however, made no inquiry, because, forsooth, the country was in danger and Saigo at the head of a strong army. But how could the government, wielding as it did the entire military force of the empire, be in such dread of that small private school' party, that it had no time to inquire into the charge? If our officers had been truly desirous to do their duty, what could have prevented them? Any one of them might have procured an Imperial order, and taking some law-officers along with him, have set out to meet Saigo on his march. When ther the Imperial order had been communicated to Saigo, and a thorough investigation had been made, and Nakahara and his followers had been proved guilty, then let them have been punished; if, on the other hand, the assassination plot proved to be a pure invention, and a mere pretext of Saigo and his friends, then let them be punished. If the government had acted in this just and impartial manner, and Saigo and his friends had not submitted. but still held aloft the standard of revolt, then they would indeed have become rebels and the enemies of the country, and the government would have been perfectly justified in putting them down by armed force, nor would there either now, nor afterward, have been raised a single voice throughout the empire to blame them. All this our officers knew perfectly well, but the thing is that their conscience was not clear. Therefore they deceived the Emperor, used the army for their own purpose, and drove Saigo and his friends into rebellion. Thus they managed to throw dust in the eyes of the people and to succeed in their treacherous scheme. Afraid of their power, nobody now dares to speak of these doings of theirs, but at some future time public opinion is sure to find a vent, and their names will be handed down to posterity blotted with a foul stain. The public blame Saigo and his friends for having set out at the head of an army, and say that as they violated the laws of their country, they were justly punished for their crimes. But this is a shallow judgment that does not look beyond the surface of things. As long as a government does its duty to the people and administers justice with impartiality, it is the duty of the people to obey and to keep peace. But if the govern ment acts contrary to its duties, violates the laws and oppresses the innocent, then the government ceases to be a lawful government, and the people have a right to see that the laws are observed, and are not bound meekly to submit to oppression. When, therefore, Saigo and his friends wanted to proceed to Tokio for the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances of the secret plot, they were perfectly justified in doing so; and if the pupils of the 'private school' wished to accompany them for sake of protection, they also had a right to do so. From their desire to serve their country, the pupils of the 'private school' had been following Saigo's lead for years; in protecting Saigo they thought they protected their country. When the government, acting contrary to its duties, attempted to injure its subjects, then they took up arms and looked out for themselves. We do not mean to espouse the cause of Saigo, but ignorant as they are of the true mainsprings of men's actions, the general public are fond of passing their superficial judgments, like swallows and sparrows, that chirp and twitter when they behold the eagle soaring high above them. Therefore we have thought proper to give a plain statement of the facts.

"As already mentioned, these traitors have committed all sorts of unlawful acts, and brought about a general dissatisfaction, and we were right in charging them with keeping the loyal and patriotic men in disgrace and thus creating civil wars.

"Fifth crime.-In their intercourse with foreigners, they lose sight of the national dignity. A number of years have already passed since the reign of the Bakufu, and during the whole of that time our country has been looked down upon by foreign powers; the injurious effects of this are becoming daily more manifest. The foreign powers are the strongest, and we have had to submit, and however repugnant to us, we feel it every day in our intercourse with foreigners. This ought now to be changed, and our foreign relations ought to be put on a footing in better harmony with the principles of international law. The obvious means for effecting this is a revision of the treaties; without such a revision the prestige of the nation can never be restored. But a revision presents very serious difficulties. And why? Because our military organization is not yet sufficiently strong to enable our country to cope with foreign powers. Our most important problem at present is therefore to strengthen our military system that we may be prepared to defend ourselves by force of arms. This, however, requires a vast outlay, and it is therefore absolutely necessary to practise the strictest economy in every other branch of the administration, and avoid all useless expenses. When therefore I, Ichiro, and my companions discuss our foreign relations, we confine ourselves to insisting on the urgency of a revision of the treaties; and as to the revision of treaties, we do not enter here into details, but we merely say that our military force ought to be increased and kept in perfect readiness, and that, as this would cost a large amount of money, all unnecessary expenses in other branches onght to be cut down.

"If now we examine how our officers manage this particular and all important task, we see them reposing in comfortable indifference, and wasting the public revenue on useless works and ornamental buildings, but no heed is taken of our military service, and expenses in the other branches are daily increasing. More than

ten years have now elapsed since the restoration, and nevertheless neither our fortifications, nor our navy, nor the armament of our army are in the proper state of perfection, although all these things are of paramount importance for the defense of our country. At this rate it is impossible to tell whether we shall ever be in a proper state of military preparation. Consequently we shall be unable to procure a revision of the treaties, although the treaties have expired long ago, and if the treaties remain unrevised year after year, our country must sink lower and lower and our people become more and more worried.

