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Opinion of the Court.
subject to taxation by the State as other like property situated within its limits. The tax here in question was not in any sense a tax on imports nor a tax for the privilege of bringing the things imported into the State. It was not a tax on the plaintiffs' goods because they were imported from another country, but because at the time of the assessment they were in the market for sale in separate parcels and therefore subject to be taxed as like property, in the same condition, that had its origin in this country. We cannot impute to the framers of the Constitution a purpose to make such a discrimination in favor of property imported from other countries as would result if we approved the views pressed upon us by the plaintiffs. When their goods had been so acted upon as to become a part of the general mass of property in the State the plaintiffs stood, with respect to liability to state taxation, upon the same basis of equality as the owners of like property, the product of this country; the only difference being that the importers paid a duty to the United States for the privilege of importing their goods into this country, and of selling them in the original packages—a duty imposed for the purpose of raising money to carry on the operations of the Government, and in many instances, with the intent to protect the industries of this country against foreign competition. A different view is not justified by anything said in Brown v. Maryland. It was there held that the importer by paying duties acquired the right to sell in the original packages the goods imported—the Maryland statute requiring a license from the State before any one could sell“ by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce,” goods imported from other countries. But it was not held that the right to sell was attended with an immunity from all taxation upon the goods as property, after they had ceased to be imports and had become by the act of the importer a part of the general mass of property in the State. The contrary was adjudged.
Without further reference to authorities we state our conclusion to be that within the decision in Brown v. Maryland the boxes, cases or bales in which plaintiffs' goods were shipped were the original packages, and the goods imported by them
Counsel for Parties.
lost their distinctive character as imports and became a part of the general inass of the property of Louisiana, and subject to local taxation as other property in that State, the moment the boxes, cases or bales in which they were shipped reached their destination for use or trade and were opened and the separate packages therein exposed or offered for sale; consequently, the assessment in question was not in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
This disposes of the only Federal question arising on this appeal. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, MR. JUSTICE BREWER, Mr. JusTICE Shiras and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.
In this case it was rightly decided in the court below, that in determining
under the provisions of Rev. Stat. sec. 902, whether the Spanish vessels sunk or destroyed at Manila were of inferior or superior force to the American vessels engaged in that battle, the land batteries, mines and torpedoes, not controlled by those in charge of the Spanish vessels, but which supported those vessels, were to be excluded altogether from consideration, and that the size and armaments of the vessels sunk or destroyed, together with the number of men upon them, were alone to be regarded in determining the amount of the bounty to be awarded.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. H. A. Herbert and Mr. Benjamin Micou for appellant and othra's.
Opinion of the Court.
Mr. William B. Kiny for other officers and men.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt for the United States.
MR. JUSTICE Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action in the Court of Claims to recover bounty money earned by the plaintiff in error as the commanding officer of the American fleet at the naval battle of Manila on the 1st day of May, 1898.
The statute under which the action was brought is as follows: “Rev. Stat. $ 4635. A bounty shall be paid by the United States for each person on board any ship or vessel of war belonging to an enemy at the commencement of an engagement, wbich is sunk or otherwise destroyed in such engagement by any ship or vessel belonging to the United States, or which it may be necessary to destroy in consequence of injuries sustained in action, of one hundred dollars, if the enemy's vessel was of inferior force, and of two hundred dollars if of equal or superior force, to be divided among the officers and crew in the same manner as prize money; and when the actual number of men on board any such vessel cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, it shall be estimated according to the complement allowed to vessels of its class in the navy of the United States; and there shall be paid as bounty to the captors of any vessel of war captured from an enemy, which they may be instructed to destroy, or which is immediately destroyed for the public interest, but not in consequence of injuries received in action, fifty dollars for every person who shall be on board at the time of such capture.”
The mode in which bounty money earned under that section was to be divided is indicated by the following provisions relating to the distribution of prize money :
“$ 4631. All prize money adjudged to the captors shall be distributed in the following proportions :
“First. To the commanding officer of a fleet or squadron, one twentieth part of all prize-money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his immediate command.
Opinion of the Court.
“Second. To the commanding officer of a division of a fleet or squadron, on duty under the orders of the commander-inchief of such fleet or squadron, a sum equal to one fiftieth part of any prize-money awarded to a vessel of such division for a capture, made while under his command, such fiftieth part to be deducted from the moiety due to the United States, if there be such moiety, otherwise from the amount awarded to the captors; but such fiftieth part shall not be in addition to any share which may be due to the commander of the division, and which he may elect to receive, as commander of a single ship making or assisting in the capture.
“Third. To the fleet-captain, one-hundredth part of all prizemoney awarded to any vessel or vessels of the fleet or squadron in which he is serving, except in a case where the capture is made by the vessel on board of wbich he is serving at the time of such capture; and in such case he shall share, in proportion to his pay, with the other officers and men on board such vessel.
“Fourth. To the commander of a single vessel, one tenth part of all the prize-money awarded to the vessel under his command, if such vessel at the time of the capture was under the command of the commanding officer of a fleet or squadron, or a division, and three twentieths if his vessel was acting independently of such superior officer.
“Fifth. After the foregoing deductions, the residue shall be distributed and proportioned among all others doing duty on board, including the fleet-captain, and borne upon the books of the ship, in proportion to their respective rates of pay in the service.”
It may be here stated that the provisions for prize-money and bounty to the navy were repealed by an act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, which declares that “all provisions of law authorizing the distribution among captors of the whole or any portion of the proceeds of vessels, or any property hereafter captured, condemned as prize, or providing for the payment of bounty for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy hereafter occurring in time of war, are hereby repealed.” 30 Stat. 1004, 1007, c. 413, $13.
Opinion of the Court.
The American vessels taking part in the battle were the Olympia, Baltimore, Boston, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel, McCulloch, Nanshan and Zafiro.
The number of officers and men on those vessels during the battle was 1836.
The Spanish vessels taking part in the battle were the Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de Ulloa, General Lezo, Marquez del Duero, Argos, Velasco, Isla de Mindanao, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Manila, and two torpedo boats. The Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, General Lezo, Marquez del Duero, Argos, Velasco, Isla de Mindanao and the two torpedo boats were destroyed by the American vessels. The Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon were disabled and put out of action in the battle, and were captured; but they were subsequently floated and repaired by the United States and now constitute a part of the American navy. The Manila was captured in the same engagement.
No claim for bounty under section 4635 is made in the present action on account of the sinking of the Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon, because proceedings are to be begun in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to condemn those vessels as prize of war, the claimant reserving the right to make such claim hereafter, if it should be held that the vessels are not subject to condemnation in prize.
The total number of men on board the Spanish vessels during the battle of Manila was 2973. The total number on board the Spanish vessels destroyed was, at the commencement of the action, 1911.
The enemy's vessels were supported by land batteries and by mines and torpedoes in the entrance to Manila Bay and in the bay itself, and some of those in the bay.exploded during the action.
It was found as a fact by the Court of Claims — and this court must assume it to be true — that taking into consideration the guns at Corregidor, El Fraile and other forts at the entrance of the bay and those at Manila and Cavite, and the torpedoes and mines in the bay and the entrance to it, the enemy's force was superior to the force of the vessels of the United