more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. . . . To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now

[1] The Governments principally involved . . . to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency... set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations." The United

to take up

States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. . . . [2] The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. . . . [and] to devise methods whereby this... material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. . . . The United States would be more than willing with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one . . . . To the making of . [the] fateful decisions ["which will lead this world out of fear and into peace"], the United States pledges before you . . . its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma-to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. President Eisenhower's proposal for the pooling of atomic energy resources for peaceful purposes won immediate and widespread apSoviet proval from most of the nonreactions to Communist nations. The Soviet the Eisenhower Union was less enthusiastic in its pooling plan reception of the idea. 13 However, on January 6, 1954, it did authorize the Russian ambassador in Washington, Georgi N. Zarubin, to talk with Secretary of State Dulles about preliminary plans for setting up the pooling project. The two men met on January 11 and had a second conference a week later. So

13 On the day following the President's address a Soviet political commentator on the Moscow Radio called it a "warmongering speech." Later Soviet reactions were more noncommittal. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:851, Dec. 21, 1953.

viet Foreign Minister Molotov announced on January 19th that he would discuss the proposal with Secretary Dulles at the forthcoming Berlin Big Four conference. What specific suggestions came out of these discussions was not revealed until a later date when the texts of the documents exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union were made public September 25, 1954.14 The matter was again discussed at the Geneva meetings in May 1954 when Russia was reported to have threatened to reject the pooling plan unless the United States agreed in advance to a ban on all atomic weapons. This alternative, it was said, was unacceptable to the United States.1 15

Speaking before the UN General Assembly on September 23rd Secretary Dulles told the UN members that the United States was going ahead with its plans to establish an international atomic energy program. He declared that the Soviet Union's failure to cooperate would no longer delay American action. Two days later the publication of the Russian replies to the American proposals over the period from January 11th to September 22, 1954 was published by the State Department.17 At no time did the Russians give way in their insistence that a ban on the use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction must come before or concurrent with the establishment of an arrangement for the peaceful use of atomic power.

14 This series of 13 documents is published in U.S. Dept of State Bulletin, XXXI:478-89, Oct. 4, 1954.

15 Mr. Baruch, on May 3, 1954, said that he doubted the Eisenhower plan would end the atomic weapons race. Only an enforceable system of international inspection and control could solve the problem, Mr. Baruch declared.

16 On the same day the President, operating a remote-control device from Denver, started construction on the first commercial atomic power plant at Shippingport, Pa.

1 See note 14, this page.

Soviets propose international disarmament

The chief Soviet delegate to the UN, Andrei Vishinsky, on September 30th proposed to the General Assembly that an international convention on disarmament, including a prohibition on atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction, be drawn up. It would also contain provision for the reduction of conventional armaments and of military forces. The western nations indicated that they would be glad to consider the Soviet proposal when assurances could be given by the Soviet Union that it would consent to effective inspection and controls. In general, opinion seemed to be that the test of Soviet sincerity would occur when the UN disarmament conference opened in London early in 1955.

United States and Great

Britain

contribute

fissionable

material to

The United States further demonstrated its willingness to work for the international peaceful use of atomic energy when, on November 15, 1954, it offered to the proposed UN atomic pool 220 pounds of fissionable material. Great Britain made a like offer the following day but in a smaller quantity, 44 pounds. A week later the UN atomic pool General Assembly's Political and Security Committee voted 60 to 0 to endorse President Eisenhower's pooling plan, with the Soviet bloc joining the rest of the membership in favoring the calling of a world scientific congress in 1955 to study ways of employing atomic power for peaceful purposes. The resolution also provided for a world atomic energy agency. On December 4th the General Assembly, without dissent, approved the action of the Political and Security Committee.

On this encouraging note the year 1954 ended. However, the favorable votes on UN proposals are not to be taken as an indication that East-West cooperation on the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is assured. Secretary Dulles was gratified by the action of the UN, and as he indicated in a statement on December 8, 1954, "The acceptance by the United Nations of the President's 'Atoms for Peace' plan constitutes the most hopeful development in this field since the inception of the atomic age. But, hard work lies ahead before this facet

9918

18 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:975, Dec. 27, 1954.

of the problem created by the discovery and development of atomic power can be fully solved. On the greater problem of the control of and, if possible, the abolition of the use Responsibility of atomic power for destructive for failure weapons, little progress has been to reach made since 1945. While responsibilagreement ity for the failure to achieve such on controls controls may possibly be parceled out rests on among a number of world powers, it Soviets appears in the light of the events of the past ten years that the major share of the blame for this failure rests upon the men in the Kremlin.

