Act Cong. April 7, 1874, (18 St. p. 27, c. 80, § 1;) Code Civil Proc. Idaho, §§ 361, 389. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed, and the case considered as pending upon the appeal alone. Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610, 612. matter of right, or to settle the issues of fact, but at the discretion of the court, and simply to inform its conscience, and to aid it in making up its own judgment upon the facts, and the real trial of the facts is by the court, and not by a jury. In all proceedings in the territorial courts in the The case being one of equitable jurisdicnature of suits in equity, therefore, as well tion only, the court was not bound to subas in those proceedings in the nature of ac-mit any issue of fact to the jury, and, havtions at common law, in which no trial ing done so, was at liberty to disregard the by jury is had, either because a jury has verdict and findings of the jury, either by been duly waived or because the issues tried setting them, or any of them,*aside, or by are issues of law only, the appellate juris- letting them stand, and allowing them diction of this court must be invoked by more or less weight, in its final hearing appeal, and not by writ of error. Davis v. and decree, according to its own view Alvord, 94 U. S. 545; Davis v. Fredericks, of the evidence in the cause. By the set104 U. S. 618; Story v. Black, 119 U. S. 235, tled course of decision in this court, it is 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176. It must also be borne not necessary that a court of equity in mind that, as already seen, in either should formally set aside the verdict or class of cases, whether equitable or legal, finding of a jury before proceeding to enter coming up by appeal from a territorial a decree which does not conform to it. court, after a hearing or trial on the facts, Prout v. Roby, 15 Wall. 472, 475; Basey v. the evidence at large cannot be brought up, Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670; Garsed v. Beall, as it is in cases in equity, from the circuit 92 U. S. 684, 695; Johnson v. Harmon, 94 courts of the United States, but only "a U. S. 371, 372; Watt v. Starke, 101 U. S. 247, statement of facts in the nature of a spe- 252; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420, 424; cial verdict," and rulings made at the trial, Wilson v. Riddle, 123 U. S. 608, 615, 8 Sup. and duly excepted to, on the admission or Ct. Rep. 255. The case of Basey v. Galrejection of evidence. Consequently the au-lagher, just cited, is quite analogous to the thority of this court on appeal from a terri-case at bar. In a suit brought in a district torial court is limited to determining court of the territory of Montana for an whether the court's findings of fact sup-injunction against the diversion of a runport its judgment or decree, and whether ning stream in which the plaintiff asserted there is any error in rulings duly excepted a right, by prior appropriation, for the to, on the admission or rejection of evidence, and does not extend to a consideration of the weight of evidence, or its sufficiency to support the conclusions of the court. Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610; Cannon v. Pratt, Id. 619; Neslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428; Hecht v. Boughton, 105 U. S. 235, 236; Gray v. Howe, 108 U. S. 12, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Eilers v. Boatman, 111 U. S. 356,4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 432; Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U. S. 617, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. purpose of irrigation, the court submitted specific issues to a jury, and afterwards heard the case upon the pleadings and proofs and the findings of the jury, and rendered a decree for the plaintiffs, in which it disregarded some of those findings and adopted others; and that decree was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory, and by this court on appeal, notwithstanding a provision in the statutes of that territory, similar to section 361 of the The present suit was brought to enforce Idaho Code of Civil Procedure, that in civil a mechanic's lien created by the statutes actions "an issue of fact must be tried by of the territory which authorize the court, a jury, unless a jury trial is waived." The in such a suit, to order both a sale of the action of the district court of the territory real estate that is subject to the lien and of Idaho, therefore, in setting aside the genjudgment against the owner thereof for eral verdict, and substituting its own finddeficiency in the proceeds of the sale, "in ings of fact for the special findings of the like manner and with like effect as in ac-jury, was a lawful exercise of its equitable tions for the foreclosure of mortgages." jurisdiction, the propriety of which canCode Civil Proc. Idaho, §§ 815, 826. The not be reviewed by this court; and it is relief provided for in those statutes, sought by the complaint and granted by the court, was purely equitable, and the proceeding was in the nature of a suit in equity. Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 The only other matters specified or arWall. 561; Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S. 545; gued in the brief of the appellant are two Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118, 128: exceptions to the admission or rejection of Walker v. Dreville, 12 Wall. 440; Marin v. evidence. The first exception was to the adLalley, 17 Wall. 14; rule 92 in equity. The mission of evidence, offered by the plaintiffs, district court so treated the case, as is evi- tending to show that, by the direction and dent from its having made its own findings with the consent of one Case, the defendof fact on some of the questions at issue, ant's vice-president and general manager,* and having based its decree, not upon the and under the supervision of the defendant's findings of the jury, but upon the proofs engineer, the ditch was made 10 feet wide produced at the final hearing, neither of and 3 feet deep, whereas the original conwhich would it have been authorized to tract annexed to the complaint was for a do, had the suit been in the nature of an ditch 8 feet wide and 2 feet deep. But the action at common law, the parties not supposed variance between the complaint having waived a trial by jury. Morgan v. and the proof did not exist. The comGay, 19 Wall. 81; Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. plaint did not proceed upon the written conS. 408, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Baylis v. Insur-tracts alone, but upon the defendant's acance Co., 113 U. S. 316, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; ceptance of the ditch, and the subsequent quite immaterial whether the general verdiet was consistent with the findings of the jury or with the evidence introduced at the trial. *518 settlement between the parties. And the court found, as facts, that the changes in the dimensions of the ditch were made with the knowledge and consent of Case, and before the execution of the supplemental agreement; that the ditch, when completed, was accepted by the defendant, through its general inanager, and had ever since been appropriated and used by the defendant; that the settlement between the parties was based upon estimates and measurements made by the defendant's engineer in charge of the construction of the ditch; and that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiffs in or concerning that settlement. tures vertised, with some ornament thereon, not being In error to the circuit court of the United The other exception was to the exclusion of testimony, offered by the defendant, of one Strahorn, its general manager at the "This was an action in which the writ time of the completion and acceptance of was dated April 18, 1884, brought by the the ditch, and who had previously been its Forbes Lithograph Manufacturing Comtreasurer, tending to show that at the pany, a corporation located at Boston, in time of the execution of the original con- said district, to recover back $1,081.42, the tract the plaintiffs were informed by him amount of duties alleged by them to have that Case had no authority from the de- been illegally exacted by the defendant, fendant to contract for a ditch of larger Worthington, as collector of the port of dimensions than those specified in that Boston, on certain merchandise described contract. But it was a sufficient reason in the invoice and entries as 'iron showfor excluding that testimony that the offer cards' imported by them. The pleadings was only to show that the plaintiffs were may be referred to. The plaintiffs importtold that Case had no authority to vary ed these cards into the port of Boston from the dimensions of the ditch, and was unac- Paris, in France, by different steamers from companied by any offer of evidence that Liverpool, the importations being made in Case had in fact no such authority, and at ten separate lots, and extending from Dethe time of the offer no evidence as to the cember 19, 1883, to April 2, 1884. On each actual authority of Case appears to have importation, as received, the plaintiffs paid been introduced; and the offer to prove the assessed duties under protest, and duly the information given to the plaintiffs was filed such protest with the collector, and not renewed after the court had allowed their appeal with the secretary of the treasStrahorn, against objection and exception ury. A copy of one of the protests, which by the plaintiffs, to testify that neither he may stand for all, is hereto annexed, and nor Case had any authority from the de- marked 'A,' and this action was seasonfendant's board of directors to enlarge the ably brought. The collector exacted a dimensions of the ditch, and that the board duty of forty-five per centum ad valorem had never ratified the enlargement of the (amounting in the aggregate to $2,432.62) ditch. It does not appear that the whole under the clause in Schedule C (last secevidence at the trial is recited in the state- tion) of the tariff law of March 3, 1883, ment of the case; and, if it had been, this which is as follows: 'Manufactures, articourt, as already shown, could have con- cles, or wares, not specially enumerated or sidered it for the single purpose of passing provided for in this act, composed wholly upon the exceptions taken to the admis- or in part of