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military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war matériel, workshops
utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, or ships of war in the harbor."
There was one abstention. Seventeen States did not respond to the call. After
the closing of the debates before the committee of examination, the French
delegation presented a new text to be substituted for paragraph 1 of Article 2
as adopted by the subcommission. It is, perhaps, calculated to reconcile the
opposing views which, as we have just said, manifested themselves in the sub-
commission. It is for the Commission to decide upon this subject.
The new French proposition is thus worded: 1

Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or
war matériel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of
the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor, are not included
in this prohibition; these the commander of a naval force may destroy with
artillery, after a summons followed by a reasonable time of waiting, if all
other means are impossible, and when the local authorities have not them-
selves destroyed them within the time fixed.

If for imperative military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed the enemy, it is understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the preceding case, and then the commander shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as little harm as possible.

On the contrary, there was no debate upon the second paragraph of Article 2; it was not contested that in exceptional cases, covered by paragraph 1, the fire may be aimed exclusively at the points therein mentioned; but it is not less true that any damage that is unavoidable, and this is a proper qualification, caused by the bombardment outside those limits, will be borne by the inhabitants of the bombarded towns, the commander of the naval forces incurring no responsibility therefor.

Article 3 states the second exception to the prohibition contained in Article 1. Although it appeared in the combined text, his Excellency Count TORNIELLI felt obliged to say at the beginning of the discussion that the initia-tive of this proposal was not due to the Italian delegation. The delegation of Belgium for its part likewise repudiated this article, which it desired to see disappear entirely, without, however, making any motion to that end. Moreover, the debates did not bear on the existence itself of this exception, which seemed to be considered as a necessary concession to the necessities of naval

war, as naval forces are often obliged to procure by means of requisitions [359] provisions and supplies that they cannot do without. Stress was laid

on the question, what should be the extent of the requisitions permitted. On this point the Spanish delegation had asked with regard to the proposal of the United States, which spoke of reasonable requisitions, that definition be given of requisitions that should be considered as reasonable and a refusal of which would render towns, etc., liable to bombardment. The delegation of Spain proposed at the same time that these requisitions should be limited to the necessary materials and supplies that ships of belligerent Powers might rightfully procure in a neutral port. Likewise, his Excellency Vice Admiral MEHEMED PASHA, in the name of the Ottoman delegation, asked for the addi

1 Annex 7.

Annex 2.

1

tion of a paragraph specifying that "the commander of naval forces should not have recourse to bombardment if it is proved that the ports, towns, villages, and dwellings in question are not in a position to furnish provisions or other supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force present." His Excellency Count TORNIELLI having proposed to restrict requisitions to such as are "in proportion to the local resources," and his Excellency the first delegate of Belgium having suggested that there would be still other provisions drawn from the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land that should be applied to the requisitions that naval forces might claim, the subcommission, while not deeming itself competent to regulate ex professo the question of requisitions for naval war in general, decided to leave to the committee of examination the task of setting forth the common idea expressed in the propositions and amendments which we have just mentioned to you; that is to say, the established rules regarding requisitions in war on land are equally applicable to requisitions, the refusal of which might lead to a legal bombardment by naval forces.

Hence the addition of the second paragraph of Article 4, which will be combined with the text of the first paragraph, decreeing that the furnishing of provisions or supplies ought to correspond to the immediate needs of the naval forces present. Thus the amount of requisitions permitted to naval forces appears sufficiently well-defined, and the analogous application of Article 52 of the above-mentioned Regulations also makes it clear that payments shall, as a matter of course, be made as soon as possible, in cash; if not, they shall be vouched for by receipts. It is likewise agreed that the requisitions shall not impose upon the populations the obligation to take part in the operations of war against their own country.

Article 4 was accepted without discussion.

It corresponds in a way to the last paragraph of the original proposals of the United States and the Netherlands,' according to which bombardment for non-payment of a ransom is forbidden. In the preparatory committee it was agreed to omit this clause, which, contrary to the views of the authors of the proposals mentioned, was believed to suggest that a demand for ransom is not prohibited in principle. It was therefore preferred to make no allusion to ransom and to forbid a bombardment for the purpose of obtaining money contributions, a prohibition which also precludes a fortiori bombardment for nonpayment of a ransom. Nevertheless, even this allusion to money contributions is not intended, according to the explanations given in the subcommission, to give naval forces a right to demand such contributions. On the contrary, this question was left open as not being cognizable by the Third Commission. The subcommission only desired to lay it down that even in a case where money contributions might be required, a bombardment undertaken with the design of imposing them by force should not be permitted.

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The articles of the second chapter are applicable to every bombardment, and correspond to the provisions contained in Articles 26 to 28 of the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land adopted by the First Con

1 Annexes 1 and 4.

T

ference. The Commission thought it should reproduce these, so that the whole matter would be regulated in the project submitted to the Conference. At the same time, advantage was taken of the opportunity to define and supplement in certain particulars the general rules on bombardment when undertaken by naval forces.

