and destroyed, unless some provision were made for their reissue, and the putting of them into renewed circulation. This would be opposed to the whole tenor of the act, would be unjust to the coupon-holders themselves, and would probably be contrary to the acts of congress in reference to the creation of paper currency. We think that the position of the court of appeals in this case is well taken,-that coupons could not be made receivable as a portion of the literary fund, and that, if they could not be received as a part of the fund, they could not properly be made receivable for the taxes laid for the purpose of maintaining said fund. For several years after the constitution was adopted, and after the law of 1871 had been passed, the taxes for the benefit of free schools were mingled in the assessment and collection of taxes, and in the treasury when received, with the other taxes and funds raised for the support of the state government. As long as this state of things continued, the collecting officers could not object to receiving coupons in payment of taxes, because the share due to the school fund could easily be paid from the treasury, to the credit of that fund, out of the lawful moneys received. But by the tax act of March 15, 1884, it was provided that all taxes assessed on property, real or personal, by that act, and dedicated by it to the maintenance of the public free schools of the state, should be paid and collected only in the lawful money of the United States, and should be paid into the treasury to the credit of the free-school fund, and should be used for no other purpose whatsoever, and to this end the auditor of public accounts should have the books of the commissioner of the revenue prepared with reference to the separate assessment and collection of said school tax, and the several treasurers of the commonwealth should have the tax-bills in their counties and corporations so made out as to specify the amount of the tax due from each tax-payer to the public free school fund, including the capitation taxes of whatever kind or nature, and should keep said capitation tax and school tax separate and distinct from all other taxes or revenues so collected by him, and forward the same, thus separate and distinct, to the auditor of public accounts, which should be kept separate and distinct by him from all other taxes or revenues until paid to the public free schools. Since the passage of this act, and in pursuance thereof, the taxes and other revenues raised for the purpose of maintaining public schools, and belonging under the constitution to the literary fund, have been kept separate and distinct from the other taxes raised for the general support of the state government. This was the practice when the case of Vashon v. Greenhow arose; and in our judgment the law requiring the school tax to be paid in lawful money of the United States was a valid law, notwithstanding the provisions of the act of 1871, and that it was sustained by the sections of the constitution referred to, which antedate the law of 1871, and override any provisions therein which are repugnant thereto.

In Paup v. Drew, 10 How. 218, a decision was made by this court in a case not very different in principle from the one now under consideration. It had been decided in Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, at about the same time, that the law of Arkansas which chartered the Bank of the State of Arkansas, (the whole capital of which belonged to the state,) provided that the bills and notes of said institution should be received in all payments of debts due to the state, was valid and irrepealable, and that, although this provision was subsequently in terms repealed, the notes of the bank which were in circulation at the time of the repeal were not affected by it, and that the undertaking of the state to receive the notes of the bank constituted a contract between the state and the holders of these notes which the state was not at liberty to break or impair, although notes issued by the bank after the repeal were not within the contract, and might be refused. After this decision the case of Paup v. Drew came up, in which it was held that, although the notes of the bank were receivable in payment of all debts due to the state in its own right, and could not be refused, yet, where the state sold lands which were held by it in trust for the benefit of a seminary, and the terms of the sale were that the debtor should pay in specie or its equivalent, such debtor was not at liberty to tender the notes of the bank in payment. The question arose in this way: Congress in 1827 had passed an act "concerning a seminary of learning in the territory of Arkansas," by which two entire townships of land were directed to be set aside and reserved from sale, out of the public lands within the said territory, for the use and support of a university within the said territory. In 1836 cougress passed another act entitled "An act supplementary to the act entitled 'An act for the admission of the state of Arkansas into the Union, and to provide for the due execution of the laws of the United States within the same, and* for other purposes,'" by which last act the lands so reserved for the use and support of a university were vested in the state of Arkansas. On the 28th of December, 1840, the legislature of Arkansas passed an act entitled "An act to authorize the governor to dispose of the seminary lands;" and in 1842 the then governor of the state sold to John W. Paup the right to enter and locate 640 acres of said land, and received from him therefor bonds payable at different dates in specie or its equivalent. In 1847 the governor of the state brought a suit upon these bonds, and the defendants brought into court the sum of $6,050 in notes of the Bank of the State of Arkansas, and pleaded a tender of the same in discharge of the debt. plaintiff demurred on the ground that the proceeds of the bonds were part of a trust fund committed to the state by congress for special purposes, over which the state had no power except to collect and disburse the same in pursuance of the objects of the grant, and the state had no power to apply said funds to the payment of ordinary liabilities, and was not bound to accept in payment of such bonds any de

The

intrusted to their charge by the legislative assembly or by congress, were placed under the entire control of the board of public works, with authority to make all regulations they deemed necessary for keeping them in repair. It was also required to disburse "upon their warrant all moneys appropriated by the United States or the District of Columbia, or collected from property holders in pursuance of law, for the improvements of streets, avenues, alleys, and sewers, and roads and bridges, and to "assess, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law, upon the property adjoining, and to be specially benefited by the improvements authorized by law and made by them, a reasonable proportion of the cost of the improvement, not exceeding one-third of such cost, which sum shall be collected as all other taxes are collected.