"What was the result of the Formosa expedition in 1874? We spent the lives of our youth and our treasure to no purpose whatever. We were hoodwinked by China, which paid over to us a small amount of money in return for the roads we had built on the island, while our government made our people believe that China had paid us a war-indemnity. Why does the government always deceive the people?

"Our present relations with Corea are mere humbug. From the times of the Emperors Chin-ai and Ojin (the fourteenth and sixteenth successors of Jimmu Tenno), Corea became a dependency of Japan and paid us tribute. The Coreans, however, took advantage of our intestine wars and ceased paying tribute; then Taiko-sama invaded Corea with a large force and subjugated it afresh. And now we have made a treaty with them on equal terms! We grieve for our Emperor, who is thus put on an equal foot with China's vassal. Was ever our country more bitterly defiled?

"As for the exchange of the island of Sagalien against the Kurile Islands, it was a deep humiliation for our country. It was called an exchange, but in real truth the island was taken from us. We ceded to Russia an important country, and we received from her some worthless islands. It was an exchange of a treasure against trash. We never wanted to make that exchange, but we were compelled to comply with the demands of Russia. Such was the conduct of the traitorous officers in China in olden times when the So dynasty was fast approaching its end; for the sake of inglorious peace they surrendered one province of the empire after another. Such an affront was never yet offered to our nation since it first became a people; now for the first time we have had to bear it, because our officers cause our present Emperor to act contrary to what his ancestors did. This is a great crime and ought assuredly to be punished. "The Liukin Islands we have treated with injustice. The inhabitants petitioned our government and with some good reason. But our government, instead of entering into negotiations with China, and coming to a clear understanding with that country whether the islands belong to us or not, took advantage of the inferior strength of the islanders, compelled them to change the form of their government, and wounded their national feelings. Our officers, who are so much afraid of Russia, are exceedingly overbearing towards Linkiu. O, ye traitors, did ye ever hear a story about the wolf? A wolf meets a tiger; directly he drops his tail, hangs his head and walks with timid steps. But let him face a fox or a badger: he swells with wrath, he snarls, his claws tear up the ground; he is every inch a mighty and ferocious beast. Our officers are exactly like the wolf.

“But in foreign relations the great point is not to possess brute force and in virtue of that oppress the weak and cringe to the strong: the great point is to have right and justice on your side. This, however, our officers have still to discover; arrogance and flattery are their only modes of dealing with foreign powers; for the sake of an inglorious peace they bring humiliation on our country and court contempt abroad. It was for this we said that they mismanage our foreign relations and lower the dignity of the country."

No. 854.]

No. 315.

Mr. Bingham to Mr. Evarts.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Tokei, Japan, September 12, 1878. (Recieved October 18.) SIR: His Majesty the Emperor of Japan set out upon a progress through the north of the empire on the 30th ultimo. It appears by a notice published in the Tokei Times of the 7th instant that His Majesty is received by formal ceremonies and popular demonstrations which indicate the affection of the people for their sovereign and their loyalty to His Majesty's Government. His Majesty visits the public schools on his route, thereby indicating a regard for the welfare of his people and a

belief that the safety of good government is not endangered by the gen. eral education of the governed.

Herewith I inclose the notice from the Tokei Times of His Majesty's progress.

I have, &c.,

JNO. A. BINGHAM.

[Inclosure in No. 854.]

THE EMPEROR'S NORTHERN JOURNEY.

[From the Tokei Times of September 7, 1878.]

The northern journey of His Majesty the Emperor is marked by similar formal ceremonies and jubilant popular demonstrations to those which distinguished his progress last year.

His Majesty visits the schools, public offices, and temples on his route, is received with suitable honors, and usually leaves tokens of remembrance behind him. Thus far the Imperial party have had nothing but agreeable, though not especially stirring, experiences to encounter.

No. 855.]

No. 316.

Mr. Bingham to Mr. Evarts.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Tokei, Japan, September 12, 1878. (Received October 18.) SIR: On the 23d ultimo, I regret to say, there was a revolt among the Imperial troops in this capital, in which the second battalion of the artillery of the Imperial Guard was actively engaged, beginning the revolt near midnight by firing signal guns from their barracks and moving from their quarters into the streets, where they met resistance from the Imperial forces, and after some hours of flight and pursuit, and some skirmishing and loss of life, the insurgents surrendered.