iron, or any other sion or rejection of parts of it, and not for metal, and whether partly or wholly manthe purpose of deciding whether the whole ufactured, forty-five per centum ad valoevidence supported the findings of the rem;' while the said importers claimed that court. The result is that the appellant has the goods were dutiable at twenty-five per not been prejudiced by the rulings and de- centum ad valorem only, (the aggregate cree below in any particular within the amounting to $1,351.20,) under the clause appellate jurisdiction of this court. Or- in Schedule M (first section) which is as dered that the record may be withdrawn follows: 'Books, pamphlets, bound or unand amended by procuring the signature bound, and all printed matter, not specialof the clerk of the supreme court of the ter-ly enumerated or provided for in this act, ritory to the certificate of authentication, and that upon the return of the record so amended the decree of that court be affirmed. (132 U. S. 655) * * • engravings, bound or unbound, etchings, illustrated books, maps, and charts, twenty-five per centum ad valorem.' The difference between the amount of said duties, at forty-five per cent. and at twenty-five per FORBES LITH. MANUF'G Co. v. WORTHING- cent., is $1.081.42, which is the amount that TON, Collector.1 (December 23, 1889.) CUSTOMS DUTIES-IRON SHOW-CARDS. Iron show or advertising cards, printed in different colors, on plates of sheet iron, from lithographic stones on hand-presses, containing generally the name of a person and of the article ad 'Affirming 25 Fed. Rep. 899. the plaintiffs claim in this case. All the goods charged with the duties were iron show-cards or advertising cards or signs. They were manufactured in Paris on orders given by the said importers to fill orders from parties here, who used them for advertising purposes, (to hang on the walls or in windows or in public places, to give to customers, etc.) The importers imported and sold them to the consumers BREWERY ESTABLISHED ROBERT SMITH'S A. D. 66 here for such advertising purposes only. | and given hereafter. The diligence of The cards were of different sizes, being on counsel has furnished us with definitions, the average about a footlong by six inches from many dictionaries and encyclopedias, wide, and contained, generally, the name of the words "print," printing," and of the person and of the article advertised, "printed matter," from which it is argued with some picture or ornament thereon,- that the essential feature of printing is not for example, as follows: the substance on which the printing is done, but the mode of making the impression. But the question here is not whether these iron show-cards, being lithographed or printed, could be styled "printed matter" within the meaning of these words as given by lexicographers, but whether they were "printed matter" as those words are used in Schedule M of the act of March 3, 1883. There was no evidence that signs of this kind were known commercially, or by printers, book-binders, dealers in books, pamphlets, or periodicals, or others, as Head of INDIA PALE ALE & BROWN STOUT, IN BOTTLE. PHILADELPHIA. U. S. A. LITH. MAX CREMITZ, PARIS. ON DRAUGHT. FORBES CO., BOSTON, SOLE AGENTS. 66 printed matter." In Arthur v. Moller, 97 "These cards were prepared in different U.S. 365, certain chromo lithographs printcolors, on plates of sheet-iron. It is agreed, ed from oil-stones upon paper were held If relevant to the issue, that the value of subject to the duty levied upon printed pathe iron plates before the printing was put per; and Mr. Justice HUNT, in delivering upon them was about two or three cents the opinion of the court, says that "the each, and that the other material of the term 'print' or 'printing' includes the most card, as material, was of like trifling value, of the forms of figures or characters or while that of the completed card or sign | representations, colored or uncolored, that was about twenty to twenty-five cents. These cards or signs were lithographed (that is to say, printed) from lithographic stones on hand-presses in the same way that lithographing is done on paper or on card-board. Samples of said cards are filed herewith, marked Exhibit B,' and may be referred to at the hearing. The case is submitted by the parties on the above, as an agreed statement of facts. If upon the foregoing facts the merchandise should have been assessed at 25 per cent., judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for $1,081.42 and costs; otherwise, for defendant for costs." may be impressed on a yielding surface;" and that "the pictures in question were printed from lithographic stones, by successive impressions, each impression giving a different portion of the view and of a different color. Like other pictures, they are made and used for the purpose of ornament. Equally with engravings, copper plates and lithographs, they are printed and properly fall within the statutory designation of 'printed matter.' If further argument were needed, it would be found, in the principle noscitur a sociis. 