PRESIDENT LINCOLN was anxious for the safety of Washington, even after the retreat of General Lee from Maryland. He desired General McClellan to take the offensive against the enemy, yet feared to sanction an advance up the valley of the Shenandoah, which was the movement that officer most desired to make. The early part of the autumn passed away in doubt and hesitation, and it was not until the setting in of the rainy season, and the consequent swelling of the Potomac so as to be unfordable, that any definite plan was formed. It was then determined to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains from Harper's Ferry, to advance along the south-eastern side of the range, and, after planting detachments in all the passes, to threaten the communications of the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley. The army began to move on the 25th of October, and the operation was completed by the first week in November. Thus the Federals occupied the whole region south-east of the Blue Ridge, with their right resting on Harper's Ferry, their left extending nearly to Paris, and their centre at Snickersville. The pass through the Blue Ridge, called Snicker's Gap, was in their possession, and this brought them in somewhat close proximity to the forces of General Lee. The latter were drawn up on the further side of the Shenandoah, and their line, starting on the left from Charleston, reached Front Royal on the right, with the greater portion massed between Berryville and Winchester. When, however, the Federals had occupied all the passes leading through the Blue Mountains, their opponents considered it expedient to retire, which they did with some little skirmishing; the Northerners made a further advance, and on the 6th of November, General McClellan's head-quarters were near Rectortown, on the Manassas Gap Railway. Warrenton was occupied by Federal troops on the same day, and all seemed going well when an unex

pected incident occurred. On the night of the 7th, General Buckingham arrived from Washington at the head-quarters of McClellan, and delivered to him an order from the President to surrender the command of the army to General Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital of New Jersey.

This change in the conduct of affairs came with a great surprise on the several divisions, by none of which does it seem to have been anticipated. A few days after, a letter from General Halleck to Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, dated "Washington, October 28th," was given to the public, from which at least some of the motives for McClellan's dismissal may be inferred. Halleck, it will be recollected, had occupied, since the latter part of July, the position of Commander-in-Chief of all the American forces; and McClellan of course came under his orders, and was amenable to his censure. He alleged that the General had needlessly delayed his movements; that he was constantly complaining of want of supplies, clothing, and horses; and that there had been no such want as to prevent his compliance with the peremptory order he had received on the 6th of October, to cross the Potomac at once, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. The dilatoriness of McClellan in moving against the Confederates was undoubtedly one of the reasons for his dismissal; but it has been thought—and perhaps with some justification in facts-that political motives had their share in determining the President's course. The politics of McClellan were those of the Democratic party, and were therefore opposed to the ideas by which Mr. Lincoln was now mainly guided. A General Order from McClellan to the army, dated October 7th, and having reference to the President's proclamation for the emancipation of the southern slaves, seemed to intimate, though in guarded terms, McClellan's dissent from that great

act of policy. While pointing out that the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing the Federal laws belonged solely to the civil authorities —while remarking that armed forces were raised and supported simply to sustain those authorities, and while deprecating more than a modest and temperate discussion of public measures determined on and declared by Government-the General significantly added:-"The remedy for political errors, if any have been committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls." This remark was made at the very time the State elections were going on; and it may have been thought that such an implied opinion, coming from such a source at such a juncture, was calculated to damage the Government in the eyes of the country. McClellan was popular with the army, and a military dictatorship was at one time feared. Political motives, however, are never avowed in these matters, and the President had at any rate a plausible excuse in the slowness of McClellan's movements, and the hesitation which always marred his plans.

How far the retiring commander was justified in complaining that his forces were insufficiently equipped for active operations, it is not at present easy to determine. But it has been stated by an American writer that the purchasing and forwarding of necessaries was going on even up to the day of McClellan's crossing the Potomac; that one army-corps did not receive its clothing until it had commenced its march in Virginia; and that several commanders afterwards averred that they had repeatedly sent for supplies of clothing, and had as often been disappointed.* On the other hand, there was some reason in the remark of Colonel Ingalls, McClellan's chief Quartermaster, who, in writing to the Quartermaster-General that the complaints were groundless, observed:-"I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles." However the point may be finally decided, there can be no doubt that McClellan was popular with his soldiers. He did nothing to call forth any extraordinary expression of their feelings; his farewell address was well felt and carefully expressed; but when, on the 9th of November, he rode rapidly through the ranks for the last time, the demonstrations of affectionate regard were overpowering, and were not unmixed with reproaches against those who, in the opinion of the men, had treated the General with injustice. McClellan quitted the camp near Rectortown on the 10th, and on his route to Washington (where he stayed a few hours pre

• Tenney's History of the Rebellion.

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viously to reporting himself at Trenton) was received at various stations on the railway with enthusiastic demonstrations on the part of the army. At Warrenton Junction he was requested to speak a few words, and said in response, "I wish you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me; and all will be well. Goodbye!" Burnside was a personal friend of the retiring commander, and possessed his confidence. He too belonged to the Democratic party, without being fanatical in his views; and he had on two or three occasions exhibited a fair amount of skill as a General. More than once before, he had been requested to take the position of McClellan, but had always refused, and now accepted the command only on the peremptory order of the War Depart

ment.

