These measures are constantly passed for debate on the first call of the calendar, when reached are sometimes not debated, and when time is spent to the extent of half or three quarters of an hour by the proponent of the legislation, he is seldom able to muster enough votes for a roll-call to overturn the adverse report." To meet the situation with a compromise that, while preserving the important part of the report system, should mitigate its hardships, recommendation was made that a committee might not report on a proposition to which it was unanimously opposed. It was submitted that "any measure which has not secured for itself a single supporter upon the committee before whom it is heard has slight, if any, chance of passing either branch of the Legislature; that it has little merit, and that it is not entitled to the right of limiting the opportunity to consider more important measures which have some chance of becoming law." In the session of 1914 there were 1431 matters reported on adversely by unanimous vote of committees. These were all read by the Clerks of both Houses, and appeared in the calendar of each. Some were kept in the calendars for a time by the process of "passing" for debate, and some were actually debated. Had the suggested rule been in force and had two minutes of time been saved on each measure a very conservative estimate the total saving would have been about sixteen legislative days, as reckoned on the normal number of minutes in such days. With other promising suggestions made at the same time, this one was shelved, but sooner or later something of the sort must be done, unless a still wiser remedy is found in preventing the trivial matters, mostly administrative detail, from ever reaching committees of the Legislature. Even then, permission to pigeonhole, where not a member of a committee favors, would be reasonable and useful. Indeed that would not be seriously dangerous if only one, two, or three members favor.

The Pennsylvania House looks in the same direction, but from a different angle, when requiring that if a committee reports adversely, the words "Negative Recommendation" are to be printed conspicuously on a line above the title of the bill. In both House and Senate such a bill is not to be placed on the calendar except by majority vote, and in the House a motion to place it on the calendar must be made within five days after the committee reports. This looks somewhat too drastic. If a committee is almost evenly divided, it seems unfair to compel a

debate on the floor over the question of consideration. Were it stipulated, however, that when two thirds of a committee are against a measure, it shall not go on the calendar without a vote, the rule might not be open to serious objection.

A committee of the Colorado House making an adverse report must, under the rule, "state explicitly their reasons therefor." Just what good this accomplishes does not suggest itself to one unfamiliar with its operation.

Certain Legislatures, where machine methods prevail, have what is sometimes popularly known as a "graveyard" committee, composed of carefully selected members who can be relied upon to bury effectually any undesirable measure referred to them. For the sake of appearances its official title is innocent enough. That in Pennsylvania, formally called "Judiciary Special," is familiarly styled "the Pickling Vat." It is said that in 1913 bills to the number of 137 that had passed the House were entombed in the graveyard committee of the Pennsylvania Senate. Of course theoretically such an institution is indefensible. In any case it is dangerous. Yet where leadership can be restrained within reasonable limits, a legislative burying-ground is not without beneficial uses.

A minor matter of detail connected with committee reports was brought to attention by the Massachusetts Special Committee on Legislative Procedure in 1915. The reading of these reports in House or Senate consumes uselessly much valuable time. Few members pay any attention, knowing the reports will all appear in the next day's printed calendar. So it was suggested that the reading be omitted. A few such time-saving changes, simple and reasonable, would in the aggregate have important effect in shortening sessions.

It is the custom in Massachusetts, and very likely common in the other States, for a committee report to be put in charge of some one member, who is expected to lead its defense on the floor. Usually the reports are so distributed among the members that each gets his fair share of opportunity and work. The chairman is likely to reserve to himself only the most important reports; if unused to debating, he may not make a single report. Lack of such freedom is one of the defects of congressional practice. To be sure, in the House the chairmen of the sub-committees of the Committee on Appropriations usually handle the appropriation bills for which they have been chiefly responsible,

and two or three of the other busy committees sometimes proceed in the same fashion, but the expectation seems to be that normally the floor work is the perquisite or responsibility of the chairman. Much of the harm from promoting to chairmanships by seniority could be avoided if chairmen conscious of their lack of skill in debate, or who are not at ease when on their feet, should feel free, without injury to pride or loss of prestige, to turn the floor work over to a junior member of the committee more expert in the science of parliamentary warfare. Many a man quite competent to guide the deliberations of a committee is not a born debater.

On the Continent of Europe it is common for Sections or Committees to elect Reporters, who take charge of the bills. In the Netherlands the Reporters of the various Sections form a committee, which in turn elects a general Reporter. They communicate to each other every question that has been discussed in the different Sections, and consider how they can best explain the principle of each bill, so as to frame their report accordingly. Should it appear that important points have been overlooked, the Sections may be reassembled to deliberate on them. The central committee of Reporters is also found in Belgium, Hungary, and Italy.

Opinion and practice in our legislative bodies differ over whether the minority of a committee has an inherent right to report. From one point of view the strict parliamentary law that gives no standing to the minority is logical enough, for it may be argued that just as a legislative body speaks when the majority speaks, so it should be with a committee. Yet there is the difference that the work of a Legislature is for the time being a finality, but the work of a committee is merely advisory and not binding. No good reason presents itself why a part of a committee, even though the lesser part, should not be heard, and the American practice in permitting it is quite defensible. With us the technical argument is rarely pressed, and the minority is usually without question allowed to print its view. In England the formal minority report as such is not recognized, but minority members secure at least publicity for their position by means of the standing order requiring every division in a select committee to be entered on its minutes, and any substitute that has been moved to be reported to the House with the names of those who voted for it.

Congressional committee reports are an agreeable novelty to a member fresh from a State Legislature where reports are of the "Yes" or "No" variety. When a committee of Congress recommends the passage of a bill, it describes briefly what is proposed. This explanation is printed and with a copy of the bill is at hand when discussion begins. The document conduces to a clearer understanding of the measure and to a more intelligent debate. State Legislatures might to much advantage copy the practice.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMITTEE FUNCTIONS

A LEGISLATIVE body may seek information for the purpose of making laws, or for the purpose of learning if laws are properly executed. These are really quite distinct purposes, though seldom discriminated. Strangely little discussion has been aroused by the common confusion of functions. Rarely is it asked how it happens that under a system supposed to emphasize the separation of powers, the legislative branch constantly asserts the right to supervise the executive branch. It seems to be accepted that this is a natural corollary of the duty to appropriate money, which is not lawmaking at all, but simply a supplying of means for the execution of law. The Constitution of Massachusetts, although distinctly saying that "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them," also says that "the House of Representatives shall be the grand inquest of this Commonwealth." Another Constitution, that of Maryland, more specifically recognizes investigation as a proper legislative duty, for it prescribes the creation of a joint standing committee to examine and report upon all contracts made for printing, stationery, and purchases for the public offices and the library, and all expenditures therein, and also to examine and report upon all matters of alleged abuse in expenditures to which their attention may be called by resolution of either House.

Rule 23 of the Virginia House of Delegates goes farther with the principle than any other formulation of it that has come to my notice, not only bringing all the committees within its application, but also imposing on them the duty of exercising initiative. "The several standing committees," it is directed, "shall not only consider and report upon the matters specially referred to them, but shall, whenever practicable, suggest such legislation as will provide upon general principles for all similar cases. And it shall be the duty of each committee to inquire into the condition and administration of the laws relating to the subjects which they have in charge; to investigate the conduct and look to the responsibility of all public officers and agents con