'Printed matter' is named in the list with engravings, maps, charts illustrated papers. With these printed pictures are naturally Undoubtedly the words Copy of the protest was attached to the statement, and samples of the cards ac-associated." companied it as exhibits. The court found" printed matter" are popularly considfor the defendant, and entered judgment accordingly, and a writ of error was sued out from this court upon exceptions to the findings and rulings. The opinion is reported in 25 Fed. Rep. 899. S. Z. Bowman, for plaintiff in error. The Attorney General, for defendant in error. Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court. We concur with the district judge in his conclusion that these iron show-cards were properly assessed as manufactures of iron, not specially enumerated or provided for in the act of March 3, 1883, and as such liable to duty under the last paragraph of Schedule C of section 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by that act, which reads: "Manufactures, articles, or wares, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, copper, lead, nickel, pewter, tin, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, or any other metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured, forty-five per centum ad valorem." 22 St. 501. This is conceded by plaintiff in error, unless the articles were dutiable as "printed matter" under the first paragraph of Schedule M of that section, (22 St. 510,) which is quoted in the statement of facts, ered as applying to paper or some similar substance commonly used to receive the impression of letters, characters, or figures by type and ink, and reference to the legislation of congress demonstrates that the phrase was used in the schedule in question in this sense. By section 18 of the act of March 2, 1861, fixing duties on imports, etc., a duty of 15 per centum ad valorem was levied " on all books, periodicals, and pamphlets, and all printed matter and illustrated books and papers." 12 St. 187. In section 94 of the act of June 30, 1864, appears this paragraph: "On all printed books, magazines, pamphlets, reviews, and all other similar printed publications, except newspapers, a duty of five per centum ad valorem." 13 St. 267. Schedule M, "Sundries," of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided: “Books, periodicals, pamphlets, blankbooks, bound or unbound, and all printed matter, engravings, bound or unbound, illustrated books and papers, and maps and charts, twenty-five per centum ad valorem." Rev. St. (2d Ed.) 474. In section 2502, tit. 33, Rev. St.. as enacted by the act of March 3, 1833, the first paragraph of the schedule headed "Schedule M, Books, Papers, Etc.," reads: "Books, pamphlets, bound or unbound, and all printed matter By 699. 109. not specially enumerated or provided for master general, the presumption was that the postin this act, engravings, bound or unbound, masters on the route had advised the department etchings, illustrated books, maps, and of the delinquency, and that an officer of the decharts, twenty-five per centum ad valo- partment had certified that the mails had been carried on the route "without any failure or delinrem." 22St. 510. And then follow nine para-quencies, so far as shown by returns received," graphs, making ten in all in this schedule, where it was not shown that the postmasters knew relating to blank-books, bound or un- of the terms of the contract and the delinquency, bound, and blank-books for press copying; and it appeared that the postmaster general repupaper, sized or glued, suitable only for print- diated the contractor's methods on being informed ing paper; printing paper, unsized, used for thereof, as the certificate indicated that the "returns received" did not show the delinquency. books and newspapers exclusively; man2. Under Rev. St. U. S. § 4057, providing that, ufactures of papers not specially enumer- "in all cases where money has been paid out of the ated; sheathing paper; paper boxes, and funds of the post-office department under the preall other fancy boxes; paper envelopes, pa- tense that service has been performed therefor, per hangings, and paper for screens or when, in fact, such service has not been perfire-boards, paper antiquarian, demy, formed," suit may be brought for its recovery, drawing, elephant, foolscap, imperial, let-money so paid out by mistake may be deducted from other money due the payee. ter, note, and all other paper not specially enumerated or provided for in the act; pulp, dried, for paper-makers' use. It is very clear that these iron signs were not dutiable under a schedule headed "Books, Papers, Etc.," and confined throughout to the subject-matter thus indicated. 