the general verdict. This motion was overruled, and judgment was given for the defendant on the verdict returned. The plaintiff asserted and still asserts an absolute title to the land. This claim is supported by the various deeds mentioned in the special findings. Upon the face of the deeds an apparently absolute title is vested in him. Conceding the plaintiff's apparent title, the defense proceeded upon the theory that, in consequence of a contemporaneous agreement, the deeds constituted nothing more than an equitable mortgage to secure the repayment of moneys advanced by the plaintiff for the defendant's use; that the plaintiff agreed, before the time for redemption expired, to take the title and extend the time for redemption. In the light of these conflicting theories, the influence of the facts specially found upon the general verdict may be considered. If we correctly apprehend the position of appellant's counsel, their contention is that, because it appears from the special findings that the plaintiff was vested with a complete legal title to the land in controversy, he was also entitled to the possession, and that, therefore, it was error to refuse to sustain his motion for judgment on the special findings. The argument seeks to maintain the proposition that any parol agreement which might have been made to the effect that the plaintiff should take and hold title as a security was void, within the statute of frauds. The evidence, whether documentary or otherwise, cannot be looked to in determining a motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict. Pennsylvania Co. v. Smith, 98 Ind. 42. The general verdict was for the defendant, and the rule is so well settled that the citation of authorities is not necessary, that unless it affirmatively appears that the facts specially found are irreconcilably in conflict with it, the general verdict must control. While the facts specially found established an apparently absolute title to the plaintiff, this would not of itself overthrow the general verdict, for the reason that the defendant may have been lawfully entitled to the possession notwithstanding the plaintiff's legal title. If it were required, when facts are found which, in one aspect of the case, are inconsistent with the general verdict, that the special findings should make it affirmatively appear that the general verdict was in all other respects sustained, there would be force in the appellant's contention; but the rule is the reverse. The special findings must present such a state of facts as that the general verdict is completely overthrown by the facts found. Against the facts found which show a legal title in the plaintiff, stands, first, the general verdict for the defendant; and, second, the facts specially found from which it appears that, at or before the delivery of the several deeds to the plaintiff, it was agreed that if the moneys paid out and expended by him were refunded, with interest, the land should be reconveyed to the defendant. It is settled by the decisions of this court that, where one holding a deed absolute on its face sues to recover possession of the land therein described, the person in possession may defeat a recovery by proof that the deed was taken as a security for money loaned to or advanced as a loan for the benefit of the person in possession. Beatty v. Brummett, 94 Ind. 76, and cases cited; Heath v. Williams, 30 Ind. 495; Parker v. Ĥubble, 75 Ind. 580; Creighton v. Hoppis, 99 Ind. 369; Smith v. Parks, 22 Ind. 59; Crane v. Buchanan, 29 Ind. 570, and cases cited: Murray v. Walker, 31 N. Y. 399; Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; Stoddard v. Whiting, 46 N. Y. 627; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251. The real nature of the transaction may be inquired into, and what purports on its face to be an absolute deed, whether made by the party claiming the equitable right, or pursuant to a judicial proceeding or otherwise, may be shown to be in legal effect only a mortgage. A court of equity will have regard to the real nature of the transaction, and, although a deed be absolute in form, if in fact it was received as a security for the repayment of money, it will be treated as a mortgage, and evidence, written or oral, will be received to show the facts. While it is true, as contended, that the holder of the legal title has prima facie the right to possession, this right, as we have seen, may be defeated by the person in possession, if upon the evidence he can make it appear that as to him the deed is a mortgage. Parker v. Hubble, supra. It is settled, too, that an agreement made during the year for redemption, by which the time for redemption is extended, is valid, and will prevent the purchaser at sheriff's sale from acquiring title under such sale. Such a contract is not void within the statute of frauds, and if the purchaser was thereby thrown off his guard, and in reliance thereon failed to redeem, the contract will be enforced, even though no money was paid to secure such extension. Butt v. Butt, 91 Ind. 305; Rector v. Shirk, 92 Ind. 31; McMakin v. Schenck, 98 Ind. 264. No error was committed in overruling the motion for judgment notwithstanding the general verdict. There is abundant evidence in this case upon which the jury could have found that an agreement had been made between Lloyd and the appellee, before the year for redemption expired, that the time for