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Seward buys a “bargain"

York and San Francisco. This was regarded by the United States government as a gesture of friendliness toward the Union cause in the Civil War. Secretary of State Seward, an ardent expansionist, capitalized upon upon this assumption of friendliness in 1867 to respond favorably to an overture by the Russian minister in Washington who told him that the Czar was willing to sell Alaska to the United States. Seward's eagerness to acquire Alaska prompted him to agree to a price of $7,200,000 which was $2,200,000 more than the Russian minister had been instructed to ask as his minimum figure. The deal was quickly concluded between Seward and de Stoeckl, the Russian minister, at a midnight conference on March 2930, 1867.

TREATY OF CESSION OF ALASKA, WASHINGTON, MARCH 30, 1867: . . . the Emperor of all the Russias agrees to cede to the United States ... all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands. . . . In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States agree to pay .. seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold. . . .

Expansion beyond our continental boundaries

The prospects for ratification of the treaty by the Senate appeared dim, for the American people had little desire to acquire this supposedly barren territory so far from the continental borders of the United States. "Seward's Icebox," as Alaska was derisively called, seemed a bad bargain even to many supporters of manifest destiny. But Seward was determined and began a campaign of education to convince the nation of the potential richness of Alaska. More important, he enlisted the support of Charles Sumner, the influential chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Partly as a result of Sumner's vigorous speech in favor of the treaty the Senate approved the agreement on April 9, 1867. But the House of Representatives, jealous of its prerogatives in the field of foreign relations, delayed voting the appropriation of the $7,200,000 needed to make the treaty effective.(18) It was not until July 14, 1868 that the House, after prolonged debate during which some evidence exists that several Congressmen accepted bribes from de Stoeckl to vote for the fundsapproved the appropriation. Alaska thereby be

came the first non-contiguous territory to pass into the possession of the United States.

Territorial expansion as a leading issue slackened somewhat after the addition of Alaska. The fever for additional territory never disappeared, but it did diminish-except as proponents for the annexation of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Hawaii, and other overseas areas became excited at various times during the 19th century. The precedents for territorial acquisition had all been set by 1867. Subsequent enlargements of the possessions of the United States followed established patterns.(14)

5. The Monroe Doctrine

One of the most far-reaching and enduring bases of American foreign policy has been the insistence upon hemispheric integrity as promulgated in what is known as the Monroe Doctrine and as enlarged by later pronouncements and actions of the United States. The genesis of the doctrine is easier to indicate than it would be to relate the varied developments which followed its publication. To trace the development of the Monroe Doctrine we must go back to the period just after our war of 1812 and the Napoleonic wars which raged in Europe during the years following the French Revolution. Then we can watch the fortunes of the Monroe Doctrine to the time of the Civil War when it had become a fixed part of American foreign policy. Its influence is still being felt today and the later examples of its employment will be noted in subsequent sections of this examination of American foreign policy.

A league against revolution

When Napoleon was finally defeated in Europe in 1815, the victorious powers joined together in the Quadruple Alliance to preserve the status quo and to discourage the development of the dangerous, to them, democratic tendencies set in motion in Europe and in the New World by the American and French revolutions. These powers-Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain (the last nation a rather unenthusiastic member of the alliance)-repressed revolts in Spain, Portugal, Naples, Greece, and other European countries between 1820 and 1823. They then turned their attention to the series of

revolutions in Latin America which had set up a number of new republics in the former Spanish colonial empire. Great Britain, although not formally withdrawing from the alliance, did not relish the prospect of the restoration of Spanish rule in South America for she had gained measurable trade advantages by dealing with the newly independent countries of that continent.

The United States was likewise alarmed by the designs of the alliance. Americans reasoned that the European powers, exclusive of Britain, might go from attempts to restore European controls in Latin America close to American territory to an attack on the United States itself as the center of democratic influence in the New World. The Russian ukase of 1821 and the rumor in 1823 that France would receive Cuba as a reward for her help in restoring the monarchy in Spain heightened the concern of the United States in these matters.

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PROPOSAL OF CANNING TO RUSH, LONDON, AUGUST 20, 1823: . . . Is not the moment come when our governments might understand each other as to the Spanish American Colonies? . . . 1. We conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances. 4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves. 5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference. If these opinions and feelings are as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other; and to declare them in the face of the world? If there be any European Power which cherishes other projects such a declaration on the part of your government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects.

