56 feet at the top, and 18 feet at the bottom. The sides of the upper vessel were constructed of 25-inch thickness of oak, coated with iron plates of 5-inch thickness. The turret, built of 8-inch plates of rolled iron, increased in thickness near the portholes to 11 inches. The deck, which was of 8-inch thickness of oak, was coated with 2-inch plates of wrought iron. The pilot-house was built of 9-inch plates of forged iron, but in the event it was found to be of insufficient strength. The vessel drew 10 feet of water; the height of her turret was 9 feet, the diameter 21 feet. She was armed with two Dahlgren guns, carrying shot or shell of from 162 to 168 pounds' weight. The deck was from two to three feet above water; the cabins, which were below the water, were lighted artificially day and night; and the commander's post was in the pilothouse, whence he directed the steering of the vessel and the movement of the turret.* The architect of this remarkable ship was Captain Ericsson, and great reliance was placed on its power to meet any floating battery which the Confederates could bring into the water.

At ten o'clock on the night of March 8th, shortly after the disappearance of the Merrimac, the Monitor entered Hampton Roads, and took up a station near the Minnesota. The crew of that vessel were greatly relieved at the appearance of this muchneeded friend; but the powers of the Monitor had yet to be tried, and it was still uncertain whether she would be able to cope with the Confederate iron-clad. Her appearance was so unwonted that it was impossible for ordinary seamen to form any precise idea as to her powers. Her deck was unprotected by any bulwarks, and stood not more than two feet above the water.

The heavy turret

and the dwarfish pilot-house were strange features in a sea-going vessel; indeed, the structure of the Monitor was so novel that, before she was launched, doubts were entertained as to whether she would float at all. Nevertheless, there she was in Hampton Roads; and although she had encountered a heavy gale on her passage, and had suffered not a little from the effects of the storm, she had proved herself seaworthy. Whatever the result of the morrow's action, she would undoubtedly fight; and the surprise in preparation for the Merrimac had a character that was truly dramatic.

During the night, the Monitor lay between the Minnesota and Fortress Monroe; so that when the Confederate vessel approached in the early morning, the presence of the new-comer was entirely concealed. The Merrimac had been a good deal

Colonel Fletcher's History of the American War.

damaged in the action of the previous day. In men, she had indeed lost only two killed and eight wounded, though among the latter was her commander, Captain Buchanan; but the vessel itself was much the worse for the encounter. Two of the guns were disabled; the anchor and the flagstaff were shot away; the smoke-jack and steampipes were riddled; the prow was twisted, the armour was battered, and the ram was wrenched. The officers, nevertheless, felt perfect confidence in the ability of their vessel to dispose of all the Federal ships which they expected to fight. At six o'clock on the morning of the 9th, the iron-clad was observed by the Federals rounding the point of land at the mouth of the Elizabeth River, accompanied by two of her satellites. It must have been with some astonishment that the crew of the Merrimac, shortly afterwards, saw emerging from the further side of the Minnesota a small, dark vessel, with an iron-clad turret which rose almost sheer out of the water. The two floating batteries approached one another, and the Monitor was the first to open fire, which she did at the distance of a hundred yards. Her antagonist at once replied, and a vigorous interchange of shots went on, at first with rapidity, but afterwards with slowness and caution. The distance between the two combatants varied from fifty to two hundred yards, and it was found that the Monitor could move with greater speed than her opponent, and was more easily turned. The Merrimac soon discovered that she had her match in the strange-looking craft which had so suddenly started out of the waves. She had begun by attacking the Minnesota; but it was now evident that she had quite enough to do in holding her own against the Monitor. The grounded vessel was in fact able to assist her protector, by firing over the low deck of Captain Ericsson's gunboat at the floating battery beyond. In doing so, two of her shots fell short of their destination, and struck the Monitor; but the ironplating of the latter resisted the action of the balls. For a little while the Merrimac ran aground, but, on getting afloat again, steamed up the harbour towards Elizabeth River, followed closely by the Monitor. Her shot produced no effect, and the Merrimac now made an attempt to run down her formidable antagonist. Five times did these two iron-clads come into collision; but the Merrimac's ram, already injured by the first day's action, was by this time entirely broken, and her engines were of insufficient strength to propel her with the necessary speed. Each time that the vessels struck one another, one of the guns of the Monitor was discharged directly against the plated

sides of the Merrimac, and the latter replied by bringing her guns to bear on the turret and pilothouse of her adversary.