redemption should be extended, and that the appellant knew of that fact at the time he received the conveyance from Lloyd. The appellee paid Lloyd $40 of the amount due him on the debt after the land was sold, and the appellant paid the balance, and both Lloyd and the appellee testified that the deed was made upon an agreement with the appellant that he was to have time to repay the amount. Without detailing the evidence further, we think the verdict is sustained as to the whole tract. A significant circumstance in all such cases is that the appellee remained in possession, and made lasting and valuable improvements on the land. Another circumstance of weight in this case was the fact, properly admitted in evidence, that, at the time the plaintiff below was prosecuting this suit for possession. there was also pending another action to foreclose the defendant's equity of redemption, thus treating the deeds in the one case as mortgages, while in the other he was insisting upon the right to recover possession under them. It is true, the foreclosure suit was, at the beginning, the second paragraph of the complaint in the present case. The actions were separated upon the order of the court, but the pleading, declaring upon the deeds as mortgages, was nevertheless properly admitted in evidence. Boots v. Canine, 94 Ind. 408. We It is insisted that the appellant had the right to state his cause of action in different ways, in separate paragraphs of his complaint, and that it was error to admit one paragraph in evidence to defeat the other. doubt the right to unite causes of action so inconsistent, involving the same transaction; but, however that may be, the evidence was properly admitted. All the other points which are properly presented by the record and discussed by counsel are covered by what has already been said. The case of Shubert v. Stanley, 52 Ind. 46, relied on by the appellant, is not applicable here. As the facts make it appear, this is the case of a mortgagor in possession. Under the statute and the decisions already referred to, he has the right to remain in possession, as against the mortgagee, until his equity of redemption is foreclosed and sold, and the purchaser's right to possession matures in the regular course. We have discovered no error in the record. The judgment is accordingly affirmed, with costs. (105 Ind. 363) WILLIS v. BAYLES. Filed February 17, 1886. 1. HABEAS CORPUS-COMPLAINT-MOTION TO QUASH WRIT. In habeas corpus proceedings the sufficiency of the complaint may be tested by a motion to quash the writ. 2. SAME-WHAT MUST BE SHOWN. Where one who is held in custody under the judgment of a court institutes habeas corpus proceedings, he must show that the judgment is not erroneous merely, but absolutely void. 3. STATUTES IN RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY-CONSTRUCTION. Statutes in restraint of personal liberty should receive a strict construction. 4. JUDGMENT ON DEFECTIVE VERDICT NOT VOID - CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ASSAILED BY HABEAS CORPUS. Although the verdict of a jury may be so defective that it is error for the court to render judgment thereon, yet if the court has jurisdiction of person and subject-matter the judgment is not a nullity, and cannot be collaterally attacked on habeas corpus. Appeal from Sullivan circuit court. S. C. Coulson, J. C. Briggs, and W. C. Hultz, for appellant. Howk, J. In this case the appellee, Bayles, filed his verified complaint in the court below, alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty and held in custody by the appellant, Willis, sheriff of Sullivan county, and praying for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in his behalf. The writ was accordingly issued and delivered to the appellant, who made return thereof in writing, and produced, in court, the body of the appellee. Written exceptions were filed by appellee to appellant's return, which were sustained by the court; and, upon appellant's failure to amend his return, the court ordered and adjudged that appellee be discharged from his custody. Appellant has assigned errors here, which call in question the decisions of the circuit court (1) in overruling his motion to quash the writ; (2) in sustaining appellee's exceptions to his return or answer; and (3) in discharging the appellee from custody. In habeas corpus proceedings, a motion to quash the writ tests the sufficiency of the complaint or application whereon the writ was issued. McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150; Milligan v. State, 97 Ind. 355. In his verified complaint, appellee alleged that he was a citizen of this state, residing in the town and county of Sullivan; that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty and held in custody by appellant, the sheriff of such county, in the county jail; that the cause and pretense of his restraint, according to his best information and belief, was a certain pretended commitment or execution against appellee's body, commanding his arrest and imprisonment, issued by one JACOB N. LAND, a justice of the peace of Haddon township, in Sullivan county, upon a certain affidavit filed before one OWEN DAVIS, a justice of the peace of Hamilton township, in such county, for a capias ad satisfaciendum by one John W. McCoskey; that such cause and pretense was wholly untrue, and such restraint was illegal, in this, to-wit: First, that there