the British Government should be first made known at Washington. This despatch was read by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell on the 19th of December; but all knowledge of its existence was most disingenuously withheld from the English public until full three weeks later, although it would necessarily have had a very tranquillising effect on that popular emotion which was nearly hurrying the country into a war with America.

Earl Russell, writing to Lord Lyons on the same day that Mr. Seward had written to Mr. Adams, intimated that her Majesty's Ministers were willing to believe that Captain Wilkes was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government. The Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honour to pass without full reparation. It was therefore believed by Earl Russell and his colleagues that when the matter should be brought under the consideration of the President and his Cabinet, they would of their own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the nation; namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to Lord Lyons, in order that they might again be placed under British protection, accompanied by a suitable apology for the aggression that had been committed. If these terms were not offered by Mr. Seward, Lord Lyons was himself to propose them. In a letter containing private instructions to the British Ambassador, Earl Russell said that, should Mr. Seward ask for delay, it was to be granted to an extent not exceeding seven days, and that if, at the end of that time, no answer was given, or an answer different from that which was required, Lord Lyons was to leave Washington with all the members of the Legation, and to repair immediately to London. The subject was of course discussed in Parliament, when a very lofty-perhaps it might even be said, a somewhat truculent-tone was adopted by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, and a great deal of unnecessary and ill-judged declamation against the United States was indulged in by Confederate sympathisers. Mr. Cobden, Mr. Bright, and some few other members of the same party, ventured to plead for a fair and temperate discussion of the points involved, which were much more difficult and many-sided than appeared in the first blinding glare of passion. But what they urged was set down for nothing better than a craven submission to the desires of the United States; and the torrent of angry vituperation and irritating menace still poured on. Government even considered it proper to make preparations for war, though they had not yet

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heard the decision of the United States, and had some grounds for hoping that that decision, when given, would be in accordance with the fair and reasonable demands of England. Two battalions of Guards were sent out to Canada, together with munitions of war for the fortifications in that colony. The despatch of household troops was an act of greater significance than the employment of any other soldiers would have been; for the Guards are never sent out of England except on occasions of great urgency, when war is considered almost inevitable. It is impossible, therefore, to acquit the Government of that day of having indulged in a policy of provocation towards the United States at a time when the Northern people had their hands so fully engaged that a foreign war would have been little short of utter ruin. An unbiassed historian must also admit that, while the feeling of anger was yet strong in England, it decreased in America. Even before the decision of the Washington Cabinet was known, the New York papers themselves the most violent of any in America— were prepared to accept the release of the Commissioners as an act required by all the circumstances of the case; and from the first General McClellan, and some other Americans of distinction, doubted the propriety of the seizure.

Fortunately, this was the feeling which ultimately prevailed on all hands. To the despatch from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Mr. Seward replied on the 26th of December. The Secretary of State began by narrating the facts of the case, which, he said, showed that Captain Wilkes had simply adopted the legal and customary proceedings of a belligerent to arrest and capture a neutral vessel engaged in carrying contraband of war for the use and benefit of the insurgents. He affirmed that the persons named, and their supposed despatches, were contraband of war; that Captain Wilkes might lawfully stop and search the Trent for those contraband persons and despatches; that he exercised that right in a lawful and proper manner; and that, having found the contraband persons on board, and in presumed possession of the contraband despatches, he had a right to capture the former. But then arose the question, whether he exercised that right of capture in the manner allowed and recognised by the law of nations. Here Mr. Seward was obliged to acknowledge that an error had been committed. He continued:-"I trust I have shown to the satisfaction of the British Government, by a very simple and natural statement of facts, and an analysis of the law applicable to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practised, nor approved, any deliberate wrong in the transaction to which