66 Appeal from the court of claims. Carr filed his petition against the United States in the court of claims on the 17th of February, 1885, averring that the postmaster general entered into a contract in writing with him in April, 1878, for carry If a duty had been imposed on iron show-ing the mails of the United States from cards eo nomine, the latter would not have Salinas city, in the state of California, to been dutiable as "manufactures of iron,' Gabilan, in that state, and back from Gaany more than "braces and suspenders,' ," bilan to Salinas city, for the annual sum of though made of rubber, were dutiable as $796, a copy of which contract he attached "manufactures of rubber," (Arthur v. to his petition; that at the time of the Davies, 96 U.S. 135;) or" artificial flowers," letting of the contract, and for upwards of though made of cotton, were dutiable as four years prior thereto, the mails were manufactures of cotton," (Arthur v. carried upon the route aforesaid, outward Rheims, Id. 143.) The specific designation from Salinas to Santa Rita,*a distance of* would prevail over the general words, 3 miles, and from Santa Rita to Natividad, which otherwise embraced the article. In a distance of 4 miles, and from the lastArthur v. Jacoby, 103 U. S. 677, decorated named place to Gabilan, a distance of 8 porcelain ware being subject to one rate miles, and on the return trip direct from of duty and pictures to another, it was Gabilan to Salinas, a distance of about 10 held that where it appeared that certain miles, without passing through Natividad pictures had been painted by hand on por- and Santa Rita; that he believed that the celain, which, it was proved, "did not in mode of transportation last aforesaid was itself constitute an article of china-ware, established under the authority of the postbeing manufactured simply as a ground for master general for said route, and prothe painting, and not for any use inde-posed to carry the mails upon said route pendent of the paintings," they were taxa- for the compensation aforesaid, upon the ble as pictures, and not as decorated por-understanding that the mails were, during celain ware. The question decided, as the term of the contract, intended by said stated by Mr. Chief Justice WAITE at the close of the opinion, was that "the goods were not china-ware, but paintings." But here the articles were clearly manufactures of iron, and were not "printed matter," within the meaning of the clause relied on by the plaintiff, because those words, as there used, applied only to articles ejusdem generis with books and pamphlets, which iron show-cards were not. We find no difficulty in concluding that the case was properly decided, and the judgment is affirmed. (132 U. S. 644) proposal to be carried in the manner before stated; that he commenced service under the contract July 1, 1878, and for four years, including the 30th day of June, 1882, carried the mails six times a week from Salinas, by way of Santa Rita and Natividad, to Gabilan, and back direct from Gabilan to Salinas, by a direct line, not passing through Natividad and Santa Rita; that the compensation was paid up to January 1, 1882, but not from the 1st of January to the 1st of July, 1882; and that the postmaster general has refused to pay petitioner the sum of $398, the amount of compensation due for the period last mentioned, upon the UNITED STATES V. CARR. ground that petitioner had not performed (January 6, 1890.) his contract, inasmuch as he had not carMAIL CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION-COMPENSATION. ried the mails from Gabilan to Salinas by 1. Under a contract for carrying the mails way of Natividad and Santa Rita. Peti"from S., by St. R. and N., to G., 15 miles, and tioner further alleged that at the letting he back," the post-office department deducted part of presented proposals to the postmaster the contractor's agreed compensation, by reason general for carrying the mails upon four of his having made his return trips by another other routes for the period of four years, route than that specified Held, that a finding that namely, from July 1, 1878, to June 30, 1882, the contract was so construed by both the contract- and obtained contracts therefor at certain or and the department as to permit this, thus allowing the contractor to recover the deductions, compensation in the proposals named; could not be sustained on the grounds that, as Rev. that, from the compensation due on the lastSt. U. S. § 3849, makes it the duty of postmasters named contracts, $348.25 was withheld on to report delinquencies of contractors to the post-account of the first-named contract, and *647 ⚫646 there was also deducted from the four last | mail on route No. 46,118, from Salinas, Cal., Contracts the sum of $35.92, for certain al- by Santa Rita and Natividad, to Gabilan leged delays in the transportation of the and back, six times a week, at $796 per mail. Petitioner therefore prayed judgment year, for and during the term beginning for the sum of $782.17. The findings of fact July 1, 1878, and ending June 30, 1882; and conclusions of law are as follows: "(1) for which services, when performed, the In April, 1878, the postmaster general and said J. D. Carr, contractor, is to be paid the claimant entered into a contract to car- by the United States the sum of $796 a year, ry the mails on route No. 46,118 in the state to-wit, quarterly, in the months of Novemof California, from Salinas, by Santa Rita ber, February, May, and August, through and Natividad, to Gabilan and back, six the postmasters on the route, or otherwise, times a week, for the annual sum of $796. at the option of the postmaster general; The material portions of said contract are said pay to be subject, however, to be reset forth in finding 5. (2) The mails were duced or discontinued by the postmaster carried on said route, under