This unique combat was witnessed by the crews of the Federal fleet, by the garrison of Fortress Monroe, by the troops encamped on the adjoining shore, and by the Confederates from their batteries at Sewall's Point. The hopes and fears of both parties alternated from time to time; but on the whole, although the result was not decisive, the Federal vessel showed that its powers were superior to those of the Confederate. The Monitor, however, withdrew between one and two P.M., owing, it is said, to her commander having been injured in the eyes by a shot which struck the pilot-house. The disappearance of the Federal iron-clad was viewed by the captain of the Minnesota with dismay; but he was shortly afterwards relieved by seeing the Merrimac and her companions steam up the river towards Norfolk, No one had been killed on board either vessel; but the commander of the Monitor, Captain Worden, was injured, as already stated, and two of the seamen had been momentarily stunned from the concussion of the shot on the turret. The Merrimac was a good deal damaged. The timbers of her framework were started; the vessel leaked badly; and it has been said (though

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the statement was denied by the Confederates) that in other respects the gunboat was much shattered by the fire of her opponent. During the fight, the working of the Monitor's guns had been directed from the pilot-house by signals to the first lieutenant stationed in the turret ; and the action proved that vessels of this character were capable of effective handling.*

The conflict was a perfectly new experience in marine warfare and it attracted great attention, not only in America, but in Europe. It may be said to have revolutionised the mode of fighting at sea, and to have rendered the ships, the armaments, and the tactics of Trafalgar as obsolete as those of Actium. Since then, all maritime nations have been compelled to arm their ships with iron plates of enormous thickness, to invent artillery of everincreasing size and power, and to depend more on revolving turrets than on the old-fashioned tiers of guns. Happily, there has been no great naval war since 1862, and we are still ignorant of the ultimate effects likely to ensue from these new methods of warfare. But the combat of the Merrimac and the Monitor drew a deep line between the past and the future; and the naval heroes of days to come will have to fight under conditions the nature of which has not yet been fully tested.

GENERAL MCCLELLAN felt himself free to change his base of operations from the lines round Alexandria and Washington to Fortress Monroe, when the ability of the Monitor to encounter the Merrimac became known to him. The council of war, in agreeing to the General's plan, had stipulated that it should be postponed until it could be ascertained whether it would be safe to send the army in transports to the vicinity of Hampton

Roads. It being now evident that the movement might be executed without any special danger, McClellan began his preparations for the new campaign. The proposed plan, as he informed the War Department in a report which he was required to send in, was to assume Fortress Monroe as the first base of operation, taking the route by

* Tenney's History of the Rebellion; the Rebellion Record, Vol. IV.

Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of advance, and contemplating Richmond as the objective point. The fall of that city would involve the conquest of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; and it was believed by McClellan that he could fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, and that the Confederates would concentrate all their forces to meet his movement in that direction. West Point was to be reached as soon as possible, and used as the main depôt of the Federal forces; and the best way of approaching that spot was to make a combined naval and military attack upon Yorktown, then to push a strong corps up the York River, under cover of the navy, and finally to establish the new base of operations at a distance of five-andtwenty miles from Richmond. "For the prompt success of this campaign," wrote the General, “it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown." This, in brief, was the scheme by which McClellan hoped to strike the Southern Confederacy to the heart, and to restore the power of the Union over Virginia and her companions. For its execution he required 150,000 men and 400 guns.

The Army of the Potomac was in a fair state of discipline when the final resolution was taken as to the way in which it should operate. A degree of unhealthiness had existed during the winter, owing to the overcrowded state of some of the tents, to want of cleanliness, and to neglect of sanitary arrangements. But with approaching spring these evils remedied themselves, and the army was now in a favourable condition for meeting the enemy. The men were well fed, and even supplied with luxuries, the transport of which from place to place is said to have seriously hampered the movements of the several divisions, and to have prevented any operations at a distance from watercommunication.* On the whole, however, the troops were not well officered, being often commanded by persons who were entirely ignorant of the military

by some others, and thus acquired a sort of popularity with the enemy, which the more extreme politicians of the North regarded with disfavour. It is curious to observe how bitter throughout the whole war was the feeling of the slave-holding States against the people of New England. They were always reviled as cowards, hucksters, knaves, and hypocrites. After the battle before Fort Donelson, it was admitted by the Confederates that their opponents could fight well, and even heroically; but care was taken to point out that the Federal troops on that particular occasion consisted almost entirely of Western men, and to a great degree of men from the more southern of the Western States. The South never could forgive the North for defying the Fugitive Slave Law, and challenging the principle of slavery in its very home.

