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Opinion of the Court.
bank of one creditor to another. Whatever may be the scope of section 5242, an attachment sued out against the bank as garnishee is not an attachment against the bank or its property, nor a suit against it, within the meaning of that section. It is an attachment to reach the property or interests held by the bank for others. After the Chestnut Street National Bank had been served as garnishee with the attachment sued out in the Long suit but before it went into the hands of a receiver, it admitted in its answers to special interrogations in the suit against Long that it was indebted to Long on a clearing-house due bill, and also that it held as collateral security for his debt to it certain shares of the stock of the National Gas Trust, as well as certain shares of the stock of the Eighth National Bank of Philadelphia. By the service of the attachment upon the bank, the plaintiff in the attachment acquired a right to bave the money and property belonging to Long in the hands of the bank applied in satisfaction of its judgment against him, subject of course to the bank's lien for any debt due to it at that time from him. The bank therefore became bound to account to the plaintiff in the attachment for whatever property or money it held for the benefit or to the use of Long at the time the attachment was served upon it. And the right thus acquired by the service of the attachment was not lost by the suspension of the bank and the appointment of the receiver. The assets of the bank passed to the receiver burdened, as to the interest that Long had in them, with a lien in favor of the plaintiff in the attachment which could not be disregarded or displaced by the Comptroller of the Currency.
We must not, however, be understood as holding that the distribution of the bank's assets in the hands of the receiver could have been in anywise directly controlled by the state court or seized under an attachment or execution in the bands of any state officer. On the contrary, the direction in the statute that the receiver pay over all moneys realized by him from the assets of the bank to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller, furnished a rule of conduct for him which neither an order of nor any proceedings in the state court could affect, inodify or change. The
Opinion of the Court.
scheme of the statute relating to suspended national banks is that from the time of a bank's suspension all its assets, of whatever kind, as they are at the time of suspension, pass in the first instance, to the receiver, the proceeds thereof to be distributed by the Comptroller among those whose claims are proved to his satisfaction or are adjudicated by some court of competent jurisdiction. So when the Chestnut Street National Bank suspended and went into the hands of a receiver the entire control and administration of its assets were committed to the receiver and the Comptroller, subject, however, to any rights of priority previously acquired by the plaintiff through the proceedings in the suit against Long.
It results that the state court did not err in overruling the motion of the receiver to vacate and dismiss the attachment issued in the suit brought against Long and served upon the bank as garnishee prior to its suspension. The proceedings in the state court prior to the appointment of a receiver were all in due course of law. We do not understand that to be controverted. But we are of opinion that the order of judgment of May 21, 1898, was erroneous in some particulars. As the bank did not cease to exist as a corporation upon its suspension and the appointment of a receiver, it was competent for the state court to determine, as between the plaintiff in the attachment and the bank, what rights were acquired by the former as against the latter by the service of the attachment; and its judgment, thus restricted, could have been brought to the attention of the Comptroller for his guidance in distributing the assets of the bank. To this extent the judgment below is affirmed. But, for the reasons already stated, we hold that the state court had no authority to order execution in favor of the plaintiff of any dividends upon the money on deposit in the bank to Long's credit at the time the bank was served with the attachment, and direct the sale of the shares of stock originally held by the bank as collateral security, but which passed upon the suspension of the bank to the custody of the receiver. This part of the judgment should be set aside. It is proper to say that the rights acquired by the defendant in error under the garnishee proceedings can be made effective upon application
Opinion of the Court.
to the Comptroller, to whom Congress bas entrusted the power to distribute the assets of a suspended bank among those entitled thereto.
The decree is reversed to the extent indicated, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
EARLE v. CONWAY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 219. Argued April 11, 1900. — Decided May 14, 1900.
A receiver of a National Bank may be notified, by service upon him of an attachment issued from a state court, of the nature and extent of the interest sought to be acquired by the plaintiff in the attachment in the assets in his custody; but, for reasons stated in Earle v. Pennsylvania, ante, 449, such an attachment cannot create any lien upon specific assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, nor disturb his custody of those assets, nor prevent him from paying to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency, all moneys coming to his hands, or realized by him as receiver from the sale of the property and assets of the bank.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. John G. Johnson and Mr. Asa W. Waters for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. H. Addicks was on Mr. Waters' brief.
Mr. James C. Stillwell for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This case differs somewhat in its facts from those in Earle v. Pennsylvania, ante, 449. It appears that on February 24, 1898, the appellee Conway, in an action of assumpsit in the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Philadelphia, ob
Opinion of the Court.
tained a judgment against one John G. Schall for $1012.43. Upon that judgment a writ of attachment was issued and served May 24 and 25, 1898, upon the Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia and upon Earle, receiver, as garnisheesthe receiver having been appointed January 29, 1898-commanding them to show cause on a day named why the judgment against Schall, with costs of writ, should not be levied of his effects in their hands.
The bank and the receiver entered their appearance as defendants and garnishees “for the purpose only of moving said court to set aside the writ of summons in attachment sur-judg. ment against him and them, and to dismiss and vacate all proceedings in attachment therein against him or them.” That motion was made upon the ground that the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction under section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The motion was denied, and the order of the Court of Coinmon Pleas was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
We are of opinion that it was not error to deny the motion to set aside the service of the writ of attachment on the bank and the receiver. No sound reason can be given why the receiver of a national bank may not be notified by service upon him of an attachment issued from a state court of the nature and extent of the interest asserted or sought to be acquired by the plaintiff in the attachment in the assets in his custody. But for the reasons stated in Earle v. Pennsylvania, such an attachinent cannot create any lien upon specific assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver, nor disturb his custody of those assets, nor prevent him from paying to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency, all moneys coming to his hands or realized by him as l'eceiver from the sale of the property and assets of the bank. After the service of the attachment upon the receiver it became his duty to report the facts to the Comptroller, and it then became the duty of the latter to hold any funds coming to his hands through the Treasurer of the United States as the proceeds of the sale of the bank's assets subject to any interest which the plaintiff may have legally acquired therein as against Syllabus.
his debtor under the attachment issued on the judgment in his favor in the state court.
As the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania goes no further than to sustain the right of the plaintiff to have the attachment served upon the receiver as garnishee, it is
Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissented.
MOTES v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA.
No. 257. Submitted April 23, 1900.- Decided May 21, 1900.
By the Revised Statutes of the United States it is provided: “$ 5508. If
two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not inore than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office or place of honor, profit or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. $ 5509. If in the act of violating any provision in either of the two preceding sections, any other felony or misdemeanor be committed, the offender shall be punished for the same with such punishment as is attached to such felony or misdemeanor by the laws of the State in which the offence is committed." Several persons were indicted under the above provisions in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama for the crime of murder committed in execution of a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate one Thompson because of his having informed the United States authorities of violations by the conspirators of the laws of the United States relating to distilling. In Alabama murder in the first degree is punishable by death or imprisonment for life at the discretion of the jury. At the preliminary trial before a United States commissioner, Taylor, one of the accused, testified and his evidence was put in writing and signed by him. It was sufficient, if accepted, to estab