It appears that by concert it had been agreed upon between this battalion and the artillery of the Tokei garrison that the latter should, upon the firing of the signal-guns, join in the uprising, but the war department having been secretly advised of the proposed revolt had on that day moved the garrison some few miles from Tokei, and thus prevented its co-operation in the conflict. Much has been said of this affair, and no doubt the reported disaffection among the troops in different parts of the empire has been greatly exaggerated.

I inclose for your information the comments of the Japan Herald upon the affair, together with the various notifications of his excellency the prime minister and the minister of war, &c., in relation to the revolt. All is quiet now in the capital.

I have, &c.,

JNO. A. BINGHAM.

[Inclosure in No. 885.]

REVOLT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD.

[From the Japan Daily Herald, August 26, 1878.]

The revolt of the artillery of the Imperial Guard, which occurred on Friday night, in Tokei, may, we fear, be followed by other outbreaks, unless preventive or pacifying measures be taken in time by the government. The disaffection, it is certain, is not

confined to the regiment in Tokio, but is common to all the troops of the guard, most of whom are stationed at present in the south. The war-worn remnants of the picked soldiers of the empire are greatly dissatisfied about the real or supposed neglects they have suffered. If the grievance be well founded it is the more undeserved, as the brunt of the hard fighting against Saigo's trained marines and samurai fell upon the Imperial Guard, as the thinned ranks of the regiments and great numbers of wounded and crippled men testify. On the other hand, the officials of the government say the rewards were fixed by Arisugawa-no-Miya, the commander-in-chief, are on a fair and even liberal scale, and that even if some reasons for dissatisfaction existed, they were still open to remedy, and that revolt and killing of officers are military crimes for which there is no palliation. It seems probable that the government may have to disband the whole body of the unruly Prætorians, whose claim to regulate their largesses cannot be admitted. The guards, it seems, have been restive for some time, and their insubordination, if not checked, would be a constant danger to the state.

As far as we can learn, the other troops of the garrison and armed police are not disaffected. But there is much and open discontent in the provinces. We do not mean that a revolt or insurrection may be expected even in Tosa, but a concurrence of events, such as trouble with soldiery and the calamity of a short harvest (now, unhappily, imminent) may lead to evil events. Most of the provinces are, in the main, poor, and the burden of taxation now imposed is hard to bear, the late remission not withstanding. As a rule, the native merchants and traders are poorer now than at any time during the last ten years; the farmer and peasant classes, who in the best of times earn a bare subsistence only, are trembling at the prospect of a failure or partial failure of the rice crop, and have no resources to meet the expected deficit; among the late privileged shizoku there is a deep resentment against the sharp practice of the government, and the increasing miseries and hopelessness of the unfortunates may induce some desperate enterprises on the part of these pauperized and suffering men. The members of the government, with few exceptions, are regarded by the country with disfavor and distrust. The Daijin are necessary personages to deal with the aristocratic families, and are believed to be, in point of personal honor, without reproach. But with the sangi, the adroit, clever, unscrupulous karos, who are now turning the empire to profit, the case is different, and the necessity of an organic change of ministry, if the government of the empire is to go on without shock or hinderance, is daily more and more manifest. The personal acts of the ministers are keenly discussed, and rarely with approval, and the more as at least one of the number took office with a reputation for probity not of the highest.

But while we are hopeful that in Japan honest and capable men could be found to administer the affairs of the state, the absence of a training for public life in this country is a serious hinderance to selection. There is reason to fear that provincial feelings are yet too strong, and would in many or most cases bar high officials from asserting a wholly national policy.

As may be readily understood, it is reported that the finances are in a bad way. The year will close with a deficit. The crops will be, at the best, deficient in quality and quantity, and as stores of food are low, an import of rice may be necessary. Deficit and the costs of outbreaks add to the increasing debt, which bears heavily on the empire. The government seems to be blind to this, and many think that there must be a crisis ere long.

All excitement has died away in Tokei, and the affair has almost ceased to be talked of. No thoroughfare is permitted, however, along the road from the Hanzô to the Takébashi gate, just inside the moat in front of the British legation, alongside the Mikado's gardens. The sentries at the different public offices about town have fixed bayonets and cartouch-boxes slung round their shoulder,.