The first divisions of McClellan's army were embarked in the latter days of March, but the General himself remained at his head-quarters in the neighbourhood of Alexandria until the larger part of his force was on its way to the Yorktown peninsula. While so waiting, he received a letter from Mr. Lincoln, informing him that he had felt constrained to order Blenker's division (amounting to 10,000 men) to Fremont. "If," said the President, 66 you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases.” This was a substantial reduction of the General's legions; but there was no help for it, and McClellan was obliged to content himself with the President's assurance that no other troops should in any event be detached from his command. On the 1st of April, McClellan and his staff embarked on a large river-steamer, and proceeded to Fortress Monroe. The Potomac was crowded with steam-transports filled with troops, with sailing-vessels carrying stores, artillery, and cavalry, and with gunboats acting as a patrol in case the Confederates should make any attempt to re-occupy their batteries at Mathias Point. Everything told of war on an immense scale; everything seemed to augur a speedy and brilliant success. Yet McClellan had no sooner arrived at Fortress Monroe than his hopes were dashed by an intimation from Flag-officer Goldsborough, commanding the fleet, that the navy could render but little assistance in the contemplated expedition. The Merrimac still kept the naval forces in terror, and the James River was practically closed by its lurking presence. It was found impossible to obtain any exact information as to the movements or the strength of the enemy, and

1862.]

the maps of the Yorktown peninsula, which dated from the time of Washington (the country never having been surveyed since those days), were so inaccurate as to be seriously misleading. Nevertheless, it would have been fatal to draw back; and the troops were accordingly landed on the 4th of April, when 56,000 men, with one hundred guns, forming the first detachment, began their march for Yorktown. But McClellan had already endured fresh mortifications at the hands of the Government. The troops were not yet in motion when their General received a telegram informing him that the garrison and other forces at Fortress Monroe were withdrawn from his command, and that he was not to detach any men from that place without General Wool's sanction. It had been understood by McClellan before his departure that Fortress Monroe, as being the base of his operations, should be under his control, and that he was to be at liberty to draw from it a force of 10,000 men. The new arrangement now communicated from Washington was at the best humiliating, and might be the cause of much embarrassment. It did not, however, make any difference in the proceedings of McClellan. A portion of the army, under General Keyes, proceeded by the James River road, while another marched on Big Bethel and Howard's Creek; but the conditions of the campaign were now a good deal altered.

These

General Magruder, the Confederate officer opposed to McClellan, had defended the Yorktown peninsula by a line of entrenchments, reaching from Yorktown itself (famous as the scene of Lord Cornwallis's surrender in 1781) to a point on the Warwick River, one of the tributaries of the James. entrenchments extended a distance of thirteen miles and a half, and were covered by Warwick Creek, which Magruder dammed up, and guarded with batteries and earthworks. Yorktown was very slightly fortified; but the York River was dominated by water-batteries of considerable power, and by various works on Gloucester Point. The defences altogether were not formidable; but the country itself presented natural obstacles, which placed several difficulties in the way of an invading force. The ground was swampy, and in many parts covered with a thick forest. Progress, therefore, was far from easy; and the defenders, having abundant opportunities of concealment, could make the most of their resources, and operate with the greatest effect on the advancing foe. They certainly stood in need of all these extraneous aids, for their numbers were few. Magruder could not command the services of more than 11,000 men, and with these he had to watch a very extended line of defence. He placed

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6,000 of his troops at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and the remaining 5,000 he distributed along the entrenchments stretching to the Warwick River. Reinforcements, however, would be sent from General Johnston's army, if Magruder could only hold the enemy in check for a few days. The fine weather with which the Federals started had now changed to wet; and this, by delaying McClellan's advance, contributed to the security of the Confederates. It became a matter of great difficulty to drag the heavy guns over the muddy and swampy paths by which alone the country could be traversed. Infantry and cavalry suffered in equal measure, and the spirits of the invading army were depressed by the gloomy aspects of the land. An earlier line of entrenchments, formed by General Magruder in advance of that which he now occupied, was found to be deserted, and the left column of the Federal army, under General Keyes, encountered no serious opposition until Lee's Mills were reached. At this point the advance was checked by the line of Warwick Creek, and at the same moment a heavy fire of artillery opened from the opposite bank. As it seemed doubtful whether the work could then be taken by assault, General McClellan determined to await the landing of the remainder of his army, and the arrival of his heavier artillery, before attempting an attack. Unfortunately for the success of the Federal plans, it was not known to McClellan, nor suspected by him, that the position in his front was held by a very small force, and that it must have yielded to a spirited assault. Instead of taking active measures, he threw up batteries of his own; and the anxiety of Magruder, when first the enemy appeared before him, gave way to a sense of comparative security when he saw that no immediate operations were to take place. He was now receiving reinforcements every day, and in a little while felt greater confidence in the strength of his position.