5. The Vandenberg Resolution of 1948

Russians veto admission

of new members

During 1947 the Soviet Union made increasing use of the veto in Security Council discussions. The Russians were particularly obstructive when it came to voting upon the admission of new members to the United Nations. Late in 1946 Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, and Thailand were admitted, but the Soviet Union blocked the admission of several other nations which it believed were inimical to the principles of collective security as interpreted by the U.S.S.R. In 1947 only two applicants for entry met with Soviet approval. These were Pakistan and Yemen. At various times during 1947 the U.S.S.R. vetoed applications by Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy (twice), Austria, and Finland. In all, the Russians used the veto nine times in 1946 and thirteen times in 1947. Against this record are placed two vetoes each by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1946, and one by France in 1947.

Because of American dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the UN, the proposal of Secretary of State George C. Marshall to the General

big-power veto in questions involving applications for membership and pacific settlement of disputes. The Marshall proposal was strongly supported by a number of delegations and some went so far as to recommend a change in the UN Charter to abolish the veto. Such a step did not meet with favor among the large powers, but they did, with the exception of the U.S.S.R., advocate restraint in the use of the veto. The Soviet Union continued to hold that unanimity of decision among the Big Five was the cornerstone of the UN. And, of course, assent by the U.S.S.R. would be necessary for such a change in the Charter.

In this atmosphere it was difficult to maintain, let alone build up, enthusiasm for the UN among several elements of American opinion inclined to

American criticism of UN increases

support sentiments of isolationism. Powerful individuals in and out of public life endeavored to undermine or minimize the value of the UN. Members of Congress, newspaper and magazine owners, political commentators, and influential pressure groups sought to swing American public opinion away from endorsement of the UN. Advocates of a "go it alone" policy used the examples of the Soviet veto actions to point out the probable inevitable failure of the UN and to suggest ways of by-passing the international body. While many of this persuasion favored an almost complete withdrawal, by the United States from world affairs, others honestly believed that if the United States was to exercise its undoubted influence in the postwar situations it could better do so unilaterally than in concert with other world powers in the UN.

Concurrent with the development of the "go it alone" attitude there came the various policies which attempted to counter the communist cam

not mean that their conception, inauguration, and implementation were hostile to the position or success of the UN. In fact, they were often the agency for holding the UN together in face of the efforts of the Soviet bloc to destroy, or at least to nullify the worth of the international organization.

It was in this connection that there grew in importance in the United States a "bi-partisan" foreign policy. (52) Actually, the term might more

The "bi-partisan" foreign policy

properly be "non-partisan." All this means is that responsible leaders of both parties realized that insofar as possible the United States should present a truly united face toward world politics. During the war of 1941-1945 such a non-partisan foreign policy had been the rule; once the nation entered the struggle both Republicans and Democrats of every shade of political opinion joined to support the leadership of President Roosevelt. In peacetime it was more difficult to unite the country behind a less dynamic leadership, especially since domestic politics had changed the party complexion of the national Congress. The mid-term elections of 1946 placed Republicans in the majority in both the House and the Senate, and President Truman did not have either the safe margin in Congress or the urgencies of wartime to foster acceptance of his foreign policies.

Still, problems of the peace in 1946-1948 were often as grave as those of war. A number of leaders of Congress, and influential individuals

American policies receive the backing of men of both political parties

outside the legislative chambers, recognized that a strong and unified approach to foreign policies was essential. Opposition to the administration simply for the sake of opposing would get the country nowhere. Wherever possible, policies undertaken by the State Department and the President to increase the strength of the free nations outside the communist orbit should receive the backing of all good Americans whether they favored Democratic or Republican candidates for public office. This did not mean a blind acceptance of the administration's program or an uncritical rubber-stamping of the President's proposals. But it did entail a submerg

ence of partisan political efforts and a subordination of partisan aims to the support of the national policy.

Numerous indications of the operation of this non-partisan foreign policy will be plain in later sections of this study. To list the individuals who from 1946 to the present have given their support to the policies put forward by the United States would occupy many paragraphs. Prominent Republicans served ably under President Truman and his successive Secretaries of State when the national administration was Democratic. With the change of political leadership in the White House and State Department in January 1953, fewer Democrats were to be found in high places, but the support of numbers of Democrats for the new President's foreign policies has been sincere and extensive.

However, it has been in the Congress, and especially in the Senate, that the non-partisan or bi-partisan foreign policy has had its most effective and most dramatic support. And in the nonpartisan support of the UN, this program affords an illustration of the influence of Congress on the nation's course in foreign affairs. We shall see other examples later of the development of this non-partisan attitude. For the present, however, it is best to confine our discussion to the question of the situation in 1946-1948 when the UN was undergoing its first period of trial.

