4 Amici Curiae and Judicial Decision Making
75
5 Amici Curiae and the Consistency of Judicial Decision Making
115
6 Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the Supreme Court
139
7 Conclusions and Implications
165
Data and Data Reliability
187
References
197
Table of Cases
221
Index
225
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Paul M. Collins, Jr. is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. In 2006, he was awarded the Council of Graduate Schools/University Microfilms International Award for the Most Distinguished Dissertation in the Social Sciences defended between July 2004 and June 2006. His research focuses primarily on appellate court decision making, with a special interest in psychological theories of judicial choice. Collins's scholarship has been published in a wide array of the leading journals in political science and law.

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