The position of the Federal army was such as to render General Lee anxious for the safety of Richmond. He feared that his communications with that city might be severed, and he had an extensive tract of country to watch with a force much smaller than that of his opponent indeed, not much more than half its size. While he was considering what he should do, General Burnside was reorganising his army with a view to active measures. He now arranged it in three grand divisions, under the orders of Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin; and a body of reserve was formed, under the command of General Sigel. On the 11th of November, General Halleck, the Commander-in-Chief of all the armies of the United States, visited Burnside, and discussed with him the plan of the approaching campaign, a sketch of which the latter had sent to Washington two days previously. It was decided to make a demonstration on the Rappahannock, to march rapidly down the north-eastern bank of that river, to cross by means of pontoons at Fredericksburg, and to advance on Richmond by Hanover Court House. Accordingly, a few days later, General Sumner was ordered to march on Fredericksburg, followed by Franklin and Hooker. The right rear of the army was to be protected by the cavalry under General Pleasanton, while Sigel was to guard the Upper Potomac, and to occupy the direct route between Gordonsville and Washington. The success of the entire plan depended in a great measure on the rapidity with which it was carried out; but there proved to be delays which were not anticipated. Burnside, moreover, calculated on General Jackson being still west of the Blue Ridge, and on General Lee having no knowledge of the scheme by which he was to be out-manoeuvred. In these respects he was mistaken; and the con

side of the river; his guns, which were extremely numerous, commanded the town of Fredericksburg, and the opposite bank of the Rappahannock; and he was therefore well able to make a powerful demonstration, with fair probabilities of success. The forces of General Lee did not amount to more than 80,000 men; but they held a strong position on a semicircle of hills sweeping round from the river to the vicinity of Newport. Lee also was well provided with artillery, which he massed towards his centre. To the right of his line he had the little river Massaponax; other small rivers ran

following morning, the men commenced building four extemporary bridges, and the air was so obscure that for some hours the work of construction was not perceived by the Confederates on the opposite bank. When, however, it was at length discovered, a heavy fire of musketry opened from various positions on the shore, and from the houses in the town. The Federals were for a time driven away, but, having been rallied, they again proceeded with their task. Once more they were compelled to abandon the attempt, and orders were then given to the artillery to open fire on the .

city. This had the effect of dispersing the Confederate sharpshooters, and of doing great damage to the city itself. The operation of throwing over the pontoon-bridges was once more resumed, and, although the Confederates again appeared on the river-bank, and still for a time interrupted the progress of the work, they were unable to prevent its completion in the course of the day. The weather had been thick and misty; the opposing armies could scarcely detect each other's movements; and it was only the red flashes of the guns which indicated to either side where the other was posted, and where it was to be attacked. When the fog rose, about the middle of the day, it was seen that Fredericksburg was little better than a mass of ruins, from which fire was bursting forth in many parts. Nevertheless, some Mississippians held their place amongst the burning houses, from the midst of which they poured a galling fire on those who were engaged in building the bridges; and it was not until a body of volunteers from the 7th Michigan and 19th Massachusetts Regiments had crossed the river in pontoon-boats, and driven them from their hiding-places, that the bridges were finished. It was now the early part of the afternoon, and the troops began to cross in heavy masses. Before dusk, General Sumner's division had got over, together with a section of General Hooker's. The transit was resumed early on the morning of the 12th, without further molestation; and Burnside massed his corps near the river, in readiness for an advance when the proper moment had arrived.

Very little of importance took place that day; but the battle known as that of Fredericksburg commenced at an early hour on the following morning. Unfortunately for the Federals, General Franklin misunderstood the orders sent to him by Burnside, and, instead of making a vigorous attack on the Confederate right, did nothing more than execute a feint, though he had two army-corps under his command, and might therefore have struck a telling blow against the adversary. Burnside had hoped to cut the Confederate army into two portions, and, having taken the heights beyond Fredericksburg, to destroy the right wing of his enemy; but he had entirely miscalculated the knowledge possessed by Lee of the manner in which he was to be assailed. The Confederate General declined to weaken his line, so as to repel a false attack which Burnside had ordered to be made some miles below Fredericksburg. Had he fallen into the trap thus laid for him, it is possible that he might have been beaten in detail; but he kept his troops well together. On the left of the Federal line, an attempt was made

to drive the Confederates across the Massaponax, by turning their position; but, although the Southern troops were forced back nearly a mile, no decided advantage was gained, owing, it would seem, to the fact that General Franklin, having misapprehended his orders, omitted to bring up all his divisions, and to press the attack with vigour. On the right of the line, the fighting was desperate during the whole day. The Confederates were posted amongst the woods and hills at the back of Fredericksburg, and two Federal divisions were ordered to expel them at the point of the bayonet. In the face of a tremendous artillery fire, the assault was renewed again and again; but as often as the endeavour was made, the regiments were shattered and driven back in extreme confusion. General Sumner ordered up his artillery in support of the attacking force, and the contest continued until dark, without the Federals winning a single yard, or their opponents being dispossessed of the positions they had assumed in the morning. During this terrible combat, which strewed the plain with dead and wounded, General Lee personally superintended the operations of his men. Towards the close of the attempt to carry this strong position-made all the stronger by a stone wall behind which the Confederates were entrenched-General Burnside sent instructions to Hooker, who with a large part of his division was still on the other side of the river, to hasten his men over the bridges, so that he might support Sumner and his lieutenants. Hooker proceeded to the scene of action, but soon afterwards sent an aide-de-camp to his superior, with an intimation of his opinion that the heights were impregnable. Burnside repeated his orders, and Hooker, riding off to where his commander was stationed, remonstrated against the vain attempt. Nevertheless, Burnside insisted on the movement being carried out, and Hooker then sent forward one of his divisions, with orders to assault the position. Nothing, however, could be done. The men staggered back before the terrible fire of their opponents, and, leaving a third of their number on the ground, sought shelter in the rear. At half-past five in the evening, the musketry fire ceased; that of the artillery continued until long after dark.

The following day (December 14th) was Sunday, and both armies remained comparatively quiet. General Burnside sent a despatch to President Lincoln, in which, writing at four o'clock in the morning, he said :-"I have just returned from the field. Our troops are all over the river, and hold the first ridge outside the town, and three miles below. We hope to carry the crest to-day. Our loss is heavy-say 5,000." It was a day of great