was no judgment against appellee upon which an execution against his body could be legally issued; second, that the justice of the peace, JACOB N. LAND, had no authority to issue such commitment or execution against the body of appellee; third, that the writ upon which appellee was arrested was wholly illegal and void,-all of which facts were true, as appellee was informed and believed. Wherefore, etc. It is claimed by appellant's counsel, that appellee's verified complaint did not state facts sufficient to entitle him to the issue of the writ of habeas corpus. Section 1108, Rev. St. 1881, declares that such a complaint "shall specify-First, by whom the person in whose behalf the writ is applied for is restrained of his liberty, and the place where, naming all the parties if they are known, or describing them if they are not known; second, the cause or pretense of the restraint, according to the best of the knowledge and belief of the applicant; third, if the restraint be alleged to be illegal, in what the illegality consists." Appellee's complaint in this case, the substance of which we have given, complies substantially with these statutory requirements. The facts stated therein made a prima facie case in his favor, which authorized the issue of a writ of habeas corpus as prayed for, and were abundantly sufficient, we think, to withstand appellant's motion to quash the writ. Milligan v. State, supra; Ex parte Lawler, 28 Ind. 241; Flora v. Sachs, 64 Ind. 155. The motion to quash the writ was correctly overruled. The next error complained of in argument, on behalf of appellant, is the sustaining of the exceptions to his return or answer to the writ of habeas corpus issued in this cause. In his return or answer the appellant said that on the third day of September, 1885, one John W. McCoskey obtained a judgment against appellee for $122.70, and costs of suit, which judgment was duly rendered by and before OWEN DAVIS, a justice of the peace of Sullivan county, duly and lawfully authorized in that behalf to try and determine, in an action wherein McCoskey was plaintiff and appellee was defendant, which judgment was still in full force, unpaid, and not appealed from; that after the rendition of such judgment, appellee having failed and refused to pay or stay the same, McCoskey duly and legally instituted proceedings for a capias ad satisfaciendum against appellee, before OWEN DAVIS, as such justice, charging appellee with fraudulently concealing, withholding, transferring, and secreting certain property, moneys, rights, credits, and choses in action, subject to execution, with intent to cheat, defraud, and delay him, McCoskey, in the collection of such judgment debt; that appellee appeared on the third day of September, 1885, in answer to such proceeding, and moved the justice to change the venue of the proceeding from Hamilton township, where the proceeding was then pending, and filed an affidavit in support of such motion; that upon such application the venue of such proceeding was changed to Haddon township, in such county, and the cause was sent to JACOB N. LAND, a justice of the peace in such township; that on the sixth day of October, 1885, the appellee and McCoskey each appeared, in person and by counsel, at the hour set for trial, before Justice LAND, who had competent authority to try and determine the cause; that, by agreement of the parties, the cause was tried by a jury of 11 good and true men, who were duly sworn to try the same, and a true verdict render therein, according to law and the evidence; that said cause having been then and there submitted to such court and jury, and the evidence having been heard, and the arguments of counsel made, and such jury being fully advised, and having retired to their room to deliberate of their verdict, "and their minds and understandings being enlightened," they afterwards on said day returned into such court their verdict and finding for the plaintiff, McCoskey, against the defendant, Bayles, "that said Bayles fraudulently withheld, concealed, transferred, and removed the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, in money, belonging to him, the said Bayles, with intent to defraud and delay said judgment creditor, John W. McCoskey;" that thereupon, such justice then and there rendered judgment upon such verdict in said cause, according to law, said Bayles having then and there refused and failed to pay over and surrender such money, or any part thereof, for the benefit of said plaintiff, or to pay such judgment; that thereupon such justice then and there issued on such judgment an execution against the body of John N. Bayles, setting out a copy of such execution, and then and there delivered the same to Andrew J. Latshaw, a constable in and for such township of Haddon, then and there duly qualified and acting as such; that such constable, by virtue of such execution, did on the nineteenth day of October, 1885, arrest said Bayles in the town and county of Sullivan, and delivered him, said Bayles, into the custody and keeping of appellant, who was the sheriff of Sullivan county, duly and legally authorized in that behalf, and as such sheriff, had control and charge of the jail of such county and the custody of the prisoners therein confined from time to time; that appellant had John N. Bayles in his custody, under the proceedings aforesaid and in the manner aforesaid; and that, so far as ap |