McClellan, in the meanwhile, was depending on the arrival of his first corps, under General McDowell. This, he anticipated, would land near Gloucester Point, and turn the enemy's defences at Yorktown by marching on West Point. But he soon learned that McDowell's corps was not to be placed at his disposal. He received a telegram from the Adjutant-General's office at Washington, stating that, by direction of the President, the first corps had been detached from the expeditionary force, and that McDowell had been ordered to report to the Secretary of War. McClellan complained to the President that he was not properly supported, and the President replied to the effect that he had military reasons for what had been done. "After

you left," wrote Mr. Lincoln to General McClellan on the 9th of April, "I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganised men, without a single fieldbattery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented-or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone-a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock, and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell." Fear for the safety of Washington was therefore at the bottom of President Lincoln's act in depriving General McClellan of so large a portion of his command. The battle of Winchester, fought on the 23rd of March-about the period that the army of the Potomac was beginning to embark-had alarmed the Government by revealing a much stronger Confederate force in front of Washington than had been supposed. That action had terminated in favour of the Union troops, but it had not been so complete a success as many of the Northern newspapers alleged. The President was consequently uneasy; and, although it is impossible not to sympathise with the feelings of McClellan on finding his plans disconcerted by the subtraction of so many regiments, there does not seem any room for doubting that Mr. Lincoln acted with perfectly good faith, with the best intentions, and not altogether without reason. The question was brought before the notice of Congress on the 26th of May, when Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, defended the President, and argued that, even if he had acted erroneously, he had done so with the advice of those military men whom he had consulted. It had been decided by the commanders of corps that the number of men necessary for the defence of Washington was 45,000. In point of fact, not more than 15,000 were left in the city. Nearly all the regiments at the capital consisted of raw troops, and four or five regiments of cavalry were not mounted, or in a condition for service. Under these circumstances, and apprehending a Confederate incursion, such as took place a few weeks later, Mr. Lincoln withheld the 30,000 men under McDowell.

Even after this reduction of McClellan's forces,

the General had, by his own admission, as many as 85,000 troops (ultimately, he had even more) for conducting his attack on the defences of the Yorktown peninsula. This cannot be regarded as a contemptible army, though it was less than what McClellan had conceived to be necessary, and what he had been led to expect. The truth appears to be that Lincoln was nervous about the defence of Washington, and McClellan over-cautious in his active operations. The Confederate army was less numerous than the Federal; yet McClellan hesitated as to striking a decisive blow. The President knew well that the country would not tolerate much more of this hesitation; and he told McClellan so in plain language, in his communication of the 9th of April. "I think," he said, "it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain. faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. . . . . The country will not fail to note-is now noting that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated." Mr. Lincoln, it will be recollected, had never been in favour of the movement by the Yorktown peninsula. He held that the attack should be made at or near Manassas, in front of Washington, and he now felt more than ever convinced that his view was the correct one. McClellan none the less relied on the superior nature of his own scheme, and, finding his march arrested by Magruder's entrenchments, which he believed himself unable to take by a sudden and rapid movement, sat down before them, to commence a siege in due form. This enabled General Johnston, the Confederate leader, to concentrate his army in the peninsula, and also to prepare entrenchments nearer Richmond, to which he could retire if the first were carried. The encampments of the Federal Army

of the Potomac were stationed between Yorktown and the Warwick River. The principal depôt for stores was changed from Fortress Monroe to Shipping Point, and siege-works on a great scale were presently commenced. The amount of labour thus expended was enormous. It was found necessary to erect bridges, to fill up swamps, and to make extemporary roads over the wet and quaking soil. These roads were formed out of logs of wood, which not unfrequently disappeared into the marsh shortly after they had been laid, when the work had to be done over again. The bringing up of the stores and ammunition from Fortress Monroe to the front, was a tedious and fatiguing task; and while it was proceeding there was but too much reason to fear that the position of the Confederates