A native correspondent has sent us the following report on the military troubles in Tokei last Friday night:

On the night of the 23d inst., about half past eleven, the second battalion of the artillery of the imperial guard, which is quartered inside the Takebashi gate, set its barracks on fire, fired two signal guns, and then marched out, shouting and yelling. The reason why the signal guns were fired was that there was an understanding about the rising between the guard artillery and the artillery of the Tokei garrison which is quartered at Ichigai; but the war department, having discovered the plot, had ordered the garrison artillery to be reviewed at Oji on that very night. In this manner the garrison artillery was prevented from joining in the mutiny. It is said that it was originally intended to postpone the mutiny until His Majesty's progress north; but it

was objected that most of the ministers would then be absent, and the mutineers would then have no chance of gratifying the grudge which they bore to some of them. As the infantry did not join the artillery, the latter fired upon the former; this firing was returned and a fight ensued. The war department, however, was not unprepared for the mutiny; it had received information beforehand of what was brewing, and as soon as the disorder broke out, the alarm was given to the public and the police by firing five guns at the imperial palace. Immediately, every gate leading from the Shiro, such as Takebashi, Kijibashi, Kandabashi, Kajibashi, &c., was occupied by the guards, whilst the police received arms at the head station, and were sent to protect the imperial palace and the residences of the Daijin and the Sangi. Some of the mutinous artillerymen had, however, already made their exit; one party went through the Hanzo gate with the intention of laying their grievances before His Majesty; another party marched out through the Takebashi gate, and attacked the residence of the minister of finance, which was riddled with bullets. His excellency Mr. Okuma, however, managed to escape unhurt, but the bullets were flying as far as Nishiki-cho and Ogawamachi, to the great terror of the inhabitants, who fled in all directions, and one poor woman is said to have been killed near Suido-bashi by a stray shot. Major Utsunomiya and Captain Fukasawa of the artillery were killed by their own men while endeavoring to restrain the revolt, and several lieutenants and noncommissioned officers of the loyal troops were killed during the fight.

When the artillerymen, who had proceeded to the imperial palace, arrived before the gate at Akasaka, they drew up in a line and were hailed by the officer on guard, to whom they replied that they came to present a petition. On his asking them why they did not present it through their commander, they answered him that they had killed their major and captain. The officer on guard then called out the troops and ranged them opposite the artillerymen, and when he thought he had a sufficient force under his command, he ordered the artillerymen to lay down their arms on the spot. This was complied with and the artillerymen were all arrested. A similar fate soon overtook those who had attacked the finance minister's residence. They were surrounded on all sides by troops and armed policemen, and they seem to have had no further settled plan, so they surrendered without even trying to resist.

The cause of this revolt is said to be the dissatisfaction felt by that regiment of artillery at what was considered by them the partial distribution of rewards to those who had fought the Satsuma rebels. The fire at the barracks was got under about 1 a.m. on the 24th, and all the rioters were either captured or surrendered themselves. Before daybreak on the 24th quiet was fully restored. But it is said that some weeks ago there was, from similar causes, a mutinous spirit among the infantry, which the officers, however, succeeded in quieting before it came to an outbreak.

We learn from another source as follows: It has for some days past been known that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst certain of the troops in Tokei, more especially amongst the guards known as the Konoye-tai. No outbreak, such as that which had taken place was, however, expected until Friday morning, when the government became aware of the impending trouble-it is said through somebody having overheard the remarks of two soldiers who were conversing in a public place. Measures were at once taken to make head against the affair, without forcing an immediate outbreak. The Tokei garrison artillery, which were known to be parties to the plot, were sent out that same afternoon to Oji to drill, whilst, in the case of another body of troops, the whole of the non-commissioned officers, who were suspected of being in league with the privates, were at once replaced by loyal officers from other corps, and thus a check was put upon the dissatisfied privates. It was understood that it was the intention of the malcontents to murder all the ministers with the exception of Ito and Saigo, whose persons, however, were to be secured. Of course, the members of the government were at once warned, and they were all, it is said, at the time of the outbreak, safely ensconced, though in anxions expectation, within the walls of the palace. When the Konoye-tai, who were probably ignorant of their secret having transpired and the precautions taken, gave the signal for the outbreak by killing their commanding officer and setting fire to their barracks, they found that they were alone, and being but few in number, they were soon overpowered by the other troops and police.

That something more than a mere riot was intended is proved by the fact that the first act of the Konoye-tai was to fire volleys agaist H. E. Okuma's house, proofs of which are still apparent, the garden fence being pierced with scores of bullet-holes, and some bullets have even entered the house and damaged carpets, furniture, &c. Fortunately, Mr. Okuma, having been, as above stated, informed of the impending danger, had that morning removed his family to a safe place, and nobody was in the house at the time of the outbreak.