they have called its attention, and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertence, consisting in a departure by the naval officers-free from any wrongful motive-from a rule uncertainly established, and probably, by the several parties concerned, either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain, or from any friendly nation, in a similar case. I have not been unaware that, in examining this question, I have fallen into an argument for what seems to be the British side of it against my own country; but I am relieved from all embarrassments on that subject. I had scarcely fallen into that line of argument when I discovered that I was really defending and maintaining, not an exclusively British interest, but an old, honoured, and cherished American cause; not upon British authorities, but upon principles that constitute a large portion of the distinctive policy by which the United States have developed the resources of a continent, and thus, becoming a considerable maritime Power, have won the respect and confidence of many nations. These principles were laid down for us by James Madison, in 1804, when Secretary of State under Jefferson, in instructions to James Monroe, our then Minister to England." The instructions were quoted by Mr. Seward in full, and he then went on to say that if he decided the existing case in favour of his own Government, he must disallow the most cherished principles of his country, and for ever abandon its essential policy. If, on the other hand, he maintained those principles, and adhered to that policy, he must surrender the case itself. "The Government of the United States," he observed, "could not deny the justice of the claim presented. They were asked to do to the British nation what they had always insisted that all nations ought to do to them." The upshot of Mr. Seward's analysis was an intimation that the four prisoners would be cheerfully liberated, and Lord Lyons was requested to indicate a time and place for receiving them.

The only unsatisfactory part of the Secretary's letter was that in which he said :-"In coming to my conclusion, I have not forgotten that if the safety of this Union required the detention of the captured prisoners, it would be the right and duty of this Government to detain them; but the effectual check and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as the comparative unimportance of the captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting to that defence." This qualification was

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quite unnecessary, and it weakened the force of Mr. Seward's argument, besides taking away from the grace and propriety of his act. If the seizure of the Commissioners was unjustifiable, as Mr. Seward himself abundantly and conclusively proved, it could not have been rendered fitting by any danger that might possibly have accrued from their release. The question was simply one of right and law, to be determined without reference to any other considerations. The Secretary of State occupied much safer ground when, towards the conclusion of his letter, he expressed his satisfaction that, by the adjustment of the case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as he trusted, mutually satisfactory to both nations, a question was finally and rightly settled between them, which in former days had exhausted, not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but the arbitrament of war itself—a question which for more than half a century had alienated the two countries from each other, and perplexed all other nations with fears and apprehensions. To this it would indeed be difficult to reply. Indefensible as the conduct of Captain Wilkes undoubtedly was, and imperative as it would have been for England to adopt the most serious measures, had reparation been refused, it is obvious that the position of the injured country was weakened by the principles which she had herself maintained in earlier times. The war of 1812 was caused by the persistent determination of Great Britain to search American ships for fugitive subjects whom she believed to be on board. The alleged right of search was enforced again and again, in defiance of the earnest protests of the American Government; and men were violently seized by British officers, even when they claimed to be American citizens, because they were English by birth, and therefore, according to the contention of the British Government, still within the grasp of English law. This asserted right was not given up at the peace of 1815; and at much later periods it was again affirmed. Even in the year 1842, Mr. Webster, when Secretary of State under the Presidency of Mr. Tyler, addressed to the British Plenipotentiary then in Washington (Lord Ashburton) a long communication, in which the whole question was discussed with that masterly force and intellectual fulness which so remarkably distinguished the writer. It was desired by Mr. Webster that some provision for putting an end to a very dangerous state of things should be agreed to between the two countries; but the Government of Sir Robert Peel refused to entertain the suggestion, and some little while before, in connection with the slave-trade, Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign

Secretary, had re-asserted the principle of the right of search (as Lord Palmerston had done before him), though with a degree of hesitation and compromise which in no respect helped the matter. From some other points of view, also, the British Government of 1861 was embarrassed in its treatment of the case which then engaged its attention. If Captain Wilkes was in the wrong, so also was Captain Moir. The one officer should not have taken the Confederate agents from off a foreign ship; the other should not have had them on board. Captain Moir, moreover, committed a grave error in not producing his passenger-list on the demand of Lieutenant Fairfax. There was, in fact, so much blundering on both sides, that it would have been tragical indeed had a war between kindred nations resulted from the incompetency and ignorance of two sea-captains, both conscientiously desirous of doing their duty to their Governments, and neither understanding in what way to do it.

