used by the Chairman, the Clerk himself removing to a stool close by. The Speaker was then presumed to have become for the time being an ordinary member, with the right to speak and vote, but that right has now fallen into disuse in Parliament, Speaker Denison (1857-72) having exercised it last.

Doubtless at the start there was much less formality in Committee than in the House itself, where the rules of procedure hampered freedom of action. In the course of time, with the application of many rules of parliamentary law to Committees, this difference has in part disappeared, but the traditional spirit of informality still pervades a Committee and is fostered by some formulated variations in practice. For instance, members can speak as many times as they please in Committee, which encourages colloquy, a most useful form of debate. This has led to the understanding that speeches in Committee should be brief, to the point, business-like, almost conversational. "The object of Committee debate," says Redlich, "is to arrive at decisions upon special questions of substance and to settle the essential points of detail one by one. The aim of what is said is to convince, and not to gain a mere debating advantage. Committee therefore offers to individual members the best scope for display of expert knowledge, untiring industry, capacity for routine work and ready action; many a new member makes his reputation there."

Some of the characteristics of work in Committee have greatly changed in the course of the last half-century. Mr. Asquith told the Select Committee on House of Commons Procedure in 1914 that if they would look at the debates on very important measures, for instance, the Bill for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church something less than fifty years before, they would be surprised to see both how short a time the Committee occupied and how many clauses passed without any discussion or amendment at all, the principle of the measure being accepted on the Second Reading. In modern times, he said, it is the practice of both parties in the Committee stage to propose amendments and carry on discussions the object of which is not to carry out the principle settled on Second Reading, but to make amendments for the purpose of the wreckage of the bill. That is a perfectly legitimate parliamentary weapon, but it is one the use of which is very much more common now than in the old days.

1 The Procedure of the House of Commons, III, 92.

Procedure by Committee of the Whole was familiar to the lawmakers of colonial America, and here too became part of the recognized parliamentary practice. In New York and Georgia nearly all bills were referred to such a committee after the second reading, and it was much used in Virginia and the Carolinas. In New England, however, resort to it was rare, and it was not employed for discussing bills.1 Virginia devised a novel function for it, that of drawing up a program for a session. The Continental Congress frequently resolved itself into Committee of the Whole to consider the more important business, and also for giving audience to foreign ministers.

When enough delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 had at last arrived, it was resolved, May 29, "that the House will meet to-morrow to resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider the state of the American Union." Virginians were leaders in that Convention, and we may presume were responsible for this wording of the motion. It had been the custom in Virginia to use two forms the "Committee of the Whole House," to which were referred bills after second reading, and the "Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Commonwealth," which discussed the Governor's letter and outlined the legislative business. The distinction was based wholly on the nature of the business, being simply a device for classification. It was engrafted on the practice of Congress, and to-day, with the omission of the word "American," the formula used in the Convention is used in both branches at Washington.

After the Senate of the newly created Union had passed only one bill, in May of 1789, it gave to the Committee of the Whole exceptional scope, for it resolved "that all bills on second reading shall be considered by the Senate in the same manner as if the Senate were in Committee of the Whole, before they shall be taken up and proceeded on by the Senate agreeable to the standing rules, unless otherwise ordered." Under this the practice in Committee differs little from that when the Senate is not in Committee. The Yeas and Nays may be demanded and entered in the Journal; a motion to adjourn, or take a recess, or postpone, or commit may be made; - in brief, the Committee may do almost anything the Senate may do.

In the House of Representatives all bills to raise revenue, or which make a charge upon the treasury, must be considered in

1 R. V. Harlow, Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825, 93.

Committee of the Whole. Since much the greater part of the work involves expenditure, the House is in Committee the greater part of the time. From the point of view of efficiency, here the House may be seen at its worst and at its best. After the opening speech explaining the bill, which is really useful, the many hours devoted to general debate - that is, debate not confined to the bill — drive most of the members to their offices. Perfervid orators hurl at empty seats the periods that later put in pamphlet form will persuade constituents to reëlect. Dreary bores drone away from manuscript. Occasionally an able man with a message worth while accepts the opportunity for want of a better, and perhaps a friend by doubting the presence of a quorum will set the call bells ringing and get him an audience. For the most part, though, "general debate" is sheer waste of time and a pitiful reflection on the capacity of our greatest representative assemblage to use intelligently and efficiently its precious hours.