It was contended in the Barnes Case that the board of public works was not a department or subordinate agency of the District of Columbia, but a federal commission, having exclusive power to make such regulations as it deemed necessary for keeping in repair the streets, avenues, alleys, sewers, roads, and bridges commit. ted to their control. This view was rejected by the court. Although that board was dependent upon both congress and the legislative assembly of the District, and was the hand and agent both of the United States and of the District, it was held to be the representative and a part of the municipal corporation created by the act of 1871, and that its proceedings and acts in repairing and improving public streets were the proceedings and acts of that corporation. The District was held liable for the injury there complained of, upon the principle, which the court declared to be sound, and supported by numerous and well-considered adjudications in this country and in England, that a municipal corporation, as distinguished from a corporation organized for private gain, is liable for injuries to individuals arising from negligence upon its part in the construction of works which it was authorized to construct and maintain. And it was expressly declared that it was not of the slightest consequence, in principle, by what means the officers of the District were "placed in their position, whether they are elected by the people of the municipality, or appointed by the president or a governor. The people are the recognized source of all authority, state and municipal; and to this authority it must come at last, whether immediately or by a circuitous process. "91 U. S. 545.

Has there been any such change in the government established for this District as will take the present case out of the rule announced in the Barnes Case? In the revision of the statutes relating to the District, the clause of the act of 1871, declaring the District of Columbia (Rev. St. D. C. p. 2, § 2) to be a body corporate for mu. nicipal purposes, with power to contract, etc., was retained. By the act of June 20, 1874, for the government of the District, and for other purposes, (18 St. p. 116, c. 337,) previous statutes providing for the District a governor, secretary, legislative as

sembly, board of public works, and a delegate in congress were repealed, and all the power and authority then vested in the governor and board of public works, except as limited by that act, were vested in a commission, composed of three persons, to be appointed by the president with the consent of the senate. But by the act of June 11, 1878, (20 St. p. 102, c. 180,) a permanent form of government for the District was established. It provided that "the District of Columbia shall remain and continue a municipal corporation, as provided in section two of the Revised Statutes relating to said District," and that the commissioners therein provided for should "be deemed and taken as officers of such corporation." Those commissioners, consisting of two persons, to be appointed by the president, with the consent of the senate, and an officer of the engineer corps, detailed for that purpose, were rested with all the powers, rights, duties, and privileges, and all the property, estate, and effects, then lawfully exercised by and vested in the commissioners of the District, including the power, among others, to apply the taxes or other revenues of the District to the payment of its current expenses, the support of the public schools, the fire department, and the police, but* making no contract, nor incurring any obligation, other than such as were provided in that act, and should be approved by congress: to collect taxes theretofore lawfully assessed and due, or to become due, but without anticipating taxes by selling or hypothecating them; to abolish offices, consolidate two or more offices, reduce the number of employes, remove from office, and make appointments to any office under them authorized by law; and to erect, light, and maintain lamp-posts, with lamps, beyond the city limits. Sections 1-3.

It was made their duty to submit annually to the secretary of the treasury, for his examination and approval, a detailed statement "of the work proposed to be undertaken by them" during the then ensuing fiscal year, and the estimated cost thereof, as well as the cost of constructing, repairing, and maintaining all bridges authorized by law across the Potomac and other streams within the district, the cost of maintaining all public institutions of charity, reformatories, and prisons then belonging to, or supported in whole or in part by, the District, and the expenses of the Washington aqueduct and its appurtenances, together with an itemized statement and estimate of the amount necessary to defray the expenses of the District for the then ensuing fiscal year. These estimates it became the duty of the secretary of the treasury to examine and approve or disapprove, or suggest such change in them as the public interest demanded, the result to be certified to the commissioners, who were required to transmit the same, with the original estimates, to congress. The act provided that, "to the extent to which congress shall approve of said estimates, congress shall appropriate the amount of fifty per centum thereof; and the remaining fifty per centum of such approved estimates shall be levied and as