In her resistance to the arbitrary proceedings of the San Jacinto, England had the full support of other nations. The Foreign Ministers at Washington expressed themselves strongly to Lord Lyons on the illegality of what had been done. France, in particular, took very decided ground in connection with the affair, moved perhaps in some degree by the fact that one of the envoys seized was on his way to her own court. On the 10th of December, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to the representative of that country at Washington that the arrest had produced in France, if not the same emotion as in England, at least extreme astonishment and sensation. "The desire," said M. Thouvenel, "to aid in preventing a conflict, perhaps imminent, between two Powers for which the French Government is animated by sentiments equally friendly, and the duty to uphold, for the purpose of placing the right of its own flag under shelter from any attack, certain principles essential to the security of neutrals, have, after mature reflection, convinced it that it could not, under the circumstances, remain entirely silent." The disposition to recognise the Confederate States was even stronger in France than in England; and it is probable that, had war broken out between Great Britain and the Government of President Lincoln, France would gladly have availed herself of such an opportunity for placing the South in the position which she earnestly coveted, and would at the same time have joined England in military and naval operations against her enemy. These matters were fully understood at Washington, and exercised an important influence in determining the event. If hostilities had really ensued, Canada would have

been one of the main seats of war; and between the Canadians and the Americans there has never been much love. On the present occasion, the former were even desirous of coming to blows. The reinforcements sent from England were received with enthusiasm. Volunteer companies were formed; drilling and marching went on all day long; and people began to anticipate a renewal of those disasters which have on several occasions befallen the Americans in their attacks upon the Northern province. The feeling of the moment derived additional strength from some foolish remarks which had appeared in one of the New York papers a little before the conflict of Bull Run. The writer of those remarks regretted that two sections of Americans should be fighting one another, and suggested that it would be far wiser for them to unite their forces, and march against Canada. For a moment, it seemed doubtful whether Canada would not march against them.

The case being at length decided, the authorities at Washington sent instructions to the commandant of Fort Warren to deliver the Confederate agents to the representatives of the British Government. They were accordingly placed on board a small steamer, and conveyed to an English vessel at anchor off Provincetown, near Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Thence they were conveyed to the West Indian island of St. Thomas, where they took passage for England by one of the regular steampackets. Not long after, Mr. Mason was doing the best he could for his Government in London, and Mr. Slidell in Paris. In both countries they met multitudes of friends, who earnestly desired to promote their cause; but their mission was a failure. The brief popularity which had resulted from their seizure on board the Trent, and which was entirely factitious in its character, died out before the cold and hard necessities of diplomacy, and neither enjoyed the honour of being at any time the accredited representative of an acknowledged Government. The arrest of these Commissioners, under circumstances which put their captors so completely in the wrong, was hailed by the Government at Richmond as the most fortunate circumstance in its career. Brilliant anticipations were formed as to the course that would be adopted by England under the affront she had received. It does not seem to have been thought possible that the United States would repudiate the act of their own officer, and disappoint the clamoro is demands of their own people. War, therefore, was considered imminent, and war between England and the United States, at such a juncture, would in all probability have established the new

the state of the navy, and to the development of the ordinary departments of government, Mr. Davis referred to the financial system of the Confederacy, which he cautiously said had worked well so far, and promised good results in the future. There was, he thought, every reason to believe that the Confederate Treasury note was fast becoming a fair circulating medium. But a large part of Mr. Davis's hopefulness with regard to the general prospects of the Southern League was derived from the presumed mistakes and wrong-doings of the adver

as those of despots; as if the state of civil war did not invariably necessitate a resort to exceptional measures; as if the Confederate ruler himself were not, at that very time, depending on far worse acts for the maintenance of the cause which he desired to establish. The arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board the Trent was alluded to in terms of great reprobation, and the Federal Government was accused of other violations of right in the prosecution of its quarrel with the South. With respect to the blockade, Mr. Davis mentioned that