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if we suppose God to be the first Cåuse or Mover, it will thence neceffarily follow, that he must always be, and could not have a Beginning; because if he ever were only in poffibility, he could not from thence pass into actual Being, without fome precedent Cause and Mover, which is inconsistent with his Being the first Cause. And if nothing could cause his Being, then nothing can take it away, and confequently he must be Everlaft-ing.

It would be a great Abatement to all the other Divine Perfections, if they were finite and perifhing. Befides, that it would be altogether inconfiftent with fome of them, namely, his Self-existence, and neceffary Exiftence. And withal, it must needs take off from the obligation to Duty on the Creatures part, if they were uncertain of the continuance of his Being, by whom Rewards and Punishments were to be diftributed in the World.

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Of the Communicable Perfections of God: And firft, of those which relate to the Divine Understanding, viz. Knowledge, Wisdom, párticular Providence.

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Efides thofe incommunicable Attributes already infifted upon, there are others ftiled communicable, becaufe they are in fome lower degree, and by way of participation, communicated to other inferior Beings. And concerning these, there is a Neceffity that we fhould make an Estimate of them, by fuch Rules and Measures as our Natures are capable of. And because the chief Perfections that we can apprehend in any reafonable Effence, muft refer to one of thefe three Things, the Understanding, the Will, the Faculties of Working; for this reason, these Divine Perfections may be reduced to these Three Heads. And whatever is the most excellent of rational Beings, muft excel in each of these, (i. e.) There is no kind or degree of Perfection that our Imaginations are able to conceive, but these Excellencies of the Divine Nature must run out still beyond

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it, fo as not to be determined by any real or
imaginary Bounds.

I purpose to treat particularly concerning
each of them, beginning with those Perfe-
&tions that belong to the Divine Understand-
ing, namely, his Knowledge, Wisdom, and
particular Providence.

1. By the Knowledge of God, I mean that Perfection or Faculty whereby he understands and confiders things abfolutely and as they are in their own Natures, their Powers, Properties, Differences, together with all the Circumftances belonging to them. And 'tis neceffary to the Notion of God, that this should be afcribed to him, in the utmoft Perfection of it, infinitely beyond what the most knowing and the most learned Men can pretend unto.

1. His Knowledge is moft deep and intimate, reaching to the very Effence of things, ours but flight and fuperficial.

2. His is clear and diftinct, ours but confufed and dark.

3. His Infallible, ours doubtful and liable to Mistakes.

4. His Eafy, and without Labour and Difficulty, always prefent and actual; ours gotten by fore Travel, and cafily loft again by the Defects of Memory or Age.

5. His Univerfal, extending to all Objects; ours fhort and narrow, reaching only to fome Eccl.1.15 few Things, That which is wanting cannot be numbred.

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He hath a perfect Comprehenfion of all things, that have been, that are, or fhall be, according to all the various Relations, Dependencies, Circumstances, belonging to each of them. So that this Attribute of his must be infinite and unbounded, both extenfivè, with respect to the feveral kinds of Objects which it comprehends; and likewise inten fivè, as it fees every single Object with a most perfect infallible view. He doth not only understand all Particulars; but he knows every particular fo exactly, as if he were wholly taken up and intent in his Thoughts upon that alone. There is a vaft difference betwixt the wifeft of Men, and fuch as are grofly ignorant and fottish; and much greater betwixt Men and other Creatures, the little Infects, Ants and Worms, which are no ways fit to pass a Judgment concerning human Counfels and Designs. And yet these things hold fome proportion to one another, being both finite; whereas betwixt God's Knowledge and Man's, the distance is infinite.

And that this Attribute doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,

1. From the Acknowledgment of the Hea then. Tully mentions it as an ufual Saying of Thales, Deus omnia cernere, God beholds all things. So Seneca, Nihil Deo claufum, intereft animis noftris, & mediis cogitationibus intervenit. Nothing is hid from God, be

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is intimate in our Minds, and mingles himfelf with our very Thoughts.

Befides, that general Practice amongst them. of swearing by him,and attefting him in their moft folemn Compacts, do fufficiently imply their belief of his Omniscience.

2. From natural Reafon. Nothing can be more manifeft, than that Knowledge is a Perfection, and therefore ought to be afcribed to that Being which is supposed to have all poffible perfection. 'Tis a Perfection that we know to be in fome of the Creatures, and therefore must be much more in the Creator himself. He that made the Eye, fhall be not fee? He that gives to Men understanding, Shall not be know?.

Befides, that the denial of this Perfection would neceffarily infer many other Imperfections in the Divine Nature. It would deftroy his Wisdom, Providence, Dominion. Where there is no Knowledge, there can be no Forecast or Provision for the Future, nor any kind of Regular Government. In brief, the denial of this Attribute must take away his Goodness, Veracity, Juftice. That Being cannot properly be faid to be Good, which doth act either out of Ignorance, or blind Neceffity.

2. As Knowledge doth refpect Things ab folutely, fo Wisdom doth confider the rela

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