said contract, general, as hereinafter stipulated, or to be for four years, commencing July 1, 1878, suspended in case of delinquency. It is and ending June 30, 1882, as follows: The hereby stipulated and agreed by the said mails were carried by the claimant from contractor and his sureties that the post-* Salinas, by way of Santa Rita and Nativi- master general may discontinue or extend dad, to Gabilan, and back to Salinas by a this contract, change the schedule and direct route from Gabilan to Salinas. The termini of the route, and alter, increase, distance from Salinas, by Santa Rita and decrease, or extend the service, in accordNatividad,to Gabilan, is 12 miles. The dis-ance with law, he allowing a pro rata intance from Gabilan to Salinas, by a direct crease of compensation for any additional route, is 10 miles. That the said route was service thereby required, or for increased operated by the claimant since the year speed, if the employment of additional 1870, the mails being always carried in the stock or carriers is rendered necessary; same manner in which the same were car- and, in case of decrease, curtailment, or ried by the claimant, namely, from Salinas, discontinuance of service, as a full indemby way of Santa Rita and Natividad, to nity to said contractor, one month's exGabilan, and from Gabilan to Salinas di- tra pay on the amount of service disrect, and, until the date of the certificate of pensed with, and a pro rata compensation inspection of the 12th of May, 1882, have for the service retained: provided, howalways been certified as duly carried, and ever, that, in case of increased expedition paid for accordingly by the post-office de- the contractor may, upon timely notice, repartment. The provisions of the contract linquish the contract. It is hereby also under which said service was performed stipulated and agreed by the said contractwere in all respects similar to the provisor and his sureties, as aforesaid, that they ions of the contract sued on. (3) For the shall forfeit-First. The pay of a trip when failure of claimant to carry the mails via it is not run, and, in addition, if no suffiSanta Rita and Natividad, as aforesaid, cient excuse for the failure is furnished, from July 1, 1878, to March 31, 1882, the an amount not more than three times the postmaster general, upon May 13, 1882, en-pay of the trip. Second. At least one-fourth tered a deduction from his compensation of the pay of the trip when the running is so of $746.25, which deduction equals one- far behind time as to fail to make connection quarter of the total compensation fixed by with a depending mail. Third. For violatthe contract for whole service under it, ing any of the foregoing provisions touchduring the period covered by the alleged ing the transmission of commercial intellidelinquency. There is no proof that any gence more rapidly than by mail; or givsubsequent failure to said date of the ing preference to passengers or freight over claimant to carry the United States mail the mail, or any portion thereof, or for leavvia Santa Rita and Natividad has ever come ing the same for their accommodation; or to the notice of the postmaster general or carrying, otherwise than in the mail, matthe post-office department. *(4) In the ad- ter which should go by mail; or transportvertisement of November 1, 1877, inviting ing persons engaged in so doing, with proposals for carrying the mails of the Unit-knowledge thereof,-a penalty equal to a ed States in certain states and territories, quarter's pay. Fourth. For violating any the postmster general invited bids for car- other provision of this contract touching rying said mails on the following route in the carriage of the mails, or the time and California, to-wit: '46,118. From Salinas, manner thereof, without a satisfactory exby Santa Rita and Natividad, to Gabilan, planation of the delinquency in due time, 15 miles and back, six times a week. Leave to the postmaster general, a penalty in his Salinas daily, except Sunday, at 1 P. M. discretion. That these forfeitures may be Arrive at Gabilan by 7 P. M. Leave Gabi- increased into penalties of a higher amount, lan daily, except Sunday, at 6 A. M. Arrive in the discretion of the postmaster general, at Salinas by 12 M. Bond required with according to the nature or frequency of bid, $1,800.' (5) 'No. 46,118. $796. This the failure and the importance of the mail: article of contract, made on the 15th of provided that, except as herein otherwise March, 1878, between the United States of specified, and except as provided by law, America, acting in this behalf by the post- no penalty shall exceed three times the pay master general, and J. D. Carr, contractor, of a trip in each case. [Duly and A. B. Jackson, of Salinas, Monterey signed, sealed, and delivered.]' (6) 'Certifi county, California, and George Pomeroy, cate of Inspection. Post-Office Depart of Salinas, Monterey county, California, as ment, Office of the Second Assistant Posthis sureties, witnesseth: That whereas J. master General, Division of Inspection, D. Carr has been accepted, according to Washington, D. C., October 23, 1878. Sir: law, as contractor for transporting the I hereby certify that the mails have been # # |