When at last the orators have used all the time that the leaders had agreed to throw away in this fashion, then comes the best work done in Congress. The bill is read section by section, with opportunity for debate and amendment at the end of each. Speeches are limited to five minutes, but if it is evident that a man really has something to say, he can easily get two, three, or five minutes more by unanimous consent. The curious practice of pro forma amendment is constantly used. Somebody moves to strike out the last word and talks five minutes on a real issue. Then somebody else pretends opposition to this pro forma amendment. The rule forbidding more than two speeches is then escaped by moving another pro forma amendment, to strike out the last two words, and so on. The Chairman permits much latitude in all this, with the result that there is a cross-fire of short, sharp speeches to the point, and intelligent decision is usually reached with reasonable celerity. There being no record votes in Committee, it is exceptional for men to share in this decision without having heard the arguments, as often happens when the Yeas and Nays can be demanded. Also the absence of the rollcall conduces to judgment disinterested, without an eye to the effect on party standing or the chances of reëlection. Furthermore, it saves time.

Most of the work in Committee is usually done with a small attendance. Before 1890 the quorum was the same as in the House,

a majority, but since then, except in two Congresses, it has been 100. Often that number will not be on hand, but it is for the most part recognized that this kind of work is best done when only a few score of members are present. They include those having some acquaintance with the topic, the watch-dogs who are always on the alert to guard the public treasury, and enough others to make a satisfactory jury. A large attendance would produce more talk and poorer verdicts.

The Senate practice of requiring every measure to be considered in Committee of the Whole has been imitated in a few of the State Legislatures, and likewise the House practice of requiring such consideration in the case of appropriation bills. It is idle to particularize because custom so often nullifies the rules that no stranger can safely undertake to say just what takes place. For instance, it would be inferred from reading the Pennsylvania rules that there the Committee of the Whole is used invariably. The fact is, however, that the Speaker's formula, "Will the House dispense with the Committee of the Whole- Dispensed with," has become a matter of routine. For the most part the rules permit rather than command, or leave the matter to the general principles of parliamentary law. In general it may be said that most of the Legislatures have allowed the use of the Committee of the Whole to lapse. The change in Iowa is typical; in its Territorial Legislature all bills had to be considered in Committee of the Whole; its latest session did not see the committee used once. The Massachusetts General Court resorts to it hardly once in a decade, and then without advantage, mainly because nobody knows how to extract its benefits.

That it has benefits may be soundly argued, in spite of the general tendency to abandon them. They are of slight consequence for the mass of bills, short, simple, containing but one or two propositions. With complicated measures of many sections, full of details, the case is quite different. For the proper handling of these, ordinary legislative procedure is grossly inadequate. It usually compels voting on what may be from ten to a hundred propositions, at the end of perhaps several days of debate, when the arguments on most of the points are no longer fresh in mind, indeed may not have been heard at all by many who vote. The conditions are hostile to independent judgment. The impulse is to vote "Yes" every time, or "No" every time. Everything 1 Samuel Bryan Scott, State Government in Pennsylvania, 26.

predisposes toward poor work. Against this there is but one safeguard, and that is to act upon the propositions that make up a compendious or complicated bill, one at a time. As far as that rather clumsy and stupid fiction, the Committee of the Whole, secures this, it serves a most desirable purpose, for which it should be preserved and utilized until legislative bodies are willing to secure the end by simpler ways.

That is wholly feasible. The Rhode Island House accomplishes most of what is necessary by its excellent rule that "any bill of more than one section shall be passed upon by sections, at the request of any member." To this might well be added that in debate, section by section, speeches should be limited to five minutes, with the previous question permissible on each section or amendment, but with assurance of say five or ten minutes on each proposal to the member of the committee in charge, as well as a like time to the minority of the committee if any, and the mover of an amendment.

It was after this general plan that the Massachusetts Convention of 1917 conducted a debate of several weeks on the Initiative and Referendum. First there were set speeches, about sixty, on the general principle. A mistake was made, as it afterward seemed, in dealing with these by going into Committee of the Whole. Since it was agreed by both sides that there should be no limit on the number or length of these speeches, they dragged out to tiresome and useless length, and this led many delegates to put the blame unjustly on the Committee of the Whole, which in fact shared in the responsibility for the waste of time only because it precluded impatient members from trying by the previous question to upset the agreement that had been made by the leaders on the two sides of the matter. After the leaders themselves saw the limits of endurance approaching and agreed to bring the set speeches to an end, treatment of the hundred or so of amendments offered went on in satisfactory and efficacious manner. Each amendment could get half an hour of debate if it was wanted, with brief speeches, and then a chance for each side to sum up. The result was general agreement that every detail of the exceedingly complicated measure received fair and adequate consideration.

As a matter of fact, everything that proved of real consequence in the procedure could have been secured without resort to the Committee of the Whole, but it might not have been secured.