Thus, with respect to Article 5, besides a small addition accepted on the motion of the Greek delegation with the object of assuring historic monuments the protection due them in case of bombardment, a provision was added at the end on the subject of the signs with which the inhabitants shall mark the buildings, etc., that should be spared. In view of the difficulty that may lie, in case of bombardment by naval forces, in the way of a previous notification on the part of the inhabitants of the signs which they are going to use to mark the protected buildings, it seemed that the corresponding provision of the Regulations on land warfare ought to be supplemented in the project before us.

The request that an understanding be reached on this point in order to fix in advance and once for all the sign to be used, was made by the delegation of Russia and supported by his Excellency Count TORNIELLI, who had already filed a similar proposal with the preparatory committee. As no objection was raised in the Commission, the question was referred to the committee of examination. But there a difference of opinion arose: some members, especially the representatives of the United States and Japan, were averse to deciding in advance upon a distinctive sign; they said that there could not be any one sign that could be • used and be recognizable in all cases; that a sign fixed upon in advance might not be found at hand at a given time by the inhabitants, who would then see themselves deprived of the means of marking buildings for protection; and that abuses would be possible, as has happened with the distinctive sign of the Geneva Convention.

The majority of the subcommission (14 votes against 3) did not take this view. If, for bombardment by naval forces, it was needful, in order to avoid delays prejudicial to the fleet, not to admit the necessity of a previous notification by the inhabitants as to the sign that they would employ, it seemed indispensable that this sign be fixed for all time. With the sign once settled upon, the inhabitants of towns liable to bombardment from the sea would certainly not fail to make timely provision, and the fault would be theirs if they did not take steps to that end. As to abuses, these might happen to any sign. It was therefore decided that a small committee composed of Vice Admiral Arago, Captain CASTIGLIA, and Captain BEHR should devise a distinctive sign that can be easily used in all circumstances and is adapted for being visible anywhere and for being lighted up at night. The formula proposed by the committee is to be found at the end of Article 5.

The committee also took care to explain "that the number and the disposition of the panels on each building to be protected would be determined by the requirement of rendering them easily visible from any one of the directions whence they might be struck by the artillery of enemy vessels."

Article 6 owes its present form to a wording adopted by the committee of examination on the basis of the discussion that took place in the subcommission in consequence of an argument delivered by Captain OTTLEY and supported by the Japanese delegation. It was said that the rule under which the [361] commander of naval forces should in all circumstances do his utmost to

warn the authorities before commencing a bombardment was too stringent and might in some cases place the naval forces at a disadvantage. There might be circumstances in which the admiral's duty will require him to destroy as speedily as possible an enemy fortress or arsenal, and the success of such operations might be endangered by an obligation to give a previous warning. But it was unanimously recognized that only an exceptional military situation should free the admiral from this obligation. It was with this understanding that the principle of the proposal made by his Excellency the first delegate of Roumania and amended by Rear Admiral SIEGEL was accepted by the Commission, which charged the committee of examination to find a formula embodying with the rule laid down in Article 6 an exception for cases where the military situation does not permit of a previous warning.

Finally, Article 7 is merely a repetition of Article 28 of the Regulations on land warfare. The transposition of the word "even," proposed by Mr. RENAULT, is only a change in phrasing.

Such, gentlemen, is the project which is presented by the subcommission for the approval of the Commission, in the form which was given to it by the committee of examination. As it appears from all the foregoing, outside of the above-mentioned hesitancy regarding paragraph 2 of Article 1, there were but two provisions among those submitted for your approval which in the subcommission were accepted by only a majority vote, on the subject of which it will be necessary for the Commission to arrive at conclusions looking toward a unanimous vote, viz.:

1. The question of the necessary summons to the inhabitants, with a reasonable time limit, to themselves proceed to the destruction of military works, etc. (Article 2); and

2. The question of the ruling regarding visible signs indicating edifices, etc., rendered immune by Article 5.

It only remains for your reporter, who appeals to your indulgence, to heartily express his most sincere gratitude for the high mark of confidence which the Commission has been good enough to bestow upon him by entrusting him with the report of the subcommission on this delicate matter.

[362]

Annex B

TEXTS SUBMITTED TO THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMMISSION RESPECTING BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES

TEXT ADOPTED BY THE COM-JAMENDMENT Presented by tHE FORMULAS PRESENTED BY THE
MITTEE OF EXAMINATION (See FRENCH Delegation AFTER
Report)

THE CLOSE OF THE DEBATES
IN COMMITTEE OF EXAMINA-
TION

DELEGATION OF BELGIUM
AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE
DEBATES IN THE COMMITTEE
OF EXAMINATION

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