When the Republicans took over control of the Congress in 1947 after their victories in the November 1946 elections, the senior Republican on

the important Senate Foreign RelaSenator tions Committee was Arthur H. Vandenberg Vandenberg of Michigan. Senator becomes an Vandenberg had originally been one advocate of of the most pronounced isolationists bipartisanship in the upper chamber. For several years, however, his attitude had been changing and, during the war, he gave evidence of becoming a farseeing internationalist. His conversion to internationalism is graphically set forth in a volume published shortly after his death in 1951.20 Although Senator Vandenberg was in opposition to many domestic policies of the Truman administration he undertook to give leadership to the Republican majority in the Senate,

2 The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1952).

and to Republicans in the country at large, in furthering the President's programs for strengthening the free world against the menace of international communism. Throughout the postwar period Senator Vandenberg was one of the most stalwart fighters for a unified front among those opposed to the designs of the Soviet Union and its collection of captive nations.

When the clamor for American withdrawal from the United Nations reached its height in 1947 and 1948 it was Senator Vandenberg, to

The significance of the Vandenberg Resolution

gether with a number of leading Republicans and Democrats, who advocated caution and patience. And when many leaders of American thought, some of them in high positions in government, pushed renunciation of American membership in the UN, Vandenberg, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced a resolution into the Senate proposing changes in the UN Charter rather than American withdrawal. This resolution had been worked out by Vandenberg in cooperation with Secretary Marshall, Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett, John Foster Dulles, New York lawyer and an important Republican spokesman, together with other leaders of both parties. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the resolution 13 to 0 on May 19, 1948. After eight hours of debate in the Senate, the Vandenberg resolution was adopted 64 to 6. As the Senator's son observes, "It is probable that never before in a single day of Senate debate was such a history-making policy underwritten in Congress.... the Vandenberg Resolution meant a long step forward in the Senator's goal of maintaining the United Nations and of bolstering the free nations against communist expansion."21

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION, WASHINGTON, JUNE 11, 1948: . . . Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this

Senator Vandenberg proposes continued support of the UN

21 Vandenberg, op. cit., pp. 411-412.

Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter: (1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members. (2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter. (3) Association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security. (4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security. (5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation. (6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

The overwhelming approval voted by the Senate for this resolution marked a high point in the non-partisan approach to foreign policy. No amount of debate and no margin of voting can, of course, remove all the difficulties in the way of carrying on the foreign policy of a democracy. But, with Senator Vandenberg as leader, and top members of both political parties in agreement, the United States faced the problems of international affairs in a posture that gave notice to the Iron Curtain countries that mere partisan advantage was not likely to dictate governmental action at a time when the administration and the Congress were of opposing political persuasions.

It was partly as a result of Senator Vandenberg's statesmanship-endorsed by so many leaders of both parties that the national election campaign of 1948 did not break down into a petty quarrel over foreign policy. If the nation had moved into the Korean crisis of 1950 with a divided and acrimonious approach to foreign policy, there is no telling what successes the communists might have achieved. The Korean affair provided the most severe test of the UN. Had the United States not been enlisted as an advocate of collective security in June 1950, the almost im

mediate failure of the UN would undoubtedly have been assured.

6. The United Nations and the Korean Incident of 1950

The Potsdam agreement on Korea

While the immediate background and later development of the Korean War of 1950 properly belong in the later chapters on the United States and the Far East,22 certain aspects of the question as they relate to the UN can be profitably discussed at this point. With the defeat of Japan imminent, the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 dealt with the problems of Korea among other matters. It was agreed at Potsdam that once the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea was received the peninsula would be divided into two zones of occupation. Above the 38° parallel of North Latitude the Soviets would administer the occupation, while south of that line United States forces would exercise responsibility.23 As soon thereafter as possible civilian governmental functions would be restored to a united Korean republican nation and occupation troops withdrawn.

North of the 38° parallel the Russians organized a Korean Peoples' Interim Committee with socialist and communist parties in control. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the commander of the American occupation forces, refused to recognize the Peoples' Republic set up with Russian backing. General Hodges fostered a Korean advisory council made up of 11 Korean Democratic party leaders, including Dr. Syngman Rhee. American aspirations for the future of a united Korea were expressed in a statement issued by President Truman shortly after the surrender of Japan.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON KOREAN INDEPENDENCE, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1945: . . . The building of a great nation has now begun with the assistance of the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, who are agreed that Korea shall become free and

American hopes for Korean

Independence independent. The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of a free and independent nation

22 See pp. 197-214 and 218-22 below.

23 This division was selected mainly because it would facili tate the surrender of Japanese forces to the nearest allied units, the Americans in the South, the Russians in the North.