It also provides that when any repairs of streets, avenues, alleys, or sewers within the District are to be made, or when new pavements are to be substituted in place of those worn out, new ones laid, new streets opened, sewers built, or any work, the total cost of which shall exceed $1,000, the work shall be given out upon advertisement, the lowest responsible bid to be accepted by the commissioners, though they have the right, in their discretion, to reject all proposals made. It further provides that the" United States shall pay one-half of the cost of all work done under the provisions of this [fifth] section, except that done by the railway companies, which payment shall be credited as part of the fifty per centum which the United States contributes towards the expenses of the District of Columbia for that year; and all payments shall be made by the secretary of the treasury on the warrant or order of the commissioners of the District of Columbia, or a majority there of, in such amounts and at such times as they may deem safe and proper, in view of the progress of the work." The act places the police, schools, board of health, and sanitary inspectors of the District all under the charge and control of the commissioners.

We have made this extended analysis of the provisions of the act of 1878 because of the earnest contention of the counsel for the defendant that, while the District of Columbia is still a municipal corporation, under its present form of government it has not, "as a municipal corporation, the features involving it in the liability under consideration." The reasons assigned by counsel for this contention have been carefully considered, with the result that in our judgment the municipal corporation created by the act of 1878 is subject to precisely the same liability for injuries to individuals, arising from the negligence of the commissioners, or of the officers under them, in maintaining in safe condition, for the use of the public, the streets, avenues, alleys, and sidewalks of the city of Washington, as was the District under the laws in force when the cause of action in the Barnes Case arose. It is said that the present corporation, as a corporation, has nothing to do with the streets. That could have been said with equal propriety in reference to the old corporation, when the streets were under the control and supervision of the board of public works. Yet that board was held to be a part of the municipal corporation. Its acts, within the scope of its powers, were deemed the acts of the corporation. Its negligence, in the care of streets, was held to be the negligence of the municipal corporation of which it was a part. So, in this case, the commissioners, having full control of the streets, are under a duty to keep the public ways of the city in such condition that they can be used with reasonable safety. Their neglect in that matter is the neglect of the municipal corporation, of which they are the responsible representatives, |

It is suggested that the District is without the means to perform the supposed neglected duty; that none of its officers can pay a judgment against it, and that no process against it could enforce payment; that even a mandamus against it to levy a tax would be futile, because neither the District nor the commissioners can levy a tax for any purpose; and that no judgment against it can be paid except by warrant upon the treasury, pursuant to an appropriation by congress. We do not perceive that these considerations materially affect the principle upon which the decision in the Barnes Case rests. That streets, avenues, pavements, sidewalks, and sewers in Washington are established. repaired, and maintained in part by appropriations made by congress, and in part by taxation upon private property, does not change the fact that, by an express declaration of congress, the District is created a body corporate for municipal purposes. Because it was a municipal corporation proper, as distinguished from a corporation established as an agency of the government creating it,this court held in the Barnes Case that it was responsible for such negligence of its officers having the care of streets, avenues, and sidewalks as resulted in personal injuries to individuals. The source from which the District obtains the means for maintaining public highways in the city is of no consequence so long as congress has made it, and permits it to remain, a mere municipal corporation, with such functions as pertain to municipal corporations proper. This municipal feature was emphasized in Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.. S. 1, 7, ante, 19, where it was said that the corporate capacity and the corporate liabilities of the District remained as they were before the act of 1878, and that its character as a mere municipal corporation had not been changed. Having that character, we held, in that case, that the District was subject to the ordinary rules governing the law of procedure between private persons, and was therefore embraced by the Maryland statute of limitations of 1715.

It is further said that the fee-simple of the streets in the city of Washington is in the United States, and that that fact is entitled to great weight. This point was made in the Barnes Case, and distinctly overruled. The court there said: "We do not perceive that the circumstance that the fee of the streets is in the United States, and not in the municipal corporation, is material to the case. In most of the cities of this country, the fee of the land belongs to the adjacent owner, and upon the discontinuance of the street the possession would revert to him. The streets and avenues in Washington have been laid out by competent authority. The power and the duty to repair them are undoubted, and would not be different were the streets the absolute property of the corporation. The only questions can be as to the particular person or body by which the power shall be exercised, and how far the liability of the city extends."