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President Monroe, when Rush informed him of Canning's plan, was inclined to go forward with the proposed action. He asked the advice of exPresidents Jefferson and Madison and they both favored cooperation with Britain. But Secretary of State J. Q. Adams wanted the United States to

remain free from European associations and held out for independent action by the American government. Adams feared that Britain was anxious to maneuver the United States into a position of self-denial of territorial ambitions in Spanish America, especially with reference to Cuba, Mexico, California, and other neighboring regions. Adams, moreover, saw little danger of actual intervention by the European powers in Latin America.

Secretary Adams convinced President Monroe and his cabinet that the United States should take independent action. It was finally determined by the cabinet that instead of announcing the American

America takes the initiative

stand in diplomatic notes to the powers, it would be better to include the pronouncement in the President's annual message to Congress. This Monroe did in phrases which are partially attributed to Adams' assistance.

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT MONROE TO CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2, 1823: . . . a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. . . . the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Gov

ernments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by an European power in any other light than as the manifestation of any unfriendly disposition toward the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us.

The ideas expressed in the Monroe Doctrine were built on purposes announced and followed by previous American leaders. They were mainly the codification by Monroe and J. Q. Adams of the ideas of hemispheric integrity, no transfer of territory, nonintervention, nonentangle

A unilateral doctrine without force of law

ment, and the recognition of new states held by the Americans since colonial days. But the President's message did set forth a policy to which the country pledged adherence and which was popularly accepted at the time by the American people. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, was not a part of the law of the land. It was actually a "unilateral, presidential enunciation of foreign policy.""

The doctrine did not bind future administrations and it had no inherent force in international law. The Latin American republics were disappointed that the doctrine did not go further in offering them protection. And the continental European nations generally viewed Monroe's pronouncement with contempt. In fact, it was not until the 1850's that it became known as the Monroe Doctrine. But it was, from the beginning, recognized as a basis of American foreign policy whether used to justify actions to protect the safety and security of the United States or to warn European powers not to encroach upon the independent territories of the Latin American portion of the Western hemisphere.

Applications of the Monroe Doctrine in the years immediately following 1823 were not numerous. In one way and another its implications were not asserted in cases relating to fears of French aggression in Colombia (1825), Brazil (1828), and Mexico (1838).

Polk's corollary of 1848

Bailey, op. cit., p. 191.

Nor did the United States protest against British occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1833. Likewise British expansion in Central America from 1823 to 1845 drew no official protests from the United States. In 1845, as has been mentioned, President Polk asserted the applicability of the doctrine to the cases of Texas, California, and Oregon. But he confined its application to North America and did not relate the doctrine to French and British hostilities against Argentina at that time. However, in 1848, Polk opposed the transfer of Yucatan from Mexico to Great Britain or Spain, even with the consent of the inhabitants of the peninsula. This added the so-called corollary of non-transfer of territory to the original doctrine. (15) Secretary of State Daniel Webster made a like protest in 1852 against a proposed transfer of Cuba to either France or Great Britain. It was in the period after 1860 that the doctrine really became a fixed pole of American foreign policy. The developments which brought about this status are dealt with in a later section.9

6. Other Fundamental Actions: 1776-1860

In addition to the elements of American foreign policy discussed thus far, certain more routine problems faced the United States in the first 85 years of our independent history. Some of these problems are presented here as illustrations of the day-to-day complexities of international affairs. To do this we must go back again to the beginnings of our national history. No attempt is made to be exhaustive. Only a few of the many problems which might be cited are included in this section.

The Declaration of Independence proclaimed the basic revolutionary right of the people to institute new governments for just cause. Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, in 1792, set forth the two most essential conditions of rec

The right of revolution

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The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.10 In other words, recognition should be based upon actual, realistic, de facto control and popular

De facto recognition

approval. In this spirit, the United States recognized the new French Republic in 1793 when President Washington received Citizen Genêt as minister. Although Genêt soon became persona non grata (an unacceptable diplomatic representative) because of his undiplomatic appeals for American popular support of the French revolutionaries and his use of his diplomatic immunity to outfit privateers to prey on English vessels, recognition of the French government continued.

