Friction on the Frontier

27

27

Accounts were current that Cordero had marched from San Antonio with several hundred troops and at the Trinity had been joined by reinforcements from Monterey. In January, 1806, Major Moses Porter, then commanding at Natchitoches, received an order from the War Department that he should require the commandant at Nacogdoches to give assurance that no acts of violence would be committed east of the Sabine. Porter was to patrol the country east of that river, repel invasion, but avoid bloodshed if possible. If the commandant gave proper assurances, the establishment at Bayou Pierre was not to be disturbed. Rodriguez, the commandant, assured Porter that no encroachment had been intended, except to prevent contraband trade and exportation of horses, but that it was his duty to patrol to the Arroyo Hondo. Captain Turner with sixty men was then sent to remove the force at Adaes, which was accomplished without difficulty.73

The easy withdrawal of the Spanish is accounted for by the fact that there were only fifty-one soldiers at Adaes. Soon after, however, Herrera led six hundred troops to the frontier, there then being about a thousand soldiers in Texas, seven hundred of whom were stationed near the eastern border.74

The American government was equally active; in March orders were issued to Wilkinson to send all the troops in the neighborhood of St. Louis, except one company, to Fort Adams. Colonel T. H. Cushing was ordered to Natchitoches with three companies and two field pieces, to reinforce the two hundred there under Porter. Not until May 6 did Wilkinson obey the order, but shortly after the departure of the troops, an alarming dispatch from Porter caused the commander to send orders to

73 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 106; Martin, History of Louisiana, 330-331; State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 799; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 400. For further details, see Cox, The Louisiana-Texas Frontier, Part II, in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, 1-42.

74 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 108; Jefferson, Writings, (Ford, ed.) VIII, 116, 435-436.

Cushing to push forward with all haste. If the Spaniards were again east of the Sabine or assumed a menacing attitude, he was to add to his command the force at Fort Adams. He was to avoid hostilities if possible and was not to cross the Sabine. Cushing arrived at Natchitoches on June 1.75

When the news of Turner's expulsion of the Spaniards reached Washington, a cabinet meeting was held at which it was decided to order nine war-vessels to Louisiana, to erect fortifications at New Orleans, and to have the militia drilled. Mobile, Pensacola, and Baton Rouge were to be seized if necessary. On May 6 Wilkinson was ordered to Orleans Territory to take personal command. He was to repel invasion and to warn the governors of Texas and West Florida that the status quo must be respected, and that the United States would insist upon the possession of territory east of the Sabine, except Bayou Pierre.76

In July additional Spanish troops occupied Bayou Pierre. Cushing demanded that Herrera withdraw them, but he refused on the grounds that that region was a part of Texas. News of the further advance of the Spaniards reached Claiborne ; after consulting with Cowles Meade, the acting governor of Mississippi Territory, he issued a proclamation calling upon the people to assist in driving the enemy from Bayou Pierre. Shortly after he proceeded to Natchitoches." There he learned that Viana's expedition had cut down the American flag at a Caddo village, that several slaves had found asylum at Nacogdoches, and that three Americans had been apprehended twelve miles from Natchitoches. Claiborne demanded explanations from Herrera regarding these, and also concerning the stopping of the Freeman party.78

75 Wilkinson, Memoirs of my own Times, II, App. lxxxvii, lxxxix; McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 107; Martin, History of Louisiana,

332.

76 Wilkinson, Memoirs of my own Times, II, App. xc.

State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 801; McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 117.

78 Martin, History of Louisiana, 334.

Wilkinson Goes to the Frontier

29

Herrera replied that he was keeping the territory of the King inviolate, that the citizens were caught spying upon Spanish movements, and that the detention of the negroes was an affair then before the captain-general. Claiborne wished to make an immediate advance and drive the Spanish beyond the Sabine, but was checked by Cushing."

In spite of the orders of May 6, Wilkinson did not arrive at Natchez until September 7, probably, as McCaleb says, because he was waiting for the development of the Burr conspiracy, to which he was a party. At Natchez he met Governor Williams and was informed of the plans formulated by him and Claiborne for the defense of the territory. He wrote that he would discourage the march of the militia "until I have penetrated the designs of the Spaniard, and may find him deaf to the solemn appeal which I shall make to his understanding, his interest, and his duty." He wrote in a grandiloquent style to Dearborn that he would do all in his power to preserve inviolate, by peaceful means, the territory east of the Sabine, but if a blow were once struck, he would "soon plant our standards on the left bank of the Grand river. ''80

After giving orders for the strengthening of the ports adjacent to West Florida, Wilkinson proceeded to Natchitoches, having on the way met Claiborne, who promised four hundred militia, but five hundred responded to the call. From Natchitoches Wilkinson wrote to Cordero that in lieu of a recognized line of demarcation and as Nacogdoches was the easternmost Spanish outpost, the United States had adopted the Sabine as a boundary and demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish to the west side of the river. Cordero simply replied that he had referred the matter to Salcedo. On October 4 Wilkinson warned the Spanish that he would advance to the Sabine, but he did

79 Wilkinson, Memoirs of my own Times, II, App. xciii; McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 118-119.

80 Annals of Cong., 10 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 568–570.

not carry out the threat, for on the twenty-first he had not taken action. On September 27 the Spanish retreated from Bayou Pierre; two weeks later Cordero threatened to advance, but made no offensive move. In the latter part of October he received orders from Salcedo that under no circumstances should the American forces be attacked.81

Late in October Wilkinson finally headed for the Sabine. To Cordero he dispatched his aide-de-camp, Burling, with the proposal that the Spanish remain west of the Sabine and the Americans east of the Arroyo Hondo, leaving an unoccupied neutral ground between. A favorable reply was shortly after received, the arrangement thus concluded being familiarly known as the Neutral Ground Treaty. Shortly after Wilkinson returned to New Orleans, where he busied himself in fortifying the city. against the insignificant forces of his former co-worker, Aaron Burr.

The period of inaction on the border, the apparent ease with which an agreement was reached, and the fact that Wilkinson suddenly turned against Burr need further explanation. McCaleb believes that in all the early operations Wilkinson was preparing the way for the conquest of Mexico, but that the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Bayou Pierre destroyed the power of Wilkinson to compel a war.82 But this does not seem to be the true explanation, in the light of certain evidence which appears to have been overlooked.

Monette quotes the following letter from New Orleans, which was published in the New York Spectator of June 10, 1807:

The intendant said that General Wilkinson first communicated intelligence of the general nature of this plot [the Burr conspiracy] to Governor Cordero upon the Sabine, and proposed to him, that if he would withdraw his forces from that river, and prevail upon the vice-king to furnish him (General Wilkinson) with $300,000, he would undertake to

81 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 123–127, 138; Annals of Cong., 10 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 590; State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 803-804; Wilkinson, Memoirs of my own Times, II, App. xciii.

82 McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 149–150, 159, 170.