Without further discussion, we adjudge, upon the authority of Barnes v. District of Columbia, that the District is liable for such negligence upon the part of its officers as is charged in the plaintiff's declaration. That case was determined in 1875, and has never been questioned by any subsequent decision in this court. On the contrary, its authority was recognized in Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, and in Brown v. District of Columbia, 127 U. S. 579, 586, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1314, and the principles announced in it were applied in District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S. 621, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 884. If the rule announced in the Barnes Case is not satisfactory to congress, it can be abrogated by statute.

We proceed to examine the objections urged by the District to the admission of evidence. The first one relates to the plaintiff's testimony in reference to his contributions to medical journals upon various medical subjects. At the trial below, he gave evidence tending to show that at the time of the accident he was, and had been since 1864, a resident practicing physician of Washington; that between 8 and 9 o'clock of the evening of December 6, 1881, while walking with his sister on the south side of G street, between Fourteenth and Fifteenth streets northwest, he stepped on a board covering a hole in the sidewalk adjoining the Riggs House, and, the board breaking or bending, he fell into the hole underneath it, was severely and permanently injured, and his ability to prosecute his studies and to pursue his profession greatly impaired. While under examination in chief, his counsel propounded to him this question: "State, doctor, if you please, whether or not you had at that time, or prior to the time of this accident, been a contributor to any medical journal of this country or abroad-the old country-of any articles or essays on diseases known to the profession." To this question the plaintiff answered: "I have been for years a regular contributor in the Philadelphia Medical Times; also to the Virginia Journal, a medical monthly published in Richmond; and other journals." The defendant at the time objected to the question and answer, but, the objections being overruled, it excepted to the ruling of the court. At a subsequent stage of the trial, the plaintiff, being recalled as a witness in his own behalf, offered to prove that he had in his possession certain written articles for medical journals and medical works on obstetrics and gynecology, and that he had been quoted as an authority upon certain subjects; to which the defendant objected, but the court overruled the defendant's objection, and permitted said testimony to be given, as follows: "Atkinson's Therapeutics of Gynecology and Obstetrics, and Wood's Library Minor Surgical Gynecology, by Paul F. Munde, [which books were produced and examined by the witness before the jury,] are text-books in the medical profession; and that on pages 73 and 140 of said first-named book were articles written by himself, or reference made to him, and also at page 217 of the last book referred to; also that in the Virginia Medical Monthly for August, 1876, there is v.10s.c.-63

an article by the plaintiff on the therapeutic use of certain remedies; and also in the American Journal of Obstetrics there is an article by plaintiff on the Application of Nitric Acid in Endocervicitis and Endome tritis;' and also a translation of one oʻ plaintiff's articles in a French journal, en titled 'Annales de Gynecologie,' in April 1875; and also in a French journal, The Review of Medical and Surgical Therapeu tics,' of May, 1875." To the action of the court in overruling the defendant's objec tion, and permitting this testimony to be given, and to the testimony itself, the de fendant excepted.

This evidence was competent upon the issue as to damages. It indicated the nat ure of the plaintiff's pursuits, and, in connection with other evidence showing the serious and permanent character of the injuries received by him, that his capacity to prosecute his studies and to follow his ordinary pursuits was impaired. The defendant insists that the evidence should have been rejected, because it did not appear that the plaintiff had derived any income from his contributions to medical journals. This is not a sound view of the question. Even if those contributions were made without compensation, his inability to continue them by reason of the injuries in question was a proper element in the inquiry as to damages. That fact tended to show the extent of both his mental and physical suffering resulting from the injuries received. All evidence tending to show the character of his ordinary pursuits, and the extent to which the injury complained of prevented him from following those pursuits, was pertinent to the issues. Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614; Ballou v. Farnum, 11 Allen, 73; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 233, 11 N. Y. 416. The authorities all agree that in cases of this character much latitude must be given to juries in estimating the damages sustained by the person injured. Physical suffering resulting from such injuries is necessarily attended by mental suffering in a greater or less degree; and as said in Kennon v. Gilmer, 1319 U. S. 22, 26, 27, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696: "The action is for an injury to the person of an* intelligent being; and when the injury, whether caused by willfulness or by negligence, produces mental as well as bodily anguish and suffering, * * it is impossible to exclude the mental suffering, in estimating the extent of the personal injury for which compensation is to be awarded." Railroad Co. v. Barror, 5 Wall. 90, 105; Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552; Holyoke v. Railway Co., 48 N. H. 541; Stockton v. Frey. 4 Gill, 406; Smith v. Overby, 30 Ga. 241; Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 Ind. 164; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577.

The next objection to the admission of evidence relates to a certain entry in the books of the Adams Express Company in reference to the dead-light placed at the hole into which plaintiff fell. It should be stated, in this connection, that there was evidence before the jury, on behalf of the