America's sympathy with revolts against monarchy prompted early recognition of new republican governments. The United States was the first to recognize the Spanish-American republics, although it delayed recognition until the Florida territory had been ceded by Spain. Again the United States was the first to recognize the independence of Texas, waiting to do so, however, until after the Texans had expelled the Mexican troops. In 1856 President Pierce, partly to offset British influence in Central America, recognized the revolutionary government led by the filibustering William Walker in Nicaragua. On this occasion, Pierce declared:

It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source, or organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government de facto accepted by the people of the country.11

Showing that the United States was not always on the side of the anti-monarchists, it may be noted that President Millard Fillmore granted de facto recognition to the government of Emperor Louis Napoleon in 1852 in spite of the circumstances under which he gained the throne by a coup d'etat. Another instance of a reversal of policy, or at least a modification of it, was in 1826 when the United States declined to recognize the existing republic of Haiti because of its alleged instability

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American policy was to accord recognition when the new government was in actual control of the country (de facto recognition) and when the new government had the approval of the people of the country (de jure recognition), preferably expressed in a popular election, although this last condition was not an absolute essential. After the Civil War and in recent times variations of the recognition policy are to be found and they will be discussed at a later point.(16)

Equality of opportunity in trade

Some of the most involved problems of foreign policy arise in connection with international trade and commerce. The United States early adopted a policy of favoring full equality and reciprocity in peacetime dealings. This policy was included in the first American treaty.

TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, PARIS, FEBRUARY 6, 1778: . . . The most Christian King [of France], and the United States engage mutually not to grant any particular Favour, to other Nations in respect of Commerce and Navigation, which shall not immediately become common to the other Party, who shall enjoy the same Favour, freely, if the Concession was freely made, or on allowing the same Compensation, if the Concession was conditional....

Freedom of navigation

Free navigation of rivers such as the Mississippi was a principal aim of American diplomacy in the early years. Great Britain. granted this in the Treaty of Paris, 1783. A treaty negotiated by Thomas Pinckney with Spain in 1795 gave the United States further navigation rights on the river. The purchase of Louisiana in 1803 settled this problem, but the United States in general maintained its stand in favor of free navigation of rivers which were international boundaries.

The United States was compelled by circumstances to alter its free trade policies during the Napoleonic wars. After 1815 it relied more on

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likely to mean the mutual reduction of import duties by nations wishing to favor each other's trade. The 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain eliminated all discriminations in trade between the United States and the British Isles, and in 1830 this agreement was extended to the British West Indies. Between 1815 and 1825, reciprocity treaties were concluded with most of the countries of Europe and Latin America. In 1833 Edmund Roberts negotiated with Siam a treaty containing a most-favored-nation clause, an agreement to grant rights comparable to those granted the nation most favored in trade arrangements. Commodore Kearney secured a pledge of such treatment in the China treaty ports in 1842 which was confirmed by the Cushing treaty of 1844. This latter treaty also contained rights of extraterritoriality, or sovereign powers within a prescribed area of another country, for all Americans, except those in the opium trade. In 1853 Commodore Perry negotiated trading privileges in Japan; and the treaty signed by the Japanese and Townsend Harris, special American envoy, in 1858 extended these concessions.

The domestic policy of a protective tariff to encourage American industries after 1816 acted

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ness agrees, that the Naval Force to be maintained upon the American Lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following Vessels on each side . . . [a total of 4 vessels, each not exceeding 100 tons and one 18-pound cannon in armament, on Lakes Ontario, Champlain, and the Upper Lakes]. . . . and His Royal Highness agrees, that all other armed Vessels on these Lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other Vessels of War shall be there built or armed. . . .

This agreement continued in force without modification from 1817 down to 1940, although Secretary Seward, in 1864, threatened to terminate it because of the use of Canadian ports by Confederate agents during the Civil War. Little else was accomplished, or even attempted, in the field of the limitation of armaments until the close of the 19th century, but the action of Britain and the United States set a precedent which gave other nations something to follow.

Arbitration

Insofar as the avoidance and renunciation of war are concerned the United States carly, although gradually, took the lead in establishing arbitration as a method for settling international disputes. In the Jay Treaty with Britain in 1794 arbitration was provided for in three subjects of dispute. The Treaty of Ghent with Great Britain in 1815 and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico in 1848 both contained provisions for the creation of arbitral commissions. However, it was in the events leading to the Washington Treaty of 1871 with Great Britain that resort to arbitration made its greatest forward steps. This development properly belongs at a later point.(18)

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